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Abstract  
This is a psychosocial research project investigating ‘national identity’ amongst 
middle class Jewish-Israelis in Britain. Its aim is to map key contents and 
highlight social categories that subjects draw on in their construction of 
‘national identity’ and to study how they negotiate these categories and 
contents when narrating a story of ‘who they are’ as Israelis in Britain.  
The first part of the thesis provides historical and theoretical background to the 
study of national identities, with a focus on Jewish-Israeli identity in the context 
of Zionism.  An empirical study is then presented, in which twelve Israelis living 
in London were interviewed in depth about their views on Israeli national 
identity, what it meant personally to them to be ‘an Israeli’, and what it meant 
to be ‘an Israeli in London’. Interviews were transcribed and a critical narrative 
approach was used to analyze the resulting texts, taking account of reflexive 
interview processes as well as exploring links with the broader cultural and 
political context.  
The findings reveal the elasticity and fluidity of ‘Israeli identity’. Subjects drew 
on a shared cultural reservoir - Zionist images, preconceptions and signifiers - 
to describe their personalized experience of belonging to or alienation from an 
acceptable notion of ‘Israeliness’ while living abroad.  
‘Israeli identity’ was constructed against stereotypical images of ‘the others’ 
which, at times, applied racist discourse. Subjects constructed ‘Israeliness’ 
differently depending on the context they referred to (e.g. Israeli or British 
society). Each context had its distinct ‘others’. Within the British context 
Israeliness was constructed against the images of ‘the local Jews’, the 
‘English’ and the ‘local Arabs and Muslims’.  
Constructing an Israeli identity was also influenced by the social position that 
subjects were implicated in, in relation to their class, ethnicity, gender, or 
occupation. This also shaped their experience of dislocation in Britain. 
Most of the participants conformed with a mainstream perspective on Israeli 
nationalism and refrained from criticizing it. This was interpreted as a discourse 
reflecting their privileged socio-cultural position in Israel and their commitment 
to a Zionist ethos which condemns emigration. Such a portrayal of Israeliness 
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both initiated and contributed to a sense of unsettledness characteristic of this 
middle-class group. Subjects moved back and forth between two identificatory 
positions (‘Ha’aretz’ and ‘Israel’) as their points of identification constantly 
changed.  The research contributes to the analysis of nationalism phenomena 
and associated concepts such as diaspora and belonging among a middle 
class group of migrants. It outlines cultural, material and political forces that 
sustain nationalism yet also demonstrates ways through which subjects 
negotiate or resist the discourses and social categories offered to them for the 
construction of a ‘national identity’.   
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Chapter one: Introduction 
Poem Without an End - Yehuda Amichai (1996) 
Inside the brand-new museum 
there’s an old synagogue. 
Inside the synagogue 
is me. 
Inside me 
my heart. 
Inside my heart 
a museum. 
Inside the museum 
a synagogue, 
inside it 
me, 
inside me 
my heart, 
inside my heart 
a museum 
 
The general aim of this thesis is to present an empirical investigation of what is 
commonly entitled ‘national identity’, to problematize this concept, put it in its 
social context, and map some of the key factors that serve individual subjects 
when making sense of it1. The title of the thesis, ‘What do we talk about when 
we talk about “national identity”’ (taken from Raymond’s Carver famous 
collection of short stories What Do We Talk About When We Talk About Love’, 
1981), points to the double meaning that ‘national identity’ may carry as a 
constructed concept (rather than an essentialist psychological entity) - i.e. what 
do we actually mean by ‘national identity’ - and as a practice - what do we 
consider relevant when we do (e.g. talk about) ‘national identity’? The study 
draws on a psychosocial theoretical approach which, as the above poem 
demonstrates, sees the social/collective (e.g. the museum/the synagogue) and 
                                            
1
 Therefore, throughout the thesis I address this term within quotation marks although in order 
to facilitate the reading I will drop these quotation marks at an early stage.  
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the private/psychological (e.g. the ‘I’/the heart) domains as inseparable, 
dependent on each other and mutually constitutive. This psychosocial study 
was conducted among Jewish-Israelis who live away from Israel, in Britain, 
and was interested in their private and collective associations of the notion of 
‘national identity’. Thus, the study brings together three main areas of 
academic interest: 1. nationalism and ‘diaspora’; 2. identities and subjectivity; 
3. qualitative empirical research in the aforementioned areas. The introduction 
will serve to locate the current research in the context of contemporary debates 
in each of these areas and will touch on my own personal engagement in it.     
1.1. Nationalism today 
In a world governed by transnational forces of globalization, massive 
population transitions, transnational projects such as the EU, technical 
innovations that facilitate data transmission across the world, all of which 
appear to erode the classic physical and identificatory nation-state boundaries, 
nationalism was portrayed by some as a thing of the past, the remnant of the 
age of modernism. In The Post-national Constellation (2001), Habermas 
makes the case for transnational forms of identity (e.g. the EU) and argues: ‘As 
nation-states increasingly lose their capacity for acting and the stability of their 
collective identities, they will find it more and more difficult to meet the need for 
self-legitimation’ (p. 110). Other social categories: gender, class, race, 
ethnicity, professional status, age etc., attract the attention of social scientists 
in western societies as ‘nationalism’ is taken as an exotic, peripheral 
phenomenon that happens ‘elsewhere’ or is relegated to the domains of the 
margins of western societies. In his influential book Banal Nationalism (1995) 
Billig warns against such an interpretation of nationalism and argues:  
This is where the accepted view becomes misleading: it overlooks the 
nationalism of the West’s nation-states. In a world of nation-states, 
nationalism cannot be confined to the peripheries. That might be 
conceded, but still it might be objected that nationalism only strikes the 
established nation-states on special occasions. Crises, such as the 
Falklands or Gulf Wars, infect a sore spot, causing bodily fevers: the 
symptoms are an inflamed rhetoric and an outbreak of ensigns. But the 
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irruption soon dies down; the temperature passes; the flags are rolled 
up; and, then, it is business as usual. (p. 5) 
Throughout the last decade such major global and local crises indeed 
demonstrated that it was too early to wish goodbye to nationalism as a 
structuring social order. The current rise of nationalist agendas and the 
tightening of western nation states can be accounted for by the 9/11 event and 
its aftermath and the rise of the ‘war on terror’ discourse (Karla, Kaur and 
Hutnyk, 2005) as well as by the 2008 global financial crash. In this context, 
immigration policies are once more tightening the physical, cultural and 
political boundaries around the nation.   
A similar pattern has occurred in Israel. In the 1990s, despite the continuous 
Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, a marked decrease in the 
hostile actions from the Palestinian population, some diplomatic advances 
towards a resolution of the Israeli Arab and Palestinian conflict (e.g. the 1993 
Oslo agreement with the Palestinians and the 1994 Jordanian Peace accord) 
and a period of relative economic prosperity in both societies seemed to 
promise the beginning of a new era, that of a ‘New Middle East’ (Peres, 1993). 
These processes of boundary lowering between Israel and its exterior and the 
economic fruits that came with it, alongside the increased socio-political and 
intellectual challenges within Israeli society towards the classical hegemonic 
Zionist national narrative2 (e.g. Shlaim, 1988, Peled, 1989) have led some to 
announce a post-Zionist (Ram, 2006) or a post-national era. Yadgar (2002) for 
example claims that there appears to be a transition from ‘the “Jewish”-
particularistic narrative to the post-national peace narrative’ (p. 69).  
And yet, the second Palestinian Intifada (uprising) (2000) following the failure 
in the peace negotiations with the Palestinians in 1999 brought about the 
intensification of the military tensions and eventually led in 2003 to the 
construction of the separation barrier between Israel and the West-Bank. Other 
military clashes, e.g. the 2006 second Israeli-Lebanese war, the 2009 ‘Cast 
Lead operation’ in Gaza and others followed. In this socio-political and cultural 
climax of re-intensification and distrust many scholars talked about the Rise 
and Fall of Post-Zionism (Livne, 2001) or of its irrelevance (Yuval-Davis, 2003).  
                                            
2
 See an elaborated discussion on Zionist ideology in chapters two and three.  
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Consequently Naveh argues: ‘many signs indicate that Israeli society is 
breaking away from the monolithic memory instilled by the canonical Jewish-
Zionist narrative, yet no other narrative has been created to replace it nor is 
there likely to be’ (2006, p. 248). First and Herman conclude that ‘in 
contradiction to Bauman’s (2000) statement that the romance between the 
state and the nation is over in the era of liquid modernity, in Israel the 
partnership between the two seems rather stable, at least as long as the 
Middle East conflict is still going on’ (2009, p. 521). The historical changes 
outlined above describe the ongoing interchange between lowered and 
heightened boundaries, between opening up to and closing down from ‘the 
others’ where ‘the nation’3 and discourses of nationalism play a major role. 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter two draws a schematic map of the 
theoretical debates on nationalism: the cultural, material, political-ideological 
and psychic forces of nationalism and the many faces it takes. Chapter three 
applies these theoretical concepts and debates to the Israeli reality and 
discusses contemporary trends in Jewish-Israeli nationalism.  
My point of departure is that nationalism in general and Israeli nationalism 
(Zionism) specifically are still very relevant in Jewish-Israelis’ contemporary 
public space where ‘national contents and symbols can still be found 
everywhere’ (First and Herman, 2009, p. 520). These notions of nationhood 
are brought by Israelis who come to live in Britain (especially those coming 
from middle class background) and take part in the construction of private 
immigration or diasporic experience.  
1.2. Diaspora   
In the past decades the concept of ‘diaspora’ has become increasingly 
relevant within academic circles and in popular discourse mainly due to the 
physical, economic, professional and cultural transitions that global capitalism 
allows and encourages. This has resulted in an expansion of diaspora’s 
traditional meaning (which Brubaker refers to as ‘The “diaspora” diaspora’, 
2005) that usually referred to Jews’ involuntary dispersion and now reflects the 
                                            
3
 Like ‘identity’ I am using quotation marks around ‘the nation’ to mark its constructability and 
its imaginative features and in order to differentiate it from an essentialist usage of the term. 
However, I will from now on drop these quotations to facilitate the reading.    
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dispersion of any collective social category (e.g. the ‘Queer Diaspora’ – Paton, 
2000) in whatever social circumstances. Its popularity among cultural theorists 
(e.g. Hall, 1990, Brah, 1996, Kaur et al 2005) stems from the political and 
cultural room it makes for hybridity, multiplicity and trans-nationality and the 
critique of stable and fixed interpretations of social categories such as 
nationality, race or ethnicity. It addresses the contemporary conditions of living 
in a rapidly changing world where physical transition brings different cultural 
and ethnic communities to live side by side in multicultural urban mega- 
centres and where notions of ‘home’ and ‘away’ can be reconsidered.   
However, while some authors prefer to look at ‘diaspora’ as a transnational 
phenomenon ‘that begin[s] with a world without borders’ (Levitt, 2010, p. 40) or  
that offers an alternative model of belonging, others (Anderson, 1998, Karla et 
al., 2005, Al-Ali, 2010) have pointed out the complicated relationship between 
diasporic communities and the local and away states where diasporas often 
play reactionary roles by accentuating (e.g. funding from afar national 
movements’ military agendas) rather than challenging nationalism. Sayad 
argues that 
In a world governed by ‘state thought’…we automatically think in 
national terms’ [which] ‘introduces that inevitable, and eminently ‘statist’ 
distinction, which is arbitrary as it is pertinent, between the national on 
the one hand, and the non-national on the other’ (2004, p. 294).   
Hence I propose to look at diaspora as a phenomenon that operates within the 
margins of the national order and which could potentially (but not necessarily) 
at times critique the territorial dimension or the attachment to a single national 
structure and imagery. ‘Diaspora’ could be thought about as a state of mind or 
as a way of consciousness (Vertovec, 1997) rather than as a settled, 
prolonged condition.  As my research will show, the perception of ‘diaspora’ is 
greatly impacted by the social and political positioning of the migrant within 
‘home’ and ‘away’ societies and its insertions into the system of cultural 
significations.    
Despite the greater legitimacy in contemporary Jewish-Israeli society of 
emigration away from Israel, this nevertheless still carries pejorative emotional 
connotations in Israeli cultural imagery. Founded on a collective narrative of 
millennia of exilic existence and non-Jewish hostility and persecution, 
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Zionism’s ideology revolves around the ‘Negation of Exile’ which depicts 
communal and private Jewish existence away from Israel as partial and 
lacking.  
Such notions of ‘diaspora’ and nationality are being imported by Israelis who 
live abroad, especially among those whose parents or grandparents emigrated 
to Israel one or two generations ago for whom transition abroad could be 
regarded as ‘the return to the diaspora’. These Jewish Israelis often make part 
of the middle class or the backbone of Israeli society. These demographical 
and biographical factors shape to a large extent the experience of migration 
and the potential integration into the local (i.e. British) host society.   
In her trilogy of video art works, And Europe Will be Stunned (2007), the 
Israeli-Dutch artist Yael Bartana toyed with the idea of the return to Europe. 
She imagines the return to Poland of 3.3 million Polish Jews (who were 
murdered in WWII) following the invitation of local Poles. Such an alternative 
narrative reverses history and reconstructs Polish and Israeli national 
narratives. While this art-work’s poignancy resides in its intentional artistic 
effort to upset basic elements of the Zionist narrative, there are contemporary 
voices within world Jewry that call for the redefinition of the Zionist notion of 
‘diaspora’, the relationship between Israel and world Jewry and accordingly 
offer alternative notions of citizenship, belonging and Jewishness (Raz-
Krakotzkin, 1994, Magid, 2006, Shneer and Aviv, 2010). Chapter four 
discusses the theoretical literature on diaspora as it is understood in British 
and Israeli societies. The current research, therefore, seeks to study the way 
Jewish-Israelis who live in Britain imagine this diasporic reality as it intersects 
with prevalent notions of nationality and diaspora in Israeli and British societies 
and potentially with alternative, counter-hegemonic models of Israeli diaspora.  
1.3. Subjectivity and Identity 
The main interest of the current thesis, however, focuses on the location of 
individual Jewish-Israeli subjects within this seemingly collective, political and 
social project of the nation and the diasporic condition. One of the areas that 
are often overlooked is the process of subjectification in relation to nationalism, 
i.e. the role that subjects play in national projects and their engagement in 
them. In chapter two I will argue that the persistence, impact and ‘stickiness’ 
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(Hook, 2008) of nationalism stems not only from economical and material 
conditions (as modernist theorists, e.g. Gellner, 1983 argue), from the ongoing 
cultural traditions and collective symbols (as ethnosymbolists, e.g. Smith, 
1991, argue) or from the political power that comes with social (e.g. national) 
projects (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985), but also from the psychic gratification 
(Zizek, 1998) it provides its individual members and the emotional attachment 
(Stavrakakis and Chyrisoloras, 2006) it is invested with in return by its 
subjects. This calls for a more psychosocial approach to nationalism that sees 
the subject and the ‘nation’, the social and the psychological as interdependent 
and mutually constitutive; two sides of the same coin. 
It has now become common among critical social theorists to conceptualize 
‘identity’ as ‘something local, fluid, unstable and contingent, made up of 
momentary stabilities that are then instantly displaced’ (Frosh and Baraitser, 
2009, p. 166). In contrast to a more essentialist, consistent and ‘internal’ 
psychological/cognitive understanding of identity, a psychosocial definition of 
identity, accentuates the process (‘identification'), the variability (‘identities’), 
and the socio-political context within which identities are formed and played 
out. The problem, however, is that such notions of fragmentation and fluidity 
contradict people’s relentless quest for consistency, stability and meaning 
(even if imaginary) which grant them a sense of control over their lives. Thus, 
while subjects are no doubt structured by the impersonal social, political and 
cultural circumstances they happen to be located in, their insertion or ‘suturing’ 
in Hall’s words into these social positions (subject positions in Foucauldian 
terms, e.g. Davies and Harré, 1990) ‘requires, not only that the subject is 
‘hailed’ but that the subject invests in the position’ (Hall, 2000, p.19). As the 
analysis of the interviews will later demonstrate, subjects indeed toil to make 
these arbitrary subject-positionings into ‘their own’ and incorporate them into 
their personal imaginary understanding of ‘who I am’. A central tool that 
subjects apply for this act of appropriation is narration. Yuval-Davis draws 
direct links between identities and narratives when she argues that: ‘Identities 
are [my emphasis] narratives, stories people tell themselves and others about 
who they are (and what they are not) but identity is fluid, always producing 
itself through the combined processes of being and becoming, belonging and 
longing to belong’ (Yuval-Davis, 2006, p. 202). In this thesis I study the 
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themes, images and concepts that are being employed by Jewish-Israeli 
subjects when performing these acts of appropriation: how they locate 
themselves within the cultural-political circumstances of the nation in a context 
of dislocation and/or emigration.  
Amichai’s opening poem describes the social (the museum and the synagogue 
and their temporal representations) and the subject (the ‘I’) as a never-ending 
chain where one never knows when representations of the ‘I’ and its body (‘the 
heart’) end and where the modern and traditional collective representations 
start. Amichai was often preoccupied with the specific location of the Jewish-
Israeli subject amidst the powerful cultural and social symbols that Israeli 
society is saturated with, as the following poem discloses:   
 
Tourists/ Yehuda Amichai (2010) 
Visits of condolence is all we get from them. 
They squat at the Holocaust Memorial, 
They put on grave faces at the Wailing Wall 
And they laugh behind heavy curtains 
In their hotels. 
They have their pictures taken 
Together with our famous dead 
At Rachel's Tomb and Herzl's Tomb 
And on Ammunition Hill. 
They weep over our sweet boys 
And lust after our tough girls 
And hang up their underwear 
To dry quickly 
In cool, blue bathrooms. 
 
Once I sat on the steps by a gate at David's Tower, 
I placed my two heavy baskets at my side. A group of tourists was 
standing around their guide and I became their target marker. "You see 
that man with the baskets? Just right of his head there's an arch from 
the Roman period. “Just right of his head". "But he's moving, he's 
moving!" 
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I said to myself: redemption will come only if their guide tells them, 
"You see that arch from the Roman period? It's not important: but next 
to it, left and down a bit, there sits a man who's bought fruit and 
vegetables for his family." 
Amichai’s poem emphasizes another dimension which is crucial, alongside 
narration and personification of the social positioning, for the construction of 
social identities: the role of the ‘other’. In the above poem, Amichai argues that 
subjectivity is determined in relation to the other and more specifically, 
according to Lacanian theorizing (e.g. Zizek, 1998), through the others’ (the 
tourists’) gaze – whether one is perceived as a subject in his own right (who 
buys fruits for his family) or as an insignificant marker of history. As I will show 
in the findings chapters (six – nine), subjects were ‘assisted’ by ‘other’ figures 
(Israelis in Israel, British Jews and non-Jews, local/British Muslims and Arabs) 
in the construction of their personal version of ‘Israeli identity’ in Britain. Both 
the force of narration and coherence and the role of the ‘other’ in the 
construction of ‘identity4’ are a central tenet of the imaginary register in 
Lacanian theorizing. While not subscribing to a psychoanalytic theory, 
Lacanian or otherwise, my research has definitely applied some Lacanian 
concepts to understand and relate to the inherent complexities and 
inconsistencies that (Israeli) ‘national identity’ construction involves both on 
private (Zizek, 1998, Stavrakakis and Chrysoloras, 2006) and collective 
(Bhabha, 1990, Said, 2003, Rose, 2005) levels.  
1.4. My personal engagement with the topic 
Amichai’s concerns around the subject and its location in culture and history 
certainly struck a personal chord. In the summer of 2006 I was living with my 
family in a small Galilean township, just south of the Lebanese border. I was 
working as a clinical psychologist at an inpatient psychiatric ward in a nearby 
hospital. Then the war broke out and our daily routine was shattered. It 
seemed like we had all been inserted into a different uncanny reality, where 
the physical scenery was familiar but its context totally unfamiliar. Like many 
other citizens in the Northern part of the country my family sought shelter in 
                                            
4
 From now on I will drop the quotation marks although the constructed features of the term are 
intended.  
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Jerusalem and I anxiously raced the deserted and bombarded roads, 
accompanied by the sounds of sirens, and occasional sounds of missiles 
between their flat in Jerusalem, our house and the hospital. Thousands of 
missiles came from the Lebanese side some hitting our town which was by 
now almost deserted. Distant towns that were previously located outside the 
range of Lebanese missiles were now hit by long-range missiles. The Israeli 
army spread its artillery units, one of them located not far away from our home, 
to launch hundreds of thousands of missiles on Lebanon. The hospital’s 
specially built huge underground spaces were now being occupied day and 
night by patients, medical staff and hundreds of civilians from the vicinity as 
sounds of explosions were heard outside.  
I was especially taken by the collective assumptions that were voiced in the 
media, in public debates and in formal governmental announcements – around 
the army’s strength, the state and its future, Hezbollah and their targets and 
the world’s hostile and hypocritical public opinion towards Israel, all of which 
were repeatedly cited and recycled, taken for granted without being given 
personal consideration. As in past military conflicts, the collective space for 
thought seemed all of a sudden increasingly limited yet I had the 
uncomfortable, ‘déjà vu’ feeling that ‘I already saw this movie’ or rather took 
part in it before. The same old sense of rage, vengeance and superiority at the 
start which would quickly turn into catastrophic visions of personal and 
collective destruction and annihilation, which was gradually replaced by 
cautious criticism of the amount of force used by the army against military and 
civilians of the enemy all of which left me with a slight sense of ‘hang-over’ and 
retrospectively, with a troubling feeling of uncertainty as to what exactly went 
on. After a ceasefire was declared following 35 days of battle, and things 
gradually went back to normal, I was struck by an inexplicable feeling of angst 
which took some time to fade. 
In retrospect, I felt a sense of disillusionment with the familiar national 
discourse not only in the way it was applied by official figures in public media 
but also as it was applied in popular discourse around me. Following the war, 
as if in a ritual, the familiar discussion of ‘who won the war’ took place, where 
mostly male army generals and military pundits would provide proof for the 
superiority or inferiority of the army’s military performance vis-à-vis Hezbollah. 
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There was no discussion of the ‘larger picture’ within which this conflict took 
place: the effects on Israeli civil society, Jews and Arabs, living in a militarized 
society where targets and goals are mainly seen through a military/security 
angle; the effects on the neighboring societies, the continuous occupation of 
Palestinian territories and the prospects of future diplomatic arrangements. It 
seemed the government was content to provide a military solution to the 
situation whereas other civil aspects of daily life were completely neglected.   
In short, I was troubled by the hegemonic militaristic narrative that was 
dominating the Jewish-Israeli public space and which I was expected to join. 
This understanding left me, however, with a sense of loss of the Grand 
Narrative, an alienation from my environment and a reluctance to participate in 
social practices and rituals. It provided me with a tangible demonstration of the 
gap between subject and society and the angst and depression that might 
accompany this realization.  
Following the war I became more attentive to the efforts of individual patients, 
especially those from social minority groups, Arabs, Druze5, immigrants, to 
construct a meaningful and positive understanding of themselves out of the 
cultural resources that the Jewish-Israeli society offers its members. I learnt 
how crucial and sometimes impossible was the task of using these socially 
acceptable ‘building materials’ to construct an acceptable and respectable 
social position within Israeli society.  
Therefore, the decision to come to Britain with my family for a PhD was not 
accidental and reflected an effort to disengage from the impact of the collective 
narrative and its discourses of nationality that circulate in every aspect of 
Jewish-Israeli society (in government policies, structure of institutions, daily 
social practices and even in the idiosyncratic contents of individual subjects’ 
self-perceptions) and study them from a distance.  
It is important to note that my interest did not stem only from a professional or 
theoretical interest in the social or political aspects of subjectivity but also from 
a deep concern for the future of Israeli society and the state of Israel 
(comprising a large minority of non-Jews – Muslim and Christian Arabs and 
various excluded Jewish groups) and its potential for growth and development 
                                            
5
 A Muslim sect that is influenced by spiritual philosophies and is scattered mainly in Israel, 
Lebanon, Jordan and Syria  
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with the hope of exploring what lies ahead and whether any transformations in 
the basic thematic logic of the collective story are at all viable. In this sense I 
felt I approached the interviews with an open mind: having certain assumptions 
about what participants might be talking about but also warmly welcoming 
alternative, novel themes. The contents and the process indeed surprised and 
intrigued me on many occasions.    
1.5. Researching identities using a psychosocial methodology    
In recent years, the psychosocial discipline was not only extensively theorized 
(e.g. Frosh, 2003, Frosh and Baraitser, 2008, Parker, 2010) as an intermediary 
space that is inseparably psychological and social at the same time but also 
discussed as an epistemological framework for conducting empirical qualitative 
research and analyzing its data (Riessman, 1993, 2008, Roseneil, 2006, Elliott 
et al, 2009, Saville-Young and Frosh, 2010).  
What is at stake in a psychosocial approach to empirical data is how to present 
the interplay of cultural and social phenomena and their political implications 
and the acts of meaning-making and appropriation that subjects engage in for 
the construction of subjectivity. Since I was interested not only in the contents 
that subjects come up with in connection to ‘an Israeli national identity’ but also 
in the work in progress of such identity construction, I chose interviews as my 
data collection method where I could follow up in vivo such acts of 
construction. Furthermore, since narration constitutes an important tool for 
subjective appropriation of the social space, I have consequently chosen 
narrative analysis as the main tool for text analysis. Nevertheless, while I draw 
on classical notions of structural narrative analysis (e.g. Labov, 1972, Gee, 
1991, 2005) to learn about the style and the techniques that subjects employ 
to create their narrative and tease out themes that lie between the lines of the 
manifest content, I have applied a critical narrative analysis (Emerson and 
Frosh, 2004) which is better couched theoretically and practically within the 
notion of the psychosocial. Such a critical approach to narrative subscribes to 
the principles of fluid and fragmented identity and highlights: a. the changing 
cultural and political context within which the narration is performed; b. the 
inevitable disruptions and interruptions of the linear narrative; c. the role that 
the ‘other’ (e.g. the interviewer) plays in the construction of the interviewee’s 
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narrative; and d. the discursive tasks that the interviewees want to achieve by 
using the specific narrative they promote. In short, my narrative outlook aims to 
study ‘national identity’ as an active, dynamic effort of the subject, negotiated 
and performed in vivo throughout the interview encounter. In this I join Hall’s 
(1994) formulation of identity which is ‘not [as] a second-order mirror held up to 
reflect what already exists, but as that form of representation which is able to 
constitute us as new kinds of subjects, and thereby enable us to discover 
places from which to speak’ (p. 402). 
Within such psychosocial research psychoanalysis has an important role to 
play. In spite of my psychoanalytic professional ‘upbringing’ I have not 
committed myself to a predominantly psychoanalytic approach because: a. it 
often assumes the predominance of the psychic over the social (as the Object-
Relations school does e.g. Segal, 1997); b. it takes for granted certain 
theoretical assumptions (about the defended subject – Hollway and Jefferson, 
2000 or the oedipal complex) that cannot always be warranted by the 
immediate interview texts; and c. it imposes a therapist-patient relationship on 
the substantially different research setting and researcher-participant 
relationship (Frosh and Baraitser, 2008). Nevertheless, as described above, a 
psychosocial critical narrative analysis does converge with certain Lacanian 
notions (e.g. about the disrupted or split subject, about identities as an 
imaginary phenomenon and about the role of ‘the other’ in the constitution of 
self/identity). In contrast to a Lacanian qualitative analysis (Parker, 2010, 
Pavon-Cuelar, 2010) which aims to reflect on subjectivity as articulated across 
the Real, Symbolic and Imaginary registers’ I have accepted ‘identities’, 
‘narrative’ and ‘nation’ as products of the social imaginary and sought to study 
them as such. The psychoanalytic influence on my research is manifested in 
the particular awareness to tensions and disruptions in subjects’ construction 
of national identities and experiences of subjectivity. I refer here to tension 
between I and not I (i.e. between the contents of identities and the contexts 
within which they are constructed); the tension between form and 
force/process (i.e. between ‘identity’ and identification); the tension between 
completeness and disruption (i.e. between a coherent and ‘accountable’ 
narrative and its confusing exceptions and disruptions) and the tensions 
between the generalized and the particular (i.e. between collective narratives 
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and private narratives). These tensions informed my reading, the analysis and 
finally the presentation of the material.  
1.6. The structure of this thesis 
Following the first three theoretical chapters on nationalism, Israeli nationalism 
and identity in an immigration context, in chapter five I describe the theoretical 
reasons for choosing critical narrative analysis as an empirical methodology. I 
discuss the practical steps I took and the dilemmas I faced when conducting 
the research. The three research questions that informed my research were:  
1. What hegemonic and counter hegemonic national narratives, themes, 
images and daily practices do Jewish-Israeli subjects draw on while making 
sense of their national identity?  
2. What are the subject-positions and underlying power relations 
implicated in these social discourses of nationality? How are practices of 
inclusion and exclusion informed and managed by this collective imaginary?    
3. How do participants negotiate or narrate these social discourses to 
accommodate them to their personal narratives of ‘who they are’?   
Chapters six to nine present the empirical findings based on the interview 
material. I have organized these findings chapters according to three main 
features that came up in the material: the application of the formal national 
narrative in the subjects’ private narrative, the position of the speaker in 
relation to the object of reference (Israeli society, local British society and the 
Israeli community in Britain) and the references to the ‘other’ as a means of 
constructing self-identity.  
In chapter six I demonstrate how subjects make use of the national narrative 
and other popular notions of the ideal nation to address the disadvantageous 
experience of living abroad and to manage the interview encounter.  
Chapter seven focuses on subjects’ construction of their Israeliness in 
reference to Israeli society and their position in it. The chapter presents some 
of the social categories along which Israeli society is stratified as subjects 
make use of these categories in order to consider their place in Israeli society. 
The tension between the subject and the social and cultural demands (which I 
have raised above) is also discussed.  
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Chapter eight presents Jewish-Israelis’ outlook on British society. Subjects 
have repeatedly used several ‘other’ figures (British Jews, the general non-
Jewish British population considered ‘indigenous’ and local Muslims and 
Arabs) as a means of differentiating themselves and articulating their 
singularity and particularity as Israelis. 
Chapter nine focuses on the ‘diasporic’ experience of living outside Israel and 
presents an outlook on the local Israeli community and highlights dilemmas 
around identity-maintenance and bringing up Israeli children in Britain. This 
chapter looks at the way a diasporic condition is being negotiated and 
understood. Categories of gender and occupation intersect with the notion of 
nationality in the construction of Israeliness abroad.  
Chapter ten discusses the findings in relation to the theoretical literature and 
raises empirical as well as theoretical aspects around the notion of national 
identity in general, Israeli national identity and more specifically Israeli national 
identity in Britain.  
1.7. Why is this research needed?  
I see a potential contribution that my study can make towards a critical reading 
(substantiated by empirical research) of hegemonic Israeli notions of ‘identity’, 
nation and ‘subject’, and to the conceptualization of the dislocated or 
‘diasporic’ condition. To start with, the notion of nationalism, as Billig’s opening 
quote discloses (1995, p. 5), is often received with suspicion and resentment 
by cultural theorists in western societies. It is my intention in this research to 
study it from a non-judgmental perspective that looks at the individual subject 
rather than at the macro social structures. Second, research on national 
identities is often conducted through a quantitative approach which is 
committed to an empiricist methodology (e.g. Auron et al, 1994, Lazar et al, 
2004). Measures of identification are generated through questionnaires and 
statistical analysis is carried out in order to determine connections between 
variables (e.g. the effects of Holocaust education on national identity, Auron et 
al, 1994). Third, although some qualitative research on Israelis’ experience 
abroad has been conducted (e.g. Hart, 2004, Gold, 2002, Floman, 2007, Lev-
Ari, 2008) they have adopted a non-critical approach to the texts generated 
and mainly focused on the manifest content, taking speech at its face value as 
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a testimony of the speaker’s ‘inner truth’ and attempting to generalize rather 
than pointing to the particular. In these analyses there was no attempt to 
contextualize the extract within the overall interview narrative and structure (as 
advocated by Gee’s structural approach), within the interviewee’s personal 
biography, the interview encounter or wider historical, political and social 
conditions in Israeli society (although Floman’s research from 2007 does make 
certain references to the speakers’ location in Israeli society). 
This research also wants to study a specific kind of migrants – those who bring 
with them social, financial and cultural capital and who, economically, fare well 
in Britain. Such groups are often overlooked in the migration literature which 
tends to focus on disadvantaged and marginalized groups.   
Following Emerson and Frosh (2004) and Riessman (2008), I am interested in 
a psychosocial reading of Israelis’ construction of Israeli identity that 
recognizes the mutual role of collective socio-political forces and their private 
interpretations. Also, while recognizing the hegemony and dominance of 
Zionist ideology in the construction of Israeli collective and private spaces, I am 
applying a critical approach that recognizes the existence of competing, 
counter-hegemonic (and in that sense ‘Post-Zionist’) outlooks and narratives 
that can offer alternative interpretations of the nation and of concepts that are 
associated with it such as citizenship, religion, Jewishness and subjectivity. 
Hence, I will point to the practical and discursive limitations (Foucault, 1974) 
that a Zionist discourse imposes on Israeli subjects who at the same time 
struggle to negotiate their subjectivity and national belonging when living 
abroad. I look at the notion of identity as a creative discursive-cultural-political 
category and at the same time highly personal and idiosyncratic where 
subjects work continuously to make sense of their social positioning and 
accommodate these into a meaningful story of who they are.    
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Chapter two: Theorizing nationalism 
2.1. Introduction  
In this opening chapter I will be presenting a schematic discussion of 
contemporary theories of nationalism with the aim of contextualizing the 
psychosocial approach of nationalism that I am applying within the theoretical 
debates and highlight relevant key concepts such as narrative, ideology and 
the links between them in the national context. Applying a psychosocial 
approach to nationalism means looking at collective symbols, images and 
signifiers, all bundled together within a narrated representation of the nation, 
as they interact with material and historical conditions and the power struggles 
between various political interest groups within a given social field. The notion 
of ‘diaspora’ will be applied as a critique of the classical perceptions of the 
nation. 
The chapter is divided into three parts: the first will present three sociological 
approaches to nationalism and the forces that drive and support it: modernism, 
primordialism and ethnosymbolism. In the second part I will be drawing on the 
ethnosymbolist approach which emphasizes the emotional impact of pre-
modern traditions and cultural symbols and look at the imaginary aspects of 
nationalism. The role of imagination within the national project is central in 
Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1991) and Bhabha’s post-
colonial reading of the nation as a disrupted imaginary notion (Narrating the 
Nation – 1990). The third part looks at nationalism as a social field where 
competing interest groups struggle for political and cultural dominance.   
2.2.  Defining nationalism 
According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary nationalism is the: ‘loyalty and 
devotion to a nation; especially: a sense of national consciousness exalting 
one nation above all others and placing primary emphasis on promotion of its 
culture and interests as opposed to those of other nations or supranational 
groups’ (‘nationalism’, n.d.). In this thesis I will use nationalism to denote a 
variety of social phenomena that revolve materially, emotionally or 
conceptually around the idea of the nation as an organizing and pivotal social 
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category. In this chapter I will mainly focus on nationalism as a collective 
project and present sociological theories. In later chapters (particularly chapter 
four – the psychosocial subject and the findings chapters), I will discuss 
national identities i.e. individual subjects’ engagement with and embeddedness 
within this social construction.  
2.3. Sociological approaches to nationalism 
Theorists of nationalism were grappling as early as the end of the nineteenth 
century (e.g. Renan, 1882 in Bhabha, 1990) to explain the conditions of its 
occurrence, its emergence and the rules that govern its performance. 
Contemporary mainstream sociological literature on nationalism can be 
roughly categorized into three approaches: modernists, primordialists and 
ethnosymbolists (see Nairn 1997, Smith 1991, and Ram 2006). Although one 
point of controversy focuses on the historical onset of nationalism as a distinct 
political structure, and on the forces that drove it, in fact, the disagreement 
revolves around: 1. the substantiality or constructability of the national group 
as an entity; 2. its external or internal contents that motivate and conduct it, 
and 3. the way it interacts with alternative social categories such as religion, 
gender, race, and ethnicity. 
2.3.1. Primordialism  
Within this discipline approaches to nationalism (Van der Berghe, 1981, Shaw 
and Wong, 1989) draw on evolutionary theories, ethnicity and family kinship 
ties to argue that group members share common ethnic, psychogenetic 
features that distinguish them from members of other national groups. They 
also argue that since belonging to the ethno-national group constitutes one of 
the essential features of human nature, many human behaviours and choices 
are determined by this collective identification which gives priority to tribal, 
primordial features such as physiognomy, traditions and territory over ‘higher’ 
civilized aspects such as citizenship or legal rules.  
2.3.2. Modernism  
Modernists contest the essentiality, innateness and historical durability of 
nationalism as presented by primordialists and see it as a modern socio-
 
33 
politically constructed phenomenon. They analyse the modern social forces 
and conditions (such as capitalism and industrialization) that emerged in the 
past three centuries, altered pre-existing forces such as religion and traditional 
social order and brought about the rise of national movements. Each theorist 
emphasizes a different historical condition as a precursor of nationalism. 
Gellner (1983) underscores the scientific and economic processes following 
industrialization; Anderson (1991) highlights the invention of print and the 
growing capitalist conditions and Breuilly (1993) focuses on the alienation 
between the absolutist rule of monarchism and civil society. They all agree, 
however, that nationalism fundamentally altered the pre-modern material, 
social and political conditions and should, therefore, be considered a 
distinctively modern socio-political phenomenon. Others analyse nationalism in 
connection to a wide variety of other social variables (globalization, pan/trans-
national projects, religion, capitalism, ethnicity, language, class and gender) in 
an attempt to understand the regularity that drives national phenomena. 
Modernists (and post-modernists) also share a view regarding the invented or 
constructed nature of collective myths and national narratives which can be 
found in many, if not all, national movements. Gellner’s assertion that 
‘nationalism is not the awakening of nation to self-consciousness: it invents 
nations where they do not exist’ (Gellner, 1964 p. 168) sums up the modernist 
approach which claims that national narratives were invented ‘beyond effective 
historical continuity’ (Hobsbawm cited in Smith, 2001 p.13) in an attempt to link 
the present with a glamorous past, and add to the national movement’s 
ancestral and ancient credentials. Billig (1995) analyses the discursive means 
by which ‘the nation’ is constructed and presented to members of a society as 
axiomatic and unquestionable through daily banal practices (e.g. selective 
media coverage, the terminology of weather forecasts, sports etc.).  
2.3.3. Criticism of the modernist approach  
While I found the modernist approach productive in moving away from the 
primordial, reductionist, essentialist and biological approaches to nationalism, 
and for pointing out other social factors relevant for the analysis of national 
phenomena, my criticism relates to its overly rational, quantitative, social-
constructivist model of analysis which emphasizes material, presumably 
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‘objective’ conditions at the expense of emotional or non-rational ones. Smith 
describes modernist approaches to nationalism as overly rational – failing to 
‘understand the global appeal of nationalism and its ability to inspire fierce 
resistance and mass self- sacrifice’ (Smith 2001 p. 26). Likewise, I argue that 
the modernist approach offers a detailed rational analysis of the structure or 
form of nationalism and how different aspects may be connected to each other 
but qualitatively ‘flattens’ the elements that drive it and give it its ‘soul’ (Renan, 
1990), ‘passion’ (Mouffe, 2001 or Rose, 2004) or ‘force’ (Stavrakakis and 
Chrysoloras, 2006). 
My second criticism towards modernist approach is that its quest for a 
comprehensive explanatory model of nationalism that draws out the elements 
that could account for the myriad of national manifestations and particularities 
(e.g. the multi-lingual/cultural/religious Swiss nationalism - see Helbling and 
Stanovic, 2011 and Kaufmann, 2011) brings about an ever-growing list of 
explanatory factors (e.g. language, territory, religion, ethnicity, race, 
geography, material conditions and political interests etc.) while ignoring the 
qualitative impact of such factors. 
Third, subjects and societies seem to cultivate a collective narrated notion or 
an image of the nation as continuous and linear which persists and even 
thrives in spite of negative material conditions or the promise for economic 
improvement (e.g. the Palestinians or the Kurds). Therefore the idea of the 
nation plays an active role in the manifestation of nationalism.  
Finally, the modernist approach ignores the reciprocal interactions between 
nationalism and material, economic and social conditions and presents it as 
uni-directional. It also ignores the role that individuals play in it as active 
members or leaders and the complicated impact that it plays on them. 
2.3.4. Ethnosymbolism  
The ethnosymbolist approach provides a third perspective on nationalism that 
offers a bridge between essentialist primordialism and modernist social 
constructivism and addresses some of the criticisms that have been pointed to 
above. According to ethnosymbolism, nationalism should also be studied as an 
emotional and mental state of mind rather than merely for its material historical 
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conditions. Smith (2001) and Hutchinson (2004) reject on the one hand the 
primordialists’ essentialist view of nations and yet insist on the importance of 
pre-modern collective features – myths and symbols of pre-nation-state groups 
(termed ‘ethnos’) - as precursors of modern nationalism thus rejecting the view 
of the nation as an invented modern political ‘tabula rasa’ whereby new 
symbols can be invented and introduced. Armstrong (cited in Smith 2001 p. 
14) suggests ‘a continuous shift between pre-modern ethnic collective 
identities with their blurred and abstract geo-political boundaries towards the 
clearly defined modern national identities’. To demonstrate, inspired by 
ethnosymbolism, a historical analysis of the Risorgimento6 emphasizes 
‘meaning, emotion and lived experience as opposed to class interests and 
structural change’ (Korner and Riall, 2009 p.398) and is interested ‘in how 
people lived the Risorgimento, how they took part in, felt about, described and 
represented these activities’ (ibid). Seen from this view-point, myths and 
narratives and the emotional effects they generate are treated as valid and 
important objects of study in their own right, rather than negligible artefacts or 
merely ‘invented’ phenomena as modernists suggest.  
Nevertheless, while helpful in curbing the over-rationality of the modernist 
approach, I find ethnosymbolism’s analysis of cultural symbols, traditions and 
practices unsatisfactory in that it fails to account for the mechanisms and 
formations through which shared symbols acquire their significance, the 
specific peculiarities of such attachments, and the way they operate and 
become significant for individuals and groups.  
In the following pages I wish to therefore focus on two bodies of not 
necessarily mutually exclusive theoretical work which highlight two aspects of 
nationalism.  Anderson’s notion of the nation as an Imagined Community and 
the psychoanalytic perspective on nationalism (which have fundamental 
differences) both highlight and emphasize the inbuilt imaginary, phantasmatic7 
aspects and therefore come closer to a psychosocial perspective. The second 
approach looks at nationalism and at the nation state as a field of socio-
political struggles. Here nationalism is analysed as a political project or 
ideology that is held in place by the continuous struggle for social and political 
                                            
6
 Resurgence – (Italian) - a period of Italian national renaissance and national unification 
7
 Throughout this thesis I will be using ‘phantasy’ rather than ‘fantasy’ to highlight its imagined 
rather than capricious or irrational aspects.  
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power. Ideology will be addressed here ‘less [as] a set of well-articulated 
political ideas or doctrines8 [but rather as] deeply resonant unconscious 
images and associations generated in everyday interactions which lead 
individuals to feel centred on others and the wider world’ (Eliot, 2009, p. 100). I 
argue that interplay between power and phantasy, ideology and imaginary 
narrative offers a better understanding of the persistence and fascination of 
nationalism while at the same time allowing a break away from both 
essentialist primordialism and the overly-rational, cause and effect modernism.  
2.4. Nationalism as an imagined community  
Although often regarded as modernist due to his insistence on the role of 
modern print as the catalyst of the national imaginary, Anderson's Imagined 
Communities introduced into academic debate on nationalism the importance 
of the psychological and social imaginary as an indispensable element 
accounting for the force and resilience of national phenomena. Anderson 
breaks away from the traditional modernist perception of the nation as 
’invented’ and claims that ‘all communities larger than primordial villages of 
face-to face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined’ (1991, p. 6) and 
demonstrated how and why an imagined community with a common cultural 
reservoir is created and shared through the mediating force of media, books or 
other means of social communication.  According to Anderson, the erosion of 
the church and monarchy’s hegemony, the rise of capitalism, secularism and 
the technological invention of print all contributed to the rise of local languages: 
‘print-capitalism gave a new fixity to language which in the long run helped to 
build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation’ (p. 
44). According to Anderson, this type of novel collective imagination - 
‘horizontal-secular traverse-time’ (p.37) - was inspired by modern 
enlightenment ideas where subjects could imagine themselves to be sharing 
common grounds with anonymous others that they have never met before and 
would have probably never meet. This collective time perception was 
qualitatively distinguishable from former forms of imagination dominated by 
ideas of religious fate or the monarchic hierarchy.  
                                            
8
 For a different, cognitive approach to ideology as a powerful set of beliefs, or a prism, that 
takes part in galvanizing a sense of national identity see Kaufmann (2008).  
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While Anderson underscores the experience of commonality at any given time 
among members of ‘the nation’, I argue that national narratives which promote 
a sense of connection among people across time and space fit well with his 
concept of the national imagined community because of their insistence on 
completeness, coherence and linearity that creates a sense of comradeship 
and links the community through a feeling of a common fate. Anderson (1991, 
p. 7) claims: ‘regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may 
prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal 
comradeship’. Other authors also address this phantasmatic, idyllic perception 
of the nation. Smith (1999) writes about the sense of entitlement and chosen-
ness that can be found in many national myths and Nairn (1997) claims that for 
the deprived communities, the small societies who could not compete with the 
stronger national forces, the ethos of the ‘ethnos offered the only way of 
ensuring such cohesion and common purpose’ (p. 66).  
However, in order to construct this sense of idyllic linearity it was crucial that 
unfavourable memories were erased from public memory. In his seminal paper 
‘What is a Nation’ Renan (1882/1990) claimed that ‘forgetting… is a crucial 
factor in the creation of a nation’ [since] ‘unity’ is always effected by means of 
brutality’ (p.11). 
Anderson’s contribution allows us not only to think about how the nation is 
experienced momentarily, but also about how this specific perception of 
collective time encourages a coherent linear narration of the nation, selective 
forgetfulness and even distorted thinking. 
Anderson locates the mechanisms that create and uphold this imagined 
community at a sub/unconscious level (‘nationalism has to be understood by 
aligning it, not with self-consciously held political ideologies but with the large 
cultural systems that preceded it, [historically] out of which as well as against 
which it came into being’ – 1991, p.12) but avoids addressing the complexities 
of that subconscious as addressed by psychoanalysis.   
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2.5. The troubled imagined community: Psychoanalysis and 
nationalism 
With the exception of Freud’s cultural papers (e.g. group psychology, 
2004/1922) and, later, the contribution of the Frankfurt school social-
psychoanalytic thinkers during the 1940s-1960s (e.g. Adorno - 1950, Marcuse, 
1955 - see Elliott, 2002) and handful of sporadic works (e.g. Segal, 1997, 
Volcan, 2002), psychoanalysis tended to analyse social phenomena as a 
reflection of intra-psychic dynamics (e.g. nationalism as a defense mechanism 
against anxiety) rather than as an independent field impacting, shaping even 
constructing  subjects’ experiences or ‘inner worlds’. However, a Lacanian 
psychoanalytically informed reference to nationalism (Bhabha, 1990, 1994, 
Zizek, 1998, Said, 2003, or Stavrakakis and Chrysoloras, 2006) resonates 
better with the psychosocial perspective I am advocating because it implicitly 
insists that the social order (as expressed in language, symbols and culture as 
well as in the image of the ‘other’) is a crucial aspect in the construction of 
subjectivity and of the subject and the ingrained ambivalence central to social 
phenomena.  
2.5.1. The libidinal nation – How the imagined community maintains its 
attraction  
Stavrakakis and Chrysoloras (2006) draw on Lacanian psychoanalysis and 
claim that in order to understand the longevity and persistence of nationalism 
one needs to apply the psychoanalytic concept of identification: the ‘bond 
between people and nation – a bond which seems to exhibit the characteristics 
of psychic investment’ (p. 147). As human subjects, we are driven by the 
constant search for an imaginary pre-symbolic experience, where we imagine 
ourselves to be at one with the perfect object, living in ultimate, limitless 
enjoyment. Once subjects enter the social world of linguistic representation 
and realize they are part of a cultural linguistic system to which everyone 
subscribes, they also enter the existential human split condition constructed on 
one hand by the social order of language, its demands and constraints and the 
demands of significant others but also constantly longing for the pre-linguistic 
‘lost Garden of Eden’ where enjoyment had no limits. Accordingly, the idea of 
the nation is sustained by a mythological narrative of a golden age where 
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things ‘were at their best’, before a rupture occurred – before ‘the immigrants 
came’, ‘the country was corrupted by capitalism’, ‘neighbouring countries are 
threatening to attack us’, ‘the youth lose their sense of identity or morality’ etc. 
What grants nationalism its magnetic force is the unconscious phantasmatic 
promise to recapture and recreate this lost and perfect era and ‘to put things 
right again’. The mere phantasy of attaining this ultimate object is enough to 
produce a sense of partial enjoyment (jouissance) and make the nation a 
perfect imaginary object of desire:  
enjoyment is kept at a ‘healthy’ distance, not too far but not too close 
either; close enough to support the appeal of an object of identification 
but far enough from letting us entertain the vision of full satisfaction as 
an imminent possibility, something that would kill desire, induce anxiety 
and put identification processes in danger’ (Stavrakakis and 
Chrysoloras 2006, p. 152).  
According to this view, ‘national solidarity is maintained through the 
ritualization of practices which offer some limited enjoyment (celebrations, 
festivals etc.) as well as through the reproduction of the myth of national 
destiny in official and non-official public discourse’ (p. 153).  
2.5.2. Bhabha and the troubled nation  
Unlike Stavrakakis and Chrysoloras who focus on the fascination of the 
national phantasm, Bhabha’s early work underscored the troubledness of such 
imagination. Bhabha’s application of Lacanian theory to understand 
nationalism, colonialism and post colonialism (1990, 1994) leads him to define 
the nation as 'an idea whose cultural compulsion lies in the impossible unity of 
the nation as a symbolic force' (Bhabha, 1990, p.1). In his book Nation and 
Narration, he looks at the contradictory and disrupted efforts to imagine the 
nation as a coherent collective story. For him, ‘the nation’ is imbued with 
ambivalence and ‘doubleness’ – the constant move back and forth between 
the phantasy of its ‘oneness’, ‘completeness’ and ‘homogeneity’ and the 
concomitant awareness of its precariousness, temporality and inconsistencies. 
Bhabha argues (1994) that although people are partly aware of the futility of 
narrating the collective past as continuous and homogenous they none-the-
less (‘quand meme’) engage in its construction as continuous and 
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homogenous. But as argued by Stavrakakis and Chrysoloras (2006), it is 
specifically this ambivalence ingrained in the idea of the nation that renders it 
its force and fascination.  
Bhabha accepts Anderson’s insistence on the centrality of the experienced 
national-time for the analysis of nationalism, but profoundly criticises his 
analysis of this homogenous time-experience and insists on its doubleness 
which renders it anxious and troubled, always alert to the inconsistencies of 
national homogeneity.  
2.5.3. The role of the ‘other’ in the construction of a troubled national 
imagination  
Some psychoanalytically informed theorists (e.g. Zizek, 1998, Rose, 2004) 
accentuate the important role of ‘the imaginary other’ in sustaining the 
phantasy of the ideal nation and repressing the acknowledgment of the split 
and lacking human condition. Here, and throughout this work, I will use ‘other’ 
to denote an image of neighbouring out-group members (e.g. minorities or 
immigrants, etc.) towards which the discharge of aggressive drives becomes 
possible (Zizek 1998). The intricate interdependence between me and not-me, 
between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ which constitute two sides of the same coin as they 
take part in the construction of (national) identities can be seen in Rose’s 
(1996, 2005) and Said’s (2003) outlook on Israeli national identity constructed 
against the image of the ‘Palestinian’ or the ‘Arab’ (see next chapter) and in 
their interpretation of Freud’s own negotiation of collective (Jewish) identity as 
presented in Moses and Monotheism (1939). Bhabha (1990, 1994) adopts the 
Lacanian view of the human split between self and ‘other’ and the construction 
of identity around this condition and adapts it to the historical condition of 
colonialism/post-colonialism and the European - non-European divide. In this 
political reality the identities of the colonizer (the ‘Other’) and the colonized (the 
‘other’) are constructed around images of the unequal, exploitative power 
relations between them. Although formal colonialism may have ceased to exist, 
its effects persist in alternative cultural, economic or political forms and still live 
in a nation’s collective imaginary or narrative.  
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2.6. Diaspora as a critical cross-national position  
It is within this theoretical discussion that the concept of ‘diaspora’ becomes 
acutely relevant as an alternative to nationalism’s narrative of one-ness and 
homogeneity and its relation to its ‘other’. If nationalism lays claim to historical 
homelands, historical linearity and communality among its members, diaspora 
resonates with trans-nationality: it inserts notions of foreignness and continuity 
across geographical spaces, the potential for geographical transitions, trans-
territorial, multiple identifications and the distinction between ‘home’ and 
‘homeland’. Diasporas fit well the contemporary post-modern and post-colonial 
conditions of economic and cultural globalization that facilitate and often 
encourage the cross-national transitions of mass populations for economic, 
professional or recreational reasons in a global society that some (e.g. 
Bauman, 2011) regard as post-national, marked with fluidity and melting social 
structures. Hence, the shift from ‘immigration studies’ to ‘diaspora studies’ 
reflects the interest in those global cultural trends (Werbner, 2002).  
According to Karla et al. (2005), the notion of ‘diaspora’ challenges the idea of 
‘the nation’ on several grounds. They argue that diaspora exposes the national 
phantasy of ‘one-nation one-people’ and forces majorities to consider and 
accept the existence of others. Diasporas also break the link that nationalism 
establishes between belonging and territory and consequently challenge the 
sacredness of territory all together: ‘many diasporic groups can be called de-
territorialized because their collective claims to an [national] identity do not 
depend upon residence on a particular plot of land’ (p. 32). Finally, they argue 
that while ‘the formation of hyphenated identities… can reinforce the sense of 
belonging on both sides of the divide... it can also result in the creation of new 
identities which have no affiliation to the nation-state form’ (p. 33). However, 
unlike Karla et al. (2005) who look at the diaspora as a competing model of 
belonging, I argue that nationalism and diaspora constitute two sides of the 
same coin as they are each defined in terms of the negation of the other. 
Diasporas do not necessarily mark a decline of the nation-state world but 
rather describes the complexities of the national order from its margins. 
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2.7. Nationalism as a site for political struggles and social inequality  
I also find it important to address the political dynamics and practices of power 
relations involved in the construction of these collective imaginations and 
forms of narration. These have been somewhat neglected in the discussion of 
the imaginative, troubled and phantasized features of ‘the nation’. Thus, I now 
wish to look at ‘the nation’ above all as a political project in the making that 
excludes, competes and struggles with alternative political projects for political, 
cultural and material supremacy (rather than articulate the idea of ‘the nation’ 
itself as a tension-laden construct). In this sense, the national imagination 
should be regarded as political since it creates tension not only around its 
boundaries – the inclusion or exclusion of its foreigners, diasporic, immigrant 
‘others‘ - but also within its boundaries, among contesting collective 
imaginations.  
Some critical social theorists, post-Marxists, feminists and post-colonial 
scholars focus on aspects of social power-dynamics and are interested in how 
alternative social categories - race, gender, class or ethnicity - are constructed 
in conjunction with national categories and discourses of nationality. They 
highlight the advantages gained by specific social groups due to the 
application of a national agenda and discourses at the expense of 
marginalized and discriminated groups such as ethnic and religious minorities, 
immigrants, refugees, women, and people from lower social classes. In his 
book Banal Nationalism, Billig (1995) sees nationalism as an ideological 
project with a seemingly coherent system of ideas that promotes a state of 
mind of ‘Us and Them’, naturalizes and essentializes the socially constructed 
category of ‘the nation’ and consequently implements acts of inclusion (of 
certain national in-group members) and exclusion (of the ‘others’). Billig 
analyses the discursive means by which ‘the nation’ is constructed and 
presented to members of a society as axiomatic and unquestionable through 
daily banal practices. Billig’s concept of the banality of daily-life nationalism 
has proved popular among researchers for tracking the mechanisms through 
which national projects throughout the world are promoted (e.g. Vidacs, 2011 – 
Cameroonian national identity promoted through discourses of sport) and 
rehearsed (First and Herman 2009 – Israeli national identity promoted through 
consumerism in times of military tension). From this critical position nationalism 
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is seen as primarily a top-down manipulative ideological tool to implement the 
sovereignty of the nation-state where subjects are duped into relationships of 
manipulation and coercion. 
Feminist critics (Yuval-Davis, 1997, Kamir, 2011) see nationalism for its male-
centric emphasis, as promoting the interests of men over women. Within the 
national order subjects are assigned specific masculine and feminine roles 
which effectively preserve masculine hegemony over femininity. These 
perpetuate inequality in financial, political and social capital between men and 
women; construct reality from a national world-view while at the same time 
closing down alternative modes of thought and being that cut across 
categories of gender, class or race.  
Butler and Spivak (2007) look at nationalism as it is promoted by national 
states, in connection to mechanisms and strategies of nation-state control (or 
violence) over its citizen and non-citizen subjects. Butler draws on works of 
political philosophy (e.g. Arendt, 1970) as part of her general interest in the 
analysis of power (e.g. 1997), ethics and citizenship (2007) and the 
relationship between the subject and the state. For her, a national ethos helps 
to maintain the state’s control over its subjects by diverting their attention away 
from their condition as members of marginalized social groups, cases of civil 
injustice or transgressions of basic human rights. 
Within this discussion it is important to note Laclau and Mouffe’s application of 
Gramsci’s ‘hegemony’ (1985) that describes the continuous struggle for 
political and social supremacy among various political-cultural groups within 
societies. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) argue that by its nature, the modern social 
field (e.g. the state) is saturated with multiple socio-political projects that 
constantly struggle for seniority or ‘hegemony’ along certain axes of conflict 
(e.g. class, ethnic background, nationality, gender or religion), characteristic of 
that historical period in that society (Filc, 2006). The hegemony of any specific 
national model/project is never completed but is rather constantly challenged 
by counter-hegemonic alternative models, each one committed to a different 
political–social discourse that makes certain economic, political and 
symbolic/cultural assumptions and serves the interests of a different group. 
Laclau and Mouffe’s analysis of the political social field describes a plurality of 
alternative political (national and non-national) projects or ideologies which are 
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the product of popular as well as elite social arrangements and it would be 
more appropriate to talk about various images and narratives of the nation 
(e.g. secular, nationalist-religious, ultra-religious, liberal etc.) and accordingly, 
about multiple discourses of nationalism that circulate within the social arena 
with one dominating and subordinating the others.  
2.8 Discussion  
The main aim of this chapter was to present a schematic mapping of theories 
on nationalism and to contextualize within it the psychosocial approach that I 
have applied. The psychosocial approach to nationalism looks at the interplay 
between historical-material conditions and nationalism’s imaginary 
interpretations, narratives and cultural symbols. It contests, on the one hand, 
the rational, social-constructivist analysis of nationalism while on the other 
hand breaks away from essentialist and primordial theories of ‘the nation’. In 
this chapter I presented various theories that address the imaginary aspects of 
nationalism, starting with the sociological ethnosymbolist approach which 
nevertheless remains insufficient in terms of the mechanisms through which 
cultural symbols acquire their significance within national movements. 
Anderson’s imagined community contributes to a psychosocial model by 
pointing to the mechanisms (e.g. the press, and the sense of anonymity) that 
promote an imaginary temporal sense (‘the horizontal-secular traverse-time’) of 
a national community. The contributions of psychoanalytic theorists help to 
further complicate and trouble the sense of collective national community by 
drawing attention to the nature of its oscillation between completeness/linearity 
and disruption/fragmentation. Bhabha argues for multiple contradictory 
temporalities and the image of the abject colonized subject which trouble the 
idea of the nation. Following Bhabha, I argued that the controversy between 
primordialists who try to provide proof of the ‘oneness’ of nations and 
modernists’ deconstruction of these essentialist units misses the point, as the 
idea of the nation is sustained specifically by the tension between a primordial 
phantasy of oneness and the rational/modernist realization of its illusion. Along 
these lines, ‘diaspora’ proves important for troubling the idea of ‘the nation’ by 
introducing notions of temporality, trans-territoriality and duality or hybridity into 
the national collective imagination. Finally, critical political theorists look at the 
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politicised or ideological facets of ‘the nation’ by examining its mechanisms of 
coercion and control, and see it as a site of conflict with alternative modes of 
social understandings, collective images and narratives. Laclau and Mouffe 
point out the chronic struggle for political and cultural hegemony among 
various social interpretations and projects. Such an approach allows us to talk 
of multiple images of the nation and alternative national narratives that 
compete side by side for political primacy. 
In the next chapter I will be applying this schematic theoretical mapping to 
contextualize Israeli nationalism and its imagination(s). This will lead me in 
chapter four to the discussion of the psychosocial Jewish-Israeli subjects and 
their insertion into the national order in the context of their life in Britain – their 
condition and experience of foreignness, immigration or diaspora on the one 
hand and notions of belonging, citizenship or nationhood, on the other hand.   
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Chapter Three: the Zionist narrative and its 
contestants in the collective Israeli 
imagination    
3.1.  Introduction  
In the previous chapter I proposed to analyse nationalism through a 
psychosocial prism which looks beyond the causality of material, political or 
economic conditions and incorporates cultural and symbolic aspects of the 
nation as cultural theorists (e.g. Bhabha, 1990, 1994 or Said, 2003) and 
ethnosymbolist sociologists (Smith, 2001) advocated. As I have argued thus 
far, the fascinating power of nationalism consists not only in its ability to 
promote a sense of 'a deep horizontal comradeship' (Anderson, 1991) and a 
'vertical comradeship across time' (Golden, 2001) that connects past, present 
and future; nationalism is also constructed around the tensions and slippages 
(Bhabha, 1990) in this narrated structure, the dynamics of inclusion and 
exclusion of its 'other' (Said, 2003) and the on-going power struggles among 
various ideological projects and their differing imagination of ‘the nation’ 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). The idea of ‘the nation’ thrives on these internal 
contradictions and tensions.  
In this chapter I will be applying this outlook to Israeli society and will study the 
Jewish-Israeli ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1991). My main argument is 
that in spite of considerable erosion in the past three decades, the mainstream 
Zionist narrative and ideology and their symbols and images ‘appear at all 
moments in the ‘circuit of culture’ model’ (First and Herman, 2009, p. 520) and 
still dominate the collective imagination in what I call the ‘Zionification of 
Israeliness’. While such wide background on the effects of Zionist ideology 
within contemporary Israeli society might appear remote from the texts of 
Israelis who negotiate their dislocation in Britain, I argued that it would be 
indispensable in order to understand the cultural context from which the 
interviewees are coming. I will first outline the historical context where political 
Zionism was incepted and demonstrate its main themes and concepts as 
manifested in Israel’s Declaration of Independence from 1948. Later I will 
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discuss the social and political, formal and informal mechanisms that promote 
it in the Israeli public space. I will then present critical approaches which open 
up the idea of the nation and reveal key concepts (e.g. religion, Judaism, 
Europeanism, social class and citizenship) and their multiple and tension-laden 
interpretations. In the context of this research of Jewish-Israelis’ national 
identities when living away from Israel, the association of ‘diaspora’ with ‘exile’ 
as a basic concept in Zionist narrative and ideology is highly significant. The 
analysis in this chapter will later serve me in the ‘Findings’ chapters to ground 
and contextualize Jewish-Israeli subjects’ personal narratives and to look at 
them as psychosocial.   
3.2. The hegemonic Zionist narrative – historical background   
The Declaration of Independence summarizes the basic principles of political 
Zionism. In the absence of a formal Israeli constitution, this declaration is still 
perceived today among the majority Zionist Jewish-Israeli public as an 
authoritative moral, political and social directive of ‘who we are’ that informs 
local perspectives on a variety of relevant topics in the public sphere. Bar-Tal 
(2007), for example, describes how the Zionist narrative constructs the 
mainstream Jewish perception of the conflict with the Palestinians.  
Here I will only present the first part of the Declaration of Independence (The 
full version could be found in Appendix 1). On 14th May 1948, on the day the 
British mandate over Palestine expired, the Jewish People’s council convened 
in Tel Aviv and made the following declaration:   
ERETZ-ISRAEL [(Hebrew) - the Land of Israel] was the birthplace of the 
Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and political identity was 
shaped. Here they first attained to statehood, created cultural values of 
national and universal significance and gave to the world the eternal 
Book of Books.  
After being forcibly exiled from their land, the people kept faith with it 
throughout their Dispersion and never ceased to pray and hope for their 
return to it and for the restoration in it of their political freedom.  
Impelled by this historic and traditional attachment, Jews strove in every 
successive generation to re-establish themselves in their ancient 
homeland. In recent decades they returned in their masses. Pioneers, 
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ma'apilim [immigrants coming to Eretz-Israel in defiance of restrictive 
legislation] and defenders, they made deserts bloom, revived the 
Hebrew language, built villages and towns, and created a thriving 
community controlling its own economy and culture, loving peace but 
knowing how to defend itself, bringing the blessings of progress to all 
the country's inhabitants, and aspiring towards independent 
nationhood…. 
The declaration was made up of two parts: the first, part of which was cited 
above, offers a colourful narrative that links, as narratives do, dramatic 
milestones in the history of the Jewish nation (the glorious biblical past through 
the hardship of exilic conditions culminating with the return to the Jews’ 
homeland and the establishment of a Jewish state in the historical Biblical 
Eretz-Israel/Palestine) to create a linear story of an ancient past, a troubled 
reality and a promise for an amended future. The establishment of the Jewish 
state of Israel is presented as the natural outcome of this unquestionable 
Jewish history.  
The second part of the declaration (see appendix 1), opens with 
‘accordingly’… [We]  ‘hereby declare the establishment of a Jewish state in 
Eretz-Israel, to be known as the State of Israel’. It draws on this historical 
narrative that was described above and outlines its socio-political and ethical 
implications regarding internal affairs and the citizens of the state, the Jewish 
immigrants (‘Olim’), the international community, the neighbouring Arab 
countries and the Jewish diaspora.    
The Israeli Declaration of Independence provides a convincing example of how 
a national narrative (dotted with significant symbols and images – ‘birthplace’, 
‘homeland’, ‘exile’, ‘political freedom’, ‘national rebirth’) has political 
implications as it is matched with an ideological agenda that determines state 
practices, policies towards in-group and out-group subjects and forms of 
governance. As argued in the previous chapter (e.g. Bhabha, 1994), narratives 
are never a-political and ideologies often have implicit narratives that support 
them and the boundaries between the two are blurred.  
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3.3.  Historical context - Zionism’s task to resolve the ‘Jewish problem’  
Political Zionism emerged in the political-cultural context of growing 
nationalism in Mid-Eastern Europe during the late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century around the need to address the ‘Jewish problem’, namely the 
chronic material, political and social conditions of exclusion and often physical 
persecution that Jews, above all in Mid-Eastern Europe, were subjected to 
officially and unofficially by the non-Jewish local population and its 
establishments. While some Jewish groups (e.g. the ‘Bund’ – a Jewish workers 
union) were struggling to facilitate the integration of Jews within local societies, 
Zionism proposed to resolve this exclusionary condition by constituting a 
separate political Jewish entity away from Europe. In the seventh Zionist 
congress (1905), it was finally concluded to form this entity in Eretz-
Israel/Palestine. Through this innovative project, Zionism promised to renew 
every aspect of the old communal and private Jewish life. The ideological 
struggle between political nationalist Zionism and other contesting anti-
nationalist Jewish ideologies: the socialists (The Bund), the cultural Zionists 
(Buber, Arendt) or the ultra-religious (see Magid, 2006) each promoting a 
different sense of Jewish communal and private life, diminished dramatically 
following the destruction of the Jewish communities in Europe during WWII 
and the declaration of the State of Israel. These historical events, argues Ram 
(2006), were taken as a convincing validation of political Zionism, its narrative 
and ideology and secured its hegemony within Israeli society and the Jewish 
world. The end of the British mandate in Palestine and the Jewish Declaration 
of Independence resulted in the eruption of the 1948 war between Jews and 
Arabs. Waves of Jewish immigrants, mostly from post-war Europe and later 
(during the 50s through 60s) from Arab countries, have changed dramatically 
the population’s ethnic make-up from a Jewish minority to a considerable 
Jewish majority. Such demographic change was also brought about by the 
fleeing, displacement and active expulsion (Pappe, 1997) during and following 
the 1948 war of local Palestinian inhabitants estimated at around 700,000 
(Morris, 1988), which is also known today as the Nakba9. Following the 1967 
                                            
9
 The Nakba – ‘the catastrophe’ or ‘disaster’, in Arabic. Throughout the work it became clear 
how different concepts are socially constructed rather than factual or objective. The Jewish-
Israeli milieu where I grew up determines specific ways how history is told and understood and 
instructs how to use concepts such as ‘war’, ‘immigrant’, ‘refugee’, ‘homeland’, ‘soldier’, 
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‘six-days’ war, Israel annexed the Palestinian West-Bank and the Gaza ‘strip’ 
and allowed and encouraged Jewish-Israeli civilians – Mitanhlim (‘settlers’) – to 
live there10.   
3.4. The Zionist imagination and its basic ideological assumptions  
According to Ram (2006), two important ideological concepts emerge from this 
narrative as reflected in the Declaration of Independence and form the 
foundations of the Zionist ideology: ‘the Negation of Exile’ (Shlilat Hagalut) and 
‘the ingathering of the Jewish diaspora’ (Kibbutz Galuyot); both are required in 
order to convince Jews to immigrate to Israel. The ‘Negation of Exile’ depicts 
Jewish private and collective existence in the diaspora as temporary and 
deficient. This ideological claim was supported by the spiritual yearning to 
'return to Jerusalem' articulated in religious scripts (although the signifiers 
'Israel', ‘Zion’ or 'Jerusalem' could be interpreted symbolically and 
metaphorically and not necessarily concretely or politically). According to Raz-
Krakotzkin (1994), the ‘Negation of Exile’ is the very essence of Zionism and 
its main rationale. The ‘ingathering of the Jewish diaspora’ sees the dispersion 
of Jews in different locations as lacking and calls for their gathering in Israel.  
According to Ram (2006), with the establishment of a growing Jewish 
community in Eretz-Israel/Palestine, the Zionist narrative insisted on Jews’ 
exclusive rights over ‘their’ biblical territory and the marginalization of its local 
non-Jewish/Arab inhabitants. 
The portrayal of the Jewish diaspora as deficient and exilic was contrasted with 
the merits of life in the Jewish ancient homeland. The Zionist Jews re-
instituting their ancient traditions in their biblical homeland were termed ‘the 
                                                                                                                              
‘terrorist’, ‘Israel ’or ‘Palestine’. Within this context the displacement of 700,000 Palestinians is 
perceived as an inevitable outcome of the war of independence or ‘a catastrophe from their 
point of view’ (Azoulay, 2009). Any other reading that acknowledges the suffering of the 
Palestinians is perceived as endangering the Zionist project. For criticism of the hegemonic 
national narrative and its usage of specific concepts see next section. 
10 In the Jewish-Israeli jargon there is a tendency to see the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a 
part of a larger Israeli-Arab conflict which in turn is seen as a part of an even broader (Jewish) 
Israeli-Muslim conflict all of which often come under the vague heading of the ‘the conflict’ 
(Bar-Tal, 2007). This contributes to a lack of distinction between ‘Palestinian’, ‘Muslim’ and 
‘Arab’, which are often used interchangeably to refer to a vague ‘enemy’ or a source of threat. 
Bundling these group members together and portraying them as part of a huge (and therefore 
threatening) crowd serves Jewish-Israelis to de-humanize individual subjects (e.g. 
Palestinians) and relieve the Israeli responsibility for its aggression and the territorial 
consequences of the long-lasting conflict between the two groups.  
      
 
51 
New Jews’ and were expected to be freed from the social and psychological 
maladies of the old Jewish diasporic existence. According to Sasson-Levi 
(2006), the New Jew is encapsulated in two idyllic images – the ‘Warrior’-
soldier and ‘the Pioneer’-settler whose merits, different from the Zionist image 
of their diasporic forefathers, are described in the Declaration of Independence 
(those who ‘made deserts bloom’, ‘love peace but know[ing] how to defend 
themselves’). Although these images have been transformed over time in 
response to socio-political changes, they are still seen as the ideological 
cornerstones of Zionist ideology (First and Herman, 2009) to which the majority 
of Israeli Jews subscribe. According to Raz-Krakotzkin (2007), the appeal of 
Jewish West-Bank religious-nationalists among the Jewish Israeli public could 
be ascribed to this image of the romantic pioneer whereas the army and the 
image of the soldier enjoys unconditional support by the vast majority of 
Jewish-Israelis (Sasson-Levi, 2006). Researchers have demonstrated how the 
hegemonic national narrative and its ideology are continuously constructed 
and maintained through formal institutional and informal (banal) and popular 
daily practices (Billig, 1995) where selective memory and forgetfulness 
(Renan, 1882/1990) are applied. This includes portraying the settlement 
project, the land confiscations and human right violations in the West Bank as 
part of the national security interests within the ethos of the struggling state of 
Israel (Ram, 2006, Sand, 2008).  
3.5.  Formal and informal mechanisms for maintaining the Zionist 
narrative  
3.5.1. State education  
The state education system provides the platform upon which the national 
narrative and its themes can be efficiently communicated to, but also 
negotiated by, pupils and staff (Lomsky-Feder, 2011). According to Ram 
(2006), after the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, official efforts 
were made to secure and ground the aforementioned narrative.  
Indeed, Said (2003) noted that the vast archaeological excavations conducted 
by Israeli governments are strategically destined to provide scientific proof of 
the continuity of Jewish life in ancient Palestine/Israel and justify its 
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sovereignty while downplaying the legitimacy of the territorial Palestinian 
claims by undermining their historical heritage. 
Naveh (2006) follows the debates around Israeli school history curricula during 
the last decades and notes that in spite of a gradual liberalization in school 
curricula and an inclusion of a wider range of global events which do not focus 
specifically on Israel, the new curriculum ‘retained elements of the national 
ethnocentric orientation’ (p. 263). Alternative history curricula that addressed 
the conditions of Palestinian Arabs in Israel and outside it during and after the 
1948 war were shelved.  
3.5.2.  Practices of mourning  
Ben Amos and Bet-El (1999) argue, that juxtaposing specific collective 
commemorative events in school ceremonies - the destruction of exilic Jewish 
communities (Holocaust Memorial Day), the fight for freedom and liberation 
(the fallen soldiers Commemoration day) and the victorious period of 
redemption (Independence Day) affirms the classical Zionist narrative. The 
same authors also noted that in spite of growing freedom granted to teachers 
as to how to conduct the ceremonies, there appears to be a tendency to stick 
to the classical Zionist narrative of national redemption described above. 
Lomsky-Feder (2011) concluded that while the majority of high schools stick to 
the classical narrative of heroic nationalism, hailing the self- sacrifice and 
bravery of the fallen soldiers, some Israeli high schools seem to break away 
from the classical narrative by adopting a narrative of victimhood that focuses 
on the sacrifice of the individual soldier. Both narratives, however, work within 
the consensus of the classical Zionist narrative which insists that wars are 
inevitable.  
3.5.3.  The army as a socializing agent  
Many researchers (e.g. Sasson-Levi 2006, Ben-Eliezer 2007) demonstrate the 
numerous ways by which the army and, consequently, the soldier figure that it 
promotes, are kept at the axis of Israeli society through the state education 
system, government funding, the public media and other channels. I argue that 
the appeal of the army and of the soldiers lies with the central role they play in 
the Zionist social imaginary as a ‘testament’ to the success of the Zionist 
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revolution in transforming the ‘Old, passive exilic Jew’ into a ‘new and strong 
Israeli-Jew’. A more elaborate discussion of the militarization of Israeli society 
will be presented later. 
3.5.4.  Promoting Zionism through consumerism  
First and Herman (2009) study the portrayal of important figures in Israeli 
history and the texts that describe their achievements as they appeared on a 
brand of sugar sachets distributed in Israeli cafes during the second 
Palestinian Intifada (2000). They conclude that in order to 'heal' itself in times 
of heightened anxiety and ideological crisis, the product reproduced images 
that are associated with the nations’ ‘golden age’ following the establishment 
of the state, emphasizing a sense of homogeneity, creativity, innovation and 
national cohesion. The figures that were chosen appeared to prioritise the 
image of the idealistic ‘New-Israeli Jew' - 'the warrior' and the 'Pioneer' over 
those whose contribution was educational, economic or cultural and avoided 
altogether controversial figures who fall outside the Zionist mainstream 
consensus. Likewise, Arabs, women, religious and Mizrahi Jews11 were 
predominately absent. The authors conclude that rather than innovating the 
collective representation, popular culture expressed in consumerism exposes 
‘the prejudices, stereotypes and rules of inclusion and exclusion that in “high” 
culture are often hidden in a sophisticated manner’ (2009, p. 506).  
3.5.5.  Immigration policies and attitudes towards emigration 
Over the years Israeli governments have strongly encouraged Jewish 
immigration (Aliya) to Israel and, with the Law of Return of 1951, granted the 
legal right to Israeli citizenship to any Jew (any person whose mother is 
Jewish, according to the orthodox rabbinical authorities) who wished to come 
(Lahav and Arian, 1999)12. They also offer generous financial assistance to 
immigrants and Israeli returnees.  
On the other hand, emigration was heavily stigmatized. Accordingly, in 
Hebrew, immigration to Israel is termed ‘ascent’ (‘Aliya’) whereas emigration 
                                            
11
 Jews who originated from Arab countries 
12
 The 1970 amendment to the Law of Return states that not only the Jew his/herself but also 
their spouse, the child or a grandchild of a Jew and their spouses, even if not Jewish, are also 
entitled to come to Israel under the Law of Return and can claim citizenship.  
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from Israel is coined ‘descent’ (Yerida). Although there is a decline in their 
popular usage these words still convey the Zionist spirit that distinguishes 
between the moral, spiritual and collective merits of living in Israel from those 
of living away from it.  
It is estimated that about 9% of Israel’s Jewish population (around 540,000) 
has emigrated and settled abroad (Della Pergola, 2012). Along the same lines 
that portray Jewish immigrants as Jewish ideologues returning to their old 
homeland (Golden, 2001), Israelis who leave Israel were seen in popular 
culture as Yordim – deserters who prioritize their personal self-interests over 
those of the national group. During the 1970’s, the then Prime Minister Yitzhak 
Rabin referred to Israeli emigrants as ‘the fallen among the weaklings’ (Gold, 
2004, Lahav and Arian, 1999). Since Zionism promised to create a new breed 
of physically and mentally strong Jews, those who chose to leave 
demonstrated their weakness and inability to endure the struggle of life and to 
fulfil the legacy of the New Jew. 
During the 1990’s in a period of relative security, economic improvement and a 
growth in professional opportunities abroad, emigration from Israel was 
countered through an intensification of school curricula promoting Zionist ethos 
and ideals prior to the military service (Lahav and Arian, 1999).  
Since the 90’s the state’s attitude towards Israeli emigrants has changed 
somewhat. This was a result of an amelioration of the security and economic 
conditions in Israel and the recognition in the émigrés’ strong emotional 
attachment to the Israeli state (Gold, 2002, Lahav and Arian, 1999). Surveys 
among Jewish Israelis in Israel showed that public opinion no longer 
associated the resilience of the state with a continuous inflow of new Jewish 
immigrants. Nevertheless, despite the lessening in stigmatized labelling, many 
scholars agree (Gold, 2002, Lahav and Arian, 1999, Cohen, 2005) that self-
images of the Jewish-Israeli diaspora (and those of the non-Israeli Jewish 
diasporas - Magid, 2006) are still organized to a large extent around the Zionist 
ethos of the Jewish ingathering and the negation of the Exile.  
The continuous stigmatization of the diaspora and the ‘Zionification’ of 
Israeliness can be demonstrated by reference to a campaign launched in 2011 
by the Israeli Ministry of Absorption (which is charged with absorbing and 
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integrating immigrants to Israel)13 that was launched in September  2011 and 
called for Israelis who live abroad to return to Israel. The campaign was 
entitled ‘They will always remain Israelis. Their children will not’. Analysing the 
images and messages used in the clips provided me with further 
understandings of the main features that construct ‘Israeliness’ in the Jewish-
Israeli imaginary and draw the lines around the Israeli and its other - the 
diasporic Jew and the non-Jew. The clips communicated the message that 
specific practices – the usage of Hebrew (rather than English), religious 
traditions (celebrating Hanukkah rather than Christmas) and cultural/historical 
practices (commemorating the day of the Fallen Soldiers) make up the core of 
Israeli identity and that those who do not practice them (the immigrants' 
children) will not be regarded as Israelis. The campaign also argued that since 
these practices are more likely to be observed in Israel, Israeliness is therefore 
bound to be lost in the diaspora. The campaign excludes other ways of 
constructing Israeliness and being part of it and undermines the ability to 
construct it elsewhere. It re-emphasizes the perception of the Jewish diaspora 
as deficient in promoting and sustaining the continuation of Jewish and Israeli 
identity. Another governmental campaign reported by Shneer and Aviv (2010) 
casts the Jewish diaspora as potentially harmful for the continuation of the 
Jewish people due to the high rate of intermarriages and assimilation among 
diaspora Jews.  
3.6.  Contesting the national narrative – critical approaches to Israeli 
nationalism 
3.6.1. An overview 
The following critical literature review disturbs axiomatic concepts, images and 
assumptions prevalent in Israeli society by pointing to the tensions and 
inconsistencies that infiltrate the seemingly coherent and homogenous 
collective narrative. As will be discussed later, the approaches certainly 
overlap but for didactic reasons I will present them separately for their specific 
troubling of the hegemonic Zionist ideology and narrative.  
                                            
13
 Unfortunately the Ministry of Absorption’s video clips are no longer accessible, but they can 
be watched on various blogs e.g. http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-
blogs/weird-wide-web/israeli-expat-ad-dont-date-americans#1  
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Following the opening up of the national archive at the beginning of the 80's 
and gradual changes within Israeli society (growing individualism, the 
lessening of the military threat) and its opening up to a globalized world, the 
hegemonic Zionist narrative and ideology was challenged by a group of 
academics known as ‘the New Historians’ (e.g. Morris, 1988, Shlaim, 1988, 
Shafir, 1989). Their critical work disrupted Israel’s formal narrative regarding 
the events before, during and after the 1948 war. According to Bronner (2003) 
rather than a David-and-Goliath tale of outnumbered idealists [the Israeli 
‘New Historians’ claimed that] the story of Israel's triumphs was both 
more explicable and less heroic [they] shifted the focus of historical 
inquiry away from the wonder of Jewish national rebirth to military and 
diplomatic manoeuvrings on the one hand and Palestinian suffering on 
the other’ (Bronner, The New York Times, 2003).  
For example, a historical analysis of the demographic conditions during the 
first waves of Jewish immigration to the region falsified the Zionist portrayal of 
Jews as ‘a people without a land coming to a land without people’ (Shafir, 
1996).  
Academics from other disciplines followed, challenging other aspects of the 
taken-for–granted Zionist imagination and ideology. Some of the criticisms 
challenged the historical validity of the Zionist narrative (Sand, 2008), the role 
of the army in Israeli society (Kimmerling, 2001), the ethnic social stratification 
(Yona and Shenhav, 2005), gender relations, (Sasson-Levi, 2006 Kamir, 2011, 
Amir, 1995), the overall absorption of Jewish immigrants (Golden, 2001) and 
that of Jews coming from Arab countries more specifically (Shohat, 1991), 
Judaism and religion (Raz-Krakotzkin 1994) or the relationship with the Jewish 
diaspora (Magid, 2006).  
Other criticisms emerge from world Jewry outside Israeli society and reflect 
both a critical Jewish non-Zionist tradition towards political Zionism (Butler, 
2011) and its interpretation of Judaism, as well as strong condemnation with 
the current ethnocentric and militaristic state policies regarding the Israeli-
Palestinian and Israeli-Arab conflict (Rose, 1996, Butler, 2011) and Zionism's 
attitude towards the Jewish diaspora (Magid, 2006, Shneer and Aviv, 2010).  
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3.6.2.  The tension between the European and the non-European 
The Ashkenazi (European)/Mizrahi (Arab/non-European) divide is one of the 
main schisms (alongside the religious/secular, Jewish/Arab, the 
veteran/immigrant and gender divides) that run through Israeli society since 
the mass immigration of Asian/North-African Jews in the late 1940s-early 60s 
tilted the demographical balance that was until then predominately Ashkenazi. 
Yonah and Saporta (2002) argue that various sociological scales demonstrate 
the continuous socio-economic advantages of Ashkenazi over Mizrahi Jews in 
contemporary Israeli society. For example, they argue that the state 
educational system enhances this social divide by directing Mizrahi pupils to 
lower vocational programmes.   
Reinhartz and Shavit (2010) explain this preference by the historical context of 
the emerging Zionist movement. They argue that Zionism emerged in the 
socio-political climate of the end of 19th century Mid-eastern Europe, 
addressed the problems of the Jewish communities in these regions and was 
therefore inevitably a European-Jewish movement committed to an imaginary 
European-Jewish habitus – i.e. to ideas of enlightenment, nationalism and the 
decline of religion. However, post-colonial researchers (such as Shohat, 2001, 
Raz-Krakotzkin, 1994 and Yona and Shenhav, 2005) draw on Said’s 
Orientalism (1978) and argue that Zionism’s insistence on Europeanism should 
be understood within the identity politics of the growing local European 
nationalism and colonialism where the Jew was excluded as the European’s 
internal ‘other’ - the Semite or as ‘the non-European’. They argue that Zionism 
was driven by the promise to resolve this identity crisis by constructing a 
European ‘New Jew’ away from its adversarial environment and thus retain 
both its Jewishness as well as its Europeanism. According to Raz-Krakotzkin, 
(2007), within such a Zionist project, the Israeli ‘New Jew’ was destined to be 
the amended ‘European-Jew', synonymous with 'modern', 'secular' and 
‘enlightened’. All aspects associated with the previously excluded Jewish 
other: the 'oriental/Arab Semite', ‘the religious', or 'the traditional' were 
marginalized and excluded.  
The Post-colonial critics mentioned above claim that this distinction between 
the European and the non-European other was imported by the Zionist 
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movement and now constitutes one of the foundational principles of the Israeli 
politics of identities. Shohat argues that   
the dominant discourse of Euro-Israeli policy makers and scholars has 
suggested that Asian and African Jews—not unlike the Palestinian 
population—originate from ‘primitive,’ ‘backward,’ ‘underdeveloped,’ 
‘premodern’ societies and therefore, unlike Ashkenazim, require 
modernization (2003, p. 63).  
In agreement with Bhabha’s arguments (1990), Shohat (2003) claims that 
Zionist writings made great efforts to normalize not simply ‘the Jew’ but 
also the very discourses that redefined the multitude of Jewish 
communities and the Jewish nation’… ‘the meta-narrative of the nation 
constructed one official past while simultaneously destroying other 
perspectives on that narrative. Non-canonical memories have been 
suppressed while previous affiliations have been severed’ (p.59).  
Finally, according to Azoulay and Ofir (2002), Israel and Zionism encapsulates 
Jews’ traumatic and exclusionary European history and comprises Europe’s 
‘unwanted remains’ - ‘a perfect example of European Orientalism that appears 
suddenly in the Orient itself’…‘the imagined encounter with the Orient that 
Europe always phantasized with anxiety and desire’ [p. 195, my translation].  
3.6.3.  The concept of Exile and the tension between secularism, 
nationalism and religion  
In The Question of Zion (2005), Rose analyses the emergence of modern 
Zionist nationalism as a product of the theological crisis within Judaism 
regarding the concepts of exile (Galut) and redemption (Geula). She sees 
Zionism, like previous messianic Jewish movements (e.g. the Shabbatean sect 
in the 17th century), as imbued with messianism in their task to resolve the 
material and spiritual burden of Jewish exile. According to Rose, Jewish 
redemption – the reconstitution of a Jewish kingdom in biblical Israel – always 
existed in Jewish religious practices and beliefs, but was restricted to its 
potential, imaginary, spiritual mode due to physical and political, but also 
theological constraints. Once the socio-political and psychological conditions 
within the Jewish group and surrounding it were ripe, Zionism transgressed 
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this exilic potentiality and concretely materialized these phantasies. The 
material and psychological consequences of transgressing this boundary 
proved to be disastrous in Rose’s view for both Jews and Palestinians and 
culminated in institutionalized violence against Palestinians, confiscating lands 
and acting to drive non-Jews out of the old promised Jewish land. Raz-
Krakotzkin (2005) also argues that although Zionism presents itself as a 
secular Jewish movement, religious elements have always driven its self-
conceptions (e.g. the national flag as based on a Talith - a religious item worn 
during prayers), its understandings of its non-Jewish ‘others’ and the state 
policies. He therefore argues (2005) that the Israeli-Zionist concept of ‘secular’ 
differs considerably from its European, libertarian, a-national and non-religious 
meaning. However, Raz-Krakotzkin sees this theological crisis between the 
secular and the religious in Judaism as a by-product of European nationalism 
driven by modernist enlightenment and its value system. Zionist secularism 
could therefore be summarized as follows: ‘There is no God but he promised 
us Eretz-Israel’ (Raz-Krakotzkin, 2005) which is to be distinguished from the 
Zionist religious-nationalists who argue that ‘There is God and he promised us 
Eretz-Israel’. Indeed, as a self-proclaimed enlightened, nationalist, modern 
ideology, the Zionist narrative described in the Declaration of Independence 
masks any reference to Jewish religious traditions which have always played a 
major part in the pre-national, religious Jewish communities.  
Rose’s views subscribe above all to a psychoanalytic reading of nationalism 
(as articulated earlier by Stavrakakis and Chrysoloras, 2006). She sees the 
messianic tendencies of Zionism in its attempts to transgress the split Jewish 
condition of ‘homelessness’ or ‘Exile’ and in its promise to reinstitute the 
glorious, homogenous, pre-split/pre-exilic state of Jewish sovereignty in its 
biblical homeland. However, Jews’ exilic condition was displaced onto the 
Palestinians ‘not just by oversight or brutal self-realizing intention but as if it 
had symptomatically to engender within its own boundaries the founding 
condition from which it had fled’ (Rose, 1996, p. 15). Zionism’s engagement 
with the Jewish condition of Exile and its ‘otherness’ has been raised by other 
critics of political Zionism, such as Butler (2011), who argues that Jewishness 
is specifically constructed around its minority status and cohabitation with a 
majority ‘Other’. These material conditions have brought about an ethical 
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condition which acknowledges the subject’s fragmented nature. According to 
Butler, Zionism constitutes a fundamental material and psychological 
transgression as it seeks to disengage from the understanding of the 
precariousness of human and Jewish conditions and therefore betrays its 
Jewishness.  
The Zionist insistence on the Negation of Exile has implications for the 
perception of Israeli immigration to this diaspora and of Jewish diaspora in 
general. Magid  (2006) argues that Zionism’s perception of the diaspora that 
dichotomises between centre/periphery, Geula/Galut, or home/homelessness 
‘contribute[s] to a virtual identity crisis among many diaspora Jews’ (p. 197);  
Shneer and Aviv (2010) document the growing discontent among diasporic 
Jewish communities concerning the portrayal of private and collective 
existence as lacking and 'exilic'. Like Rose and Butler, they argue that Zionism 
over-wrote the traditional Jewish meaning of 'Exile', which shaped Jews as 
‘rooted cosmopolitans’ who managed a creative tension between permanence 
and transition, and infused it with pejorative interpretation.   
3.6.4.  Zionism as male-centric: Militarism and gender relations in Israeli 
society 
According to Sasson-Levi (2006) and other feminist scholars (Kamir, 2011, 
Kuntsman, 2008), the militarization of Israeli society described previously 
means, above all, its masculinisation. The Zionist promise to revise the old, 
passive and helpless Jew by creating ‘a breed’ of New Jews addressed 
specifically the identity crisis of diasporic Jewish males who were perceived as 
effeminate in popular non-Jewish representation (Boyarin 1997 in Sasson-Levi 
2006). This image was adopted by Jewish males through the mechanisms 
described in other post-colonial literature (e.g. Fanon, 1967). Sasson-Levi cites 
Max Nordau's 1900 article entitled ‘Judaism of muscles’ where he calls for a 
renaissance of the glorious history of the robust and sturdy biblical Jew. 
Zrubabel (1995) shows how the Masada myth (which praises Jewish rebels’ 
decision to commit suicide and die free rather than be captured by their 
Roman foes) with its militaristic and tragic morals was selectively chosen to 
become the symbol of the Zionist national narrative. The alternative ‘Yavneh’ 
myth (where an important Jewish scholar was smuggled out of besieged 
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Jerusalem so he could found a Jewish spiritual centre in Yavneh under Roman 
rule) which stresses contesting values - preserving one's life and prioritising 
spiritual over military life - was downplayed by institutional Zionism.  
Consequently, researchers (e.g. Sasson-Levi, 2006, Ben-Eliezer, 2007, 
Kimmerling, 2001) demonstrate the numerous ways by which the army and the 
soldier figure are kept at the centre of Israeli imagination and formal and 
informal practices through the state’s education system, government funding, 
the public media, etc., and contribute to what Kimmerling (2001) calls 
militarized Israeli society. Recently, a newspaper article published the Ministry 
of Education’s plan to distribute government funding among secondary schools 
according to their pupils’ rate of army recruitment and participation in civil 
service (Nesher, 2012) while the Walla online news site reported that Israel 
was ranked first, globally, in a scale of militarization (Walla 2012). The 
continuous preoccupation with power and force could be understood as part of 
the historical psychosocial conditions out of which the Zionism national 
movement emerged, and around which the imagined national community still 
gathers. 
In contrast to the formal image of the Israeli army presented by the hegemonic 
Zionist narrative as the ‘people’s army’, Sasson-Levi (2006) unfolds the means 
by which the army promotes the values of the hegemonic patriarchal militarism 
and secures a specific stratification of Israeli society according to gender, 
ethnicity, and military profession. She concludes that in spite of relative erosion 
in the army's status in Jewish Israeli society, the military role of the combatant 
male soldier still constitutes the hegemonic social role which grants its bearer 
various socio-psychological and economic advantages in Israeli informal public 
domains compared to women or soldiers in non-combatant roles. Israeli 
citizens who do not serve in the army at all (Arabs and Orthodox Jews) find 
themselves disadvantageously excommunicated from the general social order 
when competing for social resources (e.g. state loans, preferred jobs retained 
for ex-army servicemen, university grants and more).  
Placing the army and the soldier as central figures in the collective imaginary 
also effectively shapes gender relations and gender roles, defining what a 
‘man’ is and what a ‘woman’ is. Amir (1995) has noted how state abortion 
policies, shaped by a vision of a country in war, construct accordingly the 
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‘committed, responsible and wise’ Israeli woman who will not be applying for 
abortion approval, whereas the ‘other’ woman’, e.g. the Russian immigrant 
deemed ‘irresponsible, non-committed and unwise’ (i.e. who is not using 
contraceptives, and does not want to keep the baby) represents the diversion 
from this hegemonic model of ‘the right woman’. Kuntsman (2008) 
demonstrated how post-Soviet Union gay immigrants’ sexual and national 
identities are shaped by the ethos of the ideal male soldier as they try to 
establish their membership in Israeli society through militarized patriotism, the 
claim of Europeanism and the exclusion of Mizrahi Jews.    
Thus according to the psychosocial approach I am advocating here, the 
militarization of Israeli society described above is not only the result of the 
material condition of unresolved military conflict with the Arab countries and 
the Palestinians, but also the product of Zionist ideology and its system of 
values and a ‘testament’ to its success in transforming the ‘Old, passive 
effeminate exilic Jew’ into a ‘new and strong masculine Israeli-Jew’.  
3.6.5.  Political Zionism as a site of power struggles between competing 
Zionist ideologies 
Finally, Shafir and Peled (2002) adopt a socio-political approach which 
analyses the power struggles between various economic-cultural interest 
groups in Israeli society along the lines drawn by Laclau and Mouffe (1985). 
This approach looks at the tensions between various political discourses – 
certain ways of talking and therefore making sense of the social world 
organized around certain logics of social power- within the same national field. 
They argue that the Zionist ideology and narrative always consisted of two 
contradictory and competing political discourses – a (democratic) liberal-
individual discourse which emphasizes civic citizenship and rights regardless 
of subjects’ ethnicity or civil contribution - and a (Religious/Jewish) ethnic-
communitarian discourse which prioritizes citizenship based on ethnicity. Each 
of these entertained a very different view of what Zionism was all about, how 
concepts such as ‘the nation’, ‘the state’, ‘Jewishness’ and ‘citizenship’ should 
be interpreted and consequently, how Zionism should be politically 
implemented. The tension between the two was only contained through the 
bridging force of a third, republican-statist, socialist and colonial ideology that 
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dominated the Jewish public space prior to the establishment of the state and 
until the late 1970s and was dedicated to the construction of a peripheral 
colonial socialist Jewish society. Due to socio-political and cultural changes 
within and outside Israeli society in recent decades, its ability to recruit support 
and cooperation has declined, exposing the unbridgeable rifts between the two 
competing worldviews. This is manifested in the growing polarization and 
fragmentation of Israeli society. 
3.7.  Discussion  
The main aim of this chapter was to study the Jewish-Israeli collective 
imagination and outline and analyse the reservoir of images, symbols and 
ideological concepts from which Jewish-Israelis draw their interpretations of 
‘the nation’, ‘the state’, ‘religion’ or ‘citizenship’. I have argued that this space is 
saturated with Zionist imagery organized around a national narrative 
(summarized in the Declaration of Independence) of suffering, exile, return and 
liberation. In spite of the growing pluralisation and individuation of Israeli 
society and the impact of global culture, many signs still point to its continued 
hegemony among Israeli and non-Israeli Jews (Graham and Boyd 2010). I 
have demonstrated its persistence in formal and informal practices and in 
popular discourse. Naveh argues: ‘many signs indicate that Israeli society is 
breaking away from the monolithic memory instilled by the canonical Jewish-
Zionist narrative, yet no other narrative has been created to replace it nor is 
likely to be’ (2006, p. 248); First and Herman (2009) note that ‘side by side with 
globalization and a ‘borderless’ world, national contents and symbols can still 
be found everywhere’ (p. 520).  
In this thesis I argue, in line with ethnosymbolist and cultural theorists, that 
nationalism should be studied through a psychosocial approach. This view 
does not undermine the impact of material, social economic or political 
conditions (e.g. the military conflict with the Palestinians, the forces of 
economic and cultural globalization or the large waves of immigration to 
Israel), but rather insists that collective symbols and narratives – such as the 
images of the old and New Jew – should be seen as mediators of these 
material conditions contributing to their private and collective interpretation. 
Zionism’s narrative as a movement of Jewish revival based upon the Negation 
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of Exile and the constitution of a new breed of Jews contributes to the 
glorification of the army and the soldier and there is a reciprocal relationship 
between this glorification and the continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian/Arab 
conflict. Israelis are constructed as strong New Jews not only because they 
have to stand the hardship of the conflict, but the conflict actually continues 
because the Israeli New Jews have to demonstrate their strength in line with 
the mythical narrative. As Rose noted in 1996,  ‘it seems as if Israel cannot 
grant statehood to the Palestinians, not just because of felt real and present 
danger, but also because so great is the charge of phantasy against such a 
possibility that, was it to be granted, the nation would lose all inner rationale 
and psychically collapse in on itself ’ (p.4). 
The critical readings of Zionism cited above go back to the inception of the 
Zionist idea and help to understand its evolution as a way of dealing with the 
burden of the diasporic condition, deemed exilic. Each criticism highlighted a 
different dimension of conflict which Zionism sought to resolve in relation to 
this diasporic de-territorial condition. Thus, the Zionist narrative and its political 
ideology addressed the crisis of the diasporic de-nationalised Jew within a 
specific European cultural-political context along the axes of 
masculinity/femininity, religion/secularism-enlightenment, nationality/de-
territoriality and modernity/traditionalism. I have argued that these historical 
relations are engraved in the collective narrative and national imagination and 
haunt Israeli society and its members even today. The chapter followed the 
recurrences of these preoccupations in contemporary Israeli society but also 
described the forces that challenge and disturb these traditional concerns and 
push towards a different interpretation of ‘Israeliness’. These challenge 
axiomatic Zionist ideological preconceptions, open key symbols and signifiers 
for exploration, offer alternative readings of Israeli history (e.g. the perception 
of the Jewish diaspora and the place it played and plays within the local 
societies), its relationship to its internal and external others (Palestinians, non-
Jews, Europeans), and offer alternative interpretations of concepts such as 
'the nation', 'Jewishness', ‘citizenship', ‘state', ‘territory' or 'modernity'. In sum, 
they offer alternative readings of ‘Israeliness’ and challenge the one promoted 
by the classical Zionist narrative (demonstrated for example in the 
governmental campaign encouraging Israelis to return to Israel). They disturb 
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the efforts to construct a linear homogenous sense of Israeli ‘one-ness’ which 
simplifies the complexities, denies the inconsistencies, and masks the 
exclusions of Palestinians, Mizrahi Jews or women and the coercive power-
relations ingrained in nationalism.      
Interpreting the Jewish-Israeli imagination as an on-going attempt to resolve 
the crisis of the diasporic Jew places the Jewish diaspora at the centre of 
Israeli imagination and Raz-Krakotzkin argues that ‘Zionism simply couldn't 
exist without negation of the Diaspora and the negation of any alterity more 
generally’ (in Magid, 2006, p. 200). This interpretation of ‘diaspora’ is 
especially relevant within the context of my research looking at Jewish-Israelis’ 
construction of a national identity while living away from Israel.  
The following chapter will conclude the theoretical section of my work and will 
look at the Jewish-Israeli subject and its embedment within the social world as 
a psychosocial subject in the context of a diasporic reality, charged with highly 
controversial connotations in the public imagery.  
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Chapter four - The Jewish Israeli subject: 
negotiating national identity in a diasporic 
context.  
4.1. Introduction  
In chapters two and three I took up a sociological stance and presented 
nationalism in general and Israeli nationalism specifically above all through a 
macro perspective. This theoretical introduction can help contextualize my first 
two research questions (the contents of the Israeli cultural reservoir and the 
subject positions that emerge from them). This chapter will address my third, 
perhaps more psychosocially-oriented research question that looks at how 
Jewish Israelis (within Israeli society or outside it - e.g. in Britain) negotiate 
their insertion into the Israeli system of signification described so far. My main 
argument is that in spite of the constructive and constrictive power of Zionist 
ideology and narrative, individual subjects and groups play an important role in 
their constitution, maintenance and modification. Thus a central part of this 
chapter will focus on modes of subjects’ agency and subjectification involved in 
the construction of ‘Israeli identity’.  
I will open the chapter with Stewart Hall’s cultural and post-colonial 
psychosocial understanding of identities (e.g. 1990, 2000). His analysis of 
Caribbean identities brings to the fore the colonial and post-colonial historical-
political and inter-cultural contexts within which national and cultural identities 
emerge. In the second part of this chapter I have chosen to demonstrate 
Jewish-Israelis’ construction of an ‘Israeli national identity’ through their 
participation in formal and informal practices of collective mourning. While 
there is no doubt that ‘national identities’ are practiced in various ways on a 
daily basis (Billig, 1995), practices of mourning are especially productive for 
learning about collective memory (Feige, 2007), indicating what will be 
included in the collective memory and what is bound to be forgotten. This will 
serve me to discuss various modes of subjects’ engagement with the national 
canon and notions of subject obedience and agency in the construction of 
‘Israeli identity’. The third part of the chapter will deal directly with the 
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construction of national identity in the diasporic context. I will open it with a 
literature review of contemporary notions of ‘diaspora’ and highlight the 
multiple representations that this concept has in British society as part of the 
perception of immigrants and immigration. The description of the British 
cultural and social context is important if we understand identities to be 
constructed in cultural, historical social and discursive contexts. This will be 
followed by a brief discussion of the image that Israel might have in local-
Jewish and non-Jewish British eyes. The discussion then will focus on Israelis’ 
experiences while living outside Israel – in the ‘diaspora’ - a highly contentious 
concept in the Zionist system of signification around which ‘Israeliness’ was 
and still is constructed (Raz-Krakotzkin 1994). Due to the paucity of research 
on Israelis in Britain, the discussion will be assisted by literature dealing with 
Israelis' immigration and acculturation in the North American context.  
4.2. Theorizing identities  
According to Brubaker (2004), a proliferation in usage of identities emerged in 
the USA during the 1960s and marks a certain rise in an individualist ethos 
that was correlated with the student anti-war movements and ‘the weakness of 
class based idioms of social and political analysis’ (30). This ‘identitarian’ trend 
also coincided with the popularity of humanistic and cognitive psychological 
approaches which saw subjects as free agents – authors of their destiny and 
social reality. Within these theoretical approaches, identities were understood 
to reflect an inner, persistent subjective core that is carried with the subject and 
determines the ways he or she views the world. This notion of identities was 
severely criticised by social theorists from various disciplines whose main 
argument was that such usage of identities, as inherent, stable, and 
psychologically determined, overlooked the crucial role that social forces and 
culture play in its construction. Discursive social-psychologists (e.g. Potter and 
Wetherell, 1992, or Potter, 2009), point to the variety of confounding, often 
contradictory, positions that people take in their daily lives, each associated 
with a different social identity. They therefore argue for one’s multiple social 
identities rather than psychological ‘identity’. Structuralists (Foucault, 1970, 
Althusser, 1971) and feminist intersectionalist theorists (Yuval-Davis, 1997) 
highlight the constraining political forces and coercive social power that confine 
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the subject to certain social positions and limit his/her ability to act 
independently. Cultural theorists of modernity (e.g. Bauman, 2011) argue that 
identities are better suited to reflect a modern world rather than a post-modern, 
fluid, globalized world, characterized by rapid social shifts, the emergence of 
new social categories and the decline of classical social institutions. The 
debate around ‘identity’ is often confounded with the discussion of a broader 
and more abstract term, that of subjectivity or the ‘subject’ relating to people’s 
condition, understanding  and experience of themselves within their 
surroundings. Because ‘identity’ has come to be associated with essentialist, 
stable and over-psychological meanings, alternative terms such as 
‘positionality’ (Anthias, 2002) or ‘belonging’ (Yuval-Davis, 2006) have been 
proposed to address and describe the condition and the engagement of the 
subject within his/her social context. Since, on the one hand, the concept of 
‘identity’ is central to my research, if only because it is emphasized (even 
essentialized) in Israeli nationalism and Israeli culture but, on the other hand, I 
choose to look at it critically as the subject’s troubled insertion into the 
available socio-political ‘slots’, I found Stuart Hall’s approach (1990, 1994, 
2000), especially useful. He theorizes the links between identity (and 
identification), subjectivity and the socio-political reality and demonstrates their 
interdependence.   
4.2.1.  A psychosocial approach to identities 
The psychosocial approach I am applying to the analysis of national identities 
tries to break away from the classical distinctions between sociology 
(emphasizing macro social processes and social power) and psychology 
(focusing on private ‘internal’, cognitive or psychic processes) and relates to 
the social and the psychological as inherently interdependent, ‘two sides of the 
same coin’ where distinctions are artificial. Sociologists have to accept that 
historical and social events such as the Holocaust or the 1948 War of 
independence transcend their material, concrete significance and are 
inevitably interpreted and imagined by subjects who assign them subjective 
and emotional qualities. Psychologists have to accept that Israelis’ subjective 
understandings of their socio-political ‘reality’ – e.g. the interpretation of ‘the 
military conflict with the Palestinians’ (Bar-Tal, 2007) or ‘the Palestinian Nakba’ 
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(Azoulay, 2009) are shaped by the Israeli cultural ways of talking and 
understanding ‘the nation’, ‘the army’, the ‘state’, ‘the Jew’ or the ‘Palestinian’ 
as well as certain power arrangements that structure Israeli society14. Although 
the psychosocial approach acknowledges the formative and authoritative 
effects of social order – discourses, inter-group and intra-group power relations 
and their system of signification - it argues that subjects’ identities cannot be 
reduced to ‘the power by which it is occasioned’ (Butler, 1997, p. 16). Social 
power and structure are inevitably mediated, i.e. have their subjective markers: 
they are represented, negotiated or even merely acknowledged or registered 
(Butler, 1997) consciously or unconsciously, by subjects.  
4.2.2.  Hall’s psychosocial approach to identities  
Hall considers identities as a ‘suture’ of social positioning, political and cultural 
impositions and psychological processes (e.g. representation and 
identification). This bridges theoretical gaps between social constructivist 
theory and the (Lacanian) psychoanalytical approach which has recently 
become influential in the critique of classical notions of psychological identity. 
For Hall: 
Identities are, as it were, the positions which the subject is obliged to 
take up while always ‘knowing’ (the language of consciousness here 
betrays us) that they are representations, that representation is always 
constructed across a ‘lack’, across a division, from the place of the 
Other, and thus can never be adequate – identical – to the subject 
processes which are invested in them. The notion that an effective 
suturing of the subject to a subject-position requires, not only that the 
subject is ‘hailed’ but that the subject invests in the position, means that 
suturing has to be thought of as an articulation, rather than a one-sided 
process, and that in turn places identification, if not identities, firmly on 
the theoretical agenda. (2000 p. 19)  
                                            
14
 As explained before, I did not insert inverted commas around many of the categories. The 
overall research process, generally, and the analysis more specifically often revealed the 
multiple significations that categories such as ‘Arab’ ‘Jew’ ‘Israeli’ or ‘English’ might have in 
different cultures or for individual subjects .  
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Hall’s specific understandings of ‘identity’ and the ‘subject’ will be 
demonstrated below through their contrast with other theoretical approaches to 
such concepts.     
4.2.2.1. Identities are representations of historical memory  
Hall joins the structuralist and psychoanalytic criticisms of humanistic and 
cognitive interpretations of identities as fixed, consistent and stable internal 
mental apparatuses. He claims that revolutionary anticolonial movements 
advocated, for political reasons, a lost (e.g. African) identity ‘buried’, so to 
speak, under the heavy weight of alien colonial exploitation and which had to 
be actively rediscovered. In Hall’s argument against, presumably, a lost African 
identity, I have found a similarity to Zionist arguments (captured for example in 
the Israeli Declaration of Independence) that nurtures the notion of a pre-exilic, 
authentic Jewish national identity that was lost or corrupted throughout the 
millennia of Jewish exile, the task of the Zionist movement being to return to it 
and bring it to life. For Hall, however, the essence of identity resides not in ‘the 
rediscovery [but rather in] the production of identity. Not an identity grounded 
in the archaeology, but in the re-telling of the past’ (1994, p. 393). While he 
insists on the de-essentialization of identities, Hall’s approach also rejects the 
discursive psychological approach which undermines the power of the past 
and its representation and where people’s speech is above all purposeful. 
Such a sociological-discursive approach can be demonstrated in Sela-Shefi’s 
study of Israeli identity (2006) which studied the representation of ‘the Israeli 
Person’ among Israelis and concluded that the image of the ‘uncivilized’ 
Israeli/Sabra person was constructed against an alternative idealized image of 
a ‘civilized European’. She argued that people who saw themselves as part of 
the classical elite (whether of Ashkenazi or Mizrahi origin) associated 
themselves with ‘the civilized European’ in order to distinguish themselves 
socially and claim moral superiority over ‘the Israeli masses’ while at the same 
time creating ‘solidarity among those ‘concerned’’ (p. 339). Hence, Sela-Shefi 
sees 'Europeanism' mainly as a vehicle for social mobility and respondents’ 
aligning with this image was mainly in order to claim a preferred social 
positioning over others. Her approach sees Eurocentrism for the socio-political 
social capital it yields and overlooks the cultural-historical significations of the 
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European-Sabra/Israeli power-relations and the socio-political/ideological 
symbolic system that Israelis are embedded in (as described in chapter three).  
4.2.2.2. Identities are psychosocial co-productions  
Hall’s understanding of identities  also breaks away from structuralist 
approaches: according to Foucauldian structuralism, subjectivity is strictly 
contingent upon the immediate social context and its matrix of power relations 
and subjects' efforts should focus on clarifying these underlying oppressive 
discursive regulations and try to break away from them (only to fall into other 
discursive regulations). Other structuralist theories, such as Althusser’s (1971), 
also accentuated the formative effect of the social order (organized as an over-
arching ideological system) for the constitution of the subject. Subjects are 
called into being through their response to acts of interpellation or hailing when 
encountering agents of the ideological order (e.g. Palestinian-Israelis who are 
subjected to extra security measures in Ben-Gurion airport). In what seems like 
a criticism of the Althusserian formative role of ‘hailing’ (see the quote on 
identities above), Hall claims that subjects have to invest in the position that 
they are called into rather than be hailed into it. Thus identities are rather the 
co-productions of social forces and their psychic articulations or 
representations (Hall 1994). A crucial aspect of colonialism, for example, 
resides in its ability to corrupt the colonized into accepting the colonizers’ 
representations of ‘self’ and ‘other’ and to adopt/internalize their self-
representation as the European ‘Other’. Even within the colonial context 
characterized by disproportionate power inequality, the coercive relationship 
between colonizers and colonized still involves the investment of subjects in 
their subject positioning (Hall, 1994).  
4.2.2.3. Identities as an on-going process of identification  
Moreover, Hall sees identities as an on-going process of representation rather 
than as an ‘already accomplished fact, which the new cultural practices then 
represent’ (Hall, 1994 p. 392). Consequently identities  are better thought of as 
‘identifications’,  which captures their dynamic and active aspects as has been 
discussed above, and, following the Lacanian view of the never-ending quest 
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for the phantasmatic lost object, it accounts for the continuous motivation that 
drives nationalism as argued by Stavrakakis and Chrysoloras (2006).       
4.2.2.4. Identities can be a part of a creative imaginary  
Couched in Lacanian theorizing and terminology, Hall, like Zizek (1998), 
associates identities, in this case, diasporic identities, with the realm of the 
imaginary, ‘imposing an imaginary coherence on the experience of dispersal 
and fragmentation, which is the history of all enforced diasporas’ (394). This 
phantasmatic function restores an ‘imaginary fullness or plenitude, to set 
against the broken rubric of our past’ (Hall, 1994, p. 394). As noted by other 
Lacanian theorists (e.g. Bhabha 1990), this imaginary construct is dialectical 
by nature - founded on the tension between fullness and disruption, unity and 
difference, being and becoming, stability and processes. This is manifested in 
practices of ‘selfing’ and ‘othering’ – drawing boundaries that distinguish ‘me’ 
from ‘not-me’. In colonial and post-colonial political hierarchy, the self–other 
relationship is replaced by ‘an Other’–‘other’ relationship where the western 
colonizer (or local Britons for immigrants to Britain) are seen by the colonized 
or diasporic subject as the ‘Other’ - the source of absolute power and 
knowledge - whereas the exploited colonized person or the immigrant is seen 
through the colonizer’s eyes as the ‘other’. However, unlike Zizek (1998), Hall 
sees identities not only as misleading defensive processes but also, 
potentially, as genuine signs of private and communal acts of creativity and 
self-realization. For Hall, Black cinema, for example, serves ‘not as a second-
order mirror held up to reflect what already exists, but as that form of 
representation which is able to constitute us as new kinds of subjects, and 
thereby enable us to discover places from which to speak’ (1994, p. 402). The 
crucial point here is not that (national) identities are or are not an imaginary 
construct; they certainly are. What is more important is to study how the 
inherent complexities of the imaginary are creatively managed by different 
societies and individual subjects at different times. Craib (1998) argues that 
‘the sociologically interesting questions are about the nature of the social 
conditions which encourage individuals to close down their psychic space 
around one or another social identity, and the social conditions which 
encourage and open up psychic space in attempt to explore oneself and one's 
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relationships’ (p. 170). Stated differently, the issue is in which circumstances 
identities  are acknowledged as ‘merely’ representations and when is their 
imaginary, representational dimension ignored or denied by the subject and 
society (e.g. when Jewish-Israelis imagine that they are God’s chosen people 
and that Israel was promised to them by God).      
4.3.  Identity construction in Israeli society – between interpellation and 
creative co-production  
I will now turn to explore Hall’s understandings of identities through academic 
Israeli literature that looks at rituals and practices of memorialization in Israeli 
society and their relation to identity construction. This review can highlight 
certain contents, themes and socio-political dynamics around the canonical 
national narrative and will serve to illustrate the variability of identification 
processes (ranging between interpellation and proactive co-construction of 
one’s identity). A large body of academic work (Feige, 2007, Lomsky-Feder, 
2004, 2011, Yablonka, 2009  Roberman, 2007) has focused on reconstruction, 
negotiation or challenging of the hegemonic Zionist narrative of liberation and 
revival through formal and informal practices of mourning  and subjects’ 
construction of a national identity in relation to this canon. Lomsky-Feder 
(2004) argues that in Israel, ‘memorial ceremonies are still central elements in 
establishing social unity, perhaps more than ever in an increasingly 
fragmenting society’ (p. 304).   
4.3.1.  Interpellative memorial practices 
Feige (2007) sees a gradual transformation in the Israeli mourning culture in 
the past decades that matches the transition from a highly ideological Israeli 
society to a modern society in a globalized world that encourages consumption 
and individuation. At the same time, the vast majority of Jewish-Israelis still 
take part in traditional means of commemoration, for example when standing-
up during Holocaust Memorial Day and the Memorial Day for the Fallen 
Soldiers to the sound of a siren. According to Feige, such practices constitute 
clear instances of interpellation, when subjects willingly respond to the State’s 
demand for them to join in with the national narrative by turning themselves 
into living memorials for a minute or two. In these instances, subjects’ private 
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time is suspended in favour of a collective national time which joins together 
anonymous subjects (Anderson, 1991) throughout the country in an imagined 
Israeli community. Accordingly, those who do not take part in these practices 
(e.g. Palestinian-Israelis and Orthodox Jews) signal their exclusion from the 
Israeli imagined community and are treated as outsiders.  
4.3.2.  Negotiating the national memory  
Feige reports (2007) that other practices of mourning, for example around the 
assassination of PM Rabin in 1995, generate mixed feelings and fall outside 
the Israeli cultural consensus and are therefore given to greater interpretation 
by individual subjects and groups. Likewise, there have been efforts to include 
civil casualties of terrorist attacks in the memorial rituals of the dead soldiers. 
These endeavours have met with antagonism from families of dead soldiers 
who wanted to conserve the exclusivity of the dead soldiers as important 
images in the national narrative. Roberman (2007) demonstrated how elderly 
Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union who immigrated to Israel 
during the 1990s negotiated their admission into Israeli society through the 
portrayal of their active resistance of the Nazi regime during WWII. She 
showed how ‘the experience of war… [could serve as]… a powerful symbolic 
resource for individual empowerment and social mobilization in the contexts of 
nation-states and flourishing militarism’ (p. 1035). She described how Soviet 
veteran soldiers used the growing acceptance of ex-Soviet Jewish immigrants 
in Jewish-Israeli society to include their narrative of heroism within the national 
story of the Jewish (Holocaust) bravery.  
Yablonka (2009) analysed Mizrahi Jewish-Israelis’ representations of the 
Holocaust – one of the main historical events around which Israeli identity is 
constructed. She tracked a three generational process that Mizrahi Jews in 
Israel went through in their relationship to the Holocaust: 
The first generation viewed the destruction of the European Jews with 
profound compassion, but felt that the Shoah [Holocaust] was a chapter 
in the history of the European Jews. Their children attempted to 
connect, facing, to a large extent, resentment and alienation. Their 
grand-children already have the Shoah burnt in their souls being an 
integral part of their self-definition as Israelis (p. 94). 
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Lomsky-Feder (2004) documents the emergence of a new mourning ethos 
among some middle-higher class Israeli schools’ memorial ceremonies that 
stages the soldier and his close environment (family and friends) as a victim of 
the on-going condition of war. This seems like a shift from the classic 
memorials of heroic nationalism that glorified the sacrifice of the soldiers and 
their social environment for the benefit of Israeli society. Nevertheless, 
Lomsky-Feder argues that ‘although school memorial ceremonies serve as a 
meeting point between the State's demands and the alternative voices of civil 
groups, civil society may still be unable to fully rid itself of its deep commitment 
to the national collective’ (304). While this new ethos highlights the personal 
price that individual Israelis pay when living in a conflict zone, it still adheres to 
a formal Zionist narrative according to which wars are inevitable, ignores 
Israel’s responsibilities for the continuation of this state and overlooks the 
condition of victimhood it imposes on the Palestinians by their continuous 
occupation. 
Thus, the literature reviewed demonstrates how the construction of the 
national canon is produced as an on-going negotiation between the 
establishment, local civil society and individual subjects, between old-timers 
and new timers or between the majority and a minority and not as top-down 
unidirectional interpellative power-relations. At the same time, this analysis 
also reveals the power and authority of the national canon as a means for 
admission into Israeli society and for recruiting recognition within the 
mainstream Jewish-Israeli public. The veterans were able to mobilize the 
much-admired image of the fighting Jew to achieve greater recognition within 
Israeli society while the Mizrahi Jews joined in the effort to portray the 
Holocaust as a Jewish (rather than a European) event so as to enhance their 
inclusion into mainstream Israeli society. The studies cited above demonstrate 
how Israelis’ sense of collective identities is invariably constructed in relation to 
and around certain hegemonic themes and historical events in the Zionist 
narrative. At the same time, Roberman and Yablonka also showed how 
marginalized subjects such as Mizrahi-Israelis or new immigrants can actively 
negotiate their inclusion into the national ethos and modify the boundaries of 
the imagined community. Lomsky-Feder’s study (2011) echoes Slea-Sefi’s 
(2006) findings (around the desirable signification of ‘the European’) and 
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demonstrates how privileged elites in Israeli society claim their prioritized 
positions by differentiating themselves from mainstream Israeli society in a way 
that both challenges and accepts the national narrative.     
4.3.3.  Challenging the canonical narrative  
Zuckermann (2007) describes the proliferation of informal Holocaust memorial 
ceremonies offered to various Israeli audiences alongside the formal statist 
memorial service that promotes the official national narrative (as demonstrated 
in the Declaration of Independence– see previous chapter). He describes an 
invitation to a Holocaust memory service advertised in Yiddish – the language 
of the ‘Old Jew’ – addressed at the remaining relatives of those who perished 
and the remainder of the destroyed ‘Old’ European Jewish culture against 
which Zionism is constructed. An alternative ceremony whose panel consisted 
of an Arab citizen, a Mizrahi speaker, a homosexual and a German tourist 
sought to provide a counter-hegemonic memory that invites marginal subjects 
to take part in the collective memory and openly challenges the official lessons 
of the Holocaust. On the same day, Holocaust survivors were invited to 
participate in a protest against the Israeli government accused of withholding 
benefits destined to Holocaust survivors. Zuckermann’s work demonstrates the 
multiple narratives of various social groups in Israeli society as they struggle 
for acceptance alongside and in dialogue with a certain dominant statist 
narrative. These alternative practices challenged basic tenets of formal 
Holocaust memory as part of the canonical Zionist narrative; they emphasized 
the significance of the old Jewish, pre-Zionist culture and language and the 
richness of multiculturalism; it pointed to the marginalization of certain groups 
(citizens of Arab origin, Mizrahim, homosexuals) in Israeli society and 
challenged the nationalistic moral of the Holocaust promoted by the official 
narrative (i.e. that Jews and Israelis constantly have to be alert for a future 
Holocaust) while advocating a universalistic moral (that exclusion and 
potentially persecution, can happen anywhere, even in Israel). Finally, Feige 
(2007) demonstrates how new, sometimes unconventional means of 
commemoration (e.g. virtual commemoration via the internet) allow subjects to 
challenge not only what will be remembered but also how.  
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4.4. Theorizing identities - A summary  
As argued thus far, the national category informed by Zionist ideology and 
narrative dominates the Israeli public and private spaces and subordinates 
other social categories (such as gender, ethnicity or region). This does not 
mean that the cultural representations of ‘the nation’ remain unchanged. The 
shift in Holocaust memory from collective heroism to private victimhood and 
the inclusion of previously marginalized groups such as Mizrahi Israelis or new 
immigrants into the Israeli imagined community demonstrate how the contents 
of the nation can be negotiated in response to structural and cultural changes 
in Israeli society as well as the demands from specific interest groups. The 
review shows that at specific points in time, for example during a period of 
heightened military hostility (First and Herman, 2009), or in areas and historical 
moments of overwhelming social consensus (Feige, 2007, Yablonka, 2009), 
subjects might be more susceptible to the ideological demands and will be 
more easily interpellated as ideological subjects, whereas other, less 
emotionally intense social circumstances, are given to greater personal 
interpretation.  
These research findings challenge a structuralist perspective that sees 
identities as synonymous with the range of fixed social positioning provided by 
the social system of signification. At the same time it seriously undermines any 
psychological and psychoanalytic claims that see subjects as autonomous 
from their social environments (as conscious or unconscious authors of their 
identities) and ignore the specific political, cultural or ideological contexts 
within which identities are constructed and identifications carried out. Even in 
times of greater creative space as rituals of mourning shift from ‘heroic 
nationalism’ to ‘nationalism of victimhood’, Lomsky-Feder (2004) argues that 
‘school memorial ceremonies, like most other forums and movements, have 
not begun to challenge basic cultural assumptions, such as the inevitability of 
the centrality of war and army in Israeli life’ (p. 304). 
Hall’s understanding of identities  as a creative process, ‘that form of 
representation which is able to constitute us as new kinds of subjects, and 
thereby enable us to discover places from which to speak’ (1994, p. 402), 
emphasizes the duality between process and content, ‘becoming’ and ‘being’ 
 
78 
and ‘identification’ and identities . It also points to the active role which 
subjects play in the continuous co-construction of their ‘social identities’. Yuval-
Davis argues that ‘identities are narratives, stories people tell themselves and 
others about who they are (and what they are not) but identity is fluid, always 
producing itself through the combined processes of being and becoming, 
belonging and longing to belong’ (cited in Riessman, 2008, p. 7). As subjects 
struggle to construct these momentary ‘identitarian’ stabilities (‘identities’, 
‘narratives’) they are bound to stumble across their illusionary aspects in 
moments of interruptions, hesitations, laughter, anxiety or the usage of slang 
words.  
Paying attention to the process of speech construction alongside the implicit 
and explicit content suggests that subjects’ speech about ‘national identity’ and 
their attendance at an interview about it, as discursive psychologists argue 
(e.g. Potter and Hepburn, 2005) constitute, in themselves, an identity practice, 
a creative act of identity construction, (Hall, 1994). These acts of production 
alongside the contents and the cultural contexts will all be demonstrated and 
discussed in the findings chapters and are the central focus of this thesis.   
4.5.  Immigration and diaspora in British society   
Since I am advocating a psychosocial approach that sees identities  as 
inseparable from their socio-cultural context, Israelis’ representation of 
‘national identity’ cannot be studied in isolation from the broader British cultural 
and social context within which it is represented – i.e. their lives away from 
Israel, in Britain. This content-context dialectic requires not only acknowledging 
the multiple affiliations and the spatial and temporal tensions between ‘here’ 
and ‘there’ and ‘then’ and ‘now’ captured by this condition of dislocation, but 
also learning how ‘otherness’ and dislocation are represented and valued in 
Israeli and British cultures. This condition of otherness or dislocation from what 
is considered in our contemporary jargon of nation-states as a ‘homeland’ can 
be referred to by a variety of significations: ‘immigration’, ‘refuge’, ‘expatriation’, 
‘transnationalism’ or ‘diaspora’, to name just a few. While each of these 
concepts relates to a specific material, sometimes legal condition, they also 
represent different theoretical outlooks on the condition of foreignness which 
also dictate what will be studied and how.  
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For Levitt (2010) ‘transnationalism’ is a theoretical approach that ‘begins with a 
world without borders, empirically examines the boundaries that emerge, and 
explores their relationship to unbounded arenas and processes’ (p. 40). 
Hence, addressing subjects as ‘transnationals’ or cosmopolitans (as opposed 
to ‘diasporans’ or ‘immigrants’, for example) locates them as members of this 
counter-hegemonic transnational project. Whereas ‘expatriation’ (which is 
hardly mentioned in the scholarly literature) habitually refers to high-skilled 
workers from affluent societies who have no intention of settling culturally or 
formally in their country of residence, ‘immigration’ has often been associated 
with new-comers’ economic, social, or professional adaptation or assimilation 
to or alienation from the local society and its labour market (e.g. Manning and 
Roy, 2010, Casey and Dustmann, 2010, Leinonen, 2012). 
By contrast, the study of ‘diaspora’ is often carried out through a cultural prism 
and therefore often incorporates notions of ‘identity’ or identification to the 
migrants’ country of origin in the context of their lives elsewhere. ‘Diaspora’ 
assumes a complicated identification and attachments to both new and old 
societies and to the space that is created between them. It has come to be 
associated with ‘a multidimensional understanding of space and movement 
that does not restrict it to actual physical migration [as ‘immigration’ does] but 
makes room also for imagined, discursive, material, cultural, virtual and 
socially networked places and travels’ (Knott, 2010, p. 79). Given my interest in 
Israelis’ understanding of ‘national identity’ when living in Britain and the role 
that (Zionist) ‘home’ ideology plays in its construction, ‘diaspora’ appears to be 
most suitable to address Israelis’ sense of otherness and dislocation compared 
to ‘transnationalism’ (Levitt, 2010), ‘immigration’, ‘nomadism’ (Braidotti, 2011) 
or ‘expatriation’, for example. While I adopt a critical approach to the concept 
of ‘the nation’ and the imaginary and discursive restrictions it imposes on 
subjects I am, nevertheless, working from within this ideological framework of 
the nation state (e.g. Zionism) and study the ways in which ideology is recited, 
negotiated or even challenged by the subjects. Diasporas do not necessarily 
mark a decline of the nation state world but rather describe the complexities of 
the national order from its margins. Likewise, my interest in the imaginary 
representations, images and discursive forms applied by Israeli interviewees to 
the condition of living in Britain resonates better with the ‘diaspora’ approach 
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rather than with the practical, material approach evoked by ‘immigration’. 
However, I will argue that although the notion of ‘diaspora’ is helpful in some 
ways as a theoretical framework for the analysis of Israelis’ sense of otherness 
in Britain, for various political, demographical and cultural reasons the profile of 
Israelis and the Israeli community abroad (including in Britain) does not fit the 
classical model of hybrid ‘diaspora’ as highlighted by cultural theorists such as 
Hall (1990) or Brah (1996). Nevertheless, Knott (2010) offers a broader 
understanding of diasporic space and allow us to include other features of the 
Israeli population abroad which normally fall outside the criteria that, lately, 
came to be associated with ‘diaspora’. 
I will open this section with a general discussion of how notions of ‘diaspora’ 
and ‘the other’ are represented in local British culture. Then I will discuss the 
specific representation of Israel among British Jewish and non-Jewish 
audiences. Finally, I will focus on the notion of diaspora in Israeli culture and 
present the academic research that has been conducted on Israelis abroad. 
Given the negative association of ‘diaspora’ in Zionist imagery, and the images 
and representations of ‘diaspora’ in British culture, I will discuss to what extent 
the diasporic framework can be helpful for the analysis of Israelis’ experience 
of otherness in Britain.  
4.5.1. Representations of immigration, ‘diaspora’ and ‘the other’ in British 
culture  
As the following literature review discloses, over the past decades there have 
been a myriad of interpretations and imaginations of ‘diaspora’ in western 
societies to the extent that Brubaker complained about ‘The ‘Diaspora’ 
Diaspora’ (2005) – an over stretching of the concept. According to Alexander 
(2010), the notion of ‘diaspora’ and otherness has (at least) two very different 
significations in contemporary western societies and consequently among 
diasporic subjects themselves. In its more traditional interpretation it has been 
associated with ‘the unequal and often traumatic circumstances of migration 
and dispersal, along with minoritization, marginalization and exclusion of 
diaspora people in the ‘host’ societies and the power of the ‘myth of return’’ (p. 
113). The newer-cultural interpretation of ‘diaspora’ in western societies has 
seen a shift from this traditional perception of ‘diaspora’, a critique of the ideas 
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of a ‘homeland’ or ‘ethnic community’ and a tendency to emphasize greater 
diversity in the host country. According to Hall (1990), an advocate of the ‘new’ 
diaspora, the traditional ‘literal’ reading of ‘diaspora’ (whose archetype he sees 
in national narratives of homogeneity in general and in Zionism specifically) 
sees it as ‘those scattered tribes whose identity can only be secured in relation 
to some sacred homeland to which they must at all costs return’ (p. 235). Such 
an old reading of ‘diaspora’, according to its critics, emphasizes ‘the variation 
of relationship to the homeland [as] …the defining features’ (Alexander, 2010, 
p. 114) and consequently locks the diasporic subject in alienated positions and 
invites the politics of hostility and exclusion towards the diasporic ‘other’.  
By contrast, cultural theorists such as Hall (1990) or Brah (1996) have offered 
a metaphorical interpretation of ‘diaspora’ that ‘is defined, not by essence or 
purity, but by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a 
conception of 'identity' which lives with and through, not despite, difference; by 
hybridity’ (Hall, 1990 p. 235). For socio-political theorists (Anthias, 2002) such 
an interpretation of ‘diaspora’ provided an opportunity to explore alternative 
notions of attachment such as ‘belonging’ or ‘home’ in intersections of multiple 
social categories. This approach sees diaspora as ‘a mode of engagement 
rather than an assertion of separateness and distinction’ (Alexander, 2010, 
115). Finally, such an interpretation of ‘diaspora’ resonates with ideas of 
liberalism and diversity captured by the political-cultural concept of 
‘multiculturalism’ and emerges out of a general political and cultural interest in 
alternative, marginalized social formations.  
Other authors (e.g. Kymlica, 2003, Tyler, 2010, Fortier, 2011), however, 
challenge the liberal approach that the cultural theorists above attribute to the 
British public and highlight British society’s formal and informal means of 
excluding ‘outsiders’. Kymlica (2003) explored the links between citizenship, 
immigration and multiculturalism in various societies and argues that 
(compared to Canada) ‘in the British context… there is no strong visible public 
commitment to either immigration or multiculturalism. On the contrary, there is 
if anything a consensus against (non-European) immigration’ (2003, p. 203). 
Consequently the 2002 White Paper that was introduced by the British 
government and tried to establish a liberal approach to British ‘citizenship’ and 
encourage greater openness to higher levels of immigration (following the 
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Canadian model), was ‘muted beyond recognition’ (p. 205) which ‘may well 
reflect an accurate realpolitik assessment of what the British public will accept’ 
(p. 205-6). Tyler (2010) describes the gap between various liberal 
governmental discourses of ‘citizenship’ (e.g. the 2002 White Paper that 
Kymlica discusses above) and ‘the authoritarian character of much legislation, 
policy and practice in this area’ (p. 71). She argues that ‘citizenship’ as it is 
legislated and practiced since the 1981 Nationality act15 is designed to fail or 
exclude certain populations (e.g. subjects from former colonized countries) and 
effectively redraws the empire’s boundaries within the national territory 
differentiating between those who belong and those who don’t. According to 
Fortier (2011), within British society there is a strong nostalgia for a pre-
multicultural Britain, of ‘close-knit communities’ (p.6) and ‘a narrative of the 
loss of a rural past, one that ties families to the land from generation to 
generation’ (ibid) which she terms ‘white unease’. Those ‘seek[s] to close down 
diasporic and multicultural attachment in favour of the unified nation/al.’ (p. 10).  
Finally, various theorists (e.g. Karla et al., 2005, Modood, 2010) argue that 
following ‘9/11’ the more liberal and inclusive notion of diaspora has been once 
more restricted to its ethnic or racial enclaves. This encourages xenophobia 
within the discourse of ‘national security’. This change of perception brings 
about an intensification of the assimilationist rather than the incorporative-
multicultural approach towards immigrants (Modood, 2010). Thus, within the 
post 9/11 political climate the (positive) meaning of ‘diaspora’ among the 
British majority has been limited to those groups whose ties to their 
‘homelands’ and their adaptability to the British work market and culture do not 
pose a (psychological, cultural) threat to mainstream British white society 
(Karla et al., 2005).  
4.5.2.  Diasporic identities  
As argued before, the notion of ‘diaspora’ is co-constructed mutually through 
the locals’ perceptions and practices directed at the immigrants (as discussed 
above) and the immigrants’ own perceptions of themselves. Vertovec (1997) 
outlines three dimensions along which ‘diaspora’ can be studied: as a specific 
                                            
15
 The Act restricted the entitlement to British citizenship to those whose parents were born in 
Britain and thus denied citizenship to people from former colonies or those who were born in 
Britain to non-British parents.     
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mode of consciousness, as a social forum, and as producing cultural effects 
within the community and outside it. These dimensions will serve me later in 
analysing some of the particularities of the Israeli population outside Israel and 
especially the one in Britain.   
4.5.3.  Diasporic consciousness 
While the diasporic condition promotes the potential for multiple identifications 
and hybridity as argued by Hall (1990) or Brah (1996), Karla et al. (2005) have 
emphasized the potential for reactionary ‘literal’ interpretation of ‘diaspora’ 
among members of the diasporic group themselves, i.e. raising boundaries 
around the group rather than lowering them. Nationalism and other sorts of 
sectarianism offer consolation for the malaise of the diasporic condition. 
Therefore, while the diasporic condition does open ways for hybrid 
identification and a critique of the constraining national order, ‘in practice, what 
often occurs is both syncretic cultural formation and re-enforced ethnic and 
nationalist ties with the same diasporic space’ (Karla et al., 2005, p. 33). For 
Werbner (2002), the diasporic condition reflects specifically the alternation 
between these two states of minds: between instances of fused, confused and 
hybrid identities and others where clear identity inclusionary and exclusionary 
definitions are made. Knott (2010) argues that: 
‘Every diaspora – whether recent or of long standing, whether caused 
by exile or movement for trade, whether multi-sited or settled in a single 
place – has its ‘distinctive spatiality’, informed by actual journeys past 
and present, the particular forms and distribution of its settlements, its 
demography, the nature and extent of its social networks …and its 
distinctive imagined, historical and present geography.’ (p. 81)  
Thus, through his usage of the diasporic space, Knott broadens the concept of 
‘diaspora’ to include a variety of translocated communities and individuals 
some of whom do not comfortably fit into the two models of ‘diaspora’ outlined 
above.  
4.5.4. Diaspora as a social forum 
Diaspora communities maintain their collective identities through the 
construction of joint communal public spheres. Werbner (2002), who studied 
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the Pakistani community in greater Manchester, argues that these diasporic 
public spheres are not merely the product of projected images of the diasporic 
community by the majority group (through media, public discourse, and social 
structure), but rather must be actively created by the members of the 
community. Diasporic identities ‘are formed, made and remade; they exist in 
practice, dialogically through collective action and interaction’ (Werbner, 2002, 
p. 267). For that end the community has to construct organizations, activities, 
traditions and communal forums where issues of belonging and identification 
can be actively practiced and negotiated (Werbner, 2002, Yuval Davis, 1997). 
For example, Werbner demonstrated the articulation of a Pakistani-British 
discourse which is curved out of a constant dialogue with the general British 
society and the cultural images it projects onto the Pakistani community, the 
images of Pakistani homeland and global and local politics.  
4.5.5. Diaspora as a cultural production  
Diasporas must constantly confront their invisibility within the wider (British) 
society ‘through active acts of mobilization and hospitality and through public 
demonstrations of generosity which reach out beyond their locally constituted 
territorial communities’ (Werbner, 2002, p. 10) They are requested to 
contribute ‘real material or cultural goods across national boundaries through 
their political lobbying, fund raising or works of poetry art and music’ (p.10). 
Hence, diasporic communities have to maintain a delicate balance between 
seclusion and self-distinction on the one hand and integration within and 
contribution to the local British society, on the other. This negotiability of 
position also occurs, albeit more phantasmatically, vis-a-vis the society of 
origin (in our case, Israeli society) where questions of identification and 
distinction are concurrently negotiated.  
4.5.6. Immigration and integration into British society  
Much empirical sociological work has been conducted to link various material 
parameters (e.g. gender, participation in the local labour market, and levels of 
professionalism or the immigrants’ diasporic or home identity) and immigrants’ 
inclusion into local, British society in order to predict trends and devise policies. 
In spite of the limitations that this quantitative empirical research suffers from 
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(its tendency to essentialize and fix social categories, e.g. ‘minority’, ‘identity’, 
or ‘ethnicity’, and its efforts to generalize rules across subjects), it nevertheless 
points to some relevant categories which merit attention.      
Manning and Roy (2010) lay out certain patterns that could help in predicting 
greater adoption of British identity among immigrants. They argue that as a 
rule of thumb, ethnic minorities are less likely to define themselves as British 
and that newly-arrived immigrants ‘almost never think of themselves as British 
but [that] the feeling grows on them the longer they remain’ (p. 97). Their major 
finding, which is relevant to my research, is that the ‘assimilation into a British 
identity is faster for those from poorer, less democratic countries’ (ibid). The 
authors speculated that those coming from richer, democratic countries share 
similar values with the local British society and therefore ‘there is little concern 
about the fact that Italians rarely seem to come to think of themselves as 
British’ (ibid). Thus they argue that the insertion into British society is organized 
as a ‘Culture Club’ i.e. that shared values more than a declared national 
identity is the key for social inclusion. They also conclude that the lack of 
integration into British society may be due to ‘the refusal of the majority 
population to see minorities as British’ rather than these minorities’ reluctance 
to identify themselves as British. Stated differently, the famous ‘Tebitt test’,16 
that questioned the loyalty of immigrants to British society, would only be 
raised in relation to certain minorities (e.g. Asians, or Africans) but would not 
be of concern in relation to Italians living in Britain who do not even pretend to 
identify themselves as British. 
Several authors (e.g. Battu and Zenou, 2010 or Casey and Dustmann, 2010) 
look for links between immigrants’ identities and their participation in the local 
job market, assuming there will be a positive correlation between the two. All 
found that these links were not straightforward and involved a myriad of 
alternative parameters to explain why certain subjects do adopt a local identity 
or participate in the local labour market while others hold onto their previous, 
termed by Battu and Zenou ‘oppositional’, identities and restrict their work to 
their ethnic environment. In her research on Polish immigrants’ national 
                                            
16
 Named after the Conservative MP. He declared that immigrants’ support of any other 
national team but the English or British one reveals the supporter’s lack of inclusion into British 
society.   
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identity, Rabikowska (2010) notes a marked isolation between the Polish 
immigrants and the local British population in London.     
Overall, the research on immigration in the British context tends to focus on the 
adaptation of low skilled, non-European, marginalized populations and tends to 
ignore the processes that high-skilled immigrants or relocated populations 
undergo (see later discussion on high-skilled migration in Britain). However, 
research of ‘elite’ migrants’ (e.g. highly-qualified Finns and Americans) social 
and cultural integration into the local societies (US or Finland respectively) 
found that their high professional capital may have hampered their integration 
rather than facilitated it (Lienonen, 2012).   
4.6. Israelis in Britain and the notion of ‘diaspora’  
It is now time to consider how the Israeli population fits into these legal, 
professional and ‘identiterian’ trends that characterize the immigration context 
in Britain. The Israeli high-skilled, middle-class, secular, workers in Britain who 
occupy well-paid jobs and cannot be identified by physical appearance or 
traditional clothing do not easily fall into any of the two images of ‘diaspora’ 
discussed above. On the one hand, as will be described later, Jewish-Israelis 
as a group do not fit into the liberal, multicultural model of diaspora, with its 
hybrid dual affiliation as advocated by Hall (1990) or Brah (1996); their affinity 
towards Israel remains strong and exclusive. On the other hand, they have not 
been forced into the diaspora condition due to impossible circumstances in 
Israel, and while some (especially the women) find it more difficult to match 
their prior professional experience with the British job market (see later 
section), as a group they are certainly not excluded in economical or 
professional terms in British society as the former reading of ‘diaspora’ 
demands. Yet, there is a popular tendency among Israelis, in both Israel and 
Britain to see the British public and its media coverage of Israel as hostile 
towards Israel and favourable towards the Palestinians. This has also been 
found consistently in the interviews that will be presented in the ‘Findings’ 
chapters. Thus, in Israeli eyes, although they do not fit into the professional, 
racial, ethnic or economic exclusionary system described above, they often 
assume that they are excluded on political grounds. This view at least partly 
shapes the representation of their diasporic space in Britain.   
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4.6.1.  The representation of Israel among non-Jewish and Jewish British 
public  
So far I have discussed the general representation of ‘diaspora’ and ‘the other’ 
in British society. I will now channel the discussion to address the specific 
representation of Israel among non-Jewish and Jewish British publics. 
Academic work that has addressed this topic is often accused of being one-
sided. Philo and Berry’s Bad News from Israel (2004) and More Bad News 
from Israel (2011) describe how Israelis, Palestinians and the conflict between 
them are presented in mainstream British media (e.g. BBC). Their general 
claim is that through its coverage of and focus on immediate violent events in 
Israel/Palestine, the British media loses track of the historical context of the 
conflict and under-represents the oppressive effects on Palestinians caused by 
the on-going Israeli occupation. Shindler (2003), on the other hand, argues 
that The Guardian is caught in the confusion of the liberal West and therefore 
intentionally portrays the conflict between the sides so as to promote the 
notion of a one-state, rather than a two-state solution. 
The 2012 Country Ratings Poll conducted by GlobeScan/PIPA (2012) asked 
respondents from twenty countries to rate whether the influence of sixteen 
countries was predominantly positive or negative. The report ranks Israel 
fourth from bottom (only ranking above North Korea, Pakistan and Iran) with 
21% ranking it positively and 50% negatively. Among the British respondents, 
16% saw Israel as primarily positive while 68% ranked it negatively. On the 
other hand, quantitative research findings from the 2011 Jewish Policy 
Research (JPR) report (Graham and Boyd, 2011) carried out among Jewish 
and non-Jewish university students reveals that ‘the notion that students in the 
general population tend to harbour negative views about Israel is false’; it 
contends that ‘the majority [of non-Jewish students – 63%] is disinterested and 
holds no opinion at all and of those who do have an opinion, half [18%] hold a 
positive view and half [19%] hold a negative view’ (p. 61). The JPR findings 
also challenge a common assumption among Israelis and Jews alike 
according to which attitudes towards Israel and Jews in British academic 
institutions are overwhelmingly hostile. The JPR findings regarding the 
obliviousness of British public towards Israel gains support from More Bad 
News From Israel (2011) which concluded that almost two-thirds of the British 
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population did not know whether Israel was occupying the Palestinian 
territories or vice versa. This can exemplify a misrepresentation of the conflict 
(as the book argued) or a general disinterest in what goes on there. One way 
of bridging the contradictions between the very different findings is to suggest 
that British citizens do harbour negative feelings towards Israel (as the country 
scaling poll shows) but that these views will not necessarily be articulated 
openly (as the JPR findings show) in a personal encounter.    
In contrast to the negative image that Israel might have in the general British 
society, the perception of Israel among British Jews has been traditionally very 
favourable. The 2010 JPR report (Graham and Boyd, 2010) argues that ‘the 
vast majority of respondents exhibit strong personal support for and affinity 
with Israel’ (p. 36). The report summarizes the British Jewish attitude towards 
Israel as ‘Committed, Concerned and Conciliatory’. It appears that Israel 
remains a major identity axis for the vast majority of British Jews, in spite of a 
growing dissatisfaction with the governmental policies towards the Palestinians 
and the peace process, or the over-representation of religious orthodoxy in 
Israeli society. Other works (e.g. Kahn-Harris and Gidley, 2010) have argued 
that Israel gains less attention from Jewish communities which are more 
concerned with internal, local issues. It looks as if more and more diasporic 
Jews are rejecting their position as Jews living ‘in Exile’ and insist on re-
considering the Zionist Israeli-Jewish-Diaspora contract (Magid, 2006, Shneer 
and Aviv, 2010). For many Jews, Israel remains an important part of their 
Jewish Identity but not necessarily the sole axis around which this identity 
revolves. Thus some Jews may look at Israel as ‘A Jewish homeland’ rather 
than ‘THE Jewish Homeland’ whiles others do not imagine it to be a homeland 
at all.  
4.6.2. The notion of diaspora in Israeli high and popular culture 
As described in greater detail in the previous chapter, the Jewish national 
movement, like many other national movements, selectively constructed 
(though not necessarily self-consciously) the collective narrative and 
historiography to support its political targets (Ram, 2006, Magid, 2006, Sand, 
2008). Concepts such as the ‘Negation of Exile’ (Shlilat Hagalut) and the 
‘Ingathering of Exiles’ (Kibbutz Galuyot) or the ‘Aliya’ vs. ‘Yerida’ 
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(ascent/immigration to Israel vs. descent emigration from Israel) vocabulary 
still circulate in Israeli society and support this approach to Jewish life away 
from Israel. Perceptions of Jews immigrating to Israel have been shaped by 
the Zionist ethos and they were preferred to be perceived as Jewish 
ideologues returning to their old homeland rather than immigrants relocating 
their lives out of economic and practical reasons (Golden, 2001, Anteby-
Yemini, 2004). On the other hand, the official and public attitude towards those 
emigrating abroad has always been very negative.  
The numbers of Israelis living aboard is estimated at between 500,000 and 
600,000 (Cohen, 2005, Della Pergola, 2012) - roughly 10% of Israel’s Jewish 
population and 9% of its overall population. In contrast to pessimistic 
impressions among the Israel public, Della Pergola argues (2012) that the 
Israeli rates of emigration do not exceed those in some other developed 
countries such as Switzerland or Italy.  
Sobel (1986) argues that regardless of the contraindicative information, e.g. an 
amelioration of the material economic conditions of living in Israel, there is a 
persistent psychological state of emergency among the Jewish population 
which shapes how immigration to Israel and emigration from it is perceived. 
According to Floman (2007), emigration still casts a shadow on the success of 
the Zionist project which is still perceived by Jews in both Israel and outside it 
to be ‘under construction’ or under threat.   
Despite the lessening in stigmatized labelling, many scholars agree (Gold, 
2002, Lahav and Arian, 1999, Cohen, 2005, Floman, 2007) that self-images of 
the Jewish-Israeli diaspora (and those of the non-Israeli Jewish diaspora, see 
Magid, 2006, Shneer and Aviv, 2010) are still organized to a large extent 
around the Zionist ethos of the Jewish ingathering and the negation of Exile.    
4.7.  The sociological profile of Jewish-Israeli emigration  
While relatively little academic research has been conducted on Israelis in 
Britain (see Gold, 2004, Hart, 2004 and Lev-Ari, 2008), their sociological profile 
seems to resemble that of many, though not all, Israeli communities in America 
that have been researched, i.e. mostly families (rather than singles) of highly 
skilled, middle class, Ashkenazi background which constitute the mainstream 
of Israeli society, often the descendants of the states’ founding elite. In what 
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follows I will review some of the sociological literature that describes the profile 
of Israelis and Israeli communities abroad.  
4.7.1.  Professional skills  
Cohen (2005) notes that ‘Israelis abroad are a highly educated and an 
economically successful group’ (Cohen, 2005, p. 139) and are more educated 
and professionally skilled than the average citizen in both Israel and the 
country of settlement. Like other voluntary migrations of mostly high-skilled 
workers (Lienonen, 2012), Israelis emigrate with the hope of enjoying the 
economic benefits that the western world has to offer, especially at times of 
economic recession in Israel. The growing demand for highly skilled labour 
alongside the opening up of the global market attracts highly qualified Israeli 
groups which have been exposed in recent decades to discourses of 
individualism (Roninger, 1999).  
4.7.2. Jewish-Israeli emigration and social/ethnic class  
According to Floman (2007) Mizrahi Jews, whose socio-economic class is 
traditionally lower in Israeli society, were twice as likely as Ashkenazi-Israelis 
to consider emigration since Ashkenazi Israelis risk losing the social capital 
they gained by emigrating to a new country. Yet, according to Cohen (2005), 
the percentage of Ashkenazi émigrés is greater than their percentage among 
the population in Israel and the chances that those holding an academic 
degree will emigrate is double that of those not holding an academic degree 
(Ha’aretz, 2012). Uriely (1994) and Floman (2007) categorized the Israeli 
émigrés in America into three groups: ‘temporaries’ (those who have come 
from Israel for a limited time and return at the end of this term), ‘settlers’ 
(Israelis who have immigrated and settled in their new country), and 
‘permanent sojourners’ (who voice an intention to return to Israel but do not 
have practical plans to do so and effectively may live for many years in their 
new country). The category of ‘the sojourner’ has long been documented 
among other emigration populations (e.g. Chinese in America – Siu, 1952, 
Iranians in Britain – Fathi, 2011) and does not reflect a unique Israeli feature. 
Uriely (1994) and Floman (2007) have found that a far greater proportion 
among Israelis of high socio-economic status in Israel – who are mostly 
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Ashkenazi – have adopted a permanent sojourner position compared with 
lower socio-economic status Israelis – mostly of Mizrahi background – who 
tended to settle. These findings indicate that learning about Israelis’ 
construction of ‘national identity’ abroad requires studying it in its intersection 
with other social factors – such as gender, class, ethnicity, professional 
qualifications etc. – and the power-relations they dictate, as indicated by 
intersectional theorists (Yuval-Davis, 1997). Like other high-skilled migrant 
workers (Lienonen, 2012), high-skilled Israelis often find it difficult to fit into the 
host society and to identify with it. Lienonen (2012) reported a sense of 
estrangement in the local society among American and Finish migrants to 
Finland and US, respectively. Like Manning and Roy (2010), she concluded 
that this condition was created, paradoxically, because American and Fins are 
not considered or consider themselves ‘immigrants’ and therefore are not 
assumed to make an effort and fit into the local society like other, low skilled 
work-migrants. 
The permanent sojourners’ psychology involves ‘sitting on one’s suitcase’ - 
avoiding any signs of institutionalization, settling down physically or 
psychologically, and actively maintaining an intermediate position of 
temporariness in the country of settlement (Floman, 2007). According to 
Floman, certain trends characterize the Israeli ‘temporary sojourners’: a 
tendency to stick to Israeli culture, organizing life around the completing of a 
specific task (after which the emigrant proposes to return to Israel), a tendency 
to form social ties exclusively among Israelis and the frequent travel back and 
forth between the new country and Israel. According to Uriely (1994), Israeli 
‘permanent sojourners’ experience guilt, anxiety and embarrassment due to 
the discrepancy between the proclaimed intention to return and the continuing 
life abroad; Floman adds that their apparent discomfort stems also from their 
ability to choose whether to stay or to return and the acknowledgement that by 
settling abroad they will be giving up the social capital - their high social status 
and the social networks - that reward them for their achievements in Israeli 
society.  
 
 
 
92 
4.7.3. Jewish-Israeli emigration, gender and the job market  
According to Floman (2007), the family’s gender power-relations among the 
affluent Israeli population changes following emigration. Similar to migration 
patterns among other high-skilled emigrant populations (Lienonen, 2012) 
where ‘women often sacrifice their own career for the sake of their family or 
may be disadvantaged in the process by gender bias’ (Iredale, 2005, p. 164), 
among Israeli migrants to Britain it is mostly the man who is the reason for 
relocation (Lev-Ari, 2008) and the woman who comes as his dependent. 
Whereas women’s participation in the Israeli job market amounts to 56%17 
(OECD iLibrary, 2012), Floman (2007) argues that only 30% of Israeli women, 
many of whom are high skilled professionals, join the American job market in 
the first five years of their relocation. Thus, while for many immigrant women 
who were barred from joining the job market in their home countries, 
emigration is experienced as empowering (e.g. Iranians – Fathi, 2011) since it 
allows and even encourages them to work, for Israeli women emigration is 
often perceived as professionally debilitating. This condition increases the 
gender inequalities within the Israeli immigrant family, accentuates traditional 
gender roles and determines how family life is conducted (what Floman calls a 
‘Starbucks women’s society’ where working women might feel unwelcomed). 
To compare, Fathi (2011) describes the importance of professional identity for 
the creation of a sense of belonging and inclusion into British society among 
Iranian women following their immigration to Britain.   
4.7.4. Jewish-Israeli communal patterns abroad  
Researchers disagree regarding the extent and diversity of communal 
institutions formed by Jewish Israelis in their communities. Whereas Cohen 
(2005) reports an elaborate Jewish-Israeli institutional network (in Toronto), 
most researchers describe the paucity of distinctive Israeli institutions formed 
by the Jewish-Israeli communities in USA (Shokeid, 1993, Gold, 2004, Floman 
2007) and London (Hart 2004 and Lev-Ari (2008). Floman (2007) argues that 
Israeli communal life in the San Francisco Bay does exist but that it bears 
                                            
17
 This is a figure that addresses the overall women’s (ages 15-65) participation in the Israeli 
labour market that includes some sectors where participation is minimal. Among middle class 
Israeli women it is expected to be much higher.  
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distinctive informal characteristics that revolve around spontaneous social 
encounters in homes, women’s social gatherings in cafes or organizing ad hoc 
activities usually around the Jewish and Israeli holidays. Accordingly, the 
community she described in San Francisco, like the one in London, does not 
own any permanent housing for its institutions, nor are there fundraising 
networks that could financially support the on-going communal activities. 
Floman explains this trend with the temporary condition termed ‘permanent 
sojourn’ that was described above. Thus, according to Floman (2007), Israelis 
who constantly declare their intention to return to Israel will be reluctant to 
establish long-lasting institutions that will signify their commitment and 
permanence abroad. Similarly, she found that the kinds of activities initiated 
and their contents intentionally resemble and echo those carried out in Israel 
(‘like in Ha’aretz’ in her interviewees’ words). Hart (2004), who also 
demonstrated the lack of formal institutions in the Jewish-Israeli London 
community, showed ‘the role of communal schools as a ‘mag-net’: a meeting 
point, an ‘ethnic doorway’ and a channel through which new members were 
introduced to the community and gained access to its networks’ (p.190). The 
schooling pattern helped the community to erect boundaries around itself and 
‘maintain the community’s structure and ensure its survival’ (Hart, 2004 p. 
200). It appears that the geographical proximity, the relatively low cost of travel 
to Israel (Lev-Ari, 2008) and the frequent turnover of Israeli families which 
return to Israel once the professional task has been achieved and are replaced 
by new incoming families; all contribute to the informal, ad-hoc and 
disorganized characteristics of the Israeli community in Britain18.          
4.7.5. Jewish-Israeli emigrants and the local societies  
Practically all scholars looking into the Jewish Israeli communities in North 
America (for example Gold, 2004, Lahav and Arian, 1999, Cohen, 2005) or 
Britain (Hart, 2004, Lev-Ari, 2008) report a marked reluctance of Israelis to 
identify with the host societies (by identifying themselves as British for 
example) although they may spend extended periods, achieve impressive 
                                            
18
 About a year ago, a Facebook group called ‘Mummy-land’ and later its contestant, ‘London’s 
Imas’ (London’s mums) have been set. The access to these groups is restricted to Israeli 
mothers. A great deal of emotional support and general information is provided by the 
members. These groups gradually become important public spaces, distinctively led by 
women, around which the Jewish-Israeli community gathers.     
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social and economic records and even acquire local British citizenship. This 
finding is not unique for Israelis. Manning and Roy (2010) report a greater 
reluctance among immigrants to identify themselves as British for those 
coming from richer and democratic countries as opposed to those from poorer 
countries. In a study that looked into the European context of Israeli 
emigration, Lev-Ari (2008) noted a marked disengagement with the local 
(British) society among first generation Israeli emigrants, consistent with 
research findings among other Israeli communities in North America. Other 
migrant communities (e.g. Poles, Rabikowska, 2010) also manifest signs of 
isolation and seclusion form the host British society. In Lev-Ari’s research 
(2008), this was demonstrated by indifference towards, and even ignorance of, 
British current affairs and a lack of social interaction with the local non-Jewish 
population. Lev-Ari’s content analysis showed that Israelis feel different among 
the local British population in how they talk, behave or dress and consequently 
feel alienated. At the same time they also described the tolerance of the local 
British society that allows them to keep their habits and makes their lives 
comfortable. Israelis abroad are often concerned about anti-Semitism 
disguised by anti-Zionism and faced with hostile comments have to negotiate 
their religious identity (McNamara, 1987), which is kept dormant under Israel’s 
strong national-secular narrative.     
4.7.6. Jewish-Israelis and the local Jewish communities 
Most studies note a clear division between the Israeli and the local Jewish 
communities and Lahav and Arian (1999) even see a tendency for the two 
communities to go their separate ways. They argue that ‘the ambivalence 
between Israelis and American Jews is transformed into separatism, rather 
than hostility once Israelis arrive in America for an extended stay with the 
prospect of changing their citizenship’ (p. 18). Floman (2007) notes that the 
alienation from the local Jewish community is especially marked among 
Ashkenazi-Israelis than among Mizrahi-Israelis. Gold explains that there exists 
‘a disparity between the subjective secular, quasi-national Jewish identity of 
many Israelis, especially of the Ashkenazi elite, and the synagogue based, 
ethno-religious identity of diaspora US Jews’ (2004 p. 337). Israelis see their 
ethnic identity, their ‘Jewishness’, as secular and national, more related to 
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Israeliness than to Judaism. Israelis who were brought up within a certain 
secular Zionist viewpoint and may even be part of the ‘torch carriers’ of this 
ideology in Israeli society, are also often hostile to religion because of the 
political connotations that are aroused in Israeli politics by the religious parties 
and also as a result of the classic western secular (Zionist) discourses towards 
religion (Raz-Krakotzkin, 2005). Mizrahi Israelis, who were always more 
closely affiliated to religion from their countries of origin (and were partly 
marginalized in Israeli society because of it), find it easier to integrate into the 
local, synagogue-based Jewish societies (Floman, 2007).  
Studies (Gold, 2002, Cohen, 2005, Floman, 2007) show that in the course of 
time, Jewish-Israelis who choose to settle in the US, are eventually absorbed 
and integrated into the local Jewish communities. 
Few members’, writes Gold, ‘of the first generation repudiated their 
connection to Israel to become flag-waving Canadian, English, or 
American Jews. A considerable number did, however, begin to describe 
themselves as members of the de-territorialized ethnic or religious 
community of the Jewish people. In this way, they were able to reconcile 
their connections to two or more nationalities without appearing disloyal 
to either (2004, p. 347). 
4.8. Discussion – private and communal lives of Israelis abroad 
In this section, I tried to highlight some of the main issues concerning 
immigration in Britain in general and Israelis’ migration more specifically. 
Understanding the British socio-cultural context – how ‘immigration’ and 
‘diaspora’ in general and ‘Israel’ specifically are perceived among Jewish and 
non-Jewish British publics (or at least how Israelis understand these 
perceptions) makes up an indispensable part of Israelis’ construction of 
‘national identity’. I opened with a theoretical description of the notion of 
‘diaspora’ (as a form of ‘otherness’ or dislocation) in British society since it 
appeared to be the theoretical framework of choice: incorporating the ‘here 
and now’ in the ‘new country’ with the attachments and affiliations to the ‘then 
and there’ in the ‘homeland’. A review of the relevant literature on ‘diaspora’ 
(e.g. Hall, 1990, Brah, 1996 or Werbner, 2002) reveals that Israelis do not fall 
easily into this hybrid, liberal, multicultural interpretation of ‘diaspora’ as 
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proposed by Hall (1990). Nor do they fit the profile of marginalized, low-skilled 
migrants coming from poorer countries (McIlwaine et al, 2006) or those who 
suffered difficult political or social conditions in their home countries (e.g. 
Turkey, Tanyas, 2010, or Iran, Fathi, 2011), all of whom suffer the formal and 
informal British socio-political exclusionary practices as described by Karla et 
al (2005), Tyler (2010) or Fortier (2011). As high-skilled workers who have 
established themselves financially in British society and who have often come 
from mainstream middle class Israeli society, they arrive with considerable 
social capital and therefore often have a lot to lose by leaving Israel. 
Therefore, one way of relating to the experience of diasporic dislocation has to 
do with the likelihood of the option to return to the ‘homeland’. This aligns with 
Manning and Roy’s findings (2010) which describe the reluctance of migrants 
from richer, democratic countries to adopt the local British identity. According 
to Floman (2007), Israelis’ strong attachment to Israel for social, cultural and 
ideological reasons deters them from engaging with the local societies and its 
culture. The research I reviewed never reported or discussed an engagement 
of Israeli émigrés with local politics or current affairs, for example, but rather 
focused exclusively on the ties to Israel. Such a position makes up an 
important part of their diasporic condition. Israelis’ communal and private 
existence abroad, as discussed by Gold, 2004, Hart, 2004 and Lev-Ari, 2008, 
resembles more the condition termed ‘temporary-sojourner’ (Siu, 1952, Uriely, 
1994, Floman, 2007) characterized by strong attachment to previous social 
and cultural habits, the maintenance of exclusive social ties among fellow 
Israelis, and the marked disengagement from British (Jewish or non-Jewish) 
society. Taken in its deeper meaning, an ‘Israeli-diaspora’ requires the creation 
of a distinct and particularized public space with its distinctive discourses and 
unique practises which converses with, but is not subjugated to, the dominant 
home (i.e. Zionist) discourses and culture. In this sense, an Israeli diaspora 
might constitute a post/non-Zionist arena which can envision Israelis living rich 
private and communal lives in the ‘diaspora’ and yet maintaining their 
‘Israeliness’. By contrast, the Israeli profile that comes up in the sociological 
research maintains very strong commitments to Israeli culture and to Zionist 
ideology and consequently portrays a troubled diasporic space.   
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It is also within this cultural ideological context that the academic research 
(mine included - see reference to ‘reflexivity’ in the methodological chapter) is 
conducted. The sociological research that I have mentioned above often 
emerges out of mainstream Israeli society and the aims of the research and its 
pre-given assumptions are axiomatically drawing on Zionist premises. Many 
scholars are preoccupied by the numbers of Israelis that emigrate (Della 
Pergola, 2012) or with ‘the demographical success of Zionism’ (Cohen, 2007). 
Others are explicitly concerned by the levels of assimilation of Israelis abroad 
and their patterns of returning to Israel (Lev-Ari, 2008). While there is a 
disproportionate number of Ashkenazi, high-skilled emigrants compared to 
their percentage in the Israeli population, Israelis of other social groups 
(Mizrahi, orthodox Jews or Palestinians) also emigrate but these are hardly 
ever made the object of research. Thus, the objects of study are, most often, 
the mainstream, middle-class families whose departure troubles Israelis in 
Israel the most. It points to a certain social profile of the ‘average Israeli’ cut 
out of the Zionist cloth of the ‘New Jew’. Research (e.g. Gold, 2002) repeatedly 
indicates that the permanent-sojourner Israeli communities and individual 
subjects mainly comprise those secular Ashkenazi Israelis, whereas the 
Mizrahi Jews find ways to integrate into local Jewish communities. Perhaps 
their integration in the local Jewish communities can be explained by the fact 
that their affiliation to Israeli society and its Zionist agenda is not as strong due 
to their marginalization in Zionist Ashkenazi-dominated society and their non-
European imaginary of ‘community’, ‘nation’ and ‘religion’. Orthodox Jewish-
Israelis and Palestinian-Israelis, who also make up part of Israeli society, and 
whose commitment to the Zionist ideology is even weaker, have hardly ever 
been researched. This may be due not only to their marginal percentage 
among Israeli émigrés but rather because they fall out of the profile of 
Israeliness that Zionist discourses of nationality imagine and that Israeli social 
research is interested in. These groups might often have no interest in 
participating in research of ‘Israeliness’, for them a category associated with 
exclusion and alienation. Within these communities, perhaps those who 
Anteby-Yemini had in mind when discussing the ‘Israeli diaspora’, an 
alternative, counter-hegemonic Israeli ‘diasporic space’, may be studied (see a 
discussion of my own research sample in the next methodology chapter).  
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While the ‘national imagination’ performs in the construction of any migrants 
group’s collective identity, there are various contents which inform this 
imagination. The Israeli case is different from many other migrant communities 
in that it is shaped by a clear (Zionist) narrated national ideology. This 
collective imagination determines who is an Israeli (and therefore who will be 
researched), where they should live (and that therefore living abroad ‘creates a 
problem’), or how Israeliness is to be practiced (frequent travels to Israel, 
studying in ‘Israeli’ schools – Hart, 2004 - or avoiding synagogues). Within 
these constraints, however, as I have argued in the first part of the chapter, 
Israelis, even those who have been raised within a highly conformist Zionist 
environment, introduce their private interpretations and negotiate, contest or 
adhere to these hegemonic demands. It is on this specific intersection of 
subjectivity, immigration, culture, politics and ideology, all clustered under the 
heading of ‘national identity’, that my research is focused. However, a 
qualitative, critical and contextualized look at both subjects’ personal meaning-
making (narratives) and the cultural imaginary tools (discourses, images and 
signifiers) offered to them reveals the constant struggle and incongruence 
within the hegemonic collective narrative (Bhabha’s ‘troubled nation’, 1994) 
and between it and subjects’ personalized versions. It is this encounter 
between the troubled subject described in this chapter and the troubled society 
described in the previous ones, that I have been trying to trace in this thesis.  
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Chapter five – Conducting a critical narrative 
analysis of ‘national Identities’ among 
Jewish-Israelis in Britain   
5.1.  Introduction 
In the previous theoretical chapters, I have outlined my psychosocial approach 
to the study of nationalism (and Israeli nationalism specifically), identities, 
national identities, and Israeli national identities among Israelis who live 
outside Israel. In this chapter, I will present and discuss the various practical 
stages I undertook when conducting qualitative empirical research on this 
topic.  
I have chosen a critical narrative methodology to analyse the interview texts 
and have argued that narratives do not reflect the subject’s inner, persistent 
‘truth’ on ‘Israeliness’ but are, rather, in and of themselves acts embedded in 
specific historical-political contexts destined to achieve something at the very 
moment of their articulation. This psychosocial approach embraces ‘the critical 
gains of discourse analysis … but combining it with a focus on the active 
constructing processes through which individuals attempt to account for their 
lives' (Emerson and Frosh, 2004, p. 7). As argued in the previous chapter, 
narratives play an important part in the construction of identity by binding 
together disparate and often contradictory experiences into imaginary stability. 
Yuval Davis argues that ‘identities are narratives, stories people tell 
themselves and others about who they are (and who they are not) (Yuval-
Davis, 2006, p. 201). But identity is something which is always in transition 
‘always producing itself through the combined processes of being and 
becoming, belonging and longing to belong’ (ibid). In light of this, my analysis 
sought to address the speakers’ particular and subjective interpretation of 
Israeliness (‘the nation’) and their sense of personal engagement (or dis-
engagement) with it whilst at the same time acknowledging the contingency of 
these accounts:  
A. the work that the interviewee’s speech seeks to achieve within the 
social interview encounter (the discursive psychological focus); 
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B. the co-production of texts by speaker and audience - e.g. the 
interviewer (the dialogical social-psychological focus); 
C. the broader Israeli and British social, cultural and discursive context 
within which the interviews took place (the Foucauldian focus); and,  
D. the speakers’ efforts to promote a sense of personal coherence, or 
‘identity’, in the face of disruptive experiences (the 
psychological/psychoanalytic focus).  
The chapter will open with a discussion of critical narrative analysis – the 
methodological approach I chose. I will then describe the various practical 
stages of the research – recruiting participants and their demographical 
characteristics, the data collection method (semi-structured interviews) and the 
way I formulated and managed the interview agenda, the transcription, coding 
and translation of the texts (which were produced in Hebrew), criteria for 
choosing extracts for analysis and the method of analysis. I will also present 
dilemmas around reflexivity which preoccupied me throughout the research – 
what my role was as a co-producer of the interviewee’s narrative; to what 
extent my own preconceptions of ‘nationality’ and ‘national identity’ shaped its 
course and how social roles were negotiated and administered between me 
and the interviewees in ways that shaped the production of texts.   
5.2. Choosing a research methodology: Narrative or Discursive 
analysis?  
According to Willig (2008), the methodological approach should be the most 
appropriate methodology (rather than ‘the right one’) to address the research 
questions that have driven the researcher to conduct the research and have 
guided him/her throughout its analysis. This approach encompasses the 
ontological assumptions about ‘what is out there’ (what is ‘a nation’ or what are 
‘identities’), the epistemological assumptions about how I can study it, and the 
practical means of collecting that data (e.g. interviews, participant observations 
or observing visual images), processing it (e.g. transcribing, translating) and 
analysing it.  
In the introduction I have described the socio-political and personal 
circumstances that led me to embark on the research of ‘Israeli national 
identity’ – i.e. the on-going struggle to negotiate subjectivity within Jewish-
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Israeli culture dominated by a Zionist ideology and narrative. My three 
research questions were:  
1.What hegemonic and counter-hegemonic national narratives, themes, 
images and daily practices do Jewish-Israeli subjects draw on while 
making sense of ‘their’ ‘national identity’?  
2. What are the subject-positions and underlying power-relations 
implicated in these social discourses on nationality? How are practices 
of inclusion and exclusion informed and managed by this collective 
imagery?    
3. How do participants negotiate or narrate these social discourses to 
accommodate them to subjects’ personal narratives of ‘who they are’?   
While the first two research questions focus on social discourses prevalent in 
Israeli society, and therefore lean towards a social constructivist approach, the 
third research question deals with Jewish Israelis’ engagement with these 
social discourses, assumes a degree of subject agency and independence (as 
the usage of ‘negotiate’ and ‘narrate’ implies) and may appear more 
psychologically-oriented. As argued throughout the theoretical chapters, a 
psychosocial approach, which sees the social and psychological as intertwined 
and inseparable, is the most appropriate way to accommodate both 
perspectives within the study of ‘national identities’.  
Given the dual, psychosocial reading of identities  as socially, politically and 
culturally situated and yet idiosyncratically adapted to a personal narrative of 
‘self’ and other’, both discursive analysis as well as narrative analysis could 
serve as appropriate research methodologies.  
5.2.1. Locating the main focus of research   
Over the course of the preliminary stages I gradually realized that my main 
interest lies with individuals’ Israeli identities rather than with the mapping of 
the Israeli cultural reservoir and the social and discursive configurations 
dominating Israeli culture. Since culture ‘speaks’ itself through individuals’ 
stories (Riessman, 1993), analysing the narratives of Israelis who live in Britain 
could reveal both the reservoir of collective imagery of ‘the nation’ that 
dominates Israeli society as well as its idiosyncratic and personal 
interpretations by individual subjects. Furthermore, as my experiences during 
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the 2006 Israeli-Lebanese war (described in chapter one) taught me, I was 
interested in subjects’ efforts towards meaning-making, especially in the 
context of what appears as collective and personal critical periods – e.g. the 
transitional period in Israeli society at a phase of an ideological crisis (as 
described in chapter three) and the personal condition of migration and life in 
the diaspora (chapter four). Therefore, since ‘personal narratives, typically 
emerging around people’s experiences of breaches between ideal and real, 
self and society, may have special importance for the narrator’ (Emerson and 
Frosh, 2004, p. 140), I asked myself how and to what extent do Israelis who 
live in Britain (away from Israel) sustain a sense of ‘national identity’ having 
grown up in a society that is driven by Zionist ideology, encourages Israelis 
and Jews to live in Israel and problematizes alternative forms of Jewishness. I 
was also interested to document alternative, counter-hegemonic, deemed 
‘post-Zionist’ interpretations of nationhood should these be raised in the texts.  
5.2.2. Theoretical criticism of discursive approaches  
My preference for (critical) narrative analysis over discursive analysis also 
stems from their differential approaches towards ‘identity’ or the experiences of 
self-hood. While a more culturally and politically informed critical narrative 
analysis (e.g. Reissman 1993, 2008, Emerson and Frosh, 2004, Elliott, et al 
2009 or Andrews, Sclater, Squire, & Tamboukou, 2004) acknowledges the role 
of social discourses and therefore offers a means to study and incorporate the 
cultural symbolic system within an analysis of subjects’ narratives, discursive 
analysis over-emphasizes the social impacts and has often been accused of 
‘lack of the person’ (Willig, 2008, p. 106). According to Willig, ‘discursive 
psychology does not address questions about subjectivity’ (2008, p. 106), but 
is rather interested in the discursive and rhetorical means people use in order 
to achieve certain social goals and in the action orientation that discourse, 
especially talking, brings with it. Foucauldian discursive analysis is better 
suited to study the discursive reservoir (or discursive limitations, Foucault, 
1970) that prevail in Jewish-Israeli society but reduces the subject to the 
‘discursive positioning’ in which it is caught up. Both discursive approaches 
ignore the idiosyncrasy, particularity and creativity characterizing ‘identity’ as I 
choose to read it (following Hall, 1990, 2000) which resist, or at least negotiate 
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the influences of social forces. Additionally, both approaches overemphasise 
the role of language or words as a means of communication whereas meaning 
and subjectivity also appear between the words and the lines or in ideas that 
are implied and communicated through gestures, laughs, hesitations, etc. 
Finally, both discursive approaches defy the attempt to read or analyse the 
subject’s narrative as an effort, even if imaginary, of continuity.      
If identity is to be seen for its fluidity and contextuality made of only momentary 
stabilities, as Frosh and Baraitser (2009) argue, then narratives constitute an 
important tool in the construction of such momentary stabilities. I have adopted 
what Emerson and Frosh (2004) termed a ‘Critical Narrative Analysis’ that 
reads the narrative produced in text as socially and culturally situated, 
acknowledges the fragility of narrative coherence, and sees it as a co-
production of narrator and audience (e.g. the interviewer) rather than as an 
independent, subjective  ‘truthful’ account of the speaker. As I will demonstrate 
in the findings chapter, some of the extracts (e.g. Michael’s – chapter six) 
present clear narrative structure, as outlined in Labov’s classical model (1972) 
whereas in other extracts (e.g. Roni’s – chapter eight) the structure is less 
apparent (as described in Gee’s approach, 2005).  
5.3. Critical narrative analysis  
Traditional narrative analysis emerges out of phenomenological-humanistic 
(Hiles and Cermack, 2008) and cognitive approaches (Bruner, 1990) and 
studies narratives as manifestations of the speakers’ subjective experiences of 
the world and of themselves. Structural theorists such as Labov (1972) and 
Gee (2005) focus on the ways narratives are structured in order to deepen the 
analysis of the explicit content and learn about the speaker’s style of narration 
and their thematic focus. According to the critical narrative approach, content 
cannot be separated from its context. It switches ‘figure’ and ‘ground’ and turns 
its attention to the cultural, political (Riessman, 1993, 2008), interpersonal 
(Emerson and Frosh, 2004) or biographical (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000, 
Frosh, Phoenix, and Pattman, 2003, Roseneil, 2006) context within which the 
narrative was constructed. These aspects provide additional dimensions to the 
analysis and deepen its interpretation. Analysing narratives critically means 
addressing the following aspects:  
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5.3.1. The tension between coherence and disruption/fragmentation 
‘There is room for managing departures from the canonical’ argues Bruner 
(1990, p. 50); Riessman suggests that the construction of narratives becomes 
especially crucial ‘when biographical disruptions occur that rupture 
expectations for continuity’ (2008, p. 10). However, following Lacanian 
theorists who see the subject (Zizek, 1998) and the nation (Bhabha 1990, 
1994) as inherently troubled or split, I have argued that both ‘identity’ and 
‘narrative’ are to be regarded as imaginary phenomena, serving to mask and 
veil the subject’s recognition of its condition of fragmentation and split or as 
‘momentary assemblages of contradictory forces’ (Frosh and Baraitser, 2009, 
p. 159). For that end, the narrator (here the interviewee) selects certain events 
or articulations that will serve the plot that they want to promote and 
concomitantly discards other elements or counter-narratives that will contradict 
and disrupt that plot. In this sense the narrative, according to Bruner (1990), is 
only partly committed to ‘reality’: ‘the sequence of its sentences, rather than 
the truth or falsity of any of those sentences, is what determines its overall 
configuration of plot’ (p. 44). The national narrative’s coherence as presented 
by Renan at the end of the nineteenth century (1882) can only be achieved 
and sustained through a selective forgetfulness of certain unfitting traumatic 
and incomprehensible events. Nevertheless, the precariousness of the 
narrative’s coherence and homogeneity will inevitably be revealed through 
various verbal and non-verbal articulations (e.g. hesitations, disruptions, verbal 
lapses, laughter etc.). Within a critical narrative approach attention will be 
shifted to these counter-narrative aspects as much as to the explicit storied 
content in an effort to highlight the on-going struggle among contesting 
narratives and ‘voices’. Rather than looking for or unravelling the organizing 
forces of the narrative as structuralist theorists (e.g. Labov in Riessman 2008 
or Gee, 2005) seek to do, my approach accepts the linearity as well as its 
diversions as mutually constitutive of the narrative.  
5.3.2. Narrative as a dialogical co-production  
A narrative should not be regarded as a reflection of the speakers’ consistent 
personal ‘inner truth’, but rather as a co-production of the narrator and the 
audience for whom that narrative is destined. The audience can either be 
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physically present (the interviewer/listener) or imagined (e.g. the interviewer in 
the mind of the interviewee when thinking, before the interview took place, 
what they want to talk about) and can either participate more or less actively in 
the course of the interview. Roseneil (2006) argues that the ‘interview was the 
co-production of the interviewer and the interviewee, at a particular moment in 
both of their lives [and would] have been inflected differently to a different 
interviewer’ (p. 865). Various identity markers – age, profession (psychologist), 
gender, ethnic background (Ashkenazi – as my surname discloses), academic 
qualifications, as well as my style of interviewing, to state some of the obvious 
identification categories, played a role in the text production.  
5.3.3. Narrative as a tool to achieve strategic goals 
According to discursive psychologists (e.g. Potter, 2005), texts should be 
studied first and foremost for their action orientation – the effects they aim to 
achieve within the research encounter and the speaker’s overall self-
perception in life. Riessman cites Goffman who wrote: ‘What talkers undertake 
to do is not to provide information to recipients but to present dramas to an 
audience’ (Goffman 1974 cited in Riessman, 2008, p. 106). Patterson (2008) 
argues that ‘a clause that appears to be a simple narrative clause referring to 
an event is not necessarily present in the text just because it is what happened 
…’ but may have been selected for inclusion because it supports the point of 
narrative’ (p. 30). Finally, Squire (in Andrews et al., 2004) makes a more 
general claim when she argues that ‘in performing narratives we can create 
new possibilities for identities and action’ (p. 104). Thus the content of the 
narrative should also be analysed for the social benefits it aims to achieve 
within the interview encounter and beyond.   
5.3.4. Narratives reflect broader historical, cultural and social contexts  
In contrast to phenomenological, humanistic and psychological approaches 
that underline the subjects’ construction of the world they live in, my 
psychosocial reading of narratives states that subjects are limited by a certain 
discursive reservoir prevalent in their culture (e.g. Israeli), for example when 
making sense of ‘the nation’, of citizenship, group membership, religion or ‘the 
state’. Gee (2005) suggests that ‘what is being communicated in the narrative 
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presents the clues about what is taken to be ‘normal’, ‘right’, ‘good’, ‘correct’, 
‘proper’, ‘appropriate’, ‘valuable’, ‘the way things are’, ‘the way things ought to 
be’, ‘high status or low status’, ‘like me or not like me’ and so forth’ (p.12). In 
Banal Nationalism (1995), Billig describes how a certain notion of ‘the nation’ is 
constructed through the banal daily details of ‘flagging’ which go unnoticed in 
people’s daily discourse, media coverage and formal documents. My first 
research question addresses the cultural contents that Israelis draw on when 
defining their national identity. The interviewees in my research applied images 
(e.g. ‘a country of sun’, ‘tiny Israel’), signifiers (e.g. ‘Ha’aretz’, ‘reside’ vs. ‘live’, 
‘ghetto’) and popular myths (‘all Jews would like to make Aliya’) that emerge 
out of the cultural reservoir of Israeli culture and society and also determine 
the variety of social identities from which we speak – i.e. who ‘we’ are and who 
‘we’ are not. Thus, the interview between two Israelis was informed by the 
social roles that each participant was assigned by Israeli culture and 
subsequently affected the outcome of the text produced. At the same time, 
Emerson and Frosh (2004) argue that ‘research employing critical narrative 
analysis, committed to privileging rather than marginalising subjective and 
personal narrative meaning-making, can help to interrogate personal and 
dominant social discourses’ (p. 168) and in this sense offer a critical reading 
not only of the ‘bounded subject’ but also of the social regimes of discursive 
power since subjects’ usage of culturally acceptable terms and signifiers is 
appropriated differently by each speaker (Pavon-Cuelar, 2010). In this sense, 
narratives describing ‘Israeli identity’ abroad can offer alternative images of 
‘the nation’ and subjects’ identification with it.     
These four critical readings of narratives do not exclude each other. At any 
given time, all of the above can be demonstrated depending on the 
researcher’s theoretical preferences: social psychologists emphasize the 
dialogical and co-constructive aspects of narratives, culturists and political 
scientists stress the cultural historical and political contexts, while Lacanian 
oriented researchers underscore the tension between coherence and cohesion 
and the multiple meanings of words. At various points in the analysis I found 
my attention shifting between various dimensions as their significance in the 
text changed. I argue that such ‘inconsistency’ should not be regarded as a 
methodological fault but rather as capturing an important aspect of narrative 
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construction and interpersonal communication in general. Riessman 
summarizes it succinctly: ‘stories are social artefacts, telling us as much about 
society and culture as they do about a person or a group…a story [is] 
coproduced in a complex choreography – in spaces between teller and 
listener, speaker and setting, text and reader and history and culture’ (2008, p. 
105). 
5.4. Psychoanalytic contribution to critical narrative analysis  
Psychoanalysis had an important impact on my research, if only because of 
my training and experience as a psychodynamic clinical psychologist. 
Nevertheless, it did not constitute my main methodological approach. In recent 
years, the use of psychoanalysis for qualitative research has been 
demonstrated and discussed extensively (e.g. Hollway and Jefferson, 2000, 
Kvale, 1999, Frosh et al, 2003, Parker, 2005, Midgley, 2006 Frosh and 
Baraitser, 2008) and arguments for and against its use and the ways it could 
be used have been made. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss in 
length these theoretical debates, but I would like to outline what aspects of 
psychoanalysis I found productive for my research and in what ways it was 
incorporated into the analysis.  
1. While my psychosocial approach advocates the constitutive role of 
social, political and cultural ‘external’ forces in the construction of 
subjectivity, I accept the psychoanalytic argument that the social is 
represented and negotiated differently and idiosyncratically by each 
subject and that such representations are imbued with emotionality and 
phantasies rather than calculated rationally in order to achieve certain 
social gains. This contributes to ‘enriching and deepening the use of 
qualitative interviews in the social sciences’ (Kvale, 1999, p. 93). 
2. Furthermore, my analysis attends to psychoanalysis’ portrayal of the 
subject as inherently troubled and torn between contrasting social and 
subjective forces. Consequently the texts are bound to be fraught with 
multiple, often contradictory meanings and a psychoanalytic analysis 
allows researchers to ‘trouble sense making’ and serves as a ‘tool for 
“disintegrating” and “disrupting” text’ (Saville-Young and Frosh, 2010, p. 
511) and to highlight the tensions in the text rather than its coherences 
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as structuralists such as Gee (1991) or Labov (1972) seek to 
demonstrate. Such a psychoanalytic reading of the subject looks at the 
efforts to construct a linear explanatory account of themselves as 
coherent ‘national’ subjects (i.e. as ‘Israelis’).  
3. The concept of transference relationship (i.e. the pattern of emotional 
relationship that the interviewee develops towards the interviewer as 
authority figure) in the interview encounter has been discussed 
extensively (e.g. Hollway and Jefferson, 2000, Frosh and Baraitser, 
2008). While I agree with Hollway and Jefferson that a transference 
relationship between interviewee and interviewer develops (even prior 
to the encounter) and is reflected in the interaction and consequently in 
the text produced, I take Frosh and Baraitser’s view (2008) that unlike a 
therapeutic setting, this transferencial relationship cannot be explored 
and substantiated within the interview text analysis for ethical, 
methodological and structural reasons. Nevertheless, it was important 
for me to be able to contextualize the interview text (also) in terms of the 
interviewees’ prior expectations and personal agenda which, I believe, 
played a major part in their decision to voluntarily attend the interview 
without clear financial or social incentives. This position draws on 
psychoanalytic thinking that assumes that subjects are motivated by 
some personal discomfort or anxiety and that they would want to 
address it through the interview. For instance, for Ariella, who was about 
to return to Israel after 11 years of living in London, the interview 
seemed to offer an opportunity to re-state and ground her decision. For 
Na’ama, who described her life as ‘on hold’, the interview seemed an 
opportunity to try and ‘resolve’ a decisional deadlock. For Yariv, who 
only recently completed a long psychoanalytic therapy, it could have 
been another occasion to ask if his decision to stay in Britain was 
motivated by his ‘personal issues’ - growing up as a gay man in a 
militaristic Israeli society - or whether it was based on ‘objective’ dislike 
and non-adaptation to the ‘Israeli existence’. In these three interviews 
the agenda was clearly articulated either explicitly by the subject or 
through the recurrent engagement and negotiation of these key topics in 
the texts produced. Thus, I included in the analysis specific references 
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to the interviewee-interviewer relationship only to the extent that they 
clearly emerged out of the interview text and/or the encounter could be 
corroborated with other textual data and were relevant to the topic I am 
studying.  
4. Additionally, in the course of a relatively long psychoanalytic 
relationship, the analyst gets acquainted with the patients’ idiosyncratic 
or private usage of specific signifiers and their potential subjective 
meanings. Pavon-Cuelar argues that ‘for each position the language is 
a language’ (2010, p. 164). Due to the short interview encounter it 
would be impossible to accumulate such linguistic reservoir. One of the 
interviewees, Nira, described herself as an IDF orphan (i.e. someone 
whose parent was killed in the army). This orphan status was very 
significant in the text and shaped her criticism of Israel and of Israeli 
culture. Nira talked about the need to be aggressive in Israeli daily living 
in order to be heard. By contrast she described her experience in British 
society as follows: ‘There's less of a need to… to push or… Because 
you don't have to, there is someone… There is some reaction, reaction 
{in English} to what you do’.  
It was tempting to contrast the feeling that ‘there is someone’ in Britain with the 
lack of someone in Israel, and to explain it, psychoanalytically, in terms of the 
constant absence of her father in Israeli existence. Such psychoanalytic 
interpretation argues that only by leaving behind the social context where she 
is destined to be an 'IDF orphan' – i.e. someone whose father is absent – can 
this sense of constant absence be replaced with a feeling that 'there is 
someone'. However, I felt it would require many other corroborating references 
in order to ground this link.   
To summarize, I find that psychoanalysis’ portrayal of subjects (interviewees 
and interviewers) as driven by emotional engagements, rather than by rational, 
conscious thinking contributes immensely to qualitative research. A 
psychoanalytic approach offers a way to explain the ‘stickiness’ (Hook, 2008) 
of certain discursive positions or the ‘attachments’ (Stavrakakis and 
Chrysoloras, 2006) of certain groups and individuals to certain social positions. 
Finally, it points to the inevitable gaps in the narrative and includes disruptions 
within its analysis of texts. Therefore I have often paid special attention to 
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moments of emotional intensity and confusion marked by humour, hesitations, 
frequent disclaimers, linguistic lapses etc. The psychoanalytic tradition and its 
emphasis on countertransference as an important tool for making sense of the 
clinical encounter has also informed my reflexive thinking - i.e. the role I played 
in the construction of research data.      
5.5. Reflexivity  
According to Riessman ‘the mechanical metaphor adopted from the natural 
sciences – investigators providing an objective description of the world and 
positioning themselves outside the field of study to do so – has given way to 
narrative mediating and interpreting the “other” in dialogue with the “self”’ 
(2008, p. 17). Reflexivity ‘urges us to explore the ways in which a researcher’s 
involvement with a particular study influences, acts upon and informs such 
research’ (Nightingale and Cromby, 1999, p. 228). If we adopt a psychosocial 
approach that claims the inseparability of the social from the psychic and 
therefore considers narratives to be the product of the encounter between 
subjects and their environment (be it the researcher, the linguistic system that 
informs their thinking or the imagined community they feel part of), then 
researchers should recognize their own impact on the construction of the 
interview text and include it in its analysis. Roseneil (2006) argued that the text 
produced by the interviewee ‘would, inevitably, have been inflected differently 
to a different interviewer’ but that ‘this is always the case in qualitative analysis. 
We bring ourselves to our research, and we make assumptions about what we 
study on the basis of our unique psychosocial biographies’ (p. 865). Therefore, 
the texts produced in the interviews that I conducted have inevitably been 
shaped by my own view point and so was their analysis. Below I have outlined 
some of the areas where I felt my presence particularly affected the production 
of texts.   
5.5.1. A personal attitude towards Zionist ideology  
First and foremost, since an important part of my research looks at the role that 
Zionist ideology and narrative play in the construction of ‘the Israeli subject’ 
and of ‘Israeliness’ in general, I had to monitor my personal engagement with 
that ideology. This often proved to be a difficult task the more I became aware 
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how entrenched was Zionist ideology in Jewish-Israeli culture and how 
formative it is in the construction of certain concepts and preconceptions. Over 
the course of the research I came to acknowledge the complexity of this 
ideology and its politicised implications and recognized my growing 
ambivalence. On the one hand, I grew up in Israeli society and culture imbued 
with the Zionist world view and values; private memories, tastes, images, 
social relationships, hopes and fears and other minute details of daily life 
which all contribute to a sense of ‘home’, all emerged within the context of 
Zionist Israeli society, its ethos, values and culture. Criticism of government 
policies (e.g. around the occupation of the Palestinian territories) were not 
taken necessarily as criticism of Zionist ideology or narrative. My engagement 
with Zionism was also related to my familial socio-cultural background (or 
class) which is sometimes perceived in Israeli society as the Ashkenazi 
middle-class sometimes referred to as ‘the salt of the earth’ (see Ariella and 
Aaron’s references to this term in chapter seven). Among this group especially, 
but also in the Jewish Israeli public and its collective imagination Zionism is still 
associated with egalitarian (if not socialist) values, social engagement and 
mutual collective responsibility. Only after moving to Britain and having to 
struggle to gain social, professional and economic recognition, did I come to 
acknowledge the social, cultural and economic privileges that came with being 
part of that social class in Israeli society. On the other hand, I feel a growing 
criticism towards Zionism when it is often applied as a pretext for the 
continuous occupation of the Palestinians, encourages the proliferation of 
nationalist-messianic ideologies and sentiments, provides justification for the 
marginalization of various groups within Israeli society, and promotes the 
militarization of Israeli society. This criticism emerged while still living in Israel, 
materialized in the decision to take a break and move to London for my PhD, 
and is currently present in the dilemma whether to return to Israel or to make 
my stay in Britain permanent. This ambivalence was captured for example in 
the dilemma whether to address the power-relations between Israel and the 
Palestinians as ‘occupation’ or to apply the more neutral term ‘the conflict’ as it 
is known to the Jewish-Israeli public. Thus adopting a critical position also 
widens the vocabulary for use. Most of the participants in my research had 
their own dilemmas regarding Israel and Israeli society although not always for 
 
112 
the same reasons as mine. Some, like Liat and Nira stated it explicitly. Others, 
like David, manifested greater ambivalence. In these encounters the interview 
constituted an area of mutual concern around our position as Israelis abroad, 
faced with the dilemma of whether to return or to stay, the longing for the 
culture, families and friends we chose to leave behind and the new 
opportunities awaiting in Britain alongside the hardship of being immigrants or 
new-comers in other people’s ‘homeland’. These highly emotional dilemmas 
manifested themselves at unexpected times during the interview and 
sometimes I was only able to acknowledge them in retrospect when analysing 
the texts. For example, Liat asserted: ‘I remember, from a very early age that I 
felt I didn’t want to be there [i.e. in Israel] {giggle}’. This surprised me greatly 
since she was born in Israel, lived there for most of her life and on first 
appearance seemed to have been part of a privileged social class. This 
surprise shaped the rest of the extract as I tried to make sense of her 
unexpected, critical position and her persistent reluctance to identify Israel as 
her ‘home’. A critical reflection during the analysis allowed me to recognize 
some of my own cultural, social axioms which also revealed the 
preconceptions underlying Israeli social discourses on nationality (e.g. the 
absorption of Jewish migrants as reflected in the interviews with Michael, Liat 
and Udit, the power relations between Ashkenazi and Mizrahi Jewish-Israelis, 
articulated in Yariv’s interview or the attitude towards the Israeli community in 
Britain demonstrated in Dorit and Roni’s interviews). This reflexive work 
allowed me to approach the next interview with greater sophistication and 
awareness of what is at stake for me, but also for my subjects.    
5.5.2. Distribution of social roles in the interview encounter  
Social roles and their respective subject positions were negotiated and 
assigned by both parties. Their analysis taught me about the social 
stereotypes prevalent in Israeli culture which confine subjects on both ends of 
the interview encounter to specific expected social positions and determine 
what is expected to be said. For Nira and Liat, who were highly critical of Israeli 
society and who were the only ones who didn’t entertain the thought of 
returning, I was a representative of the official Israeli institution which they had 
left behind. After talking about her reluctance, from a very early age, of living in 
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Israel, Liat added with a laugh: ‘I’m screwing up all your results now [laughs]’. 
This comment demonstrated to me what she believed I was expecting to hear 
from her as an Israeli subject abroad – that Israelis have fond memories of 
their childhood in Israel and therefore maintain a strong nostalgic attachment 
to it. In Nira’s interview I was cast as a representative of formal Zionist Israel. 
This served her to produce a critical text of Israel but I also found myself 
speaking from this assigned position, adopting at times a conformist and 
defensive approach towards Israel. Udit’s story about her immigration from 
North Africa to Israel and the social integration hardships she encountered 
have placed me as a ‘Sabra’ from a veteran family in Israel in a defensive 
position. In Dorit’s interview, who was highly engaged with the Israeli and 
Jewish community of London, I found myself in a position of an Israeli who 
lives away from the ‘Israeli ghetto’ as it is often referred to. Finally, for some 
interviewees (e.g. Na’ama, Yariv or Roni) who knew I was a psychologist, the 
talk seemed to be motivated by a phantasy that I will help them make sense of 
the ambivalent feelings and confusion regarding their status in Britain. In these 
occasions my profession as a psychologist played an important role in the 
construction of texts.   
5.5.3. A growing acquaintance with the area researched  
As a relative new-comer to London and to the field of social research, my style 
of interviewing was shaped gradually. My acquaintance with the Israeli 
community in London, its establishments and the typical formal and informal 
daily practices of Israelis in Britain was collected gradually, partly through 
certain informal meetings I held with various members of the community (an 
editor of the local Hebrew newspaper, a local Israeli rabbi, and other members 
of the community) and partly in the course of the first interviews (e.g. in 
Na’ama’s interview). Hence, my agenda as a researcher changed gradually in 
the course of the first few interviews.  
5.6. The sample group – criteria and means of recruitment  
My research sample included twelve interviewees aged 30 – 63. This sample 
size is desirable in qualitative research, which is more interested in the 
qualities of the texts rather than in their generalizability and reliability across 
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many respondents, the main concern of quantitative research (Willig, 2008). 
The recruitment criteria were set up to cut out participants who lived for less 
than two years in Britain and therefore did not have substantial acquaintance 
with life in Britain, and those who were under 30 and therefore have not spent 
a substantial period of their adult life in Israel. Since I was mainly interested in 
Jewish-Israelis’ understanding of ‘Israeli identity’19, the advert was formulated 
in Hebrew although Israelis whose mother tongue want’s Hebrew (like 
Palestinian-Israelis) were welcomed to join. Another criterion was voluntary 
participation which was meant to eliminate situations where interviewees took 
part because they expected to be financially rewarded or because they were 
pushed into participation as a favour. Two of the participants (Dorit and Nira) 
responded to my ad in the local Hebrew newspaper thinking that it was a job 
offer but decided to take part in the research after realizing their mistake. The 
main criteria, however, required that subjects considered themselves as 
Israelis, however they chose to define it, and were interested in discussing 
‘Israeli national identity’. I advertised the research on ‘Israeli national identity’ 
(see appendix 3) through my internet social connections, through word-of 
mouth personal and professional connections, at a nursery parent-meeting and 
its notice-board and through an advert in the local Hebrew-printed and 
electronic newspaper.. In retrospect, the recruitment process reflects the 
informal features and lack of structure characterizing the Jewish-Israeli 
community. Since there are hardly any established social spaces where 
Israelis gather (see chapter four), the recruitment was done through informal 
and personal channels. These modes of recruitment meant that I was able to 
access mainly those Israelis who frequented similar social and/or cultural 
circles as me. This may have limited the variability of the sample. At a later 
stage in the research, I made efforts to expand the recruitment process to 
alternative social groups by hanging notices in local shops frequented by 
Israelis or actively writing to people who might have access to such group 
members (e.g. local rabbis or people in the Haredi community). These efforts 
                                            
19
 It is clear that my research interests – mapping the language and images of Jewish-Israeli 
nationalism – drew on a specific interpretation of Israeliness which also inevitably narrowed its 
definition. Thus I have not made an intentional attempt to recruit Palestinian Israelis and after 
some efforts have given up the hope of recruiting Israeli- Haredi subjects. I will elaborate on 
discursive limitations of ‘Israeliness’ in the ‘Findings’ and ‘Discussion’ chapters.    
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were only partly successful. Table one summarizes some of the main 
demographical categories that are often discussed in sociological literature.     
5.6.1. Table one: Descriptive characteristics of the participants20 
(pseudonyms)   
Part. A  YI
B  
G MS  RS  EB COB  PCOB AQ  PCI PCB  BN CH 
Ariella Late 
30s 
12 F M. Sec A. Isr Isr.  MA Stu.  N.E. Y Y 
Na’ama 38 10 F M Sec. A. Isr E.Eur.  BA Emp PT  Y Y 
Noga Earl  
30s 
5 F M Sec. A. Isr. E.Eur. MA Emp FT  N Y 
Michael 47 11 M M. Sec. A. USA E.Eur.  SS
c 
S.E. N.E. ? Y 
Roni 30 5 M M Sec As Isr. E.Eur. MA Emp FT  N Y 
Aaron 39 10 M M Sec. A. Isr. ? MA Emp FT  Y Y 
Dorit 36 2 F M. Trad M. Isr Asia ? Emp N. E. N N 
Nira 37 12 F Sin Sec. A. Isr ? Ba N.E. N.E Y N 
Liat 34 14 F Sin Sec. A. Isr. E.Eur. Ph
D 
Stud N.E. Y Y 
Yariv 37 9 M Sin Sec. A. Isr. Isr. MA Emp FT  Y N 
David 43 7 M M. Sec. A. Isr. ? Ph
D 
Emp FT  N Y 
Udit  63 41 F M Trad M. N. Af N Afr. SS
c 
Emp S.E.  Y Y  
 
Part = participant, A = age, YIB = Years living in Britain, G= gender, MS = 
Marital status (Married/single), RS = religious status 
(secular/traditional/religious), EB = Ethnic background (Ashkenazi/Mizrahi) 
COB = continent of birth (Israel/Eastern Europe/North-Africa), PCOB = parents 
country of birth, AQ = Academic qualifications (secondary school/B.A/etc.), PCI 
                                            
20
 Subjects were given Hebrew pseudonyms that were chosen based on their Hebrew initials 
as they appear on the English keyboard.    
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= Professional background in Israel (Student/employed/not employed) , PCB = 
professional background in Britain, BN = British nationality, CH = children.   
5.6.2. The participants  
After conducting a number of interviews, I noted that the recruitment process 
yielded a relatively homogenous sample that mainly consisted of middle class, 
secular, academic Sabras (Israelis who were born in Israel) that come from a 
relatively affluent family background in Israeli society. I also noticed that with 
the exception of Udit (who lived in Britain for over 40 years) the other 
participants (who all stepped forward and volunteered to be interviewed) had 
been living in Britain for 2-14 years. Such a sample does not reflect the 
population distribution of Israeli society as I know it. The recruitment process 
stopped once I realized that most of the content areas – e.g. Israeli society, 
British society, Israeli community, work, raising children, celebrating holidays, 
etc. - had been repeated consistently and I had managed to expand, 
somewhat, the variability of my participants sample in terms of their social 
backgrounds (e.g. ethnicity, religious orientation, and class membership). This 
allowed me to discuss the content and the interview dynamics also in terms of 
these categories and learn about their significance.  
This disproportionate sample in terms of social class (replicated in previous 
research on Israeli emigrants, e.g. Hart, 2004, Floman, 2007), the length of 
stay abroad and the difficulty of recruiting members of alternative audiences 
constitute the first finding in my research (even before analysing the content of 
the interview texts) and can be explained in various ways. First, the group of 
middle class, secular Israeli academics constitute a larger portion of the overall 
emigrant Israeli population than their representation in general Israeli society 
(Della Pergola, 2012, Klingbail, and Shiloh, 2012) and therefore a researcher 
is more likely to sample members of this group. Second, those middle class 
Israelis abroad who have an academic background are more familiar with 
academic research and perhaps feel more comfortable with the interview 
setting and are therefore more likely than other, non-academic Israeli 
audiences, to take part in it. Third, my hypothesis is that this disproportionate 
sample discloses the interest in and the engagement with this topic among this 
population of Israelis, the middle-class backbone of Israeli society. As argued 
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in Uriely (1994), Gold (2002) and Floman (2007), because they are frequently 
marginalized in Israeli society and because they come from moderately 
religious families, Jewish-Israelis from lower social classes and other members 
of marginalized groups find it easier to integrate into local communities, be it 
the Jewish religious and orthodox communities, Arab or Muslim communities in 
London or general British society and might be less concerned with 
maintaining ‘an Israeli national identity’. By contrast, the preoccupation with 
‘Israeli national identity’ is mainly the concern of a middle-class Israeli group 
which has got more to lose in terms of material, social and cultural capital that 
they accumulated in Israel and for whom the transition to another country 
clashes with their Zionist upbringing and consequently involves harder choice 
making. This hypothesis also explains why the vast majority of respondents 
lived in Britain around 10 years, i.e. they were still unsure whether they would 
stay or return. Indeed the question whether to go back or not (and if yes, 
when) was raised in all but two (Nira’s and Liat’s) of the interviews although at 
times it seems to function as an acceptable discourse of nationality (where 
subjects are expected to signal their on-going engagement with Israel through 
mediating going back) rather than a practical issue.   
Within this relatively homogenous and skewed sample the narrative analysis 
reveals great variations between participants. Subjects entertained a variety of 
ideas and feelings towards Israel, Israeli society, life in Britain, etc., in a way 
that could not be accounted for by the demographic categories such as 
ethnicity, religious affiliation, academic or economic status, parents’ 
background etc. While many topics were replicated spontaneously across the 
different interviews (concern with children’s future identity or reference to 
various groups in British society – Jews, Muslims, local Israelis or generally, 
the local British public), subjects had different ways of using these topics within 
their personal stories of ‘who they are’ as Israelis in Britain.  
5.7. Using interviews as data collection tools  
According to Willig (2008), interviews have become the most popular way of 
generating data in qualitative research. As qualitative researchers, we 
acknowledge that the interview texts (and other means of communication) do 
not give us access to the ‘real’ experience but rather to the participants’ 
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representation which is mediated by the specific socio-cultural context within 
which they produce this account (Riessman, 2008). Of all data collection 
methods, open and semi-structured interviews especially encourage the 
generation of narratives (Hiles and Cermac, 2008) since they offer the 
interviewee the space, time and audience (the interviewer) that encourages 
them to tell their personal version. Discursive psychologists (e.g. Potter and 
Hepburn, 2005) argue that the interview has to be studied as a unique social 
practice in itself, different from other forms of communications such as 
speeches or conversations. They argue that its unique communicative rules 
have to be taken into consideration in the analysis of the narrative produced.   
The main aim in narrative interviewing is to generate detailed personal 
accounts from subjects that could teach us something about their personal 
engagement and interpretation of the social. In my interviews, I focused on the 
private and personal interpretation, embarrassing as it might be for the 
speakers, to capture their (if only momentary) subjective angle and private 
location within what they see as Israeliness. In short, how do they define their 
‘Israeli national identity’? Potter and Hepburn (2005) argue that participants 
are invited to participate in interviews ‘as members of a social category of 
some kind’ (295); in my case, as Israelis living abroad. However, they also 
came with a myriad of other social identities that intersected with that one.  
5.8. The interview schedule  
As the title of my thesis discloses – What do we talk about when we talk about 
‘national identity’ and in line with qualitative research tradition (see Willig, 
2008) I approached the interviews without specific prior hypotheses as to how 
‘Israeli national identity’ would be constructed, what contents would be raised, 
what power-relations would be revealed by taking these subject positions and 
how subjects would accommodate the social axioms of nationality within their 
personal narrative of ‘who they are’. Based on the theoretical literature and the 
material generated from the two pilot interviews, I prepared an interview 
schedule that consisted of a small number of questions that all interviewees 
were asked and the conversation developed differently from these. Since the 
interviewees often come with their own agendas, as argued before, and the 
texts are co-produced out of the interviewee-interviewer encounter, a different 
 
119 
interview atmosphere was developed in each meeting. I opened with a short 
and telegraphic description of the research, explaining that it aimed to study 
the notion of ‘national identity’ among Israelis who live in Britain. The consent 
forms were given and signed. This was followed by an open question: ‘tell me 
a bit about you’. The decision to open with this orienting question was taken 
following the two pilot interviews and the exposure to the BNIM (Biographical 
Narrative Interpretative Method) which studies how interviewees narrate their 
biographies (Buckner, 2005). The aim was to generate some general 
biographical information about the speaker and since I did not give the 
interviewees any guidelines as to what aspects they were expected to 
address, participants were left to tell whatever they felt was relevant in the 
context of an interview about ‘Israeli national identity’ and I was able to learn 
what biographical details seemed salient for them in connection to this topic. In 
retrospect, this self-introduction often constituted an ‘abstract’ where main 
areas of concern that were later elaborated were flagged. Dorit, for example, 
mentioned that she came to London ‘probably because she didn’t find love in 
Israel’. Later in the interview the topic of romantic and gender power relations 
became central when she discussed the romantic power relations between 
couples of Jewish-Israelis and local Jews. Liat mentioned in her introductory 
description the circumstances of her parents’ immigration to Israel and the 
frequent translocations that the family has gone through. Her own sense of 
transnationalism and ambivalence towards living in Israel was later explored in 
this context.  
Since my main goal was to try and arrive at what the speaker regarded as 
‘Israeliness’ and their identification with it, the other two questions that all 
participants were asked were: ‘what does it mean for you to be an Israeli?’ and 
‘what does it mean for you to be an Israeli in London/Britain?’, which attempted 
to focus on the specification of the British/London context and the ‘diasporic’ 
condition. I paid special attention to any reference of being Israeli (e.g. when 
participants argued that ‘this is very Israeli’) and followed such comments with 
‘in what way is it Israeli?’ In this way I hoped to create a private/personal, as 
well as collective, reservoir of images, signifiers, myths and stories that 
address the popular and private notion of Israeliness.  
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The interview concluded with a question that all participants were asked: if 
there was anything else they wanted to add. This seemingly procedural 
question often yielded some highly interesting material that often recapitulated 
(rather than added) what the participants thought of as the most important 
aspect in their speech or what areas they were most concerned about. In the 
psychoanalytic section, I argued that participants often have explicit or implicit 
concerns that they are trying to deal with by coming to the interview and telling 
their story (although I also argued that the researcher has a limited ability to 
reveal these within the constraints of the research structure). Throughout his 
interview, for instance, I wondered what made Roni want to be interviewed. 
Just before ending I asked him this question and his response (detailed in 
chapter eight) about the fear of being caught in an ‘Israeli ghetto’ if he stayed 
in London, helped to clarify some of the other segments of interview.  
Overall 12 interviews (and two pilot interviews) were conducted. They lasted 
between an hour and an hour and a half. Most interviews were held in the 
interviewees’ homes while four of them were conducted in spaces I offered.  
5.9. Transcription, translation and coding  
Following the interviews, which were all conducted in Hebrew, I transcribed 
them in their entirety and translated in full the first four for my supervision. For 
the remaining interviews, I translated only the extracts that were destined for 
analysis. I found that it was easier for me to closely transcribe the texts to 
Hebrew, to code and complete the analysis in Hebrew, before translating them 
to English. Thus, the translated version constitutes the end product of a long 
analytic process. The translation process did require me to go back and forth 
between the Hebrew original and the English version in a way that often 
sharpened my attention and understanding of specific nuances (see later for 
the ‘translation’ section).  
On first sight, the transcription of the interview texts and the coding that reflect 
it appeared to be merely technical. Having gone through the process of 
transcribing the interviews, I learnt about the huge variety of verbal and non-
verbal articulations in the interviewees’ speech which forced me to reconsider 
the above view. Theorists such as Mishler (1986), Emerson and Frosh (2004), 
Riessman, (2008) or Willig (2008) regard the transcription as part of the 
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researcher’s interpretative process and an inseparable stage in its 
interpretation. Since there is no way of decoding everything that went on in the 
interview encounter, either verbally, visually, bodily or emotionally, in a way 
that would capture and re-create these moments, Taylor (2001) argues that ‘a 
transcript therefore constructs a certain version of the talk or interaction which 
is to be analysed. This does not, of course, mean that it is false or misleading 
but simply that it is not neutral. The process of transcription selects out the 
features which the analyst has decided are relevant, that is what the analyst 
counts as data’ (p. 38). Consequently, ‘the ‘same’ stretch of talk can be 
transcribed very differently, depending on the investigator’s theoretical 
perspective, methodological orientation, and substantive interest’ (Riessman, 
2008, p. 29). I found that the initial transcription was crude and captured 
mainly the essential, more evident parts of speech, whereas additional 
hearings revealed many more verbal and non-verbal nuances that helped to 
fine-tune the hypotheses. My attention to the recording was also affected by 
the knowledge and data I had generated in the research process thus far. For 
example, in the fourth interview, with Michael, the significance of the signifier 
‘Ha’aretz’ (THE Land – a reference to Israel) was revealed to me (although I 
was aware of it intuitively before) when he interrupted and corrected himself 
saying ‘I was in a Bar Mitzva in Isra…in Ha’aretz’. This new knowledge 
affected the interpretation of previous (and future) interview recordings where 
the reference (or lack of reference) to ‘Ha’aretz’ and its different discursive 
usage compared to ‘Israel’, had previously escaped my attention. Hence, each 
hearing could potentially reveal new aspects of previous texts. Over the course 
of the interviews I have accumulated a list of significant words (e.g. roots, live, 
reside, growing up or being born) which I then checked against the various 
interview texts. Some signifiers seemed significant in many texts, but each 
interview yielded its ‘unique’ key signifiers. 
5.10. The researcher’s style of analysis  
I found that the method of analysis differs from one empirical research study to 
another due to the differential theoretical approaches (content vs. structural vs. 
dialogic narrative analysis), the structure of research (e.g. multiple interviews 
vs. single case study, longitudinal or short-term research) and even the 
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personal preferences and tastes of each researcher. Riessman argues that 
selection depends on the ‘situated perspectives and commitments an 
investigator brings to narrative inquiry’ (2008, p. 200). Hence, while I have 
drawn considerably on Emerson and Frosh’s critical narrative approach (2004) 
for the coding and analysis of the texts (who in turn, drew on Gee’s structural 
analysis), my analysis and transcription of twelve interviews with often highly 
verbal participants differs from their analysis which was based on two 
interviews with a single not especially verbal youngster and was designed as a 
methodological guidebook (of how to conduct a critical narrative analysis). 
Because my research was based on a relatively large number of interview 
texts each consisting of approximately eighteen Hebrew transcribed pages, my 
analysis focused on specific short extracts consisting of not more than sixty 
lines while knowing that much material had to be left unanalysed. This made 
the task of choosing extracts for analysis especially challenging (see later 
section). Given the nature of my research, I had to balance a fine-grained 
within-interview text analysis that sought to study the subjective interpretation 
of ‘Israeliness’ of this specific interviewee in this specific interview section, with 
an across-interview analysis that could teach me about the generalizability of 
certain individual engagements and common usages among Israeli 
participants. I have tried to address this tension by enclosing short extracts 
dealing with the topic under question which were taken from other interviews 
alongside the main extract for analysis which was more closely analysed.  
5.10.1. Choosing extracts for analysis and for the final writing  
Each of the 12 interview recordings yielded 12-18 transcribed pages in Hebrew 
(which added up to roughly 15-20 pages per interview in English since Hebrew 
is more concise than English). Consequently, I was required to select one or 
two extracts from each interview for analysis. This proved to be a challenging, 
often frustrating task. When choosing, I tried to capture a significant segment 
of speech that caught my attention either during the interview or after reading 
the transcription. At times my attention focused on the usage of stereotypes, 
myths and cultural axioms prevalent in Israeli culture (Dorit and Michael’s 
applications of classical Zionist narrative, Yariv’s racial discourse of nationality, 
or Noga’s vision of the split world in its relation to Israel). At other times I noted 
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specific emotional intensity in the interview encounter (Liat and Nira’s critical 
perspectives of Israel), a specific usage of certain words (e.g. ‘Tlusha’ – torn 
away, in Na’ama’s interview) or exceptional usage of culturally familiar 
concepts (‘an area free of Jews’ – by Ariella, or ‘the Israeli ghetto’, by Roni). I 
also noted repetitive usage of specific words by certain interviewees or their 
application by different interviewees (choosing the usage of ‘Ha’aretz’ vs 
‘Israel’ or ‘reside’ vs. ‘live’ proved to be significant in the way speakers sought 
to locate themselves vis-à-vis Israel). Through Ariella’s story of her dramatic 
conflict with a member of her workshop (presented in chapter eight), I was able 
to demonstrate many of the aspects that have been discussed throughout this 
chapter. In the story she made special use of specific terms (e.g. ‘an area free 
of Jews’) and stereotypes about Israeliness (e.g. as ‘warm’ or ‘truthful’ people) 
and narrated them in a way which allowed her to present Israeliness as an 
inherent trait that stands in the way of full integration in British society. This in 
turn served her to justify her decision to return to Israel after living eleven years 
in London. Roni’s usage of ‘the Israeli ghetto’ (chapter nine) appeared 
significant in describing his own experience (and concerns) of living in London 
as well as articulating certain Zionist preconceptions about living away from 
Israel and was therefore chosen for analysis although it did not demonstrate a 
clear narrative structure compared for example with Nira’s story (chapter 
seven) of riding her bike during the memorial day for the dead soldiers. 
Thus, in choosing the extracts for analysis I was driven by multidimensionality 
of the narrative: the salience of specific signifiers within the narrated content, 
the dialogic-cultural context within which the narrative was created, and the 
narrators’ private agenda (or private narrative) that drove them to volunteer to 
be interviewed. All these extracts that were chosen for analysis accumulated, 
eventually, to form a ‘data bank’, already selected out of the huge amount of 
raw interview material.  
5.10.2. Presenting the findings  
When writing the final thesis I had to make a second selection out of this 
already ‘digested’ material and to categorize it in a systematic and meaningful 
way. The various elements of speech and the interrelation between them are 
presented across four ‘Findings’ chapters. Chapter six reflects my interest in 
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subjects’ investment in the collective imaginary – i.e. the classical Zionist 
narrative, in my view the pillar of the imagined Israeli community. It presents 
the usage that subjects make of certain elements of the hegemonic Zionist 
narrative, and popular stereotypes about ‘Israeliness’ or about ‘who we are’. 
The emphasis is placed on the tension between coherence and idealization of 
the nation and its disruption as part of the effort to narrate certain areas of 
conflict in the interviewee’s life. The other three chapters follow a classical 
division in immigration and diaspora studies (e.g. Fathi, 2011) corroborated by 
my interview material where immigrants or diasporans tend to reference 
themselves in regards to three locales: the ‘home’ Israeli society from which 
they have migrated – chapter seven; the local British society (and the 
relationships with three significant local groups: Jews, the general British public 
and Arab and/or Muslims) – chapter eight; and the community or diaspora of 
Jewish-Israelis in Britain – chapter nine. To demonstrate certain claims I made 
within the fine grained analysis, I enclosed short extracts from the same 
interview or from other interviews which have only been presented for their 
manifest content. For these, I have not included a fine grained structural 
analysis.       
5.10.3. Analysing the text’s micro structures (stresses and lines)  
As a structural analyst, Gee (1991, 2005) distinguishes between micro and 
macro structures of the text, all of which are important to arrive at the narrator’s 
specific style and make grounded claims about the narrator’s personal 
meanings conveyed in their text. However, while Gee focuses mainly on the 
narrative structure in an attempt to enrich understandings of what the narrator 
had in mind, my psychosocial approach shifts the attention ‘from what is said 
and/or how it is said to the dialogic environment in all its complexity: historical 
and cultural context, audiences for the narrative and shifts in the interpreter’s 
positioning over time’ (Riessman, 2008, p. 137). Consequently I have used 
Gee’s method of structural analysis of micro and macro text structures as a 
broad guideline but also paid attention to other aspects of speech, such as the 
role of the interviewer in the construction of text and the broader cultural 
system of signification revealed by the co-constructed text. Riessman 
describes well the overall strategy of analysis that I have also followed. She 
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writes: ‘I start from the inside, from the meaning encoded in the form of the 
talk, and expand outward’ (1993, p. 61). 
A micro analysis refers to the basic idea units – specific words that are 
emphasized by pitch glides and single sentences that communicate basic 
intentions. Discursive and conversational social analysts (e.g. Potter and 
Hepburn, 2005, Potter, 2009) look closely at the minuscule ways 
communication is carried out and apply systems of coding such as that of Gail 
Jefferson (1972) which marks pitch glides, short and long pauses, 
exclamations, question marks, accelerated speech, lowered or heightened 
volume and different means of approval. However, as a reader, I often found 
myself lost in this complicated, cryptic and confusing system of marking which 
alienates the text rather than renders it more vivid. And yet, ‘the different stress 
patterns in a spurt of speech set up its intentional contour’ (Gee, 2005, p. 121) 
and direct the hearer’s attention to specific aspects of the content that the 
speaker wanted to convey and adds greater validity to the researcher’s 
interpretations. My analysis therefore started with the underlining of words that 
interviewees’ and interviewer emphasized although I did not mark them 
differentially according to how exactly they have been emphasized (as 
suggested by the Jefferson system of coding). Thus, Liat describes her 
preference for living away from Israel. She said:  
1. and it was terribly easy for me to get used to being there  
2. It was... it was sort of difficult like it’s difficult moving from one place to 
another  
3. Like moving schools 
4. But the transition to South America  was very smooth and easy 
5. And was received with a lot of... happiness {I cough} 
6. And returning to Ha’aretz was very very-very-very difficult [later] 
The words Liat chose to emphasize and the adverbs and adjectives she picked 
(‘terribly easy’, ‘very smooth’, ‘very-very-very difficult’) serve to dramatize her 
main argument that, contrary to most expectations, for her life abroad as a 
child was easy whereas life in Israel was difficult. If other words would have 
been emphasized, e.g. ‘for me’, or ‘from one place to the other’, my attention 
and interpretation would have been directed to alternative areas, i.e. her 
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unique, exceptional experience, or the difficulty of frequently moving between 
one place and another.   
 Below is the marking system I used to highlight certain aspects in the 
text which included:  
 uncompleted words that have been interrupted in the middle (e.g. It was 
funn={y}) 
 hesitations and pauses (marked with …) 
 slang words often taken from Arabic alongside their translation in curly 
brackets (e.g. ‘and I was sort of really Mabsuta {happy/content in 
Arabic})’ 
 repeated words  
 Important signifiers in Hebrew were noted in italics and their translation 
or explanation was added in curly brackets (e.g. Our Hutzpah {audacity 
or straight-forwardness}). Hebrew concepts that appeared a few times 
were only translated in their initial appearance.  
 Usage of an English word in the speech was noted in curly brackets 
(e.g. and they are all very friendly, {Eng.} really, but I still feel the 
difference’). 
 My own questions or interventions are brought in square brackets ([so 
the family basis was actually there, in your experience, and you were 
a… remote?] 
After transcribing the text in Hebrew, I broke it down into numbered lines which 
marked the basic idea units. In the above example, lines four and five from 
Liat’s extract work together to form one idea unit (and a few of these formed a 
stanza):  
4. But the transition to South America was very smooth and easy 
5. And was received with a lot of... happiness {I cough} 
5.10.4. Analysing the text’s macro-structure (stanzas and parts)  
Gee’s structural coding (1991, 2005) has been widely used by psychosocial 
empirical researchers (e.g. Riessman, 1993, 2008, Emerson and Frosh, 2004, 
Saville-Young and Frosh, 2010), perhaps because it aims to look at the 
particular specific styles that each speaker brings with him/her. Following other 
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psychosocial researchers, I also include in my analysis the parts played by the 
researcher and the way hegemonic social discourses and the cultural system 
of signification are reflected in the texts, which Gee leaves out. Gee argues 
that breaking the text into smaller units such as lines, stanzas, strophes and 
parts allows the researcher to ‘reveal’ an underlying structure and narrative in 
what appears on first sight as fragmented, disorganized and structure-less text.   
I opened the analysis with a short segment that preceded the extract I 
analysed closely so as to introduce the context for that extract. This segment 
of speech was mainly presented for its overt context and was not analysed in 
depth. In the analysed extract itself stanzas were made of a succession of 
lines which together promoted a common idea – in the above example, 
demonstrating how life in South America was far better than life in Israel. A 
group of stanzas formed a common part. In Liat’s text, this specific stanza 
aimed to highlight the prioritization of family identification over national 
identification. In spite of its neglect of social content, I found Gee’s approach to 
text analysis most helpful in identifying the main themes and contents around 
which groups of lines are organized. This also helped to clarify the role that 
each stanza played in the construction of a larger narrative and provided 
potential hypotheses about why certain arguments and examples were brought 
up by the speaker, what they aimed to convey and demonstrate, and why the 
speech often got caught up in hesitations when contradictory examples 
disrupted the main story and revealed areas of conflict or uncertainty. In short, 
Gee’s structural analysis helps to identify the speaker’s skeletal narrative 
against which diversions, contradictions and disruption can be studied.  
5.11 Translation  
As mentioned before, all the interviews were conducted, transcribed, coded 
and analysed in Hebrew. Selected extracts were translated into English. This 
posed certain problems that researchers who demonstrate their findings in 
their mother language do not face. The grammatical structure of the sentences 
in Hebrew is different from that in English. For example, the adjective follows 
the noun rather than precedes it; there is an explicit difference between males 
and females which will not be captured in the English translation unless 
specifically mentioned: a ‘friend’ will be recognized for its gender in the Hebrew 
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version which might contribute additional meaning to the text. Translating the 
extracts also involved decisions about which words should be translated (and 
how) and which words would be kept in their original Hebrew version. Na’ama 
said:  
I'm comfortable being a….foreigner. Here, I'm isolated [‘Tlusha’ - literally 
torn away] and it makes it easier for me to handle… I feel that I haven't 
exhausted life yet: {Exhausting life means} [talking in an ironic tone] 
Here. I live ('Chaya'). I bought a house. I live ('Chaya') in Ha’aretz. This 
is my place.  
In this short extract I chose to keep some of the Hebrew words because they 
exemplify some unique meanings significant for the construction of belonging 
among other respondents and are being used here in order to make a 
personal claim (mocking at the Israeli middle-class dream of settledness). 
‘Isolated’ was presented with its Hebrew translation (‘Tlusha’) to demonstrate 
the exceptional, unconventional usage of such a verb which normally would 
hold negative connotations of alienation and lack of belonging. Likewise, 
adding the Hebrew translation of ‘live’ enabled me to contextualize her talk 
within the broader, cultural ‘Israeli lexicon of belonging’ (see chapter six) and 
compare it with other respondents. Had I not kept the Hebrew translation the 
uniqueness of this term would have been lost. Slang words from Arabic, whose 
usage was also found to be significant, were left in their Arabic form next to 
their English translation. Having to think about the appropriate translation of 
specific words also sharpened my attention to the usage that the speaker 
seemed to be trying to convey. Eventually, as in other stages of analysis, I 
found myself going back and forth between the original recording and its final 
written presentation in a way that constantly opened up new perspectives on 
the text and demonstrated the inherent discrepancy between the original 
interview experience and its final representation on paper. Finally, verbatim 
interview material often comes across as inarticulate and disrupted. 
Translating these into another language makes the text look even more 
incoherent and messy and I needed to restrain the urge to clean it up. After all, 
while presenting my participants’ efforts of narration I was also engaged in 
narrating this thesis in front of my own audience – my supervisors and future 
readers.      
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5.12. Ethics  
Ethical considerations in qualitative research refer to any moral issues that 
might arise within the immediate research encounter and beyond it. These are 
addressed institutionally by the university and help researchers secure the 
rights of their research participants. Nevertheless, researchers inevitably come 
across unexpected ethical dilemmas that arise out of the immediate interview 
encounter and/or following it - for example when analysing the texts, reporting 
the findings or making further use of the participants’ texts. I will briefly address 
the ethical issues that I encountered in the course of this research.   
Institutional ethics - I have followed closely Birkbeck’s ethical guidance when 
planning and conducting the research. This included keeping the confidentiality 
of the interviewees by using pseudonyms and altering any salient information 
that might disclose their identities (e.g. country of birth, place of work or town 
of residence in Israel). Likewise, the interviewees’ participation in the research 
was itself kept confidential. The participants were all given a printed 
description of the research which informed them about its general aims – to 
study Israelis’ understandings of their national identity (see appendix 1) - and 
stated its affiliation to Birkbeck College. They were also asked to sign a 
consent form where they were assured that their confidentiality would be 
respected and they were informed that they could opt out of the research 
whenever they wanted. Participants that showed interest in the outcome of the 
research were promised a concise summary of it. One participant wanted to 
look at the transcript of the interview and later asked that a certain part, 
dealing with sensitive family issues be removed from the records.  
Other ethical dilemmas - Although all speakers stepped forward voluntarily, the 
unavoidable discrepancy between the implicit and explicit agendas of each 
side of the encounter (interviewee and interviewer) and the dynamics that 
developed throughout interviews could have potentially brought about 
frustrations and disappointments. Throughout the interviews and during the 
analysis of the material, it became clear that some of the participants (e.g. 
Na’ama, Roni or Yariv) came to be interviewed in order to work out an 
important dilemma (often around the decision whether to return to Israel or to 
settle for good in Britain but also, more broadly, around ‘belonging’ or the life 
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away from Israel). Such expectation and need rendered them more vulnerable 
and, presumably, placed me in a position of power. Although they did not, 
intentionally, come to seek advice, nor was such advice promised, I felt that for 
some of the participants who knew that I was a psychologist (if they received 
this invitation from any of my colleagues or if they corresponded with me via 
email where my signature includes my profession) there was an expectation 
that clarity would follow the interview. While some did articulate a sense of 
satisfaction with the interview process, and enjoyed the possibility to express 
their views and emotions, I noted a certain disappointment among at least two 
of the participants (Yariv and Na’ama). Na’ama, for example, who termed her 
life in Britain as ‘life on hold’, described the heavy responsibility she feels she 
is carrying for making a decision whether the family will return to Israel since 
her husband would definitely like to stay. In such cases I specifically 
addressed the frustration and noted, on the one hand, the limitations that an 
interview encounter has for addressing practical life dilemmas while, on the 
other hand, highlighting the opportunities it provides to lay out, think and speak 
about controversial issues. Participants were offered to call me again to 
discuss the interview.  
I feel that since, overall, I was tuned to my participants’ concerns and handled 
these concerns ethically the expectations and frustrations form an integral ‘risk’ 
when taking part as an adult in the research encounter alongside the 
aforementioned advantages.   
While it has become customary in contemporary qualitative research to 
acknowledge the role (and responsibility) that the researcher bears as a co-
producer of the interviewee’s text, the research encounter as a practice still 
involves a power relation between the researcher and the participant. This is at 
least partly due to the inevitable unequal distribution of roles where the 
participant is the object of study and the researcher, the observer.  
In the reflexivity section earlier, and throughout the ‘Findings’ chapters I 
include in the analysis, the effects that I might have had on the speakers. I 
contend that subjects were drawn into specific positions and made certain 
arguments because of the way they imagined me to be inserted into Israeli 
culture and society. Some of the participants clearly located me as one of 
‘their’ group – an Academic, Ashkenazi, secular Jewish-Israeli. This allowed 
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them to express views (e.g. towards religious Israelis or local Jews, Arabs or 
Muslims etc.) that they might have been reluctant to share with a foreigner or a 
member of another social class in Israeli society. Such familiarity could have 
potentially contributed to a certain role confusion masking the role division or 
boundaries between the researcher and the participant. This was further 
enhanced by the fact that most of the interviews were held in the participants’ 
homes. This turned the conversation less formal as we often sat in the kitchen 
or the living room, sipping coffee. Such blurred boundaries and their theoretical 
as well as  ethical implications are characteristic of qualitative social research 
which are often conducted in less controlled environments and allow even 
encourage, informal authoritative relationship between the researcher and the 
participants.      
Although some of the assertions were harsh and at times raised antagonism in 
me, I tried to read and analyse them not as a testament to the speaker’s moral 
merits and ‘personality’, but rather as part of a more generalized social 
discourse and as the subjects’ effort to locate themselves and me in an intense 
Israeli social space – in a society that is flooded with political, social and 
military tensions. This approach helped me to make sense of and engage with 
the more contentious assertions (e.g. regarding foreigners, Arabs or Muslims, 
religious Israelis or Mizrahi Jews) and read them as part of the speakers’ effort 
to address a certain troubling condition rather than as an indication of a ‘racist 
subject’ or a ‘racist discourse’.       
5.13. Discussion  
In this chapter I have described the various theoretical and practical stages of 
my research. The main challenge was how to apply a psychosocial theoretical 
approach to nationality and identity within the framework of qualitative 
empirical research. I opened with a theoretical discussion of critical narrative 
analysis which was best suited to address my three research questions (see 
chapter one). 
Given my psychosocial approach to ‘identity’ as an on-going process of 
identification –subjects’ continuous engagement and negotiation of available 
social categories – I have opted to use a critical narrative analysis. This 
approach challenges classical assumptions of narrative analysis as 
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representing the narrator’s ‘truthful’ subjectivity or its overemphasis on the 
immediate content, the speaker’s autonomy and authority and the coherent 
structure underlying the narrative. Riessman argues that in a critical dialogical 
analysis of narratives ‘historical and cultural contexts, audiences for the 
narrative, and shifts in the interpreter’s positioning over time are brought into 
interpretation. Language – the particular words and styles narrators select to 
recount experiences – is interrogated, not taken at face value’ (2008, p. 137).  
At the same time such critical narrative approach challenges basic tenets of 
discourse analysis, which focuses away from subjectivity, the emotional and 
idiosyncratic interpretations of the text, subjects’ agency or their investments in 
specific discourses and subject positions, and rather is concerned with the 
social discourses available for usage or the social and discursive power 
regimes. Thus, a  narrative approach helps ‘to interrogate personal and 
dominant social discourses’ (Emerson and Frosh, 2004, p. 159) and 
challenges the social identities provided for the subjects and the discursive 
reservoir that they are restricted to. I argued that the meanings that emerge 
out of narratives have to be grounded within the specific usage that the 
speaker makes of recognizable cultural terms and signifiers. Emerson and 
Frosh (2004) argue that ‘critical narrative analysis constantly subverts 
tendencies to assume that the ‘meaning’ of any utterance can be understood 
on a priori grounds, rather than embedded in, and emergent from, its very 
specific narrative context’ (p. 145).  
I have pointed to four areas where the manifest content of narratives (no 
doubt, important in its own right) has to be critically inspected: a. the existential 
tension between cohesion/ structure and fragmentation/disruption which 
underlies any narrative; b. the narrative as a co-constructed product of the 
interview encounter; c. the narrative as a means to achieve strategic discursive 
goals; and d. the narrative as emerging from a broader socio-cultural and 
political system of signification.  
Consequently, rather than focusing on one aspect – e.g. how speakers make 
strategic use of available discourses to achieve discursive tasks (as discursive 
psychologists do, see Wetherell and Potter, 1992, Potter, 2009) or mapping 
the subject positions that subjects are restricted to by Zionist ideology (as 
Foucauldian analysts do e.g. Parker, 2005) - my choice of extracts for analysis 
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was based on various aspects. At times I was attending more to the specific 
usage of words and special cultural concepts; in other instances I focused on 
the interview politics and the distribution of social roles between interviewee 
and interviewer which determined what could be said about ‘national identity’. 
In yet other instances, I focused on the social pre-conceptions or axioms taken 
from the Israeli imagined community’s cultural reservoir for the definition of ‘us’ 
or ‘them’. While this complicates, no doubt, the strategy of analysis, it 
nevertheless captures the messy, complex nature of identities as I choose to 
see them.   
My research included 12 interviewees (7 women, 5 men) who have lived in 
Britain for 2-40 years and were mainly Ashkenazi, secular, middle class, Israeli 
Jews. This skewed sample of participants appears to be my first finding even 
before attending to the texts. In line with previous research of Israeli émigrés 
(e.g. Uriely, 1994, Floman, 2007), I am proposing that Israeli members of the 
privileged middle class – the backbone of Israeli society – have higher stakes 
in the dilemma of whether to stay in Britain or to return and are therefore more 
likely to take part in research that explores Israeli identity compared with 
members of marginalized lower classes in Israeli society who have not been 
socially and economically privileged and for whom the question whether to 
return or not is not so dilemmatic in this respect.  
I have applied Gee’s structural method of analysis (1991, 2005) to study the 
trajectory that the narrative seemed to take. Thus, the analysed extract was 
appreciated for both its internal structure as well as its position within the 
overall interview narrative. However, in line with a critical narrative approach, I 
incorporated my articulations and the social roles I played as an audience 
which made the text a co-production of both participants who negotiate 
meanings and acceptable social positions among them. My own emotional 
engagement with the topics discussed by the interviewees was sometimes 
also included in the analysis as a reflexive exploration of my own contribution 
as well as to study collective preconceptions prevalent among Jewish-Israelis.    
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Findings – chapters six – nine   
That national identities (and identities in general) are contextualized and 
shifting was aptly articulated by David, who, in response to my question ‘What 
does it mean for you to be an Israeli?’ answered:  
… and there are many aspects to being an Israeli: towards Israel, I 
mean the interest in what’s going on in Israel, or the longing, or… the 
connections with the people who are there or thoughts about being an 
Israeli outside Israel, this is one kind and you have an Israeli in England 
vis-à-vis the English or…. an Israeli who seeks or doesn’t seek to 
preserve his Israeli identity and an Israeli with Israeli friends and again, 
an Israeli with non-Israelis so all these together form the … ah…the 
Israeliness.    
I found David’s comment very useful after I completed the primary analysis of 
the interview material and was wondering how to arrange my findings 
chapters. It struck me that the participants made very different sense of 
‘Israeliness’ in different contexts: when they were thinking about Israeli society, 
about the local Israeli community in Britain/London, the local Jews or when 
talking about the image of local ‘Arabs’ or ‘Muslims’21. Moreover, even within 
these interfaces, subjects could make very inconsistent statements which often 
left me puzzled and confused, as if they were guided by some hidden agenda. 
One can conclude, as some indeed have, that identities are no more than 
constructed phantoms and therefore easily given to deconstruction. However, I 
prefer to look at the apparent inconsistencies, mentioned above as indications 
of the fragmentary qualities of identities which, as many have said before, do 
matter greatly to people.  
However, the participants indicated a limited number of recurring contexts that 
seemed to be significant for the construction of ‘Israeliness’. These included 
                                            
21
 While in the UK the discourse around Israeli tends to contrast between ‘Israelis’ and 
‘Palestinians’, in popular Jewish-Israeli culture, ‘Arab’ is a general term applied to anyone 
speaking Arabic – Muslim, Christian etc. The fact that not all Muslims are Arabs or that not all 
Arabs are Muslims is often overlooked in Israeli discourse of nationality that is organized 
around Us (Jews) and Them; ‘Muslims’ or ‘Arabs’. Such an ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ approach is also 
prevalent in the local Arab-Palestinian culture – I have sometimes been referred to by local 
people, not to my face, as Yahudi – a Jew in Arabic. I will address this variety of terminologies 
and its specific usage among Jewish-Israelis in chapters seven and eight.   
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participants’ past and present positioning in Israeli society and their current 
positioning in Britain performed through their encounters with local British 
Jews, with non-Jewish local British, with the members of the local Israeli 
community and with local Arabs or Muslims (terms that are often used 
interchangeably, as mentioned in the previous footnote). Each interviewee 
emphasized differently the encounter with these groups to make sense of their 
‘Israeliness’.  
The findings part of my thesis includes four chapters. In chapter six I will be 
reviewing basic assumptions, myths and symbols that underline the 
hegemonic Zionist narrative and ideology as they are being used by subjects 
for various psychosocial goals. As part of this chapter I will present a glossary 
of key signifiers that are constitutive of the specific politics of Israeli group 
belonging. If the national narrative seeks to highlight consistencies in the life of 
the national group through idyllic imagination, chapter seven will present the 
socio-political complexities of post-ideological Israeli society seen through the 
eyes of the Jewish-Israeli interviewees. Chapter eight presents key aspects of 
constructing ‘Israeli identity’ in Britain through the daily encounters with 3 local 
groups – the Jewish community, the British majority and the local Arabs and 
Muslims. Chapter nine will focus on the dilemmas of constructing an ‘Israeli 
national identity’ away from Israel as they emerge in practices of the raising of 
children and engagement with the local Israeli community.  
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Chapter six - the Jewish Israeli subject and the 
hegemonic Zionist narrative  
In the opening chapter of my findings, I draw on Anderson's concept of the 
'imagined community' (1991) as a shared national space and on 
ethnosymbolist approach to nationalism (Smith, 2001) which looks at the 
contents and symbols of such space to learn about the role of the Zionist 
national narrative and popular beliefs that draw on it for the construction of the 
Israeli imagined community. I argue that collective narratives play an important 
role in the construction and maintenance of a joint imagined community 
because, by their storied nature, they facilitate the imagination of ‘a national 
time’ – i.e. forming a temporal, vertical, link between a glamorous past, present 
conditions, and a promise for a better future while at the same time, 
horizontally, connecting its subjects to each other through a shared collective 
space, mutual language and cultural symbols and the promotion of a sense of 
homogeneity and comradeship. Anderson claims (1991) that ‘if nation states 
are widely conceded to be ‘new’ and ‘historical’, the nations to which they give 
political expression always loom out of an immemorial past and still, more 
important, glide into a limitless future’ (p. 11-12). Other collective beliefs which 
draw on the national narrative cement the notion of collective unity and 
promote a sense of group grandiosity and exclusivity. Thus, national narratives 
and the images, myths and concepts that support them, allow subjects to join 
together and form an illusion of coherence, continuity and union which 
alleviates daily conditions of social and subjective ambiguity, uncertainty or 
loneliness.  
The Zionist narrative as described in the Declaration of Independence 
(18/5/1948) provides a convincing example: it tells a story of a nation that was 
uprooted by force from its land, remained loyal to its origins and returned 2000 
years later to reclaim its lawful homeland. Rose (2005) sees the risks of 
messianism and grandiosity that drives the Zionist movement and its aims. I 
argue that although it has changed considerably over the years, and is 
interpreted differently by various political and social groups in Israeli society 
(Filc, 2006), basic features of the Zionist narrative and its socio-political 
implications still operate in the formal Jewish-Israel public space (e.g. see the 
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2011 governmental campaign addressed at Israelis living abroad presented in 
chapter four) and form the crux of the Israeli imagined community, i.e. shape 
what Jewish-Israeli subjects consider as the core of their collective identity - 
Israeliness - for good and for bad (Bar-Tal, 2007). As such, it constitutes a 
dominant and hegemonic (although not exclusive) discursive and cultural 
reservoir for subjects to draw on when constructing personal stories and 
subjective meanings as Jewish-Israelis abroad.   
Against Anderson’s assertion, Bhabha (1990, 1994) argues that the nation is 
narrated along multiple, contradictory temporalities which give it its distinctive 
‘Janus-faced’ (Bhabha, 1990, p.3) qualities. In the following chapters I will be 
presenting disruptions and contestations of the Zionist canon and ways in 
which other social categories - economics, gender, class, and religion - 
intersect and disturb it. However, in my opening findings chapter I wish to 
demonstrate the discursive value and appeal of Zionist symbols, images and 
themes as they are applied by three subjects to accommodate personal 
concerns, disturbing experiences and/or in order to manage the interview 
encounter. This also follows on my first research question: What hegemonic 
and counter-hegemonic national narratives, myths and symbols do Jewish-
Israeli subjects draw on while relating to and trying to make sense of their 
national identities? Methodologically, I have chosen to present the discursive 
usage of this national canon through a close analysis of a single interview. In 
this way, I also hope to demonstrate the methodological approach I took for 
analyzing texts and to unfold some of the issues I dealt with in my work 
process. In a separate section, I also present some important signifiers that 
took part in the negotiation and construction of an ‘Israeli identity’ away from 
Israel.   
6.1. The national narrative as a tool to manage Israeli-diaspora 
relations: ‘The Israelis are the strong people!’  
Dorit (pseudonym) is a 34 year-old woman, currently unemployed, who came 
to London two and a half years ago, met an Israeli man and got married 
recently. She lives in a rented apartment in a Jewish North-Western London 
neighborhood popular among local Jews and Israelis.  
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When asked to describe briefly her background she chose to talk about her 
decision to come to London and said:  
You need a good enough reason for leaving everything at the age of 34. 
I didn’t have that good a reason, or I had a personal reason, that, 
simply, the need for novelty. I had, I have a charming family, I had a 
good career, I had many guys I kind of went out with, ones who courted 
me, but I didn’t have, I wasn’t satisfied, because I guess I didn’t have 
love and I was looking for some…  
Dorit signaled her romantic relationships as a probable motive for leaving 
Israel or at least as an area of preoccupation. She also demonstrated a 
common belief of what constitute good or not good-enough reasons for 
‘leaving everything at the age of 34’, perhaps referring here to gender roles 
and expectations whereby personal or romantic issues do not constitute good 
enough reasons to leave for a ’34 year old woman’. In the extract I’m about to 
analyse, Dorit focuses on the relationship between local Jews and Jewish 
Israelis, particularly the romantic relationships between members of the two 
groups. The analysis will trace the personal areas of concern that she is trying 
to sort out with the help of common beliefs and self-perceptions prevalent in 
Israelis’ discourse around the national group.  
In order to understand the specific usage of the extract that the speaker 
makes, it is important to note the interview history or narrative from which the 
analysed extract emerged. Dorit shared her ambivalence towards the 
exclusion of non-Jewish communities and individuals (e.g. foreign workers, 
refugees and their children), compared mono-religious suspicious and 
inhospitable Israel to multicultural London and tried to explain it through 
Jewish-Israelis' fear of assimilation, a potential loss of the Jewish state and the 
need to preserve Jewish identity. She related it to the condition of 
demographic threat that Jews in Israel and abroad are constantly dealing with 
and said:  
‘Here, too, the Jewish community is very closed, by the way, even more 
than… Here too, the Jewish community really preserves itself….they 
are much more… If I compare my Jewish friends here to my Israeli 
 
139 
friends here, they are much more Zionist than us, they believe {in God) 
more than us, they are more united, in their Judaism’.  
In this discursive context, the British-Jewish group which 'really preserves 
itself' and its members who are 'more united, in their Judaism' are used to 
generalize a claim (of seclusion) about Jews and Judaism in general which 
could serve as mitigating circumstances for the exclusionary attitude to mainly 
African refugee and migrant illegal workers22 in Israel. However, unlike Israeli 
society whose acts of self-preservation and anti-assimilation are seen as 
exclusionary and racist towards non-Jewish foreigners, the secluded (‘closed’) 
local Jewish community which ‘really preserves itself (see a discussion of 
‘preserving the identity’ in chapter 12) is presented in a positive light 
(‘amazing’) and is admired. In contrast to her Israeli friends, her local Jewish 
friends seem to have managed to retain values that Israelis have lost – the 
national affiliation (‘more Zionist than us’), the religious practices (‘believe’ {in 
God} more than us’) and the sense of a united community organized around 
religious identity (‘united in their Judaism’). At this point in the interview, 
diasporic Jewish identity is presented as fuller, marking the lost values of 
contemporary Jewish-Israeli identity. The comparison between the two groups 
was often raised by other interviewees as a means to define what an Israeli is 
(i.e. someone who is different from a local Jew). The comparison and 
competition between the two groups and her position as an Israeli subject 
takes a turn when I ask her specifically about the relationship between the two 
groups.    
Stanza 1 – the relationship between Israelis and British Jews  
1. The relationships between the two groups [the Jewish-Israelis and the 
British Jews] How do you understand the….?  
Stanzas 2 – The main argument (1) - Israelis are the strong people  
2. The Israelis are the strong people [as in folk/nation] 
3. [The Israelis are the strong people?]  
4. {she laughs}No I'm joking, look, look  
                                            
22
 According to human rights organizations, since 2003 an estimated 50,000 refugees and 
labour migrants from Africa (mainly Sudan, South Sudan and Eritrea, some but not all are 
Muslims) have illegally entered Israel (Sherwood - The Guardian, May 2012). Their presence 
has attracted much public debate and conflict.   
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The claim: 'the Israelis are the strong people’ (2) became the axis around 
which the rest of the extract, which will be outlined below, revolved. 
Structurally, the extract is clearly constructed around the main statement (that 
draws on Zionist ideology) – ‘Israelis are the strong people’ (stanzas 7, 11), the 
efforts to ground it by providing examples from daily practices (stanzas 8, 12, 
13, 14, 15,) and frequent disclaimers that contest its validity and point to her 
discomfort with this hegemonic discourse (stanzas, 9, 10). 
This chapter will trace popular Israeli social concepts that may discursively 
support Dorit's assertion around Israelis being the 'strong people' in their 
relation to local British Jews, look into the discursive value that such 
arguments may have for her while, at the same time, addressing potential 
reasons for the discomfort she expressed.  
Two aspects stand out in Dorit's spontaneous response: the reference to 
strength as a category of difference between the two groups and her unusual 
usage of the concept 'people' (‘Am’) to define the Israelis as a group.  
The theme of strength as a marker of self-definition often appears in the 
popular public Israeli discourse and could easily be interpreted as a derivative 
of the Zionist image of the Israeli as ‘the New Jew’, in contrast to the ‘Old 
diasporic Jew’. Hence, Dorit's spontaneous response 'the Israelis are the 
strong people' may resonate with common discourses of Israeli nationalism 
and with basic aspects of Zionist Ideology. However, although a theme of 
strength, force or militarism could be found in Israeli public discourse (Sasson-
Levi, 2006), we have to look for the meaning that this particular speaker 
applies to ‘strength’.   
Dorit’s usage of the term 'people' (‘Am’ or Volk) is not very common. There are 
various ways to define the national group (group, nation, society) and 'people' 
comes closer to an ethnic definition which essentializes the nature of the 
group. It is much more difficult for foreigners to join 'A People' as it draws clear 
boundaries around a common historical tradition. While in the section 
preceding the analysed extract Dorit talked with ambivalence about the pitfalls 
of Jewish-Israeli essentialism leading to the exclusion of foreign workers and 
their children from Israeli society, the terminology she applies here (‘We are 
the strong People') is taken from this contested collective approach of ethnic 
seclusion and demonstrates how speakers can navigate their way by using a 
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variety of signifiers which might support a variety of arguments which 
sometimes contradict each other. I argue that in this context, when she is 
about to glorify the Israeli group, it is useful for her to present its merits as 
essential rather than circumstantial and/or arbitrary.  
After making a series of disclaimers which point to local Jews’ cultural, 
economic and material advantages over Israelis, in stanza 7 she comes back 
to her main argument that ‘the Israelis are the strong people’.   
Stanza 7 – main argument repeated (3): socially Israelis are desired  
25. Yes, yes. Socially,  in  daily life I see many, many Israeli guys, slash, 
sorry Jewish guys  or Jewish girls 
26. That yearn {or cry out} for an Israeli partner 
Stanza 8 – main argument exemplified (1): Israelis are attractive for local Jews 
because (1) they serve as a gateway for local Jews to make Aliya  
27. They really like to make Aliya 
28. But like everyone else they are a bit afraid that they wouldn't find a job, 
that they … [ahhm]  
29. And the… the… Their breakthrough will be through their partner, they 
really… 
30. [so in this respect the Israelis are the strong people]  
Stanza 9 – A disclaimer (3):  this rule only applies for social relations.  
31. So it's ...it’s funny, no, it's funny,  I was merely joking … 
32. The strong people socially wise, where you see here really plenty… 
33. I see here… once again, but I’m talking about the social relations 
Stanza 10 – A disclaimer (4): this is my own subjective impression  
34. Out of my subjective impressions  
35. I don’t talk at all about… I don’t want to… I don’t know 
36. I don’t know if I’ll sound so smart. If I’m saying what I say 
37. Because these are my personal feelings  
38. It’s very important for me to note these things.  
Stanza 11 – main argument (4): socially Israelis are desirable for local young 
Jews.  
39. That I see Jewish guys are really, really, really looking for Israeli girls  
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40. And Jewish girls are really, really, really enthusiastic about Israeli guys, 
ah… there’s… 
Stanza 12 –Main argument exemplified (2) Israelis have characteristics that 
local Jews don’t have (confidence, hutzpah, knowledge of Hebrew) and would 
like to have.    
41. [So what do we have to offer them?]  
42. Our Hutzpah {Hebrew -‘audacity or straight-forwardness’} 
43. Our confidence 
44. That they want to learn Hebrew through us  
45. Our Hebrew, the… the fact that … 
Stanza 13 – Main argument exemplified (3):  Israelis are attractive for local 
Jews because they allow them to experience Israel as a local Israeli by 
hosting them 
46. Yes, all my girl-friends, the Jewish girl- friends, are dying for me to invite 
them to Israel  
47. And I invite them, some of them came  along with me 
48. And they are very enthusiastic about having a friend in Israel who hosts 
them {in her house} 
Stanza 14 – Argument exemplified (4): they help them reconnect with their 
forgotten Jewishness  
49. They, they also kno…They also know  I think that through us they get in 
touch with their Jewishness, more {than they usually do}  
50. Because here you have many Jews who are by definition Jewish but 
they don’t kind of, live it in their daily life 
51. They don’t ‘do’ {celebrate} holidays  
52. They don’t observe it very much  
53. And through the Israelis, all of a sudden , someone reminds them that 
today it’s Purim 
54. All of a sudden, someone reminds them that today it’s…  
55. They do get more connected to it, they connect to these parts {aspects} 
Stanza 15 Example (5) – Israelis are attractive because of their personality-
confidence, Hutzpah, joy of life – all a product of the sunny climate  
56. I think it’s because of our personality, let’s say the…  
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57. We are Sabras 
58. We grew up in a country of sun {or a sunny country} all day long we are, 
sort of…  
59. So it’s reflected immediately  
60. Our confidence,  
61. our Hutzpah 
62. and they love it 
63. Not because they are Jews but because we have a certain joy of life 
which I think people…that’s it. 
To ground her claims around the strength of Israelis and in order to stress 
them, Dorit started with local Jews’ advantages over the Israelis. The 
awareness of the inequality in social, cultural and material resources between 
locals (Jews) and (Israeli) immigrants/new-comers is common-place in 
immigrants’ experience and daily life conditions; in the current extract Dorit 
sets out to upset this inequality of power-relations by using various Zionist 
ideological arguments and concepts to balance the odds. Jewish-Israelis find it 
difficult to consciously associate themselves collectively as inferior, weak and 
dependent having been raised as the ‘New Jews’(although the haunting image 
of the helpless 'Old Jew' does ‘lurk in the shadows’, constantly threatening to 
emerge through the fissures of the 'New Jew' national ethos (McNamara, 
1987). The idea of Israeliness that the Jews 'love', according to Dorit, emerges 
from local Jew's idealization of Israelis, which gives them advantage over 
diasporic Jews (see chapters 3, 5) and that some Zionist diasporic Jews may 
indeed share. Zionism's foundational ideological pillar, the 'Negation of Exile' 
has indeed shaped for many years collective Jewish identity both within Israel 
and in the Jewish world outside it and is still very influential today. Thus, in this 
account, the national ideology and its practices become generalized, dominant 
personal features that Israelis are endowed with, cutting across age, gender, 
class, professional occupation, appearance etc… It is especially worth noting 
that in this Zionist story of romantic encounters, gender differences are denied 
as Israelis all share the same (fortunate) condition of being objects of desire. It 
is to be noted that canonical collective stories require subjects to relinquish 
their individuality and enmesh into a definable unified crowd.        
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Dorit realizes that the intergroup relations she described cannot fully account 
for the complex relations between the two groups (as described in literature on 
Israeli immigrants in North America - Gold, 2004, Lahav and Arian, 1999), so 
while Zionist ideology places the Israeli as an object of admiration for diasporic 
Jews, reality often proves otherwise and relations between the two groups is 
often described as distant, troubled or avoidant (Lahav and Arian, 1999). 
Cultural, religious, linguistic and material differences between the two groups 
have been cited in other interviews (see chapter eleven).  
This disadvantageous socio-economic status of Israelis is balanced here by 
the attraction of Israeli men and women as objects of love and romance. Dorit, 
whose preoccupation with social and romantic life was mentioned before, 
draws on her experience in this field where she 'sees' (in her own eyes and not 
only hears from others or assumes) 'many, many local young Jews’ (25) (and 
not just 'occasional' or 'some'), that 'yearn', 'cry out' or even 'crave' (and not 
merely 'look for' or ‘show interest in') ‘an Israeli partner' (26).  
In stanza 8, Dorit explains this 'yearning for an Israeli partner' which is not 
directly related to the Israeli partner as a person, but rather points to the 
function that they serve in attaining an even greater wish – 'to make Aliya' (28). 
Hence, the real object of desire for British Jews, according to Dorit, is settling 
in Israel. This is also Zionism’s basic ideological assertion (see Israel’s 
Declaration of Independence presented in chapter 3): that Jews all over the 
world have always yearned to (re)settle in Israel and have felt that their life 
abroad is lacking spiritually, socially and psychologically. However, this 
constant longing to make Aliya is unachievable because of practical reasons 
('like everyone else they are a bit afraid that they wouldn't find a job' 28) and 
the 'breakthrough' (29) from this ever-going pattern of unfulfilled wish would be 
finally achieved ‘through their {Israeli} partner’ (29). Thus, here the longing or 
yearning for Zion is displaced and directed to the Israeli partner who could 
provide this ‘breakthrough’ to living in Israel. 
After I summarized her argument (30) that the Israeli partner holds the key to 
the fulfillment of a personal wish (to make Aliya), which makes her/him ‘strong’, 
Dorit went on to provide her third and fourth disclaimers (stanzas 9-10 (So it's 
...it’s funny, no, it's funny,  I was merely joking – 31).  One can hypothesize 
that her uneasiness about her statement stems from disclosing a hidden 
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power-relations scenario where one (she) occupies a desired position in the 
Jewish-Israeli, female-male relationship. In an effort to contain this possibly 
exciting, albeit anxiety-provoking, position of desirability, she restricts it to 'the 
social relations', 'the strong people socially wise', '...but I'm talking about...' (32-
3) and goes on to limit its absolute validity (stanza 10 – fourth disclaimer) by 
asserting that her claim is based on her subjective impressions (34), or her 
‘personal feelings’ (36). Claiming subjectivity is an effective discursive strategy 
to justify one’s assertions as it cannot be discarded as not-true.  
However, Dorit reiterates her argument based on her personal experience 
where ‘Jewish guys are really, really, really looking for Israeli girls, and Jewish 
girls are really, really, really enthusiastic about Israeli guys’ (ls. 39-40), where 
the desirability of Israeli men and women for local Jewish men and women is 
emphasized through the adverb repetition. Although Israelis, women and men 
alike, are equally presented as desired romantic objects for local Jews (as a 
means for achieving Aliya), she introduces classic gender roles in the romantic 
encounter where men are expected to be active (‘look for Israeli girls’) and 
women are passive (‘enthusiastic about Israeli guys’). When I probe about the 
desirable features of Israelis ([so what do we have to offer them?] (41), 
colluding with her collective speech (‘we’), Dorit adds five more aspects to the 
one that was already mentioned (making Aliya), which might explain this 
desirability (stanzas 12-15).  
Her initial spontaneous response (stanza 12) relates to Israelis' personality 
traits (Our Hutzpah, Our confidence (42-3). In the current discursive context, 
Hutzpah (42) is strategically applied as one item on the list of desirable Israeli 
features, here associated with ‘confidence’ (43). In the collective Israeli 
imaginary, an ‘Israeli Hutzpah’ is taken fondly as a central feature of the Israeli-
New Jew: the ability to be creative, interact in an informal way, take risks 
against all odds, etc. It is mostly referred to positively when exercised outside 
Israel, or in interactions with non-Israelis. When applied within daily Israeli life, 
it is seen negatively as a mark of audacity, impoliteness and aggression (and 
causes many Israelis to complain about the life in Israel – Sela-Shefi, 2006 
Bloch and Lemish, 2008). The knowledge of Hebrew is then also presented as 
a desirable Israeli feature in the eyes of local Jews. Once again, from a Zionist 
point of view Israelis who provide access to living in Israel also provide access 
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to speaking Hebrew, ‘the true Jewish language’, presented here as a Jewish 
diasporic aspiration which is inaccessible otherwise.  
In stanza 13, Dorit further describes the introductory function that Israelis, in 
this case herself, have for local young Jews which allows them to connect with 
Israel from a quasi-local position. In line with the classical Zionist narrative, 
visiting Israel with an Israeli friend 'who hosts them' (48) allows young British 
Jews to gain temporary access to the 'Israeli experience' which is only 
secondary to the ultimate 'real thing' – making Aliya. According to Dorit, her 
Jewish girl-friends (rather than her non-Jewish ones) are 'dying for me to invite 
them to Israel' (46). This points to the special place that Israel, according to 
Dorit drawing on classical Zionist narrative, plays in the eyes of Jews. Indeed, 
diasporic Jews have a special relationship to Israel (mostly idealistic but often 
also critical) as waves of tourism testifies. However, it is relevant in this context 
to note how the special relationship between Israel and diaspora Jews is 
understood and interpreted from an Israeli-Zionist approach, influenced by 
personal experiences of relocation: the need to adjust to a new place and the 
material, socio-economic and professional disadvantages that come with it.    
Whereas in the paragraph that immediately preceded this extract (see above) 
Dorit argued that local Jews are ‘much more Zionist than us {Israelis}, they 
believe {in God) more than us, they are more united, in their Judaism’ (as other 
Jewish-Israeli interviewees asserted often in a critical way, in their interviews – 
see chapter eleven), for the purpose of the current discursive task they are 
described as ‘Jews who are {only} by definition Jewish but they don’t kind of, 
live it in their daily life' (50), or commit to Jewish practices (51-2). Israelis, on 
the other hand, are cast here by Dorit as the ‘identity preservers’ who re-
introduce local Jews to their otherwise inaccessible ‘lost parts’ whereby 
‘through us they get in touch with their Jewishness, more’ (49) and ‘get more 
connected’ (55) and are reminded of these parts of their identity which have 
been forgotten (53) hidden or even lost.  
In stanza 15, Dorit explains the Israelis’ attractiveness in the eyes of local Jews 
with the national character or collective personality that developed out of the 
geographical (the sun), political (emancipation) and psychological (confidence) 
conditions of living in Israel. As Zionism planned and anticipated, a new breed 
of ‘New Jews’, governed by a different psychology and a different personality, 
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is to emerge out of the move from the diaspora to the Jewish homeland. For 
Western-European Jews who lived in political conditions of inferiority, Zionism 
promised a revolutionary amendment of all life aspects, including a change in 
weather. Growing up in these ‘healthy’, ‘natural’ conditions is assumed to be 
reflected in the development of a healthy personality characterized by 
'confidence' and 'joy of life' (60, 63) and even ‘Hutzpah’ (61). Once again (ls. 
42-3), Dorit couples ‘Hutzpah’ with ‘confidence’ which is now explained as the 
product of Sabras upbringing. The connectedness with nature – with ‘how 
things really are’ - allows Israelis, according to Dorit citing a Zionist narrative, 
to be direct and confident in their demands, which translate into Hutzpah. Due 
to the 'faulty' (lack of sun) climatic conditions in Britain, British people, and ‘not 
because they are Jews’ (63), are assumed to lack these personality features 
('a certain joy of life') and therefore ‘they love it’ (62). This last argument 
needn’t necessarily follow from a Zionist mythology, but could also be drawn 
from a European vs. Oriental/Mediterranean discourse. In that discursive 
context, Israelis are taken as an example of the ‘free’, ‘easy-going’, ‘laidback’ 
and ‘optimistic’ Mediterranean societies as opposed to the hard-working, 
ambitious, formal and serious British (Jewish and non-Jewish) Europeans.   
Seen from local Jews’ perception, the interest and attraction (if it indeed exists) 
that Dorit describes, could be explained as a way to engage romantically with 
an acceptable (Jewish) yet exotic other (Israeli) and may disclose social 
dynamics within the local Jewish community – a wish to maintain identity (to 
marry a Jew) while at the same time to fulfill a phantasmatic wish to break 
away from an established and familiar social order through a romantic 
relationship with an outsider (Israeli).  
Throughout the extract, Dorit also made frequent disclaimers, undermining the 
validity of her claims about Israelis being ‘the strong people’. Following the 
extract she added: 
'I don’t know, I don’t know, I feel terribly uncomfortable with the 
responses I give, because I feel that they are stupid'.  
I felt that Dorit’s discomfort stemmed from both the disclosure of private ideas 
around power-relations between men and women, relating to her position as 
an (Israeli) object of desire and attraction for local Jews. On another level I 
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interpreted her discomfort, manifested in the above quote, with the 
generalizability of her claims – speaking in the plural about Israelis in general, 
attributing a common personality to a large group of individuals, applying 
common popular statements of collectivity to explain her personal experience 
of migration. While collective discourses offer convincing and fascinating 
explanations to social and private conditions and offer relief from disturbing 
experiences (e.g. mourning the loss of previous socio-economic status, the 
longing for loved ones or traumatic experiences of marginalization or exclusion 
in the new country), they also often clash with alternative discordant personal 
experiences. This discrepancy often leaves subjects anxious.    
Just before ending the interview, Dorit provided a concluding remark that might 
offer another hypothesis for her usage of images and themes from the 
canonical national narrative. When asked if she wanted to add anything she 
said:     
My identity as an Israeli in London…I think that… Firstly I’ll sum it up in 
that it is felt much stronger, no doubt, it is manifested regardless of what 
it is… no doubt… [stronger than what?] Stronger than in Ha’aretz. It’s… 
in Ha’aretz it doesn’t preoccupy you. Here it’s an issue that you go 
around with all the time; I go around with it proudly. For me it’s very 
important to stay Israeli, to be integrated among Israelis,  to… to….to 
know what is going on in Ha’aretz, in terms of politics but also in terms 
of the actuality, even television shows, ‘The Big Brother’. 
Thus part of the reason Dorit applied collective national narratives might relate 
to her condition as a recent arrival for whom classical national discourses, so 
dominant in Israeli society, are still very much available (see the discussion on 
promotion and usage of national discourse and mythology in a governmental 
campaign that encourages Israelis living abroad to return to Israel – chapter 
five). Israeli subjects who have been bombarded throughout their lives with the 
Zionist narrative and its approach to Judaism, living abroad, diaspora Jews, 
Arabs, etc., may find these ideas compelling while trying to make sense of their 
disadvantageous condition as newcomers, foreigners or immigrants (a term 
that was categorically absent from all interviews) when negotiating personal 
experiences around religion, gender and ethnicity. 
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Dorit was applying Zionist images and concepts drawing on the national 
narrative and ideology to present an idealized Israeli identity – that of the ‘New 
Jew’. This was done to construct more balanced power-relations between local 
Jews and Israelis in Britain and manage the disadvantaged condition of 
immigrant.  
A second extract, taken from the interview with Michael, also presents the 
Zionist outlook on the Jewish diaspora-Israeli relationships, but this time from 
the reverse angle, that of the diasporic Jew, presumably lending support to 
Dorit's account of the mesmerizing effects that Israel has over the diasporic 
Jewish ‘Ole’ (immigrant to Israel). However, the second extract demonstrates 
how similar canonical contents can be applied by different members to achieve 
different goals. Michael's usage of these themes was done to reclaim 
membership in the Israeli group in general and manage the interview 
encounter in specific. The second extract, then, highlights the importance of 
the interview encounter and the politics of interviewee-interviewer as the 
platform upon which persuasive collective images and narratives can be 
recycled. It also raises a question regarding subjects' investment in the 
canonical narrative and their ability to break away from it.  
6.2. Using the national narrative to claim group membership: ‘I arrived 
to Haifa, got off the boat and said: phew! I’m home’. 
Michael (pseudo-name) is 46 year-old man who emailed me willing to be 
interviewed following a notice I placed in the local Hebrew magazine. When 
asked at the beginning of the interview to give a brief autobiographical 
description, he said:   
I was born in NY in 1965. My parents were both self-employed. After the 
Bar-Mitzvah I started working for them. I studied hotel and restaurant 
management {English wording}. After the studies I didn’t want to study, I 
didn’t want to work, so I sold the Harley Davidson and everything I had, 
took a backpack, and thought for a few months, and dad had customers 
in Japan, Japanese who invited me to come in and see… and for 
almost… eighteen, nineteen months… all the way to Japan, Australia, 
South Africa, up to Kenya, to London down to Gibraltar, all around 
{English wording} until I arrived to Haifa, got off the boat and said: 
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‘phew! I’m home: everyone is crazy, I’m one of you! And in three months 
I made Aliya, and got enlisted to Golani23. [How old where you?] Twenty 
two. Nineteen eighty-seven. And I enrolled to the army in eighty seven, 
at the end of my military service I had an Ulpan24 and I married the 
teacher and opened a small business in X [in Tel Aviv?] and I was self-
employed until ahh… two thousand and one day… we have Uri, Noa 
and Neta (Hebrew names of his three children)…. 
In this short introductory paragraph, Michael gives a first-hand account of an 
oft-cited scene in the Jewish-Israeli collective imaginary – that of a Jewish 
immigrant (normally referred to as Olim - Jewish immigrants) coming for the 
first time to Israel (e.g. Haifa port). This romantic scene which has references 
to major historical events in the history of Jewish-Israeli society (various waves 
of Jewish immigrants in the first half of 20th century and following the 
establishment of the state and, most notably, the smuggling of illegal post-war 
European Jewish immigrants at the time of the British mandate) has been 
especially efficient in articulating Zionist ethos and concepts and has therefore 
managed to capture the public’s imagination. It was represented in local 
culture through novels, movies, historical journals and documentaries. 
Obviously cognizant of this canonical story, Michael presents himself as the 
classical ‘lost diasporic Jew’: Like many others in American Jewry, he comes 
from a financially comfortable family background (they have their own 
business, his dad is well connected and has Japanese customers), but he still 
feels dis-satisfied (after completing his basic studies he doesn’t want to go on 
studying or to work). He therefore sells all his material belongings and gives up 
the masculine life style - free, self-reliant, sexually desirable (having a Harley 
Davidson motorcycle) much admired by many western youngsters and sets off 
on a long journey in an attempt to find something else. He is not tempted by 
the material potential that Japan could have offered him but rather continues 
his journey from one place to the other without settling. Once he gets off the 
boat in Haifa, Israel, he experiences a ‘revelation’, utters a sigh of relief 
(‘Phew’!) and finally has a sense of belonging (‘I’m home’). Michael’s sense of 
homeliness in Israel is described in a somewhat unusual way: ‘everyone is 
                                            
23
  An IDF infantry unit known for being tough and hard working. 
24
 A state-funded intensified programme for learning Hebrew, which all immigrants can take. 
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crazy, I’m one of you’ but rather than experiencing it as stepping into a 
disturbing inpatient psychiatric ward, he attributes positive meaning to the 
signifier ‘crazy’ (see above for a positive appropriation of 'Hutzpah' in Dorit's 
speech). Under the Zionist lexicon and within the discursive atmosphere that 
Michael constructs, ‘crazy’ may mean ‘unconventional’, ‘informal’, ‘vibrant’, 
‘refreshing’ or ‘creative’ which here capture an aspect of the idyllic self-
perception of Israeli society. Michael, who restlessly moved about not finding 
his place (considered ‘crazy’) in American society where he was born and grew 
up, finally manages to fit in: ‘I’m one of you’. Once experiencing this 
recognition everything proceeds quickly and smoothly: within three months he 
formalizes his decision to stay (he makes ‘Aliya’ – completes the formal 
application to become an Israeli citizen), and takes on one of the most crucial 
commitments of Jewish-Israeli group members – enlisting into the Israeli army 
and even more so, volunteering to serve in an especially demanding and 
physically strenuous army regiment (Golani).  
Michael becomes fully integrated into Israeli society: he learns Hebrew in an 
Ulpan, marries the teacher, a local Israeli woman, opens a small business and 
has three Sabra children with distinctively Israeli names. In terms of the Zionist 
narrative this is no doubt a great success story where, as promised, a rootless 
diasporic Jew finally finds ‘home’ within the Israeli group, settles down and 
becomes a full member. His choice to open with a personal testimony of this 
highly compelling collective story was made to convey to me, an Israeli-born 
and, by my accent, presumably a ‘Sabra’ that was born in Israel, that he is 
indeed a part of the Israeli group. In spite of the explicit ideological message 
‘Israel is home to Jews all over the world’ and even some formal legislation 
and material benefits to encourage Jews to immigrate to Israel, social reality 
demonstrates that new immigrants suffer discrimination and find it difficult to be 
accepted into the local Jewish-Israeli society. Michael made exceptional efforts 
to demonstrate knowledge of famous figures, special locations, key events, 
vernacular signifiers (see ‘The signifiers of belonging’ section later on in this 
chapter) and slang words which would demonstrate to me his ‘genuine’ group 
membership. For that discursive task it is advantageous to portray himself as a 
diasporic Jew who immigrated to Israel. He can provide first-hand testimony of 
the reliability of the collective imaginary – the mesmerizing effect of Israel for 
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diasporic Jews (‘got off the boat, Phew! I’m home’) and the qualitative and 
spiritual advantages that living in Israel has over diasporic life, which Zionism 
constantly claims (as communicated in Dorit's interview discussed earlier) and 
Israelis like to hear. Towards the end of the chapter I will return to Michael's 
acculturation story.  
Later in his interview, Michael ‘pulled the same discursive trick’ out of his 
sleeve when he told me of his personal encounter with a Palestinian refugee 
from Gaza, which most Israelis (due to security fear) probably won’t have: 
So he took me to ‘s ouse (his house – a Hebrew slang) in Jebalia {a 
refugee camp in the Gaza strip} and I was met {a Hebrew grammatical 
error} his father and his father told me of how he lost his whole life in 
Julis {which used to be an Arab village prior to the 48 war). You know 
where Julis is? Right next to Ashkelon [yes]. There is an armored 
military base over there. And he told me 'yes, mi {my – Hebrew slang} 
house is over there’, and he told me of how he lost everything, because 
he would listen {a grammatical mistake in Hebrew} their leaders and he 
was sorry he ran away from home.     
In this case, much like in the ‘boat story’, Michael is able to present himself to 
me as both a legitimate in-group member who is well versed in the group 
mythology (the Israeli version of the Nakba25 according to which Palestinians 
fled from their homes following the advice of their leaders26  - see Bar-Tal, 
2007 about the Zionist-Israeli narrative of the conflict with the Palestinians) and 
at the same time enjoy the advantages of an out-member who can have 
access to these sources (he was invited to a Palestinian refugee’s house) 
which is beyond the reach of local Israelis. Therefore, Michael can claim his 
superiority over me as he, a diaspora-born Jewish-Israeli who had an informal 
first-hand account of the Nakba events while I, an Israeli-born man have to rely 
on formal information, rumors and popular hearsay (he asks me if I know 
where Julis is and then quickly demonstrates his knowledge). In our encounter, 
Michael negotiates his specific position as an ‘outside-insider’ within the Israeli 
                                            
25
  The ‘Disaster’ or ‘Catastrophe’ (Arabic).  A term referring to local Palestinians who were 
forced to leave their homes during and following the 1948 war between Jews and local 
Palestinian forces as well as Arab armies.   
26
  It is now known that many Palestinians were driven out or were collectively transferred and 
were not allowed to return to their homes.   
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group where he gets to ‘hold the stick from both ends’: he enjoys the benefits 
of being included as an in-group member (Israel is his ‘home’), while at the 
same time retaining a personal and critical perspective of the group. Michael 
was the only interviewee who mentioned the contentious events during the 
1948 war during which Israel was founded. Although he brings the classical 
Israeli version of the Nakba (‘they fled’), Michael offers a humanistic view of 
individual Palestinians’ tragedy and of their suffering which other Israelis 
normally avoid. His exceptional reference to the Palestinian Nakba signals 
perhaps that he feels freer than most Israelis to skim between various 
discourses and their subject positioning. This may perhaps be due to Michael's 
upbringing in a liberal Jewish family in America (a diasporic perspective) or to 
Michael's insistence on being an outsider wherever he is, be it in America, 
Britain or Israel.   
However, it would be wrong to conclude that canonical national narratives 
serve merely as self-conscious discursive tools for subjects to manage the 
politics of the interview encounter, a means to signify identity affiliation and 
gain social status or a way to make sense of or explain away a 
disadvantageous social condition. I argue that collective identities and the 
canonical narratives that play a major role in holding them together – the 
imagination of ‘who we are’ – address subjects’ uncertainties, hopes and 
dreams, thus making them especially compelling, and explains their ‘stickiness’ 
(Hook, 2008) and resistance to change (Stavrakakis, and Chrysolaras, 2006). 
In the following short extract I will focus on the assertion ‘We are the centre  of 
the world’, that exemplifies, according to the interviewee, the experience of 
being an Israeli in London. While this specific example had, no doubt, 
discursive and rhetorical value for managing the immediate interview 
encounter which I will briefly present, I would rather like to focus on the 
mesmerizing effect that collective preconceptions taken from the canonical 
national imagery have on individuals in general and especially in 
disadvantageous circumstances.  
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6.3. The nation as a glorified group: ‘Israel is (not) the Centre of the 
World’.  
Noga is a woman in her mid-thirties. She has lived in London with her husband 
and two little children for the past 3 years. She has been sent to work abroad 
by her company, an Israeli-affiliated High-Tec company which is often 
regarded in Israeli society as an example of the Israeli success story: originally 
founded in Israel, it was bought in the mid-eighties by a well-known world-wide 
American firm. Because of its history and given that, as Noga notes, higher 
positions in the company’s professional hierarchy are occupied by Israelis, it is 
perceived as ‘an Israeli company’.  
to which she ?’ London…hat is it for you to be an Israeli in wI asked her ‘
responded with an anecdote from one of the professional conferences she 
attended: 
There was a guy and we talked about sales in Europe, etc., and then he 
says a sentence: ‘Israel is not the centre of the world’, Israelis have the 
feeling that …  
She provided a description of the company’s structure from which I’ve learnt 
that many workers in the higher levels are Israelis. She then continued her 
story about the guy she met in the conference:  
24.  And so the feeling that you get is as if … 
25.  So he tells me ‘Israel is not the centre of the world’ 
26.  Firstly it is!  
27.  But it’s funny because every Israeli he told it to him gave him the same 
answer 
28.   [‘sure it is’ {meaning We are the centre  of the world’] 
29. Yes. And then later when a {Israeli} speaker mentioned it in the larger 
forum,  
30.  He {the German guy} started to be pissed off.  
31.  I don’t know if he thought that it was funny anymore, 
32.  Because you still have that feeling... 
33.  you come from this little Israel into the big world,  
34.  [and] still, we are the centre of the world.  
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The assertion 'Israel is (not) the centre of the world' was made in response to 
the question around the sense of Israeliness in London. Often interviewees 
related to the discomfort or complexities that arise once they are disclosing 
their Israeli identity in what is almost unanimously perceived as politically 
unfriendly London (see chapter eleven). In other instances, interviewees 
related to their existential sense of alienation, foreignness and lack of 
belonging. Noga addresses her singularity as an Israeli in a different way. She 
works in an Israeli-friendly professional environment (populated by quite a few 
Israelis and whose higher directorate is described as mainly Israeli), hence 
(‘and so...’ 24), the malevolent experiences that many Israelis describe ranging 
between discomfort, a need to justify, hostility and even fear is replaced here 
with confidence, dominance and superiority. Israelis often like to boast about 
the globally disproportionate number of High-Tec and start-up companies in 
Israel and Israeli High-Tec industry is often seen as the front window of Israeli 
society (Senor and Singer, 2009), a testimony to its financial strength, and a 
supporting proof to the merits of the Jewish-Israeli ‘brain’ - informal, 
unconventional (often described favorably as ‘crazy’), creative and daring (see 
the discussion of Hutzpah in Dorit’s extract earlier) - and to the Israeli way of 
doing things; Noga makes use of this narrative. Within the context of 
professional success, the non-Israeli guy’s reasonable and rational claim 
‘Israel is not the Centre of the World’ can actually be emotionally contested (‘so 
the feeling that you get is as if …’ (24), ‘because you still have that feeling...’ 
(32). To justify this obviously, irrational feeling (that I too know about – I also 
took part in the Israeli private joke – [sure it is] 28), Noga draws on one of the 
nation’s favorable myths ‘you come from this little Israel into the big world’ (34), 
which resonates with the idea of success against all odds (manifested through 
the myth of small David fighting huge Goliath). In this context the ‘smallness’ 
magnifies the sense of success and achievement. In such discursive climate of 
national spirit, constituting a small minority (here ‘coming from this small 
Israel’) can actually turn out to be an advantage. It makes part of the appeal of 
national identities which offer individuals the chance to take part in a larger-
than-life collective dream or phantasy of greatness, a sense of specialness 
and uniqueness that other groups might aspire to. The material conditions of 
professional success support this dream-like mentality so while you know that 
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‘Israel is not the Centre of the world’ yet (‘still’ – 34) the {comforting} feeling is 
‘we are the centre of the world’.  
And still, the proposition ‘We are the centre  of the world’ was raised as a 
response to the troubling assertion of the non-Israeli man, ‘Israel is not the 
centre of the world’ (i.e. Israel as a marginal country), which Israelis who leave 
Israel and come to London have to confront. The geographical, political and 
cultural isolation from its neighboring countries that is the result of, on the one 
hand, external security threats, and on the other hand, an active effort to 
differentiate itself from its environment or even enlarge its geographical 
territory also contributes to a mental isolation, an ‘island’ or ‘siege’ mentality, 
whereby being a (local) majority supports the impression that ‘We are the 
centre of the world’. This sweet illusion of the privileged majority was recreated 
in the international conference which many Israeli professional employees 
attended. There the German man, taken as representative of ‘the big world’, 
found himself to be in the minority. In a room filled with Israelis his joke about 
Israelis’ illusion of centrality turned against itself – then and there, Israel indeed 
could be perceived to be the centre of the world. The same happened within 
the interview encounter itself. For a minute, both interviewee and interviewer, 
living away from Israel, shared the comforting experience of a hegemonic 
majority rather than that of newcomers in a foreign country.  
Later, Noga went on to voice yet another collective phantasy recognizable 
within the Israeli public discourse of nationality:   
43. and the world always splits,  
44. and you see it everywhere,  
45. into those who love you and those who don’t love you,  
According to this rhetorical logic 'me', 'you' and 'we' are completely enmeshed 
with each other (they love or don't love 'you' rather than 'us' or 'me'); I, the 
researcher, being an Israeli, am confined to the same rules as all the other 
group members and distinctions between different group members are erased. 
There are only two options (black-white) left: either 'they' love you or they do 
not. Noga also uses a highly intense verb – ‘love' rather than more nuanced 
ambivalent ones – 'like', 'respect', 'accept' and she argues that the truthfulness 
of this assertion is beyond doubt (because it 'always' happens and 'you see it 
everywhere’). This extract demonstrates vividly how discourses of nationality: 
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a. have the capacity to blur nuances and complexity, to present a highly 
intense black-and-white interpretation of events and overlook experiences 
which contradict the narrative's truth; and b. are mesmerizingly compelling to 
individual subjects by making sense of complex situations, setting up rules and 
sorting out 'the mess' of inexplicable daily incoherent experience.  
The two assertions: ‘the world is split into those who love you and those who 
don't’ and ‘we are the centre of the world’ go hand in hand and support each 
other. We have this feeling that ‘We are the centre of the world’ because 
everyone is engaged with us ('the world {only} splits into those who love and 
those who don't'). At the same time, because ‘we are the centre of the world’; 
everyone either loves or doesn't love us (they either admire us or are jealous 
of us). It is also interesting to notice how the subjective (symbolic) status of the 
assertion ‘we are the centre of the world’, which still retains its symbolic quality 
and distinguishes between what is and what is felt ('the feeling that you get is 
as if…' 24), is lost and is taken concretely ('the world always splits and you see 
it everywhere'). 
6.4. Words in the service of the nation: the Lexicon of belonging.   
As the interview material started to pile up, I became aware not only of 
recurrent or exceptional contents and themes that drew on shared myths and 
symbols, but also of specific signifiers that articulated belonging to or 
alienation from the national group; these signifiers often constituted signposts 
within the interview that signaled the subject’s shifts in her/his social 
positioning.   
As part of the current chapter dealing with the hegemonic nation narrative, I 
would like to demonstrate subjects’ differential usage of two key signifiers that 
address Israel: ‘Ha’aretz’ and ‘Israel’. This section will look at the application of 
those signifiers across individual texts to learn about their shared cultural 
meaning. While Lacanian discourse analyst Pavon-Cuelar (2010) argues that 
‘instead of wasting time looking for imaginary similarities beyond discourse, 
Lacanian analysts may confine themselves to examining evident real gaps and 
symbolic differences in discourse’ (p. 9), it is my specific intention in this 
section to study that very collective imaginary which ‘cover[s] up the real 
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separation between individual subjects’ (Pavon-Cuelar, 2010 p.15) and results 
in ‘an imaginary collective identity’ (p.15).   
At an early stage in my research, I became aware of the high frequency with 
which the term ‘Ha’aretz’ (‘The Land’ in Hebrew) appeared in the interviewees’ 
speech alongside the term ‘Israel’. The usage of ‘Ha’aretz’ was of course very 
familiar to me, but the differential significance of these two designations 
became markedly visible during the fourth interview with Michael (presented 
earlier in this chapter), an American born Jew who came to Israel in his late 
20s, stayed there for ten years, divorced and settled in London. As discussed 
in the previous section, throughout the interview Michael went ‘out of his way’ 
to demonstrate his acquaintance with Israeli actuality, culture and politics. In 
response to my question ‘what did you find there (in Israel) that you liked so 
much (and made you want to stay)’ he responded: 'I was in a Bar-Mitzvah in 
Isra… in Ha’aretz' and then went on to tell a story of friendship with some 
people he met there. I found his accidental slip of tongue as significant as the 
other manifested contents of his story. ‘Ha’aretz’ – ‘The Land’ is the way 
Israelis commonly refer to Israel. But it is more than a common discursive 
currency. It also bears specific meaning within the daily discourse of nationality 
that goes unnoticed (Billig, 1995): THE Land (Ha’aretz) - the one and only 
homeland possible for Israelis in Zionist terms. 'Israel', on the other hand, 
could be read as a neutral designation, a country like any other, Belgium, 
England, Russia. By correcting himself, Michael revealed a tension between 
his diasporic external outlook on Israel and his Israeli identification. Seen from 
the outside it is ‘Israel’; seen from within, it is ‘Ha’aretz'. Michael’s precarious 
Israeli identification taught me, an Israeli born Jew, about these taken for 
granted, discursive social-politics and the outsider’s view of the Israeli group. 
Therefore, it came as no surprise to me that Aaron, who settled in Britain nine 
years ago, who belongs to a local Jewish synagogue, and who lives away from 
the traditional Israeli or Jewish neighborhoods with his non-Israeli Jewish wife 
and is acquainted with British actuality and politics, rarely used ‘Ha’aretz’ in his 
interview. He also introduced an unusual interpretation of the concept ‘Israeli 
Identity’ which prioritized civic and cultural aspects, prevalent in British society, 
over the more ethnic one which dominates the Israeli discourse of nationality. 
Aaron had to disengage from the ‘Ha’aretz’ position and adopt a new subject 
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position that of ‘Israel’, in order to find his place in British society because of 
the exclusivity that Zionism demands of its members. By contrast, Dorit (whose 
text was analysed in this chapter), who came to London only 3 years ago and 
lived in a Jewish/Israeli bubble, talked about her strong Israeli identification 
saying: ‘For me it’s very important to stay Israeli, to be integrated among 
Israelis,  to… to….to know what is going on in Ha’aretz’.  
My research experience taught me that within a strong Zionist discursive 
atmosphere, ‘Ha’aretz’ operates as the hegemonic designation for the country 
and that when the less habitual form, ‘Israel’, prevails it testifies to a certain 
disengagement with the country and its ethos, at least as far as ‘engagement’ 
is understood in Israeli hegemonic and popular discourses of nationality (it 
would be wrong to conclude the opposite i.e. that whenever ‘Ha’aretz’ is 
applied a ‘Ha’aretz’ engagement follows). I argue that subjects who speak from 
an ‘Israel’ subject position also demonstrate some broader freedom from the 
discursive and ideological constraints that ‘Ha’aretz’-Israeliness imposes on 
them. However, while I could trace general preferences for specific signifiers 
among different interviewees, I also witnessed different applications of 
signifiers of identification in different parts of the same interview. As will be 
demonstrated in David’s interview (chapter ten), the dialectics between 
‘Ha’aretz’ and ‘Israel’ also disclose subjects’ efforts to make subjective sense 
for their own sake. This can demonstrate that identities, and hence 
identification positions, by their very nature are fluid, negotiated and ‘changing’ 
rather than being solid and fixed.  
In comparison, an alternative signifier - ‘immigrant’ - which comes to clash with 
hegemonic Zionist ideology, was completely absent from my respondents’ 
speech. As presented in Michael and Dorit’s texts, immigration to Israel is 
welcomed and is referred to as Aliya (literally meaning ‘ascent’), and is seen 
primarily as ideological (Golden, 2001). By contrast, none of my interviewees 
referred to themselves as ‘immigrants’ and they had to apply alternative 
signifiers to describe their departure from or absence from Israel. Roni, for 
example, used a variety of alternative verbs -‘reside’ (‘Gar’), ‘stay’ (‘Nish’ar’), 
‘be here’ (‘Sho’he’) - to describe his presence in Britain but avoided using the 
term ‘living’, which in Hebrew signifies settlement and permanence (see also 
chapter eleven and the negotiation of a diasporic Israeli space). Compared 
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with subjects of other diasporas for whom the signifier ‘immigrant’ is 
acceptable (see Sayad 2004, Tanyas, 2010 Fathi, 2011), for Israelis 
‘immigrant’ bears a negative connotation. This can be due to its disadvantaged 
socio-economic connotation, but it can also be related to its counter-
hegemonic non-Zionist connotation. Only one interviewee (Ariella - see 
chapter 12) referred to herself as an immigrant and compared herself to 
Russian Olim (Jewish immigrants) to Israel, and she applied this term 
specifically in order to explain to me her decision to go back to Israel after 
living for 12 years in London. She said: ‘I always compare myself to new Olim 
from Russia. Here, I’m a new Ola (immigrant) from Russia, and I don’t like this 
position, I don’t like it.’ 
The couplet the ‘Israeli-ghetto’ (see full discussion in chapter nine) was used 
by some of my interviewees, usually with a pejorative connotation, to refer to 
the tendency of Israelis to close among themselves, presumably out of fear of 
opening up to new cultures, communities or people. It seems that Hebrew, 
heavily dominated by a Zionist ideology and its lexicon, does not ‘allow’ for any 
normative collective social existence outside the boundaries of the Jewish 
state. I argue that this discursive field, with the discursive limitations (Foucault, 
1970) it imposes on Jewish-Israeli subjects living abroad, affects not only the 
ways they speak but also their ability to form and normalize institutions, 
practices and other structures of communal lives.   
6.5.  An epilogue: Undoing the Zionist narrative  
I now wish to return to Michael's story of acculturation in Israel. As seen 
before, Michael is a crafted story teller and knows well how to ‘play his 
discursive cards’. We last read it as a success story that ticks all the right 
boxes on the Zionist list: the miraculous arrival to Israel, falling in love with the 
country, enlisting into the army, marrying an Israeli woman, establishing a 
business and having children with Israeli names. As the story unfolds, Michael 
describes what can be seen as the collapse of this mythological collective 
narrative, which explains how he ended up in London.  
...one day, we have Noam, Gali and Smadar {Israeli pseudonyms 
names of his children}… ‘in two thousand she asked to get a divorce on 
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the Friday, by Tuesday she had the Gett27 and everything she asked 
for, and I ran away aboard… I moved here, bought this house and 
wandered like a butterfly and in the mail [sec. meaning email] I met 
Judith and I have two more children with her… and now I have Joseph 
and Maurice. And that’s it.  
Michael introduces a twist in the story (‘one day’) but then suspends it a bit 
longer by returning once more to his successful integration story in Israeli 
society (noting the distinctively Israeli names of his children). Hence, he 
skillfully constructs the narrative climax before he brings it to its disruption: the 
love-at-first-sight story and the sense of homeliness ended as abruptly as they 
started: when his wife asked him for a divorce he granted it within days and 
ran away abroad, went back to his wandering (‘wandered like a butterfly’), 
before re-settling not in Israel but rather in London, marrying a local Jewish 
woman and having two kids with clearly diasporic Jewish names. This falling in 
love with the country ends when the romantic interpersonal relationship with 
his wife fails. Then, no ideology, or even material and familial relationship, can 
keep him from running away. This is the perfect disruption of the perfect Zionist 
success story he opened up with, the subordination of the grand collective and 
ideological narratives to the interpersonal intimate circumstances. While this 
could be seen as a story of ideological disillusionment and a critique of 
Zionism, it also conveys Michael’s position as an outsider who never fits. In our 
encounter, Michael seemed to enjoy living in both worlds – on the one hand, 
claiming his membership with the Israeli group (sharing with me details of 
Israeli daily life, performing the knowledge of the hegemonic collective story 
and even claiming to know it better than me), while at the same time 
renouncing any group belonging and pointing to its limitations.     
6.6. Discussion 
This chapter presented various examples where interviewees drew on aspects 
of the Zionist canonical national narrative and popular beliefs that support it 
('We are the centre  of the world’ and 'the world always splits into those who 
love you and those who don't love you') to achieve various psychosocial goals. 
The main aim in this chapter was to study the myths, symbols, signifiers and 
                                            
27
 Jewish divorce agreement 
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narratives that contribute to the Israeli imagined community and demonstrate 
its usefulness for the construction of an ‘Israeli identity’.  
The main part of the chapter focused on an interview with Dorit, who applied 
aspects of the Zionist narrative (which depicts Israel as the ultimate personal 
and collective phantasy of diasporic Jews) to manage troubling issues around 
power-relations between the two Jewish groups, the disadvantageous socio-
economic condition of a new-comer, and gender relations within these 
disadvantageous conditions. Perhaps because she only recently arrived in the 
UK and has chosen to live in a Jewish-Israeli ‘bubble’, and thus was not 
exposed to alternative, local, discourses, Dorit compensates for the material, 
cultural and social disadvantages and inequality in power-relations vis a vis the 
locals (Jews) by drawing on available Zionist conceptualizations which offer 
her momentary consolation. 
Michael’s account of the ‘love-at-first-sight’ he experienced as a diaspora Jew 
when he first arrived in Israel converges with the Zionist argument that Dorit 
promoted here that diaspora Jews ‘would really like to make Aliya’ (to 
immigrate to Israel), i.e. to amend a (deficient) diasporic condition. In Dorit and 
Michael’s interviews, the state of Israel (Michael) and its group members by 
proxy (Dorit) constitute ideal objects of desire for diaspora Jews. Unlike Dorit, 
however, Michael was disenchanted with collective narratives and insisted on 
his position of an ‘outside-insider’, or a skeptical member of the national group, 
and provided a critical and even ironical view of these shared collective stories. 
The love-at-first-sight with the country ended up in a personal divorce from his 
Israeli wife and a return to a diasporic condition. The Israeli narrative of the 
Palestinian Nakba (that wasn’t mentioned by any other Israeli interviewee) was 
coloured with the recognition of the individual Palestinian’s tragedy. Michael 
was rather using these canonical anecdotes in an effort to claim and prove his 
group membership and his acquaintance with the groups’ collective cultural 
reservoir and in order to manage his relationship with me, a Sabra-Israeli and 
a presumably ‘legitimate’ member of the group.       
Finally, the third short extract from Noga’s interview provided insight into the 
mesmerizing effects that national narratives, operating within the grey area 
between dream and reality and promoting a sense of group grandiosity, offer 
individual group members, especially as they are located in disadvantageous 
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social, material and psychological conditions. Noga’s extract highlighted, in 
particular, the Israeli ethos of a miraculous national phenomenon – achieving 
success and international recognition against all odds. The three extracts 
highlight ideal aspects of the group – ‘its appeal for members of other groups’ 
(diaspora Jews), ‘a sense of a collective home’, the centrality and superiority of 
the ‘nation group’ and, as Anderson (1991) wrote: ‘[regardless of the actual 
inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each] the nation is always 
conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship {my emphasis}’ (p. 7).  
Another section looked briefly at the application and negotiation of shared 
signifiers such as ‘Ha’aretz’, ‘Israel’, ‘ghetto’ or ‘living’ that circulate in the 
discursive public space and take part in shaping ideas and experiences of 
belonging and alienation. I argued that alongside Zionist narrative and ideology 
there is an accompanying vocabulary that supports them.     
While the aim of this chapter was to present some of the building blocks 
(themes, symbols, images and stories) of the national imagery from which 
subjects construct their shared sense of national identity, it should be made 
clear that I am not proposing to see such images or narratives as essential 
social axioms, a reflection of a specific ‘historical reality’ which are not given to 
deconstruction. Rather I see it as the combination of historical events as they 
were interpreted, negotiated and imagined (Hall, 1990) in the group’s ‘market 
place’ under certain historical, socio-political conditions in the past, which are 
accommodated to subjects’ present conditions (e.g. immigration, finding 
oneself in a minority situation). While Michael’s usage of the Zionist narrative 
demonstrates subjects’ ability to critically reflect and sometimes disengage 
from hegemonic discourses of nationality, for others, mostly those who were 
brought up within a Zionist world view, the persuasion of national narratives 
stems from the ‘solution’ they offer to adversarial group and individual 
conditions and their ability to make sense. 
While the emphasis in this chapter was given to the narrative, and to the sense 
of ‘wholeness’ and meaning that it promotes, and in this sense follows 
Anderson’s portrayal of the national linear time, other chapters will be looking 
at this national story through critical lenses presenting the fracturing of 
‘oneness’ or of the national ‘linearity’. The problems with the nation as a 
narrative are twofold: The sense of glamorous ‘We-ness’ that the (hegemonic 
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Zionist) narrative advocates shifts our attention away from the disruption, 
fragmentation, confusion and meaningless that people often experience. 
Scholars coming from a Lacanian approach (Bhabha, 1994, Rose, 1996, 
Stavrakakis and Chrysoloras 2006) point out that the force of national 
phenomena lies specifically in the tension arising between a coherent narrative 
and its disturbance. Such moments of disruption were evident even within 
these extracts, which presumably prioritized sense-making over the disrupted 
and fragmented, the idyllic and grandiose over the lacking and painful. Dorit 
was constantly making disclaimers that limited the validity of her assertions 
and concluded by saying: ‘I feel terribly uncomfortable with the responses I 
give, because I feel that they are stupid’. The value of stereotypes and 
generalizations for nurturing a coherent linear national story and the clarity it 
provides often contradicts alternative private experiences and personal 
narratives which describe a different picture. Michael toyed with the canonical 
narrative, leading it (and me as the listener) skillfully to its climax before 
deconstructing it in the same skillful way. Unlike me and the other two Israeli-
born participants who were raised on the notion of Israeli Zionism, Michael’s 
diasporic position as an outside-insider allows him to move freely between in-
group and out-group collective imaginaries and choose his preferred position. 
Noga’s reference to the Israeli group grandiosity (‘we are the centre of the 
world’ and ‘the world always splits...’) alternated between an awareness of 
their phantasmatic quality (‘you have a feeling that’) and their concrete 
essentialist fixity (Israeli is the centre of the world). 
Secondly, a national linear cohesive story comes at the expense of individual 
differences and social and cultural diversity. Explicitly drawing the line between 
‘Us’ (Zionist Jewish-Israelis) and ‘Them’ (diasporic Jews, Palestinians, local 
British people) blurs differences and conflicts between various social groups 
within Jewish-Israeli society (i.e. the ‘We’ group) that are categorized 
according to gender, ethnicity, religion, class, etc., thereby repressing 
alternative narratives. As Shafir and Peled (2002) and Filc (2006) argue, the 
hegemony of the Israeli-Zionist narrative to which most Jewish-Israelis adhere 
was achieved, as any hegemonic project, by pushing out alternative political 
and ideological projects that advocated alternative narratives. Thus, Dorit’s 
description of local Jews’/Israelis’ romantic view of Israel men and women 
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highlights Zionist themes, images and rhetoric that sees the Jewish diaspora 
as a socially, politically and psychologically deficient condition (‘They really like 
to make Aliya’) rather than as an alternative, and equally valuable, model  of 
Jewish life (Shneer and Aviv, 2009). Likewise, feminist scholars (e.g. 
Kuntzman, 2008, 2008a, Kamir, 2011) point to the male-centric bias of 
Zionism. Indeed, in Dorit’s account there is no distinction between Israeli men 
and Israeli women; they are all presented as the typical ‘New Jew’ Sabras: 
‘Hutzspadic’, confident, coming from a country of sun, and as objects of desire 
for Jewish diasporic men and women. 
My choice to look at the material through the ideological and national narrative 
prism stems from the appreciation of the impact that such discourse has on 
Israeli subjects. It allowed me to trace the myths, symbols and specific 
signifiers that are the building blocks of a shared imagined community and to 
follow their subtle negotiation by subjects in their quest for personal meaning.  
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Chapter seven - the Jewish-Israeli abroad: an 
inside-outsider’s perspective on Israeli 
society and culture: ethnicity, race and class   
7.1.  Introduction 
In the previous chapter I reviewed some of the interviewees’ references to the 
national ethos and its narrative which, as I argue throughout my work, still 
constitute the backbone of the Israeli imagined community. I described the 
function that such an idyllic group image served for the speakers in order to 
achieve certain discursive goals: managing their pre-interview agenda or their 
perception of ‘who they are’, and negotiating it with me as an audience within 
the interview encounter. I also studied the limitations and disruptions of these 
idyllic group images. 
However, since the construction of ‘Israeli identity’ is determined by the social 
and cultural context within which the subject is positioned, subjects’ perception 
of their dislocation as Israelis abroad plays an important part in how ‘national 
identity’ will be constructed by each subject. However they choose to define 
their status in Britain - as immigrants, diasporic, sojourners or expats – 
subjects defined their Israeliness in relation to three localities (Anthias, 2002): 
‘home’ (Israeli society – chapter seven) ‘away’ (British society – chapter eight) 
and ‘between home and away’ (the local Israeli community - chapter nine), 
although some subjects especially focused on one locality. The dialectic 
relations between ‘home’ and ‘away’ in these three localities will be presented 
in the next three chapters. 
This chapter will cover the main areas that were raised by the participants 
when relating to their place in and engagement with ‘home’ (i.e. Israeli 
society). In chapter three, I described the changes that Israeli society has 
undergone in the past few decades from an ideological, collectivist, society 
with a certain political and cultural hegemony, to a society with greater 
pluralism and multiculturalism and growing challenges to the canonical 
narrative and its political order by contesting counter-hegemonic narratives in 
what has been regarded as a post-ideological or even post-Zionist phase 
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(Ram, 2006, Smoocha, 2010). At the same time, the on-going occupation of 
Palestinian territories and the unresolved conflict with neighbouring countries 
is kept centre-stage in Israelis’ daily reality (Grinberg, 2007) and still greatly 
affects Israeli politics. For Israelis in Britain, in the absence of formal and 
informal daily mechanisms promoting ‘Israeliness’ (Billig, 1995), alternative, 
British discourses of private and public spaces may become available. I was 
interested to learn how Israeli society and the notion of ‘Israeliness’ might be 
described from a distance (first RQ), what power-regimes are disclosed by 
them (second RQ) and how these are accommodated into the participants’ 
personal narratives of ‘who they are’ as Israelis.   
Two areas appeared to be especially significant in the participants’ portrayal of 
Israeli society: the internal divisions in Jewish-Israeli society along seniority 
(veterans vs. new immigrants) and ethnicity (Mizrahi vs. Ashkenazi) and the 
tension between the subject and the surrounding social and cultural demands. 
I also noted the absence (or marginality) of certain topics in the construction of 
‘Israeliness’, such as the on-going military tension with neighbouring Arab 
countries, the continuous occupation of Palestinian territories and the tensions 
and uncertainty it brings with it to the civil society or the role of Palestinian 
citizens in Israeli society.  
7.2. Social divides in Israeli society – ‘veteran Israelis’ and Jewish 
immigrants  
This section will draw on two extracts of interviews with Ariella and Liat, who 
provided two different outlooks on ‘belonging’ as they look at the rules of 
inclusion and exclusion in Israeli society and define ‘who is ‘really’ an Israeli’ 
and who is not.    
7.2.1. In ‘Ha’aretz’ I walk ‘with my head raised high’. I’m ‘the salt of the 
earth’ 
I conducted the interview with Ariella just a few weeks before she and her 
family returned to Israel following eleven years in Britain. This fact appeared to 
impact on the interview’s content and its dynamics and I felt that Ariella was 
highly motivated to justify her decision to go back as she herself declared at an 
early stage of the interview:   
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‘I sort of don’t know who you interview but I wanted to tell you that… 
before we start, that my head is in Israel, I mean I’m very... but it’s a 
very-very long process that I went through over many years’. 
Hence, Ariella was aware of the constraints that such a position (‘my head is in 
Israel’) might impose on her portrayal of ‘Israeli identity’, whose complexities 
she believed I was expecting to hear. However, she testifies to her suitability 
for the research by claiming that she has not avoided the complexity and has 
given it much thought (‘it’s a very-very long process’).  
Therefore, while the experience of living in Britain no doubt shaped her 
decision to return to Israel, within the immediate interview context her decision 
to return shaped how events and experience could have been portrayed to me. 
It is within this discursive context that she chose and related to various 
professional and social difficulties in her life in Britain (her story about social 
alienation in British society will be presented in the next chapter). The extract 
below was taken from a larger segment where Ariella talked about her 
frustration over the loss of her professional status and her difficulty to find a job 
as a foreigner in the British job market.  
Stanza 1 – In Britain I’m an immigrant   
1. I always compare myself to new Olim (Jewish immigrants to Israel) from 
Russia. 
2. Here, I’m a new Ola (immigrant) from Russia, 
3. and I don’t like this position, I don’t like it 
Stanza 2 – a disclaimer - I don’t have anything personal against Olim 
4. and I don’t have anything against Russians, 
5. my husband [sic] married, my sister in law…. she married, 
6. I love her  
Stanza 3 – immigrants in Israel are forever foreigners and will never really 
belong 
7. but the position that she is in, 
8. she’s a foreigner  
9. and probably throughout her whole life, she will stay a foreigner 
10. she has this accent and she will stay foreign  
11. no matter how much she’ll belong,  
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Stanza 4 – I’m a foreigner who doesn’t’ belong here, in Israel it will be different  
12. and I feel that I’m in that position here and in Ha’aretz it’s not like that. 
13. Or at least this is how I feel 
14. And this is something that I desire and I’m waiting for it 
15. and it could be that with the years it will dissipate and I won’t remember 
what I am talking about.  
Stanza 5 – How will it be different in Israel – ‘I’m the salt of the earth’  
16. [Q: Waiting for that feeling that…?]  
17. The feeling that I’m walking straight up with my head raised high 
18. I’m ‘the salt of the earth’, 
19. me and my dad were born in the same room  
20. in the same hospital, you know,  
21. I have roots in the place. 
In this extract Ariella likens herself to new Olim from Russia. Although we don’t 
know exactly what are the private associations she entertains about the 
Russian Aliya (immigration wave) we do know that she left Israel when the 
impact on Israeli society of the massive wave (almost a million) immigrants 
from the former Soviet Union, (commonly called by veteran Israelis, ‘the 
Russians’) was still very marked. One aspect of this migrant group was the 
discrepancy between their privileged educational and professional status - 
doctors, engineers, artists – in their home countries and the simple manual 
jobs (e.g. cleaners, non-skilled workers in the building industry etc.) they were 
forced to take following their immigration. Therefore, addressing herself as a 
Russian Ola in the context of a discussion on the limited options of foreign 
high-skilled working women in the British job market might be connected to the 
image of the Russian Olim in the 1990s in Israel.   
Ariella’s text emphasizes a tension between the popular rhetoric of Zionist 
ideology and the actual rules of inclusion and exclusion in Israeli society: on 
the one hand she uses a Zionist term – ‘Ola’, i.e. a Jew who has come (back) 
to their homeland and is therefore expected to be accepted and embraced - 
rather than using ‘immigrant’ (‘Mehageret’), who came to the new country 
(‘merely’) in order to improve their material conditions. On the other hand, 
Ariella argues that in practice, the rules of belonging, exclusion and inclusion in 
Israeli society are not organized according to the Zionist ideology of equal 
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opportunities (for Jews), but rather according to the seniority and the social 
capital that goes with it (‘me and my dad were born in the same room in the 
same hospital [therefore] I have roots in that place’). She speaks from the 
position of the old Ashkenazi elite (who are often seen as the flag carriers of 
Zionist ideology – see Yariv’s short extract later on) whose members arrived in 
Israel/Palestine earlier. This allowed them to occupy key major socio-
economical positions in the young Israeli society and shape the local culture to 
match their taste. Note that even within a very young Israeli society whose 
citizens have mostly immigrated in the past eighty years and in which three 
generations are still very rare, subjects construct a hierarchy of nobility 
according to seniority where second generation Israelis feel socially privileged 
compared to first generation Israelis or those who arrived recently 28. From 
Ariella’s point of view, the unwritten social rules that distribute the power in 
Israeli society and determine who belongs and who will ‘never belong’ privilege 
having a family ‘dynasty’ over any other form of belonging. Therefore, her 
Russian Ola sister in law will never belong – because she and/or her father 
weren’t born in Israel and she has ‘this foreign accent’. Ariella describes Israeli 
society as a ‘members-only’ social club, where foreigners, Jews or non-Jews, 
can never become legitimate members and consequently will never belong.  
The discursive benefits of such a claim are clear: If the same rule of exclusion 
applies to foreigners in Israel and in Britain she can also justify and explain her 
own sense of exclusion and inferiority (which she discussed in other parts of 
the interview) in British society, because of the lack of roots, the foreign accent 
and in general the way that she can be pointed out as looking, acting and 
talking differently (see an analysis of another one of Ariella’s extracts in 
chapter eight). She can only be accepted in Israeli society where she is 
amongst the excluders.  
7.3.2. I remember, from a very early age, that I didn’t want to be there 
A different angle on this veteran-immigrant social hierarchy is demonstrated in 
Liat’s interview. Liat, a thirty five year-old academic who is raising her only 
child on her own, was born in Israel to Jewish parents who emigrated from 
                                            
28
 This has been captured in a highly popular comic video clip from the seventies whose 
continuous relevance is testified by its on-going popularity: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VjDx2ZwLUs0 
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Russia in the seventies while passing en-route through South America . In 
Israel her parents separated, and while part of her mother’s family stayed in 
South America, her father settled in Israel. Consequently, she and her mother 
moved a few times back and forth between Israel and South America. I asked 
her if she could recall what it was like for her to be an Israeli while living in 
Israel and her answer greatly surprised me:  
Stanza 1 – the opening statement – I didn’t want to be there (in Israel) 
1. I remember, from a very early age 
2. That I felt I didn’t want to be there {giggle}  
Stanza 2 – demonstrating her point – as a child I was happy to go away to          
South America   
3. I remember that when they told me that we are going to live in South 
America , I was very-very glad 
4. And it was terribly easy for me to get used to being there  
5. It was… it was sort of difficult like it’s difficult moving from one place to 
another  
6. Like moving schools 
7. But the transition to South America  was very smooth and easy 
8. And was received with a lot of... happiness {I cough} 
Stanza 3 – and returning to Israel was hard  
9. And returning to Ha’aretz was very very-very-very difficult [later] 
10. I didn’t want to return at all  
11. And… still we returned and it was hard 
Stanza 4 - Coda – returning to the initial claim – I didn’t feel that I belonged 
there.  
12. So I guess that actually from a very early age I didn’t feel that I really, 
totally belonged to Ha’aretz 
Liat’s response surprised me because until that point she came across as a 
woman who was well embedded in middle-class Israeli society and culture. 
Nevertheless, Liat responded to my question without hesitation. She 
emphasized ‘didn’t’ and claimed to have a recollection of this sentiment ‘from a 
very early age’. This statement was followed by a giggle which was helpful in 
tracing moments of tension or conflict in other parts of the interview.   
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She insisted and grounded this sentiment by using various adverbs and 
adjectives which drew a clear line between her experience in Israel (‘very very-
very-very difficult’) and those in South America (‘very smooth and easy’). Liat 
added a disclaimer (‘it was sort of difficult like it’s difficult moving from one 
place to another, like moving schools’ 5-6) to make her case more credible but 
then resumed her ‘black and white’ argument. The words she emphasizes: I 
didn’t’ want’ (4), ‘very easy’ (6), ‘smooth and easy’, ‘happiness’, seem almost 
an intentional effort to upset a recognized discourse of Israelis’ relocation 
where people are expected to worry about their children’s reaction to their 
decision to relocate, where settling down abroad is expected to be fraught with 
difficulties and is never expected to be ‘smooth or easy’. Although most of my 
Israeli interviewees pointed to many advantages of living abroad, they would 
also spend some time mourning their lost friends and families, the weather, the 
informal relations, childhood memories or daily habits as a way to 
communicate their commitment to shared cultural and collective experiences. 
Here was an Israeli who plainly declares that she was glad to go away. In line 
12, Liat summarizes her argument regarding the sense of belonging: ‘So I 
guess that actually from a very early age I didn’t feel that I really, totally 
belonged to Ha’aretz’. Liat talks about the totality of Israeli belonging, a key 
feature in Israeli Identity, which is sometimes praised by interviewees as a 
marker of collectivity and mutual reliance, but is also sometimes described as 
limiting and constraining (see David and Nira’s texts later on in this chapter). 
Liat makes an exceptional use of ‘belonging to Ha’aretz’ – i.e. belonging to the 
land or the national territory - rather than the more habitual usage - belonging 
in Ha’aretz’ – i.e. a sense of belonging among the Israeli group of people who 
live in Ha’aretz. The heavy requirements of ‘belonging to Ha’aretz’, which she 
doesn’t meet, work well to explain and justify her disengagement and 
alienation in Israeli society. Following this extract I enquired into this sense of 
non-belonging and she related it to the absence of her grandparents and other 
family members who were living away.   
Stanza 10 – I formulate my conclusion from the previous section – the family is 
the main source of identification  
37. [so the family basis was actually there, in your experience, 
38. And you were a… remote?] 
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Stanza 11 – Liat describes the strong ties to her grandparents  
39. Yes, and I also was very-very attached to my grandfather and 
grandmother,  
40. They actually raised me until they left 
41. Suddenly they got up and left 
42. And that was so terrible 
Stanza 12 – Liat describes how she realized that ‘there are other places in the 
world’  
43. So [chuckles] I wanted to be there. 
44. And, then perhaps, all of a sudden, I became aware that 
45. That perhaps there are other places in the world 
46. That are perhaps more suitable for me to live in [ah-ha] 
Stanza 13 – the attachment to the grandparents (11) and the realization (12) 
made her conclude that she will leave Israel.  
47. And because it was later, it was so difficult returning to Ha’aretz at the 
age of 14 
48. So I knew that the minute I’ll get out of the army, I’ll go [giggles]  
49. I didn’t know where, but I knew I’ll go [ah-ha] 
50. I’m screwing up all your results now [laughs]    
The Zionist ideology presents Israel as a home-land for diasporic Jews like 
Michael (chapter six – ‘got off the boat. Phew! I’m home’) who could find there 
an ‘imagined national family’ among people they didn’t know. One of the 
aspects that this Zionist model of belonging undermines is the impact of the 
real family that in some cases fortifies the attachment to the place (if the family 
is living there and is well embedded in the hegemonic culture), but could just 
as well disrupt the attachment to The Land - Ha’aretz - if the family is away or 
is marginalized.  
Liat, on the other hand, provides an alternative model of belonging, a diasporic 
one whereby the transnational family network and the emotions invested in it 
are the prime site of identification. Both Liat and Ariella’s stories demonstrate 
that the sense of ‘(Israeli) national identity’ is related to the affective personal 
family experiences in Israel rather than to the fascination with the collective 
narrative. However, whereas Ariella’s attachment to the land where she ‘can 
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walk straight up with her head high’ is passed on from her father to her through 
a shared bodily experience (‘being born in the same room’), Liat’s 
geographical attachment is linked to her family’s presence in Russia, South 
America  or Israel and the attachment and relationships she has with them.  
For me, Liat’s interview highlighted my personal engagement with the 
collective hegemonic narrative as a member of a family which was well rooted 
in Israeli society. My own grandparents came from Russia in the early 1910s 
and Poland in the 1930s. Liat’s parents and grandparents were immigrants 
who joined the national ethos at a later stage and did not take part in what is 
considered the nation’s formative years. This encounter demonstrated to me 
that Israelis are invested to various degrees in the Zionist ethos depending on 
their family’s social and cultural engagement.   
Liat did not tell specific stories of social exclusion or rejection but related to a 
sense of estrangement as the daughter of immigrants who didn’t fit in and 
whose grandparents, ‘who raised her up’, were away. Stanzas 12 and 13 
function as a conclusion that was reached ‘all of a sudden’ in South America 
(‘and then perhaps, all of a sudden, I became aware that, that perhaps there 
are other places in the world that are perhaps more suitable for me to live in’ 
44-46). Stanza 13 serves as a corroborative evidence for this awareness 
stimulated by her subsequent Israeli experience (‘and because … it was so 
difficult returning to Ha’aretz… I knew I’ll go’ – 47, 49). Note the caution with 
which Liat constructs her conclusion in stanza 12 (limiting its validity with three 
‘perhaps’ and uttering frequent giggles of embarrassment). She also makes 
her claims personal and relative rather than absolute and categorical by 
saying: ‘[there are] …other places in the world that are perhaps more suitable 
for me to live in’ (45-6). Liat cautiously challenges some of the basic tenets of 
Zionism without upsetting it totally. For example, she takes serving in the army 
as an unquestionable axiom after which she knew she would leave.  
Her final statement: ‘I’m screwing up all your results now’ (50), which was 
made in a cheerful although apologetic tone, demonstrates clearly the 
preconceptions she has about being interviewed on ‘Israeli national Identity’ in 
the context of an academic interview – i.e. that Israelis who live abroad will 
stay, nonetheless, attached to Israel, have fond memories of their childhood 
and would long to go back. My embarrassed cough and her giggles and laughs 
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originate from the same social and ideological axioms that both she and I are 
equally acquainted with but are invested in to different degrees at different 
times.  
One can look at Liat and Ariella’s stories as complementing each other. Liat’s 
story of alienation and non-belonging in Israeli society provides a different 
angle on mainstream Israeli society where Ariella can walk ‘straight up with my 
head raised high’, while her sister in law, (or Liat’s parents or even Liat) who 
emigrated from Russia, ‘will stay foreign’, ‘no matter how much she belongs’.    
While Israel is portrayed in the Zionist ideology and its narrative as the 
homeland of world Jewry, daily reality proves that the veteran Jewish-Israeli 
public marginalizes the Jewish new-comers. Such marginalization, in itself, is 
not surprising since all societies have informal mechanisms of inclusion and 
exclusion. The significance, and consequently the problems, arise from the 
fact that Zionist ideology promises that it can transcend these inequalities.      
7.3. Ethno-cultural divides and racism in Jewish-Israeli society  
The social divide in Israeli society also runs along what is often referred to as 
the ethnic, European- non-European (‘Ashkenazi’ - ‘Mizrahi’ or Oriental) axis. 
The demographics of the Jewish population in Israel changed considerably 
following the establishment of the state from a population that was 
predominately of a European/Eastern European origin to one which now has a 
small majority of Jews from Arab and Asian origin (classified as Mizrahi). This 
demographic changee brought about a gradual political, social and economic 
decline in the hegemony of the old Ashkenazi elite and its social and political 
establishments. This ethnic divide is still debated and discussed in Israeli 
public spheres and some (e.g. Yonah and Shenhav, 2005) strongly claim that 
such a divide still informs the distribution of social and economic capital in 
Israeli society.  
7.3.1. Today, everybody seems to me terribly Mizrahi in Israel 
Yariv's interview demonstrates the orientalism (Said, 1978) of the classical 
Ashkenazi elite where ‘Israeliness’ was constructed against the image of the 
non-European (Mizrahi) Jew. His generalizations and stereotyping often bore 
racist significations (which were difficult for me to hear). In its analysis, I will try 
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to demonstrate the socio-political context from which Yariv draws his 
arguments as he tries to achieve some personal discursive goals while 
constructing his own version of ‘national identity’.   
Yariv talked plainly about his preference for the 'Ashkenazi' and the 'European' 
over the 'non-European' (the Mizrahi in Israel or the Asian in Britain). He talked 
proudly about his European Ashkenazi-Kibbutz origin and the privileged social 
status associated with it in Israeli society:  
It’s true that I look very European, I have a much more European 
appearance than most Israelis, {and} ten years without the Israeli sun… 
but {in Israel} I’ve always been the Ashkenazi, the Polish guy who came 
from the ‘Polish noblesse’ that founded the state in the ... Kibbutzim and 
all that, the Ashkenaziness … in its extreme’  
He stated plainly his physical preferences for a partner:  
I don’t like foreigners and I have a… ahhm, an attitude… a problematic 
personal reaction to people who are different, especially to people with 
a different skin color. I have very personal choices; my personal 
preferences are for Caucasian skin colour slash European slash 
Eastern European slash blond [yes].  
I asked him how he finds Israeli society nowadays to which he answered:  
Stanza 1: Israelis are terribly-terribly Mizrahi (Oriental)  
1. Look, the Israeli being… 
2. It's terribly funny 'cause… 
3. Today, everybody seems to me terribly Mizrahi in Israel 
4. terribly-terribly Mizrahi in Israel 
Stanza 2 – Israelis all look alike  
5. Everybody seems to me terribly, first of all, they all look alike to me 
the… 
6. I arrive to Israel and everybody ….is the same, 
7. {they are} dressed alike 
8. they all have the same {skin} colour {i.e. sun tan}  
9. Look alike, hmm… 
10. Even people on the street, ordinary, seem to me very-very alike  
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Stanza 3 – Israelis are ‘mixed’  
11. And very-very mixed 
12. It's a kind of a Chocó 
13. It's not black nor white 
14. But it's certainly not white 
15. It's a mixture 
Stanza 4 – By contrast, in London you see ‘many-many [different] colours’ 
16. But it's a mixture that identifies them all as similar 
17. It's almost, you arrive to Israel and the sensit={ivity}… the capaci={ity}… 
18. And what you are used to seeing here,  
19. Seeing all the time colours, many-many colors, a lot of colorfulness, it 
isn't there 
Stanza 5 – Israelis in Israel want to feel themselves unique (i.e. not European 
nor Mizrahi). 
20. Israelis would very much like to feel  
21. And I say Israelis as if I'm not… 
22. The Israelis who live in Israel would very much like to feel that they are 
uniquim {using the English word ‘unique’ with a Hebrew ending for 
plurals} 
Stanza 6 – But some Israelis, like me, define their uniqueness through their 
Europeanness  
23. and some would like to feel that they are Europeans, 
24. I'm one of them too 
25. I just live here in order to make a terribly big effort to feel that I'm 
European, 
In the first two stanzas Yariv lays out his views of the orientalization and 
homogeneity of the Israeli public. Yariv who has decided to settle in London 
and not to return to Israel, distances himself from Israeli society portraying the 
Israeli mass as 'Mizrahi' against which his European appearance and 
preference (demonstrated in his earlier quotes) stands out. His repeated usage 
of ‘terribly Mizrahi’ which could be understood as ‘very oriental/Mizrahi’ but 
could also be read as a criticism against the ‘terrible’ orientalization of Israeli 
society. Finally, his usage of the term ‘Israel’ (rather than the common usage of 
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‘Ha’aretz’ (see discussion in chapter six) signifies the emotional 
disengagement he seeks to portray and helps him to distance himself from the 
‘Israeli being’.  
Stanza 2 (lines 5-9) serves Yariv to distinguish himself from ‘the Israeli being’, 
this time on account of its ‘homogeneity’. He draws a line between himself and 
the anonymous crowd which is made up of faceless individuals who all look 
alike, based on their physical appearance. Within this homogeneity his 
exceptional European looks (emphasized in the preceding extract) clearly 
locates him outside the group in a way that signifies him as ‘unique’ and not 
belonging.  
In Stanza 3 Yariv presents the ‘mixture’ as another feature of the Israeli 
population. Referring to Israelis’ skin colour, he describes it as ‘a kind of a 
Chocó, it's neither black nor white, but it's certainly not white, it's a mixture’. 
While in different discursive contexts ‘a mixture’ and ‘a kind of Choco’ might 
serve as favorable descriptions (e.g. ‘the exotic’), in the current text, and 
bearing in mind his previous remarks around ‘foreigners’’ appearance, it is 
taken as a pejorative denomination. The emphasis in ‘it’s neither black nor 
white’ (13) conveys that its fault results from not having a clear and ‘unique’ 
identity (black or white). The ‘mixture’ is taken as an indistinctive compromise, 
or an ‘average’, between the two distinctive colour identities. However the 
usage of ‘but’ and the emphasis on ‘certainly not’ (14) clarifies that there exists 
a hierarchy of preferences – where the ‘white’ is superior to the ‘black’ and that 
the ‘mixture’ or the ‘Chocó’ might assume itself to be compatible with the 
‘white’ but it ‘certainly’ isn’t (14).  
Stanza 4 further stresses the link between indistinctive identity (‘mixture’), 
sameness or homogeneity and non-Europeanness. While it could be argued 
that this ‘mixture’ (15, 16) constitutes a new and unique (skin-colour) identity in 
Yariv’s eyes, this potential uniqueness is lost as this mixture ‘identifies them all 
as similar’. The disparaging tone disclosed that this similarity is associated with 
the ‘ordinariness’ of Israelis. Yariv applies the discourse of multi-cultural 
‘colorful’ (19) London which, presumably, sharpens your ‘sensit{ivity}…{and} 
capac{ity}…’ to identify ‘many-many {different skin} colours’ to accentuate the 
contrast with the Israeli homogeneous public. Thus, he is using the discourse 
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of multi-culturalism in a racist way: where he presumably celebrates the 
‘colorfulness’ (19) of London but actually refers to a racial segregation and to 
distinctions between people of different skin-colours who, unlike Israelis, 
presumably do not mix. This assertion, together with the opening remarks 
preceding this extract regarding his clear personal preferences, allow him to 
describe the white people in London as visibly distinct and thus retain their 
hegemony in the hierarchy of skin-colour groups, which was lost in the ‘mixed’ 
Israeli society.  
In stanza 5 Yariv insinuates that this Mizrahi, homogeneous mixture that 
constitute the ‘Israeli being’ is seen by Israelis, mistakenly (‘Israelis would very 
much like to feel’), as unique. In stanza 6 Yariv finally calls the 
Ashkenazi/European-Mizrahi ethnic divide by its name (i.e. raising once more 
the issue around the historical and on-going unequal distribution of political 
and social power between Ashkenazi and Mizrahi Jews). The logic of ‘and 
some would like to feel that they are Europeans’ (23) seems to be as follows: 
while Israelis in Israel ‘would very much like to feel that they are unique’ 
{‘uniquim’} through their inter-racial, inter-cultural ‘Mizrahi-Ashkenazi ‘mixture’, 
some of them, like him, refute this mixture and would like to hold onto their 
European origins or adopt a European mentality/culture/ behavior, resisting the 
Mizrahi influences on Israeli society. Nevertheless, Yariv distinguishes himself 
even from these Europhile Israelis by claiming that he ‘live[s] here29 in order to 
make a terribly big effort to feel that I'm European’ – 25.   
Thus Yariv makes a series of claims which distance him from every 
contemporary social milieu in Israel and serve him in his argument that he 
cannot go back.  
7.4. The subject and the clash between collectivism and Individualism  
Social demands for conformity and self-restriction are part of subjects’ 
experiences in all cultures and psychoanalysis understands this tension and 
the discontent that accompanies it as a basic tenet of the human condition 
(Freud, 1930). However, in this section I wish to highlight some of the 
                                            
29
  Here Yariv applies the contested verb ‘live’ [chay - see discussion in int. 5), which has a 
more settled resonance than other verbs: ‘stay’, ‘reside’, ‘sojourn’, which emphasizing a more 
temporary status.    
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particularities of Jewish-Israeli culture and its demands as it is negotiated or 
resisted by its subjects. Nira’s text deals with the social pressure to conform to 
the Israeli practices of mourning, crucial today as ever, in the promotion of a 
coherent national story. David’s extract presents the social pressure to return 
and live in Israel.   
7.4.1. ‘But what? Her father is dead, her father is dead. How come she is 
laughing? Her father is dead’ 
Nira, in her mid-thirties, is divorced and has no children. She works 
occasionally in the arts and cultural industries and has been living in London 
for the past twelve years. In a telephone conversation held prior to the 
interview she apologized that she might not be the right person for me to 
interview as she sees Israel merely as the place she grew up in and added 
that she lives away from any Israeli community. This conversation disclosed 
some of her preconceptions on what is means ‘to be an Israeli’, i.e. having a 
positive emotional engagement with Israel and having social connections with 
other Israelis living in London. In the interview, when asked to give a brief 
biographical background she said shortly: 'I was born in Haifa (significant 
details have been changed to ensure confidentiality), I’m an IDF orphan30’. 
Being ‘an IDF orphan’ (her father died in the 1973 war31) indeed occupied a 
large part of the interview. Thus, Nira’s agenda for an interview with an Israeli 
researcher on ‘Israeli national identity’ appeared to be dominated by her 
insistence (even prior to our encounter) on de-identification as an Israeli and 
the efforts to explain it to me and perhaps to herself.       
The extract I chose describes Nira’s particular position within her Israeli 
environment in Israel in the context of one of the nation’s foundational 
ceremonies - that of Memorial Day for the Dead Soldiers (Yom Hazikaron). 
Various authors (e.g. Ben-Amos and Bet-El,1999 and Lomsky-Feder, 2004, 
2011) described the important task that public ceremonies have in fortifying a 
sense of collective identification and solidarity in the construction of an Israeli 
imagined community. Through the celebration of common rituals, subjects can 
imagine themselves as part of a larger imagined community alongside others 
                                            
30
 A term used for children whose parents died during their military service.  
31
 The 1973 war between Israel and Syria and Egypt also called the Yom Kippur war.  
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that they will never meet or even know about (Anderson 1991) and join in with 
the collective narrative that links past, present and future. In a previous part of 
the interview, Nira talked about the special attitude that IDF orphans get from 
their Israeli environment:    
it was always a kind of ahh… sort of a  task… a task, yes a kind of a 
task. Because they always looked a bit differently at… I didn't want to 
be the miser={able}… as if there is something, a kind of… IDF orphans 
are always sort of slightly miserable, or they treat them a tiny bit 
differently in a kind of: ‘wow, what happened to her? 
In retrospect, when living away from this immediate Israeli environment, Nira 
can reconstruct how it feels to be 'caught up' in an emotionally and socially-
charged social role where messages, demands and assumptions are not made 
overtly but rather insinuated to the role-occupying subject. Thus, she felt 'a sort 
of a task', 'a kind of a task' whose nature is not really clear, where people 
'always looked a bit differently at...' [all italics mark my emphasis]. These subtle 
communications impose on IDF orphans the social position of ‘the miserable’ 
for the group's sake, and although these messages were communicated 
implicitly and not directly, Nira could pick them up.   
Stanza 1 – Nira’s attitude towards memorial days - being behind 'a screen' 
1. … I've always been in [behind] a sort of… a screen,  
2. I don't know I wasn't interacting  in any way (or: I didn’t connect) with 
this whole business {of ceremonies for the dead soldiers}  
3. Let's say, with cemeteries etc.  
Stanza 2 – why she didn’t connect with these practices: the discrepancy 
between that day and the rest of the week   
4. It was funn={y} things that weren't supposed to have happened  
5. Memorial days, I didn't feel… it didn’t seem to me…  
6. It seemed to me awkward that only on one day I have to be sad 
7. Because… my father is dead 
8. it's actually…as far as I was concerned it was just another day 
Stanza 3 – what Nira saw around her – how people around her behaved 
during Memorial Day. 
9. I didn't understand why they make a national memorial day  
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10. and everyone has to sit and light a candle  
11. And all of a sudden everyone is so sad for…. 
12. It seemed weird to me that throughout the year everything is all right  
13. And all of a sudden one day it's…  
Nira’s disengagement with the public ceremonies is carried out through 
remoteness, blankness and emotional detachment; the emotionality that other 
people express does not resonate with her private experience of grief. Nira’s 
sense of emotional incompatibility among others during these days of 
memorials gives rise to a sense of bodily difference, of being beside oneself. 
During her interview I had one such experience when I related to the title 'IDF 
orphan'. For a split second this linguistic term seemed to me somehow wrong 
and since I was aware of the heavy signification associated with it, I hesitated 
to use it lest I get it wrong.  
Due to her specific familial and biographical situation and the importance that 
society assigns to it, Nira is located at a crucial social ‘hot-spot’ and can testify 
to subjects’ sense of intrusion and awkwardness (but perhaps also of violence 
and rage) when they are expected to produce genuine feelings (of sadness) in 
response to, or for the sake of, artificially initiated collective practices ('It 
seemed to me awkward that only on one day I have {my emphasis} to be sad 
because my father died' (6-7) and ‘everyone has {my emphasis} to sit and light 
a candle (10)’.  
I asked Nira if she could recall when she felt the discrepancy that she 
described above and Nira replied:    
Stanza 6 – I was going on as usual during one such Memorial Day  
24. I think I was still in {primary} school 
25. I think I ran or rode on the bike  
26. And I was sort of really Mabsuta {happy/content in Arabic} and kind of… 
27. And it was memorial day 
Stanza 7 - Her surroundings' reactions to her going on as usual during 
Memorial Day   
28. And every minute they told me 
29. But what? Her father is dead, her father is dead,  
30. How come she is laughing? her father is dead 
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31. And the teacher caught up with me  
32. And told me, it's memorial day and you have to… ahh 
Stanza 8 – Nira realized that she is not allowed to carry on as usual on 
Memorial Day {or perhaps anytime} 
33. And then I got it: Walla {Ahh So! In Arabic}? Kind of, that’s great! So 
what?  
34. So apparently you are not allowed to sort of… 
35. Yes, I actually remember that day pretty clearly 
36. I think it was at the age of 12, 11-12 
37. It's like 'the coin dropped' that it's not... it’s not appropriate for me to be 
Mabsuta {happy - Arabic}.   
Nira describes an encounter between the emotionally free, spontaneous (‘I 
was still in {primary} school’, ‘I was really Mabsuta’), and dynamic (‘I ran or 
rode the bike’) subject and the restraining social order (the children around her 
- and the teacher). She registers multiple contrastive voices during this 
confusing event: On the one hand she describes a clear sense of physical 
enjoyment riding her bike, and on the other hand, she is aware of disturbing, 
warning voices around her partly talking to her (‘they told me’) partly talking 
about her (‘her father is dead’). This multiplicity of ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ voices that 
runs in parallel, converges into one once the teacher catches up with her and 
makes the social demands clearer but actually not clear enough (‘It’s memorial 
day and you have to…’).  
It is interesting to note Nira’s use of Arabic in order to advocate the position of 
the spontaneous, authentic subject. It struck me that Nira, like some other 
Israeli interviewees, makes use of Arabic to address an ‘authentic’ emotional 
condition un-spoilt by linguistic formality and social conventions. In this context, 
this could be seen as an unintentional identification with members of another 
dispossessed group – the Arabs/ Palestinians whose language, ironically, is 
often absorbed into Hebrew slang as a form of non-formality and Israeli, Sabra 
authenticity. Only through the physical encounter with the literally restraining 
teacher, a representative of the formal social order was she able to finally get 
what she is not expected to do (i.e. enjoy herself). The ‘Walla’ as its addition 
(Great, so what?) testifies and serves as an exclamation mark in the face of 
some unreasonable and almost ridiculous formal demand (that I’m not allowed 
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to be Mabsuta’), demonstrating to me, presumably a representative of the 
national group, a reconstructed moment of the subject's resistance to the 
imposition of the national narrative and its rituals.    
In this extract Nira describes a moment when she realized that her personal 
story as she told it to herself turns out to be a part of another collective story 
wherein she and her family are given an important role, without being aware of 
it. Ben-Amos and Bet-El (1999) studied the means by which the Memorial Day 
for the Dead Soldiers promotes and consolidates the Zionist narrative within 
Israeli schools. The sequence of three memorial days, which are 
commemorated within a span of ten days (The Holocaust day, followed by the 
Memorial Day for the Dead Soldiers and completed with the Day of 
Independence) gives a concise summary of the national Zionist narrative that 
starts with the exilic horrors, goes on to the active battle for freedom and finally 
celebrates its achievement through national independence (which nonetheless 
is constantly felt to be endangered). Within this nationalist agenda, men and 
women are assigned different gender roles. The active contribution of the 
combatant males, who risk their lives in the battlefield, and are joined together 
through masculine comradeship is matched by the women's contribution: 
carrying the burden of mourning and grief over the dead males for the sake of 
the group's collective memory (Kamir, 2011). The governmental campaign 
(see chapter four) indeed depicts the young Israeli woman who will have to 
mourn on her own on Commemoration Day if she decides to stay abroad since 
her non-Israeli partner ‘will never understand’. This message is meant to 
persuade Israelis abroad to return to Israel (and those in Israel not to leave) as 
if by giving up their mourning practices they also loosen their sense of national 
identity. Not taking part in the rituals, ignoring or merely being oblivious to them 
will be considered a major violation of the national-social codes and risk being 
subjected to social sanctions – explicit condemnation or indirect social 
alienation32.  
Nira’s status as an ‘IDF Orphan’ clearly demands her to take an active part in 
the collective ritual; to act as the one to whom group members gaze in order to 
form this sense of collective unity and justification for the collective narrative 
                                            
32
 During the sirens that mark the Dead Soldiers and the Holocaust memorials, Israelis are 
expected to stop and stand up. Those who don’t take part in the rituals, often Arabs or 
Orthodox Jews, are seen as actively challenging the collective narrative and are pointed out.  
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that the group tries to maintain and promote through collective practices. 
Therefore, the emotional disengagement she, an ‘IDF Orphan’, takes towards 
this pivotal practice clearly locates her outside the national consensus. In this 
and in other parts of the interview, Nira presented her reluctance to play the 
demanding social role that was assigned to her. 
7.4.2. It pisses me off that someone tries to classify it as 'an experience' 
David provides another example of the informal social pressure to return to 
Israel placed on Israeli subjects who live abroad using signifiers around 
temporariness and fixity of ‘life’.  
David has lived in Britain with his family for the past seven years in an affluent 
town outside London, has completed his PhD in a British academic institution 
and now works as a researcher. David says that he feels very comfortable in 
England and considers himself ‘some sort of a ‘ballot error’’, because his ‘basic 
character, in a way, suits more the English character rather than the Israeli 
character’. He said:  
76. I have an aunt, who, every time I'm in Ha’aretz 
77. She says: 'yes-yes, that will be an experience for life, it's really an 
experience for life' 
78. [ah, you being here!] 
79. And I try to tell her that it's not an experience for life, it's already life itself 
80. It's already seven years {since they left} 
81. In a little while it will be eight, nine {years}, I don't know,  
82. In any case it's more than 'an experience for life'   
83. It pisses me off that someone tries to classify it as 'an experience' 
A conflict erupts between David and his aunt around the interpretation of 
‘experience’ and ‘life’ (see further discussion in chapter nine). According to 
David, his aunt reduces his life in England, which was very important for him, 
to merely ‘an experience for life’ (77), in the same way that Nira felt her 
personal experience of grief over her father was transformed by her 
environment to suit a particular form of ‘national grief’. Seen through the eyes 
of the elderly Israeli aunt who will probably always live in Israel, ‘experience for 
life’ distinguishes between ‘real’, established life (in Israel) and the temporary, 
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capricious, perhaps exciting adventures of young people seen as merely 
‘experiences’. David is 'pissed off' because his aunt imposes on him a 
completely different narrative, her narrative, the hegemonic Zionist narrative, 
according to which he will return to Israel and will look at his period in Britain 
as merely an adventure. The logic of the collectivistic discourse denies the 
private one he entertains. Alternative understandings of ‘life’, ‘experience’ and 
‘reality’ are less likely to be entertained in the Israeli public space saturated 
with Zionist concepts and signifiers.  
In the course of the interview, and when I listened to its recording later, I was 
fascinated by the efforts that David was making to free himself of these social 
pressures and to construct a preferable subjective space for himself. He said:  
85. I think that today it's less like this 
86. When I come to Ha’aretz, I think that I feel, a tiny bit, yes a tiny bit, more 
of a foreigner 
87. Still not… I wouldn't say that I feel a foreigner 
88. And I think that when I come to Israel, a tiny bit, England is more, stays 
more… 
89. I mean something which is not a distant dream  
I sensed a strong intentional effort to uproot himself from a ‘Ha’aretz’ 
discursive position - that which sees Israel as 'The Land - the one and only' 
(line 86), and plant himself in an alternative, more neutral discursive position 
(88), which sees Israel as merely ‘Israel’. By its very discursive nature, 
‘Ha’aretz’ monopolizes the subject's engagement and would not allow for any 
form of alternative or competing identification. The text describes vividly the 
continuous, slow and gradual struggle (‘when I come to Ha’aretz, I think that I 
feel, a tiny bit, yes a tiny bit, more of a foreigner’ (86), to disengage from 
‘Ha’aretz’ (i.e. to feel a foreigner in Israel), and to engage with England (i.e. to 
retain its memory while being away, 88). Within the efforts to construct an 
alternative meaning of ‘life’ away from Israel, being ‘a foreigner’ in Israel 
becomes a desirable goal.  
Earlier (see Noga’s text regarding the tensions around the military conflict), I 
presented the contradictory and confusing messages circulating in Israeli 
society urging Israelis to return to Israel and join in with the national project 
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while at the same time calling on them to stay away and take care of their 
personal interests. I argue that these contradictory discourses reflect 
contrasting trends in Israeli society between a collectivistic/ideological Zionist 
discourse and a growing individualistic, post-ideological one. Hence they 
reflect the opening-up of Israeli society’s discursive space in what some see as 
Israel’s post-ideological era. However, as the material suggests, particularly in 
light of the threatening trends of individualism and the plurality of narratives, 
formal and informal channels of collectivism persist and even intensify - 
pushing for greater group cohesion and homogeneity.  
7.5. Silenced disputes – absences in the Israeli discourse of nationality  
It was interesting to note that many of the controversial issues in Israeli society 
that I was expecting to hear – the debates around the occupation of the 
Palestinian territories, the status of Palestinian-Israelis in Israeli society or the 
militarization of Israeli society and the effects of the ongoing military conflict 
with the Arab neighboring countries - were either completely absent or were 
downplayed in the interviews and did not constitute main topics. In the 
concluding section I will discuss possible explanations for this phenomenon.    
7.5.1. The representation of the Palestinian Israeli citizen.   
Most Jewish-Israeli participants completely discarded Palestinian citizens from 
their portrayal of the politics of identities in Israeli society (e.g. immigrants, 
veterans, Ashkenazi, Mizrahi, religious or secular) and actually referred to the 
Jewish–Israeli public when talking about ‘Israeliness’. This reflects a general 
tendency among the Jewish-Israeli majority that overlooks the Palestinian 
members of society and their cultural, economic, political or social role in 
Israeli society33. This absence was raised by Aaron when describing the 
changes that Israeli society has undergone in recent decades:  
…. I think that there are many, many Israelis who are not exactly what 
… what used to be once the model of 'The Israeli', ah-ha…[…] ….If it's 
Palestinians… at the end of the day they are 20 percent of the 
                                            
33
 Admittedly, my own choice, to study Israeliness through Jewish-Israelis’ texts, reflects such 
discursive tendency that synonymizes ‘Israeli’ with ‘Jewish-Israeli’. In the ‘reflexivity’ section 
(chapter four) I have addressed my own embededness in Zionist culture.    
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population, and I don't think anyone in Israel considers them at all as 
Israelis 
Michael (whose story of integration into Israeli society was brought in the 
previous chapter) was the only interviewee who referred to the Palestinians’ 
defeat and suffering during the 1948 war – known among Jewish Israelis as 
the ‘war of independence’ and among the Palestinians as the Nakba or ‘the 
disaster’. The Palestinian Nakba is usually avoided in the mainstream Jewish 
public although it is gradually becoming more present in public discourse (as 
the recent issue of the Nakba law – the legal sanctions imposed on institutions 
that commemorate the Palestinian defeat in connection with the day of Jewish 
independence – testifies). I felt that Michael took the privileged position of an 
insider-outsider who was knowledgeable enough of the Israeli culture but at 
the same time not totally constrained by its rules and obligations. Nevertheless 
even Michael presented the events as they are told by the formal Zionist 
narrative – putting the blame on the Palestinians for believing their leaders and 
choosing to flee:  
So he took me to ‘s ouse {his house – a Hebrew slang} in Jebalia and I 
was met {A Hebrew grammatical error} his father, and his father told me 
of how he lost his whole life in Julis. You know where Julis. is? right next 
to Ashkelon [yes]. There is an armored military base over there. And he 
told me 'yes, mi {my – Hebrew slang} house is over there, and he told 
me of how he lost everything because he would listen {a grammatical 
mistake in Hebrew} their leaders, and he was sorry he ran away from 
home , and Abed told me of all the nut cases that roam Gaza, and the 
Muslims. 
Michael was eager, to demonstrate to me his group membership by 
strategically drawing on shared collective knowledge (the events as they are 
told by the formal Zionist narrative), using Hebrew slang and voicing 
consensual opinions within the Jewish-Israeli public about Muslim radicalism 
(‘the nut cases that roam Gaza’). This perception of the Palestinians as the 
beaten enemy who lost their right over their lands persists in the imaginary of 
Jewish-Israeli subjects, contributes to the fear of future conflict and obstructs 
any possibility for co-existence and the envisioning of joint socio-political 
projects. Such portrayal of the Palestinian and the 1948 war also constructs 
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Jewish-Israelis’ perception of ‘Arabs’, ‘Palestinians’ and ‘Muslims’ in Britain as 
will be described in chapter eight.   
An indirect reference to ‘Arabs’ or ‘Palestinians’ was made in subjects’ speech 
through the usage of Arabic as slang and the application of various practices 
symbolizing life in the Middle East. The vast majority of Jewish-Israelis do not 
speak Arabic but many Arabic words have been introduced into daily slang 
Hebrew. It would be beyond the scope of this research to determine the role 
that Arabic plays in Hebrew language. However, my impression was that it was 
applied for the purposes of managing internal politics of Israeli society rather 
than as a direct reference to the Palestinian and/or Arab culture and its role 
within Jewish-Israeli society. In the context of this research, Jewish-Israelis 
who live in Britain often applied it to articulate the distinction of Israeliness from 
the formality of European culture and to portray it as a unique European-
Mediterranean/Middle Eastern hybridity. Hence, ‘The non –European’, like 
‘The European’ plays a part in the construction of ‘the authentic Israeli’ since it 
makes part of the matrix of identities around and against which subjects can 
construct their ‘Israeliness’. 
7.5.2. The military occupation and the ‘security condition’  
The unresolved military situation has immediate material and psychological 
impact on subjects’ daily lives in Israel and some subjects mentioned ‘en 
passant’ the tension and the anxiety, the military service, the ‘security 
condition’ or ‘the conflict’ (as it is usually referred to). However, these did not 
perform as main themes in subjects’ interviews. Only one participant (Na’ama) 
explicitly described it as a possible explanation for her ambivalence over going 
back to Israel (which was her main interview topic) and another, Ariella, 
described it as the cause for her decision to leave Israel eleven years earlier 
but completely omitted it when explaining why she chose now to return. Most 
subjects, even those who have lived in Britain for a long time have talked 
about the possibility of returning to live in Israel and did not mention the 
military situation as an argument that would deter them from doing it. I am not 
arguing that the participants did not have a recollection of traumatic events in 
Israel, but rather that in the context of the interview on ‘Israeli nation identity’ 
they chose other topics as a means to define and describe their sense of 
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national identity. I noted that when subjects did mention their experiences of 
the military conflict they tended to describe themselves as the targets of 
attacks by Arabs or Palestinians and that although many have served in the 
army as soldiers, their experience of the conflict does not include an image of 
themselves or of other Israelis as the perpetrators but rather as victims facing 
potential attacks. Israelis’ experience of being the targets of attack on the part 
of the ‘Arabs’, ‘Muslims’ or ‘Palestinians’ persists when they arrive in Britain 
(see chapter eight) and is manifested in the images of these group members.   
So while the hegemonic Zionist narrative (chapter six) depicts Israel as the 
‘land of milk and honey’, describes the horrors of the Jewish past in exile and 
the story of heroic collective and personal resurrection and transformation from 
helplessness and persecution to independence and liberation, the continuous 
military conflict and the public discourse creates a contradictory daily 
experience of anxiety and fear which subjects carry with them in Israel and 
abroad. Noga talked about the double messages they get from Israelis in Israel 
when they hear about their intention to return to Israel:  
And that’s why I always find it funny that bit about the ‘why didn't you 
stay there?’ … ‘{Israelis in Israel ask} ‘why didn't you stay for the 
passport, so that you’ll have… a place to run away to.  
While on one hand, Israelis get formal (see the government campaign 
encouraging Israelis to return ‘home’ in chapter four) and informal messages 
from Israel friends and family members to return to Israel and to push aside the 
security (and economical) difficulties, they also get a message that 
acknowledges the silenced stress. These confounding messages also convey 
two narratives that are in conflict and contradict each other: The hegemonic 
Zionist narrative promotes the sense of Jewish heroism and self-reliance in a 
Jewish state and urges subjects to fight - a personal narrative - while a 
diasporic one imagines collective apocalypse and urges people to flee. This 
clash of narratives has accompanied the Zionist movement from its inception 
and still lives in Israelis’ daily experience as Noga summarized:  
Everyone would like to live abroad but also to live in Ha’aretz too. And 
it’s a sort of a dissonance, and if you ask me what’s an Israeli this is 
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also a part of being an Israeli. Wanting to live in Ha’aretz but being 
abroad too. 
7.6. Discussion 
In this chapter I addressed some central themes concerning Israeli society that 
came up within and across the interviews. As highlighted in the methodological 
chapter, the interview extracts could be read through various, often 
overlapping and not mutually exclusive, critical approaches. This discloses the 
multilayered nature of narratives. All of these take part in the construction of 
‘national identity’ in interviewees’ texts although some aspects were more 
visible in certain interviews compared to others. I’ll demonstrate this argument 
through Yariv’s extract (‘today, everybody seems to me terribly Mizrahi in 
Israel’).  
1. The psychoanalytic reading – Yariv’s text could be read for the inevitable 
disruption and the impossibility of the (national) narrative (as argued by 
Lacanian theorists - Bhabha, 1990, Zizek, 1998 Stavrakakis, 2007). While in 
Jewish-Israeli society there are, no-doubt, many daily expressions of racism, 
there is also a strong public discourse of ethnic and cultural equality drawing 
on the (Eurocentric) Zionist ideological ethos of the ‘Melting Pot’ (‘Kur Hituch’) 
or ‘the Merging of Exiles’ (‘Mizug Galuyot’).34 According to this national ethos, 
Jewish-Israelis are assumed to work together, regardless of cultural or ethnic 
origin, for the benefit of the joint collective project35, building a Jewish-
democratic state regardless of the variety of cultures and traditions. Yariv’s 
speech reveals the gap between ideology and daily practices, between the 
official phantasmatic ethos of collectivity, solidarity and multiculturalism her 
was raise on and the undercurrent forces of racism, class divisions and 
separatism that exist in daily social reality. This gap was also captured in 
Ariella and Liat’s portrayal of the relationships between Olim and veterans and 
the unequal distribution of cultural and social capital.   
                                            
34
 Although this ethos is applied for Jews and excludes non-Jews altogether 
35
  Israeli public opinion often boasts about ‘the first Iraqi Chief-of-Staff’ or ‘the first Sephardic 
(Non-Ashkenazi) president’ taking it as a testimony of the high social mobility in Israeli society 
where someone who came as a penniless immigrant can occupy a senior socio-political 
position 50 years later.  
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2. the socio-political reading (Peled and Shafir, 2002, Ram, 2006) – Yariv’s 
text could be read as a reference to the political and social ‘reshuffling’ in 
contemporary Jewish-Israeli society and the continuous erosion of the old 
classical Ashkenazi hegemony and its flagship symbol – the Kibbutz. Yariv 
longs for a specific European-Israeliness, a part of the imagined glorious past 
where he, a Kibbutz member, was a member of the classical Ashkenazi elite 
and was granted preferred social recognition. In another part of the interview 
he said:  
And this is the Israeli history that I know. The good old Eretz-Israel… 
this is what I was brought up on: the… the agricultural ethos, and the 
ethos… the other culture that we’ve created there, and the Israeli 
culture that has gone bad everywhere and has now gone and wherever 
I look for it in Israel, it’s not there.   
Aaron addressed these changes it in a more subtle way:  
And I think that I'm also somehow stuck, with or without inverted 
commas with, perhaps out of convenience,  with the model that is more 
of a… of the … Zionist vision and that of Herzl's36 with Zionism, Zionism 
and Israeliness which is something much more secular and liberal than 
what is probably the average in Israel today. 
Aaron’s text describes how various groups in Israeli society interpret differently 
‘the nation’ and the meaning of Zionism. These distinct models also inform how 
‘Israeliness’ would be portrayed: who falls within this category, who can be 
considered ‘the salt of the earth’ (see Ariella’s extract above and Aaron’s later 
on) and who falls outside. Aaron implies a distinctively European model 
(Herzl’s), which is informed by the cultural, political and social ideas and tastes 
prevalent in European societies which promoted certain groups but by doing 
so, marginalized others who did not fit. Ariella’s claim to be ‘the salt of the 
earth’ references this discourse of privileged Ashkenazi Israelis which would 
have marginalized others like Liat’s parents and undermined their sense of 
belonging.   
                                            
36
 An Austrian Jewish publicist, considered the visionary of the Zionist movement and of a 
Jewish state. 
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3. The psychological reading (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000) - Yariv also uses 
this lost socio-political model to tell a psychological story – the search for 
uniqueness in the context of the immigrant condition. Yariv was often 
preoccupied with the notion of ‘uniqueness and distinctiveness from any group’ 
(the local Jews who are religious, see chapter eight; the Mizrahi Israelis in 
Israel; the European Israelis in Israel; the foreigners in London, etc.). He used 
it to explain that he cannot return to Israel lest he be ‘swallowed up’ by this 
homogenous, Mizrahi and non-distinctive ‘Israeli being’ and thus lose his 
‘uniqueness’. Nira and David’s extracts highlighted emotionally-charged 
psychological moments when subjects find themselves caught up within the 
constraining social demands of Israeli narrative – the sanctification of the dead 
soldiers through ceremonies of mourning, the role that family members of the 
dead soldiers have to play within the national imaginary and the insistence on 
living in Israel as the only meaningful way of living. 
4. The sociological-diasporic reading – Yariv’s text could be seen as the story 
of an immigrant who lost his former (Ashkenazi) previous socio-cultural 
privileges and where he can only ‘make a terribly big effort to feel that I'm 
European’ (30), to distinguish himself from other foreigners. The crisis around 
the loss of social status following immigration is well documented in 
immigration literature (Grinberg and Grinberg 1989, Sayad 2004 Fathi, 2011) 
and was demonstrated in some of my participants’ interviews (e.g. Ariella’s 
text). Yariv’s claim to Europeanism which in Israel was sufficient to classify him 
as an ‘Ashkenazi’ (a ‘European’) could not be applied in London. ‘European 
identity’ itself is contextual: Tell me where you live and I’ll tell you if and how 
much of a European you are. Hence the experiences of dislocation or sense of 
embeddedness in Britain (i.e. the extent to which subjects feel they found a 
place or ‘a home’ in Britain) and the image of Israel that they entertain are 
interdependent.    
5. The dialogical reading – (Emerson and Frosh, 2004, Riessman, 2008) – 
Yariv’s text could be analysed for its discursive, inter-relational strategies and 
the interview politics. Such an approach undertakes that his description of 
Israeli society as oriental, homogenous and mixed was designed for me as his 
audience and in accordance with the relationship that developed within the 
interview encounter. Indeed, I often felt that his provocative racist remarks 
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were made in order to construct for me a specific image, and perhaps establish 
his uniqueness. Interviewees like Liat or Nira constructed images of 
‘Israeliness’ based on their assumptions of who I am within the Israeli matrix of 
identities and what I might expect to hear.  
The interviews were also informative in what they did not present – e.g. the 
marginalization and exclusion of non-Jews in Israeli society, the occupation of 
Palestinian territories and the stress of living in a society which is in ongoing 
military conflict. As Roninger (1999) argues, for Jewish-Israelis, the image of 
‘the Israeli’ is closely associated with ‘the Jewish’ and no room is left for the 
non-Jewish within this imaginary. Furthermore, post-colonial theorists (e.g. 
Raz-Krakotzkin, 1994, 2007 or Shohat, 2003) explain that Zionism was and 
still is committed to the Europeanization of the Israeli and is constructed 
against the image of the non-European ‘other’ where the ‘Arab’ or ‘the 
Palestinian’ is its ultimate exemplar. For this reason the ‘Arab’ cannot be 
incorporated within the imagination of the ‘Israeli’.  
Overall, participants tried to negotiate a personal understanding of themselves 
in Israeli society without stepping out of the consensus. As described in the 
methodological chapter, the research sample consisted mainly of highly 
qualified, middle-class Jewish-Israelis who came from relatively affluent 
backgrounds. I hypothesized then that the skewed sample was partly due to 
this group’s engagement in this topic as members of the privileged social 
sectors in Israeli society who were therefore more invested in the Zionist 
narrative and had greater social and capital stakes to lose by staying in Britain. 
By avoiding certain conflictual topics, they maintain a favorable national image 
that helps them keep the ‘door open’. Indeed, most of the participants, even 
those who had been living in Britain for 40 years, declared the possibility of 
returning to Israel. This declaration seemed partly ‘a membership fee’ - a 
discourse, or a practice that signals their interest in and identification with the 
nation. This will be discussed further in chapter nine (the diasporic community)  
To conclude, the extracts demonstrate various schisms and dialectical 
tensions that constitute (rather than endanger) ‘identity’ and the nation as 
emotionally engaging, albeit troubled and troubling, constructs. The material 
highlighted some of the specification of the socio-historical Israeli context 
within which the subjects constructed their texts: on the one hand the 
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compelling national narrative of collective resurrection linking a traumatic 
collective past and the promise for a better future (Golden, 2001); on the other 
hand, the daily accumulating effects that the military Israeli-Palestinian/Arab 
conflict bears on individual subjects, the social divides in Israeli society and the 
social pressures to conform to formal and informal rules of the group in an age 
of growing individualism and the waning of ideology. Thus, subjects refer to an 
increasingly troubled perception of ‘Israeliness’ shaped by a changing 
symbolic and value system and the encounter with an alternative (British) 
system of cultural signification seen from the disadvantaged perspective of ‘the 
immigrant’ or outsider. Narratives are situated in many ways: within the context 
of ‘home’/‘away’ and what is between them, and in the intersection of the 
private, interpersonal and the socio-historical. Narratives reflect subjects’ 
struggle for linearity and meaning in the face of disruptive forces. All of these 
were part of my participants’ narratives where some aspects, at different parts 
of the interview took supremacy over others.  
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Chapter eight - ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ – Jewish-Israelis 
in Britain Constructing National Identity 
through Difference  
8.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to study how individual Jewish-Israelis who live in 
Britain make sense of their positioning within the matrix of collective identities 
prevalent in the local public space. The interview material highlighted two main 
discursive strategies for defining Israeliness: In chapter six I looked at how 
subjects construct a sense of ‘we-ness’ by drawing on aspects of the national 
narrative and idealized images of the national group. In the current chapter I 
will trace how such a sense of ‘we-ness’ is constructed and negotiated through 
the articulation of difference from ‘the others’. Other empirical research among 
immigrants in Britain (e.g. African and non-African low paid workers - 
McIlwaine et al, 2006, or Polish migrants – Rabikowska, 2010) showed how 
collective identities are constructed in difference to other ethnic or national 
groups.  
Stepping away from Israeli society where they constitute the majority, Jewish-
Israelis find themselves occupying an unfamiliar social position – that of ‘the 
other’, as members of an immigrant minority group. This becomes especially 
significant for middle-class Israeli émigrés who previously enjoyed a privileged 
position in Israeli society. Like previous research on Israelis in the USA (Uriely, 
1994, Lahav and Arian, 1999, Gold, 2002, Floman, 2007) and Britain (Gold, 
2004, Hart, 2004, Lev-Ari, 2008) my research sample mainly consisted of 
interviewees from this socio-economic background. Therefore it is within this 
socio-cultural demographic context that my Israeli interviewees constructed 
their ‘Israeli identity in Britain’ or their sense of ‘otherness’ or foreignness. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the overall reluctance to define themselves 
explicitly as 'immigrants' is partly connected to their privileged position in Israeli 
society.   
Their high economic and professional status and the lack of distinctive physical 
markers that could signal their foreignness (physical appearance or special 
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ethnic or religious clothing) distinguishes this group from other unskilled, ethnic 
or work-migrants who might be excluded or subjected to racial remarks on 
grounds of their appearance, their low socio-economic or professional status 
(for a comparison see for example McIlwaine et al, 2006 on low-paid 
immigrants in London; Tanyas, 2010, on Turkish migrants; or Fathi 2011, on 
Iranian women doctors) which are often cited in diaspora literature.  
When describing ‘Israeli national identity’ in Britain, many interviewees referred 
to the difference from two groups: the local British-Jews and the non-Jewish 
British public. These ‘assist’ Jewish-Israeli subjects in the construction of their 
distinct national identity. Within this matrix of intergroup affiliations, the ‘Arabs’, 
‘Palestinians’ and ‘Muslims’ often occupy an important role as the ‘cause’ of 
this love or hate relationship towards Israelis. Therefore, while these were 
often kept backstage, Jewish-Israelis’ perceptions of Arabs and Muslims will 
also be discussed to chart the matrix of identity politics and affiliations. These 
alternative identities mark the boundaries of the imagined Israeli community in 
Britain and as such can teach us about the contents of that imagined 
community, its conditions of existence and its assumptions in the current 
diasporic context. McIlwaine et al (2006), who focus on identity construction 
among low paid workers in London, demonstrate how identity is established 
through racial references to other migrant communities that compete for the 
same vocational resources. In the current chapter I will be looking at Israelis’ 
representations of these three groups as the participants narrated their 
personal version of being an ‘Israeli in Britain’. In the first section I will use an 
extract from Na’ama’s interview to highlight some of the dimensions along 
which differences between Israelis and local Jews are argued. In the second 
section I will look at Ariella’s story of a cultural conflict which she uses to 
demonstrate the unbridgeable differences between Israelis and non-Jewish 
British and Europeans in general. In the third sector I will look at some of the 
cross interview references to ‘Muslims’ and ‘Arabs’.         
8.2. The Jewish/Israeli divide: ‘the Jewish community here… has 
nothing to do with Israelis’  
Contrary to what can be expected for two sub-groups which, according to the 
Zionist narrative, share a common imagined historical past, common interests 
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in the present and a mutual collective future, relationships between Jewish-
Israeli émigrés and local Jewish communities in both North America and 
Europe are reported to be distant and uncooperative (Lahav and Arian 1999, 
Gold, 2002, 2004).This section will track various aspects of these conflictive 
and complex relationships as they are understood by Jewish-Israelis. It will 
illuminate some of the discursive and ideological preconceptions that prevail in 
the secular Jewish-Israeli group’s self-perception concerning the neighboring 
‘Jewish’ diasporic group. At the same time, those accounts have to be read 
critically since subjects make use of these distinctions as building blocks within 
their personal story and how they choose to present themselves. The analysis 
of Na’ama’s extract is helpful in drawing out various constitutive 
preconceptions among Israelis about ‘who they are’.  
Na’ama, a thirty eight year-old woman is married with two children and has 
been living in London for the past ten years. She approached me following a 
lecture I gave where I mentioned my research and volunteered to be 
interviewed on ‘Israeli national Identity’, but claimed that she didn’t really know 
what to say about it. In the meeting she told me that she works part-time as an 
administrator in an Israeli organization, having dropped her professional career 
following the move to Britain. Na’ama is surrounded by Israeli families:  
who share with us the same state of mind that ‘we’ll go back in a year or 
two’, that daily life is very comfortable and that making a big change and 
returning {to Israel} is a bit difficult.  
Na’ama and her family live in a rented house, speak Hebrew at home, send 
their children to the Hebrew Sunday school and travel to Israel whenever there 
is a school holiday. In her initial statement and throughout her interview I was 
taken by the sense of temporality in her life. She said: ‘it’s a kind of a life… as 
if ‘on hold’, because it’s not the real life but I think that I prefer it this way’.  
Just before ending the interview I asked her if there was anything else she 
would have liked to add or emphasise. Like other interviewees, Na’ama took 
the opportunity to recapitulate the theme of 'having to make a decision' which 
ran throughout the interview and presumably drove her to be interviewed. She 
said:  
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Me, I'm terribly comfortable {here in Britain}, I'm afraid of the change but 
I know that sometime it will come, that we'll have to deal with making 
decisions this way or that way but right now I'm comfortable here, with 
being an Israeli and a foreigner.  
This position of in-between resembles the profile of the ‘sojourner’ (Siu, 1952) 
prevalent among Israeli families in USA who are ‘sitting on their suitcases’ and 
whose lifestyle, choices and state of mind are dominated by the avoidance of 
making such decisions (Uriely, 1994 and Fluman, 2007). Since Na’ama was 
troubled by having to take a decision about staying in Britain or going to Israel, 
living a ‘life on hold’ allows her to avoid coming to a decision that will require 
giving up the other option. It is within this social/ psychological position of 
Israeli temporality and uncertainty, which Na’ama discussed, that she 
described the complicated relationships between the two groups. Hence the 
subject position of ‘life on hold’ shapes how the relations between the groups 
is described, but it is equally plausible to argue that the relationship between 
the groups as she experiences them contributes to the ‘life on hold’ position. 
Overall, she differentiated between ‘the Israelis’ and the Jews on four 
dimensions: their different approach to Zionism and Israel, religion/ Judaism, 
daily practices and the politics of identity within British society.  
8.2.2. British Jews and their relation to Israel    
At one point, the interview focused on her educational preferences for her 
daughters. Hart (2004) followed the patterns of choosing schools among Israeli 
émigrés in London and concluded that although many Israelis send their 
children to Jewish schools, they are more likely to follow the footsteps of other 
Israelis around them and send their children to specific local (non-Jewish) 
schools around which the Israeli community gathers and organizes. I asked 
Na’ama about her own choices and Na’ama said that ‘it was never an option’ 
to send her daughters to a Jewish school. I then asked her:  
1. [I gather that there isn't a point of contact or a touching point   
2. with, say, the Jewish community, here?] 
In response she answered:   
3. No. But the Jewish community here is very sort of …Jewish?!, 
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4. it is even not anti-Israeli 
5. but it has nothing to do with Israelis  
6. [what do you mean?] 
7. I think, I lived for a year in US, 
8. I worked in a school, filled up a place of a teacher 
9. a Jewish school, 
10. there was an affinity,  sort of togetherness, towards Ha’aretz, 
The mixture of puzzlement and decisiveness in ‘Jewish?!’ conveyed to me the 
improbability of sending her daughters to a Jewish school and at the same 
time demonstrated the unattractiveness of the signifier ‘Jewish’. Although she 
was living in London for ten years already, Na’ama’s associations to ‘Jewish’ 
seemed to be taken from the secular Israeli discourse on religion and 
nationality whereby ‘Jewish’ is associated with ‘religious’ or Haredi (ultra-
orthodox) which is then associated with ‘non-Zionist’ – manifesting indifference 
if not hostility towards Israel as a state. Hence, in this context, ‘Jewish’ stands 
in contrast to ‘Israeli’. This Zionist interpretation of Jewishness ignores the long 
tradition of cultural non-religious, non-Zionist Jewishness as argued by Jewish 
critics of Zionism (Butler, 2011, Magid, 2006, Shneer and Aviv, 2010). For 
Israelis, as argued in the theoretical chapters, the territorial affiliation to the 
land and the state of Israel (‘Ha’aretz’ – THE land) is a central component of 
their Jewish self-perception while, according to Na’ama, for English Jews the 
category ‘Jewishness’ does not include an ‘Israel’ or a Zionist aspect. Na’ama 
ignores the fact that a large majority of Jews in Britain who consider 
themselves religious do see themselves as Zionists (Graham and Boyd, 2010) 
and keep close connections with Israel (although there are others who base 
their sense of Jewishness around spiritual or cultural, but not necessarily 
religious, practices and would not see themselves as Zionists). These close 
connections to Israel if not to Israelis, have been noted by other respondents 
and match my own impression that a majority of the Jewish community in 
Britain is strongly engaged with Israel. Nevertheless, Na’ama’s argument that 
‘the Jews have got nothing to do with Israelis’ is made in order to highlight the 
identity boundaries around the Israelis. 
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8.2.3. Daily practices and the military conflict in the Middle East in the 
eyes of local Jews.  
Na’ama then went on to describe the ways Israelis’ daily practices, for example 
child-rearing and obeying rules, are perceived, negatively, by local Jews and 
justify the exclusion of Israelis. She described a conversation she had in the 
gym with a local Jewish man, part of which I record below:   
24. and he said: ‘you Israelis, one can't work with you.  
25. You don't know the rules, 
26. I don't blame you, 
27. you come from a country which is fighting for survival  
28. so it's more important to be… to deal with the daily life  
29. rather than to focus , say, on children's education,  
30. putting children to bed at 7 pm’ 
This short paragraph exemplifies how differences in daily practices – broadly, 
‘following the rules’ and specifically, ‘putting kids to bed at 7pm’ are used by 
interviewees in order to lay claims for identity difference. From Na’ama’s point 
of view, local Jews use these differential practices to distinguish themselves 
from Israelis and justify (‘one can’t work with you’) their exclusion. In Na’ama’s 
account, the ‘fight for survival’ was strategically used by the man to explain 
away these differences and justify the exclusion. Since later on (l. 48), Na’ama 
expected ‘more sympathy’ from the local Jews, the same as she got from the 
American Jews when she lived there, we can assume that Na’ama understood 
‘fighting for survival’ as a reference to the hardship related to the military 
condition in Israel. According to this view of Israelis, the inevitable condition 
they are placed in shapes every aspect of daily life and Israelis are depicted as 
survivalists who ‘deal with the daily life’ rather than attend to the long term 
benefits of obeying rules, focusing on children’s education, and putting them to 
bed at 7 pm. Subjects will often try to accentuate or caricaturize the situation 
when trying to establish their argument. Since Israelis pride themselves on the 
freedom they grant their children, or the informality with which they manage 
their relationship with others, including their children, Na’ama’s account would 
be sufficient in persuading an Israeli listener that British-Jews and Israelis 
indeed cannot get on together. 
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But we also have to read Na’ama’s account of the man’s criticism of Israelis’ 
child-rearing practices in the context of the gender roles that the immigration 
process places on women. As will be elaborated in chapter nine, many Israeli 
women, including Na’ama, come to Britain following their husbands’ well-paid 
jobs, live a materially ‘comfortable’ life in Britain but have to abandon their 
previous professional careers and Mainly focus on caring for the family while 
having minimal engagement with the wider British society. Lev-Ari, 2008 and 
Floman, 2007, have documented this trend among Israeli women in USA while 
Hart, 2004, noted a similar tendency in Britain. Thus, child-rearing becomes an 
important part of Israeli women’s identity in the context of immigration and the 
man’s criticism of Israelis’ laxness with their children could be interpreted as an 
attack on one of Na’ama’s key aspects of self-identification.          
46. I didn't like what he said 
47. because you expect, ‘why, you are a Jew too, we are…you… 
48. normally you'd expect some sort of sympathy   
49. Sympathy to Israel?]  
50. Yes, I think so. In US it was very accepting, sort of, very open, 
As the above paragraph discloses, of all the arguments the man raised against 
Israelis Na’ama was especially preoccupied with his argument about ‘the fight 
for survival’ which portrays people in Israel as living ‘from one day to the other’ 
and consequently constructs them as ‘not knowing the rules’. Therefore while 
Na’ama presumably accepts the man’s reference to the condition of survival, 
she expected to get sympathy (48) or support for it rather than criticism. She 
finds out that the limits of the Zionist narrative and discourse that cannot be 
‘cashed in’ (as she did among American Jews) among British Jews who 
consider ‘the fight for survival’ as the Israelis’ problem – it’s ‘your’ country 
(rather than ‘ours’). This supports Na’ama’s earlier argument that the Jewish 
community ‘has nothing to do with Israelis’ (5). The tension between the two 
groups is captured in the immediate contact between the man and Na’ama 
who ‘didn’t like what he said’.    
8.2.4. British Jewishness as conservative and restrictive in its 
interpretation of ‘religion’ and ‘Jewishness’ 
Na’ama then went on:  
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51. In US it was very accepting, sort of, very open, 
52. Their interpretation of religion, too, is much more… 
53. The fact is that there is a Jewish network of schools 
54. but it's not these orthodox, conservatives 
55. where everything is very sort of open and accepting  
56. whereas here, the Jewish is much more conservative 
57. and I can't be affiliated with it so much.  
58. [Conservative? in what sense?]  
59. Kind of Jewish, in terms of religion 
60. [When you say ‘kind of Jewish’ tell me what's on your mind, what do you 
mean?] 
61. that they don't accept your interpretation of religion, sort of 
Na’ama compares the American and the British Jewish communities along the 
dimension of conservatism and openness in relation to Israelis’ secular 
Jewishness (i.e. their Zionism). In contrast to the American Jewish community, 
according to Na’ama, the local British community is not hospitable to Israelis’ 
interpretation of religion which is basically not religious at all but is rather 
ideological. Hence, in America, she claims, Israelis could fit in within an 
accepting Jewish community whereas in Britain they have nothing to offer and 
are therefore excluded and marginalized. Note that Na’ama talks about the 
ability of the local Jewish communities, in America and in Britain to ‘accept’ 
Israelis’ secular perception or interpretation of religion but does not talk about 
the ability of Israelis to reconsider, or adapt to, other versions of Jewishness 
which diasporic Jews, in America or in Britain, hold (Kahn-Harris and Gidley, 
2010).Na’ama draws her images from discourses of nationality and religion in 
secular Israel where such variations also go un-noticed.  
Yariv relates to the Kibbutz’s interpretation of Judaism and asserts:  
Our Jewishness is something very-very specific: It doesn't have a God. 
In the Haggadah of the Kibbutz there is no God. You can check it out. 
You don't have the word ‘God’. {it reads) 'We left Egypt' and not 'we 
were taken out of Egypt'. And that's my Judaism.  
Since the secular Zionist interpretation of Jewishness was constructed around 
the negation of the exilic old Jew who was seen to be caught up in the anti-
Semitic rules of the non-Jewish world, great emphasis was put on Jews’ 
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agency. Hence, one has to ask: ‘what do we talk about when we talk about 
Jewishness’ and who does the talking’?   
8.2.5. The power struggles between immigrants (Israelis) and locals 
(British Jews) 
Na’ama concluded her discussion of the local Jewish community by drawing 
attention to the socio-political struggle between the veteran, well-established 
local Jewish community and the new-coming Israelis.  
92.  there is a separation between Israeli and Jewish  
93.  and also among the institutions that operate here.  
94.  I know it from my own work. 
95.  It's not that you can get support from all sort of Jewish institutions 
96.  as Israelis, we are not of interest to them. 
97.  it’s a totally different thing.   
Dorit also talked about the complicated relations between the two groups 
where the romantic fascination of local Jews with Israelis (‘the Israelis are the 
strong people’- chapter six) is accompanied by rejection:  
19.  Some people, for example in business 
20.  If you ask businessmen they will tell you that  
21.  The Jews prefer not to do business with Israelis 
[Why?]  
22.  Because we are not perceived as reliable people [folk/nation] 
23.  And they really hate it that we give them a bad name, they really hate it 
Dorit draws a picture of two groups competing with each other rather than 
sharing and supporting each other. According to her ‘the Jews prefer not to do 
business with Israelis' (21), because the two groups are often associated with 
each other in the eyes of the British non-Jewish public and therefore Israelis 
give local Jews a 'bad name' - Israelis’ unreliability is inflicted upon British 
Jews and damages their reputation in the eyes of local British people. Thus, 
according to Dorit, the reluctance towards Israelis does not stem merely from a 
disagreement between the two groups regarding how best ‘to do stuff’ (here, 
business practices, and in Na’ama’s interviews, raising children and following 
rules), but rather originates from British Jews' position within the general British 
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society and the embarrassment that their immigrating, undisciplined ‘family 
members’ are causing them when associated with them. Similar inter-group 
politics between the socially and culturally established German Jewry and the 
new-coming Polish-Jewish immigrants in Germany at the beginning of the 20th 
century was described by Elon (2003). 
It is interesting to note that while acknowledging the advantageous socio-
economic position of British Jews in British society, some of my interviewees 
still complained about the general British public’s ignorance of the distinctions 
between Jews and Israelis. The British public gaze plays an important role in 
Israelis’ construction of a separate collective identity. Liat said:  
I don’t define myself as Jewish, when they ask me {about my 
Jewishness} I say ‘by inclusion, not by faith’. ‘When they ask you ‘where 
are you from?’ and you answer ‘from Israel’ and they ask ‘are you 
Jewish?’ {I answer} So OK, if you must!.  
And later:  
And here, especially, I find that non-Israeli and non-Jews don’t get it, 
the difference, it’s like in South America. In South America, anyone who 
is Jewish, they call him ‘Israeli’. They just don’t get the difference.   
And Yariv complains:  
I'm constantly fighting wars here with the ….I'm not Jewish, I'm Israeli, 
sort of, don't confuse me with the British Jews, don't conf... it's not the 
same thing.  
Like British-Jews who, according to Dorit and Na’ama, try to disengage from 
an immigrant group which is mistakenly associated with them, Jewish-Israelis 
in Britain assume that by disengaging with the local Jewish community, as it is 
perceived by them, they will be able to gain a preferable social position in 
British society. This might be due to their Zionist upbringing in a society whose 
raison-d’etre is constructed around the crucial distinctions between the Old 
and the New Jews rather than due to a close acquaintance with the positioning 
of Jewishness in the British identity politics. 
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8.2.6. Discussion 
Na’ama’s text draws out four dimensions in which ‘the Israeli’ is differentiated, 
according to Israelis, from ‘the (British) Jew’. These differences have been 
articulated around the attachment to Israel and Zionism; the interpretation of 
religion and Jewishness; the differential daily practices of how to do things and 
the politics of identities and power-relations within broader British society. 
Hence ideological as well as practical arguments are brought together by 
Na’ama to justify the group distinction which she is keen to emphasize. 
However, my analysis also wanted to address how subjects are emotionally 
invested in these discursive milieus. I felt that central to Na’ama’s extract was 
the personal experience of exclusion and devaluation: ‘I didn’t like what he 
said’, ‘why, you are a Jew too, we are…you…’ - that she felt during the 
encounter with the Jewish man which she later generalized (‘as Israelis, we 
are not of interest to them’).  
Israelis who have been brought up on certain Zionist values regarding 
Jewishness, Zionism and daily practices, and who have often enjoyed a 
privileged socio-political status in Israeli society, struggle to accommodate 
themselves to their new social condition as immigrants (this signifier was never 
used by my interviewees to address their status in Britain). Na’ama’s account 
of her encounter with a local Jew demonstrates the clash between the Zionist 
preconceptions that Israelis bring with them (‘sort of Jewish?!), the new 
cultural-political intergroup experiences in Britain and the experience of 
exclusion and rejection (‘you don’t know how to do things’) that is associated 
with it. Only when they arrive in Britain, do Israelis realize that local Jews are 
engaged in alternative systems of social significations which override the 
Zionist agenda. This makes fertile soil for disappointments and frustrations.  
Na’ama’s description of the local Jews discloses the limitation that Zionist 
ideology imposes on the concept ‘diasporic Jew’, and ignores the rich cultural 
non-religious and non-Zionist Jewish tradition among Jews who do not live in 
Israel (Magid, 2006, Kahn-Harris and Gidley, 2010, or Butler, 2011). Indeed, 
my respondents demonstrated ignorance of the local non-religious ethos of 
Jewishness and its daily practices and meanings.  
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The examples I have cited clarify that the often pre-supposed alliance between 
people from the two Jewish groups, which assumes their common cultural and 
religious affiliation under the auspice of the Zionist narrative, in fact covers a 
diversity of often contrasting interpretations of those apparently shared 
signifiers – ‘Jewishness’, ‘Israel’, ‘religion’, etc. Those different cultural 
understandings set up different guidelines as to who is ‘like us’ and who isn’t. 
It is nonetheless important to analyse the tensions not only through the 
differential system of symbolic identifications but also in terms of power 
dynamics between an increasingly ambitious immigrant group (Israelis) that 
troubles the hegemony of an established local community, itself a minority 
group that is conscious of its image, social positioning and cultural capital in 
the broader British society. The relationship between British Jews and Jewish-
Israelis should be understood within the broad socio-political British context. 
This will be the focus of the next section. 
Finally, Na’ama’s text also presents the Jews/Israelis’ relationships through the 
eyes of an immigrant Israeli woman, and the specific conditions of immigration 
that accentuate differential gender roles for men and for women among an 
affluent immigrant community. Drawn to the traditional feminine roles of child-
rearing and having to abandon a professional career, Jewish-Israeli women, 
like Na’ama, might be inclined to draw a line between Israelis and local Jews 
along child-rearing practices (see chapter nine for an extensive discussion of 
Jewish-Israeli women’s construction of identity along the axis of professional 
status).  
8.3. The Jewish-Israeli and ‘the European’ in British society 
In this section I will be sketching some of the significant themes in the 
construction of ‘Israeli identity’ in the context of broader non-Jewish British 
society. Like the previous section, I will open with some thematic 
commonalities across the interviews, such as ‘anti-Zionism/anti-Semitism’ and 
‘the Israeli way of doing things’, in an attempt to sketch the collective cultural 
reservoir (my first research question) regarding ‘the English’ (Israelis would 
normally refer to the locals as English rather than British). In the second part of 
this section, I will demonstrate, using a critical narrative reading of an interview 
extract with Ariella, how subjects make specific and personalized uses of this 
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glossary of themes, signifiers and discourses to make sense and justify 
personal choices and private narratives. Not less importantly, self-perception of 
the Israeli group members is constructed in reference to the image that other 
group members, e.g. the British, are assumed to have of them. In other words, 
(Israeli) subjects’ national identity also reflects their sense of Otherness as 
members of a minority group within the larger British majority.   
8.3.1. The role of ‘The conflict’ in the construction of an ‘Israeli national 
identity’ in Britain: ‘and the world always splits…. into those who 
love you and those who don’t love you’  
As mentioned before, many Jewish-Israelis enjoy privileged economic and 
professional conditions in Britain and are normally not subjected to exclusion, 
marginalization or racialization on account of their physical appearance or 
recognizable religious or ethnic markers. In the absence of other adversarial 
demographical features, the on-going Israeli-Palestinian/Arab conflict and the 
occupation of Palestinian territories is perceived in the Israeli imaginary as an 
area of friction between the Israeli public and British society, along which their 
experience of foreignness is often explained. In his book Living with the 
Conflict, Bar-Tal (2007) describes what he calls ‘the siege mentality’ of Jewish 
Israeli society. Jewish-Israelis have been socialized from a very early age that 
Jews have always been subjected to violence from other groups throughout 
the millennia of communal existence, and that these attacks are founded on 
anti-Semitism. The Holocaust constitutes the ultimate proof of the victimhood 
of the Jewish people as does the continuous military conflict with the Arabs, in 
general, and the Palestinians, more specifically. Bar-Tal demonstrates the 
means (Jewish tradition, Zionist ideology, media and school curricula) through 
which this outlook persists and dominates contemporary Israeli society 
outweighing any counter-indications or narratives (e.g. Shafir and Peled, 2002, 
Sand, 2008 and many more). 
A section from Noga’s interview (see also chapter six – ‘We are the centre  of 
the world’) demonstrates the way Jewish-Israelis often see the international 
community's (British society included) attitude towards Israel , and gives a 
general guideline of how their positioning as Israelis within British society might 
be perceived. This specific paragraph elaborates the notion of ‘the split world’ 
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(discussed in chapter six). Following on my question about 'what does it mean 
for her to be an Israeli in London?' Noga elaborated:  
43.  and the world always splits,  
44.  and you see it everywhere,  
45. into those who love you and those who don’t love you,  
46.  I mean, and here there are many Jews, everywhere,  
47.  So you go about and {they will say to you} ‘ah, really?, my mom lives in 
Herzliya’37. You constantly hear it 
48.  but I still remember that we walked in Montreal,  
49.  a sort of France within Canada and…  
50.  someone stopped us and said ‘are you from Paris?’  
51.  and we said ‘no, no we are from Israel’.  
52.  you could literally see the disappointment on his face  
53.  and he said: ‘ahh, because the way you dress, it looks like you are from 
Paris [ah-ha,] ahhh… 
The notion of the importance (here the ‘centrality’) and contestability (here, ‘the 
split world’) of Israel within international relations (usually explained through 
the continuous Israeli-Palestinian conflict) is well grounded in Israelis’ self-
perceptions. The benefit of nurturing such preconceptions is clear: it portrays 
Israel not as a tiny, negligible, marginal country, but rather as the object of 
interest and (positive or negative) importance. David says, critically:  
{When I lived in Israel} I really thought that the whole world, not only the 
politicians, but also every citizen in the world… Israel is something that 
fascinates him, yes? That he and his wife are talking about Israel every 
night before they go to bed.  
Noga makes a clear distinction between those ‘who love you’ and those ‘who 
don't’. The amiable local Jews whose family members live in Herzliya are 
perceived here as ‘shareholders’ in the Israeli project and are those who ‘love 
you’. The non-Jewish western world represents here the ‘non-loving’ 
environment and, drawing on the Jewish-Israeli memory of persecutory Europe 
(Bar-Tal, 2007), Montreal is likened to 'a sort of France within Canada'. Within 
the binary map of national affiliations distinguishing between supporters of the 
                                            
37
 An Israeli affluent town inhabited by many Jewish-Israelis of Anglo-Saxon origin.   
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Palestinians or supporters of Israel, France (Europe) is traditionally perceived 
by Israelis as ‘Pro-Arab’ and therefore hostile to Israel, while the US is taken 
as supportive of Israel. Hence, I am suggesting that French-speaking Montreal, 
by being ‘a sort of France in Canada’, is associated as an extension of the 
‘hostile’ or ‘not-loving’ France. Noga also tells us a story about the similarity in 
appearance (‘because the way you dress, it looks like you are from Paris) yet 
the painful fundamental difference between Israelis and other Europeans 
which captures the dialectics between ‘the European’ and ‘the Israeli’ (see 
chapter seven). While Israelis would like to categorize themselves as 
Europeans or Westerners (see Sela-Shefi, 2006 and the discussion on 
ethnicity and class in Israeli society in the previous chapter) and often boast 
about Israel being the only democracy in the Middle East, their geographical, 
ethnical and political conditions position them outside this ‘desirable club’. It 
becomes clear that the binary of ‘love-don't love’, as it is presented here by 
Noga, is drawn around the distinction between Jews and non-Jews. In the 
previous section I reviewed the complexities in Israeli-Jewish relationships (as 
demonstrated in Na’ama’s text), but in the current interview context Noga 
depicts the British-Jewish community positively so that she can describe a 
sense of discomfort within the politically ‘hostile’ British environment. These 
generalizations serve Noga to help maintain a coherent world view and avoid 
the complexities that the intercultural, inter-national encounter brings about. It 
allows her to gloss over the ambivalence in the relationship between Israel and 
the Jewish diaspora; to avoid the recognition of the disinterest and marginality 
of Israel in the eyes of local non-Jewish British people (as argued by Graham 
and Boyd, 2010), or to address the international criticism of the Israeli handling 
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Philo and Berry, 2004, 2011).  
Noga is not alone in her view of British public opinion as politically hostile. Most 
Israelis perceive general British public opinion as pro-Palestinian and hostile 
towards Israel on account of its role in the continuous conflict in the Middle 
East.  
Nira said:  
they ask me where I’m from so I say I’m from Israel, so the English way 
is like: ‘Oh, how interesting’ {we laugh} and when I hear it I understand 
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that something not nice is about to happen so it’s on the tip of my 
tongue {to say}: ‘yea, yea, I know what you think, get on with it.  
Ariella said: 
The feeling was generally not comfortable, and especially when Israel 
was portrayed in not such a positive light, there were many comments 
that I didn’t like such as: ‘what? {You are Israeli?} You don’t look like 
one.   
There is also a general agreement among the Israelis I interviewed that the 
British media coverage is hostile to Israel and is pro-Palestinian and that this 
position constructs a hostile public opinion towards Israel.  
Dorit says:  
and judging from my personal impressions, well, I don’t know… well, not 
everyone is in on our side, let’s say it this way, I mean the media here is 
very biased, it’s pretty much pro-Palestinian. 
And David said:  
There is a legitimate and non-legitimate criticism of Israel which creates 
a demonization of Israel and an over-focus on Israel, and an idealization 
of the Palestinians and you have the {economic} boycott which is stupid 
and the academic boycott which is even more stupid.  
Generally then, Israelis feel discomfort associated with the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and apply a variety of strategies to ward off the discomfort. Yariv said:  
I don't look Israeli, at least not the Israeli that most Europeans get to 
know here. So if they don't ask, I don't say 
Ariella, who eventually returned to Israel, said:  
Especially during the years I’ve been abroad, it was very important for 
me to be liked, to be an ambassadress for my country, in the most 
informal way, to make people who had their thoughts about Israel… 
after encountering me, they could say ‘there are actually good people in 
Israel. 
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8.3.2. Jewish-Israeli subjects and ‘anti-Semitism in British society’  
While the presence of anti-Israeli or anti-Zionist tendencies in British society is 
widely accepted by Jewish-Israelis (although they report rare occasions where 
they actually felt discomfort because of it), none of my interviewees reported 
coming across an anti-Semitic event. One can conclude that Israelis consider 
‘anti-Semitism’ an issue that concerns local Jews who grew up and live within 
a predominately non-Jewish environment while for Israelis, who come from a 
country whose majority is Jewish, anti-Semitism is only hear-say, something 
that happens to Jews abroad (see McNamara, 1987, on Israelis’ responses 
when subjected to anti-Semitism in Australia). This might also explain some of 
the Israelis’ insistence on clearly differentiating themselves from local Jews 
when interacting with the general British population. The perception of anti-
Semitism among Israelis in Britain seems to be more about these notions as 
they are imagined in Israel and imported to Britain by the new-comers, rather 
than based on actual acquaintance with the local identity politics and the 
image of Jews in the local British society.    
David describes cynically the popular notion of anti-Semitism as it is held in 
Israeli society:  
In my opinion, the Israelis in Israel are convinced that your life as an 
Israeli abroad constantly revolves around your Israeliness and that you 
constantly have to peek around your shoulder to see that they don’t 
throw a stone at you because of anti-Semitism, if I’ll allow myself a bit of 
exaggeration, {Israelis in Israel believe} that anyone you work with is 
either anti-Semitic or a latent anti-Semitic or else is currently a 
‘Hadassah38 donor.  
However, educated within a Zionist Israeli society and bombarded by 
information in the public media39 about the prevalence of anti-Semitism in the 
western world, as well as the international anti-Israeli approach (Bar-Tal, 
2007); this option seems to be entertained at the back of the mind. 
Consequently, Israelis seem confident that anti-Semitism exists, but do not 
really know what it looks or feels like and as a result remain unsure whether 
                                            
38
  A big world-wide Jewish women charity. 
39
 See the documentary film ‘Defamation’ by Yoav Shafir for a study of the interpretation of 
anti-Semitism in Israeli society. 
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they have indeed been subjected to it or whether they just weren’t aware of it 
occurring around them. Roni demonstrates the belief in the inevitability of anti-
Semitism in British society:  
I assume that if I would have been in a more anti-Semitic environment 
or something like this, for argument’s sake, and I would have had to 
work in an anti-Semitic environment, naturally, it would have been 
inconvenient but since I’m not forced to live in such an environment…  
The concept of ‘anti-Semitism’ was sometimes inserted in my interviewees’ 
speeches within the context of anti-Zionism and anti-Israeliness where the 
boundaries between them were not always clear to Jewish-Israelis. Noga 
demonstrates this common mix-up:  
There were these anti-Jewish demonstrations and they {the Israeli 
embassy} did... they organized a gathering in support of… in Trafalgar 
Square, it was a year ago [anti-Jewish demonstrations?] yes, the anti… 
Israeli.  
This mix up between anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism or the political criticism of 
Israel is very prevalent in Israeli society (or among the local Jewish community, 
see Shindler, 2003) where anti-Zionism is presented as the modern version of 
an undercover anti-Semitism which went out of fashion due to western 
societies’ political correctness. The common fear of anti-Semitism in fact joins 
the Jewish and Israeli communities through a mutual enemy and helps to 
bridge the gap between the two groups. As a result, Jewish-Israeli subjects 
who come to live abroad in material and economically advantageous 
conditions and are not subjected to racism or marginalization for their socio-
economic status, find it difficult to accommodate the Israeli discourse of anti-
Semitism to their daily experiences. Ariella’s story, which will be analysed later, 
demonstrates how the vague notion of anti-Semitism circulates in Jewish-
Israelis’ interpretations of their daily encounters with their non-Jewish 
environment. 
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8.3.3. Doing things differently – constructing distinct ‘national character’ 
through daily practices   
Many of the interviewees defined ‘their Israeliness’ in terms of the way they do 
or see things which differentiate them from local British people. Subjects talked 
about practices of arranging play-dates for the children, work relationships, 
socializing etc. 
I will briefly analyse a short extract from Aaron’s interview where he talks about 
the ‘Israeli way of thinking’ as something that defines ‘Israeliness’. Aaron, who 
settled down nine years ago in London with his American wife, presented an 
exceptionally liberal model of Israeliness:  
you have to,  kind of, {have} a few things to be Israeli: I think it's a way 
of thinking, I think it's language, I think it's a cultural context; Ah… and it 
can also be the place where you were born.  
Within such a liberal model of Israeli belonging that also emphasizes, beside 
the territorial aspects (being born or growing up in Israel), a-territorial and 
cultural means of belonging (such as an ‘Israeli way of thinking’) he too, an 
Israeli who doesn’t intend to return and in whose home the family members do 
not speak Hebrew, could be included. Thus, it was important for Aaron to 
emphasize the distinctive ‘Israeli way of thinking’ and he therefore made the 
following statement:       
56. …i.e. Israelis, they don't have… you don't schedule lunch a month and 
a half in advance.       
57. It's: ‘shall we meet {tomorrow} for lunch?  Let's talk tomorrow morning!’ 
58. You don't have the… I mean  
59. even if nothing changes between the morning and noon time,  
60. You don't have that ability to plan in advance  
61. Or it's less common 
The Israeli thinking (perhaps a variation on ‘the Jewish genius’) that Israelis 
are very proud of – the spontaneity, the lack of formality and therefore the 'lack 
of planning' - has been mentioned in other interviews (for instance around 
issues of organizing the children’s 'play-dates'). This 'lack of planning' in 
advance is presented here as a virtue (like ‘Hutzpah’, in Dorit’s interview - 
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chapter six) which signal Israelis’ ability to improvise, find a solution and adapt 
themselves to changing circumstances. Thus the assertion that Israelis, unlike 
the British, ‘don't schedule lunch a month and a half in advance' (l. 56) is an 
implied criticism of the inflexible and formal ‘British way of thinking’, among 
people who are presumably so preoccupied with pre-planning and formality 
that they schedule a lunch a month and a half in advance regardless of 
whether they are hungry, have had a rift with this friend or will have to be away 
from town on that date. Thus 'planning in advance' is deliberately exaggerated 
and caricatured to better define the unique 'Israeli way of thinking', which is 
especially emphasized in Aaron’s model of Israeliness so that he could be 
included in it too.    
By contrast, the Israeli way of scheduling lunch is straightforward and practical: 
A invites: ‘shall we meet {tomorrow} for lunch?’ B retains all options: ‘Let's talk 
tomorrow morning’. Within the climate of absolute spontaneity and 
improvisation it is acceptable for B not to accept A's offer right away and have 
A wait for his answer without breaching the social norms of friendship. 
Moreover, Aaron argues that even if B doesn’t have in sight any event that 
might deter him from attending the lunch (‘even if nothing changes between 
the morning and noon time’, 59), B still retains the option to delay his response 
until the following morning. Aaron’s text tells us also about the way ‘friendship’ 
among Israelis is imagined where rules of friendship are characterized by 
informality, openness, flexibility, adaptation to changing circumstances, 
frequent interactions (‘let's talk tomorrow morning’), all of which are lost in the 
formal 'scheduling lunch a month and a half in advance' pattern of British 
friendship.   
Aaron’s example draws on common Israeli self-perceptions which revolve 
around  ‘Israeli’ informality or ‘uncivilized Israeli behaviour’ which is given a 
range of interpretations: ‘spontaneity’ ‘aggression’, 'pushiness', ‘not observing 
rules', ‘straightforwardness’ and more. David for example states:  
‘I think that the average Israeli is in some respects a ‘street cat’: he is far 
less constrained or restrained by rules of this is how you are allowed to 
behave and this is how you shouldn’t behave. He has a goal and he will 
achieve it, not in every situation and not at all costs but he will strive for 
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it more or less without looking right or left. And certainly without getting 
worked up by rules or regulations or social norms’  
Within this broad category of ‘undisciplined behaviour’ (as demonstrated in 
Sela-Shefi’s ‘talk-back’ analysis of ‘the Israeli person’, 2006) subjects bring up 
a wide range of idiosyncratic interpretations that they accommodate to suit 
their requirements within the immediate interview encounter and within a 
broader perspective of ‘who they are’ in the world. As part of the effort to 
differentiate themselves within British society, Jewish-Israeli subjects often 
romanticize this image of the ‘uncivilized Israeli’.  
The image of the Israeli as ‘a street cat’, ‘aggressive’ or ‘uncivilized’ is strongly 
based in Israeli folklore and emerged as foundational in Sela-Shefi’s research 
(2006) on Israelis’ self-perceptions. In her study, the image of the ‘uncivilized 
Israeli’ was constructed in opposition to a desirable image of the ‘civilized 
European’. She concluded that Israeli respondents positioned themselves 
differently in reference to this ‘uncivilized’ Israeli image and the alternative 
counter-figure of the ‘civilized European’ in order to signal their preferred social 
positioning in Israeli society. However, Jewish-Israelis in Britain who struggle 
to articulate their distinctiveness within the majority British society have to 
position themselves differently, vis-à-vis this image of ‘civilized European’. 
‘Aggression’ is central to the image of the ‘undisciplined Israeli’ and is used 
creatively in order to produce a favourable private and group identity as 
Israelis. Yariv described his Israeliness among his work colleagues:   
I’m vocal, I try to squeeze in. I push. I advance {professionally}. I have 
ambitions. When I look at the English I say {to myself} ‘they don’t have 
ambitions.  
In the interview, Yariv stressed his professional achievements and success. 
Within this context of someone who emerged from the Kibbutz and succeeded 
in London, his Israeli pushiness (or ‘aggression’) was seen as a personal asset 
that helped him achieve his professional goals in Britain. Pushiness is 
described as merely an open and sincere manifestation of one’s ambitions to 
succeed and since the English ‘don’t have {professional} ambitions’, they don’t 
push. Thus ‘pushing’, being ‘vocal’ and ‘squeezing in’ are being rehabilitated 
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and presented as legitimate or even advantageous in the context of a 
competitive and ambitious international professional environment.     
And Aaron said:  
I think that my way of doing business, which is a very Israeli way, is 
much more of an aggressive way than the British way, but it’s 
aggressive not in the sense of the classical Israeli aggression. It means 
‘not to leave good will on the table’ {English wording}, daring, is the 
word, try out things, in a creative way, perhaps that’s the word… and 
not give up. 
Aaron, like Yariv, claims ‘the positive’ or adaptive side of ‘Israeli aggression’ – 
which is more about being ‘daring’, ‘creative’, entrepreneurial, and insistent 
(‘not giving up’). The other aggression with which Israelis are involved (‘the 
classical Israeli aggression’, for example as part of the conflict with the 
Palestinians, or in daily life), which bears destructive consequences for the 
subject and for the other, was widely denied in the interviews or just mentioned 
casually, like here. A rare reference to the harmful consequences of ‘classical 
Israeli aggression’ can be found in Ariella’s story, later on.        
David was trying to explain why he feels comfortable in Britain and why he 
likes to stay. To exemplify his comfort, he describes the British way of being 
aggressive:    
Perhaps they don’t have the American enthusiasm of everything that 
shoots and {the wish} to conquer the world, but if they {the British} feel 
that there is an issue that really endangers the… ahh…Western 
interests, significantly, they will go to war... I think that in my first visit to 
England, I noticed… in the tube, you know, in the tube, yes? So there is 
a very clear rule: you don’t go in before everyone gets out. And there 
were some people who were about to go in before the others went out 
so the ones who went out, a few of them… there were two guys and 
they gave them Wahad {one hell of a… – in Arabic} elbow… and these 
were guys with ties and jackets  
Within the immediate discursive task he wanted to achieve, namely explaining 
why he feels comfortable in Britain, and how he can express his Israeliness, it 
was important for David to stress that British people too, like Israeli ‘street 
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cats’, can be aggressive at times, pursue their agenda and exercise power 
regardless of what is expected of them. This description warrants exercising 
aggression within specific rules and makes the British social environment more 
liveable and familiar for the Israeli subject who is accustomed to thinking about 
himself as ‘aggressive’. Also, within the scale of aggression, the Israeli and 
British versions are presented as reasonable compared to the ‘American 
enthusiasm of everything that shoots and {the wish} to conquer the world’.    
Being active, creative, not obeying formal rules and striving to achieve one’s 
goals supports the imagined figure of the revolutionary New Jew that Israelis 
feel committed to. The ‘New Jew’, which according to feminist theory (Kamir, 
2011) was constructed against the compliant, obedient, passive, ‘feminine’ Old 
Jew, was also constructed in reference to the ‘formal and civilized (albeit 
excluding) European non-Jew’ as some theorists (e.g. Reinhartz and Shavit, 
2010, Raz-Krakotzkin, 1994, Shohat, 2003) argue is constrained by social 
norms, formality and bureaucratic regulations. Thus, the ‘uncivilized Israeli’, 
who is perceived negatively in Israeli society (Sela-Shefi, 2006), is strategically 
portrayed, within the British context, more positively as a way of arguing an 
identity distinctiveness. Moreover, subjects assign different, even constructive 
values to similar behaviours when they are performed within the context of 
Israeli society and when they are performed in Britain. ‘Pushiness’ for example 
can be seen as a negative feature of Israeli society but is portrayed by Israelis 
as a positive and beneficial trait when applied in specific circumstances in 
Britain and interpreted as ‘resourcefulness’ or ‘resilience’. 
In the following section, I will analyse an extract from Ariella’s interview to 
demonstrate how subjects make specific use of shared themes, signifiers, and 
discursive arguments some of which have been discussed above, to construct 
private narratives and justify personal decisions and preferences. I argue that it 
is important to locate the story she told within the overall interview narrative 
and to contextualize it within the matrix of British collective identifications as it 
is understood in the Israeli public space. These can teach us not only about 
the available assumptions of Israelis regarding nationality and the subject 
positions that come with them but also about the limitations they impose on the 
construction of alternative private and collective identifications.     
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8.3.4. Being ‘the other’ - an Israeli foreigner in an ‘area free of Jews’.  
Ariella in her late 30’s approached me following a professional lecture I gave 
where I mentioned my study, and offered to be interviewed. She said that she 
will be in London for three more months before she and her family will move 
back to Israel after living in Britain for 11 years. By the time the interview took 
place the preparations for the family’s return to Israel were under way.  
It would be reasonable to assume that the immediate context within which this 
interview was conducted greatly impacted on the contents that she raised and 
how she presented them. Indeed, at an early stage in the interview, she 
‘warned’ me saying:   
I sort of don’t know who you interview but I wanted to tell you that… 
before we start, that my head is in Israel, I mean I’m very... but it’s a 
very-very long process that I went through over many years. 
As the above quote demonstrates, she was aware of the constraints that such 
a position (‘My head is in Israel’) might impose on her ability to present 
multiple, contradictory or ambivalent views concerning her sense of Israeliness 
in Britain, which she believed I was expecting to hear.  
While subjects often (but not always) come to the interview with some pre-
planned agenda (in the same way that interviewers come with their own 
agenda), throughout the interview they find themselves occupying a variety of 
often contradictory discursive positions which are only partly serving the pre-
planned agenda. Ariella’s interview, on the other hand, seemed to be 
committed to a pre-planned agenda and as the interview developed I came to 
appreciate what she meant by ‘my head is in Israel’.  
A story that describes a dramatic intercultural encounter with a German 
woman was produced towards the end of the interview. By then, Ariella had 
already laid out a personal story of social isolation in London, of loneliness, 
and of fear that this isolation would eventually creep into her relationship with 
her children thus isolating her altogether. Like Na’ama, whom I presented 
earlier, Ariella felt frustrated because she had to give up her professional 
career. At this stage of the interview, Ariella talked about her sense of being a 
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foreign woman among the British, a topic she returned to a few times 
throughout the interview40. She said:  
but here’s for instance, I’m in, I work once a week in a studio, in South 
London, which is an area ‘free of Jews’ , let’s call it this way… and 
{‘free’} of Israelis. I’m the first Israeli that has arrived there and I love 
very much the... my studio’s landlady, which is coordinating some short 
courses etc… and I always take part in these courses and my fellow 
students [English wording] I feel at ease with her, and they are all very 
friendly,  {English} really, but I still feel the difference, I feel that they like 
me because I’m different, because I’m warmer, I’m more open, I say 
what’s on my mind. [and doesn’t it give you some points of credit?] 
Maybe, yes, yes, it does… [Are you the only foreign woman there?] No, 
there are other foreign women but they are European, one is from 
Poland and one is from Germany, so my foreignness is much more…  
Ariella casts herself as an outsider: she is the only Israeli woman, the first one 
to arrive in this area which is ‘free of Jews’. The fact that there are no Jews 
living in that part of London does not necessarily mean that they are banned, 
or excluded from there as her choice of anti-Semitic terminology seems to 
suggest. The unclear distinction between anti-Semitism and anti-Israeli/anti-
Zionist (which are all taken for granted) is manifested here. As discussed 
above, Israelis can identify much more easily an anti-Israeli criticism, but anti-
Semitism seems to be an abstract option that can never be ruled-out. Ariella’s 
comment demonstrates the availability of the discourse of anti-Semitism from 
which ‘an area free of Jews’ is taken. This description also casts her as an 
adventurous woman who dares to travel to unfamiliar areas which most Israelis 
or Jews would consider ‘inhospitable’.  
On the face of it, she describes a reasonable integration into the group where 
she ‘loves very much’ the studio landlady, and makes an effort to come to the 
courses. Her efforts are noted by the local fellow students who accept her and 
are ‘all very friendly’. However, Ariella’s usage of English in 'very friendly' and 
its articulation hint that the relationship formed is precarious: it is based on 
                                            
40
 She was the only interviewee to describe herself as an immigrant specifically in order to 
explain and justify her decision to go back. No other interviewee, no matter how long they lived 
in Britain, used this signifier to describe their status! 
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polite formality (see scheduling ‘lunch a month and a half in advance’ in the 
previous section) rather than on mutual emotional friendship (while she ‘loves 
her {landlady} very much’, her fellow students are ‘very friendly’). But in spite of 
being liked for her difference, the difference is felt by her and stands in the way 
of her becoming like the others. To make her case stronger she draws on the 
geographical and political definitions of Europeanisms that group together the 
other non-British participants (a German and a Pole) and the local British 
people, leaving her, a Middle Eastern Israeli, outside this category. Although I 
know that Ariella’s grandparents came to Israel from Europe and that in Israeli 
society she would enjoy the informal social privileges of being an Ashkenazi (a 
European Jew) – earlier in the interview she described herself as ‘the salt of 
the earth’ - here her ‘Israeliness’ as non-European overshadows her Israeli-
Ashkenazi ‘Europeanness’ (see chapter seven on the ethnic divide in Israeli 
society) and casts her as the Other; different in every way:  an exceptionally 
warm, open and straightforward Israeli (non-European) Jew among 
presumably formal, introverted, non-Jewish Europeans in an area which is 
‘free of Jews’. This description of otherness sets the stage for the drama that is 
about to erupt where these classifications and distinctions are performed in the 
open: she said ‘I’ll give you an example of when I felt very-very uncomfortable. 
Stanza 1 – Ariella describes a German group member who is like her in some 
aspects  
1. One of the girls who is from a German origin, 
2. I don’t know how many years she lives here,  
3. if she is married to an Englishman, 
4. a girl about the same age as me, 
5. she also has two kids, 
In this opening stanza, Ariella compares herself as a woman and a mother to 
this other non-English yet European ‘girl’ through features that she discussed 
in previous parts of the interview: the length of time spent in England and the 
marital status, as measures of settled-ness in England (being married to a 
local Englishman provides, according to her, a greater sense of belonging; 
Ariella is married to an Israeli and therefore ‘the only roots I have in this place 
are my children’), and the age and the number of children. By highlighting the 
similarities and common aspects between the two she points to the national 
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origin (European/non-European) as the main differentiating category. Although 
she doesn’t explicitly relate to it, within the context of Jewish-Israeli 
historiography ‘the European- German’, coupled to her earlier reference to an 
‘area free of Jews’, accentuate her sense of discomfort and foreignness. 
Stanza 2 – describing the nature of the relationship with the German girl  
6. and we worked on a project, 
7. and I love her work very much 
8. and I tend to compliment, 
9. when I compliment I do it with all my heart, 
10. I don’t say: ‘oh it’s very nice’ [English wording] although at heart I feel 
differently. 
11. If I don’t like it, I won’t say anything  
Ariella feels a need to clear away any impression that the drama which will be 
described shortly could be attributed to personal resentment rather than to the 
national or cultural aspect that she wants to articulate. Therefore she stresses 
that she is on good terms with this girl, ‘loves ‘her work very much’, and lets 
the other girl know it. Ariella refers here to other Israeli self-attributed 
characteristics of being straightforward and candid rather than formal or 
hypocritical, like ‘the English’, or ‘the Europeans’, who talk in a polite way (‘oh, 
it’s very nice’) but actually feel differently. The role of this stanza is to 
demonstrate that in spite of the similar circumstances (mentioned in the 
previous stanza) and the good will, the drama is inevitable.   
Stanza 3 – Ariella wants to share an idea with the German girl that will help her 
in her work  
12. and … ah, one project she did, one piece of jewelry, 
13. I told her all of a sudden, I had an idea 
14. and I really wanted to share it with her, 
15. for her sake, 
16. ‘look, I found a stone, which, I think , look, you can do something like 
this 
Stanza 4 – this process of brainstorming is acceptable in the group 
17. because it’s a brainstorming [English wording]. 
18. It’s true that it’s her work  
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19. but I too like to have other people’s input. 
20. It helps a lot, 
Ariella describes the immediate, associative and even impulsive emergence of 
an idea that she urgently (as the repeated 'look' might disclose: ‘look, I found a 
stone, which, I think, look, you can do something like this') wanted to share 
with her fellow student and presents this act as initiated for the other girl's sake 
rather than out of her own need (for recognition or friendship perhaps) and as 
an acceptable act within the group's norms. What in other circumstances could 
be described as Israeli impulsivity, is described here as a legitimate and 
acceptable procedure within this non-Israeli group culture.     
Stanza 5 – this idea is rejected by the German girl but Ariella insists on it  
21. and she said: ‘oh yes, it’s an interesting idea’ 
22. and I came with the stone and wanted to show her how it would look 
23. and without paying attention,  
24. because I’m an Israeli and it’s imprinted in me, 
25. I took the stone and I fel{t}… 
Stanza 6 –a physical struggle evolves   
26. and she caught my hand  
27. and I felt that for one split second I was trying to resist and to put it on 
her piece [English wording] 
Stanzas 5 and 6 describe the height of the drama that developed into a 
physical conflict. By now, we can appreciate the necessity and urgency of 
Ariella to communicate with her 'friendly' fellow students, to 'share', 'show' and 
be recognized and be seen in these 'friendly' but alienated social 
circumstances where she feels out of place. In these circumstances, the drama 
erupts. While the German girl politely rejects her suggestion ('oh yes, it is an 
interesting idea’), Ariella still acts out her intention ('I took the stone and fel=t'). 
In her story she attributes her failure to 'pay attention' to her national origin ('I'm 
an Israeli’), which 'is imprinted' in her. For that 'one split second', she resisted 
the unbearable recognition of her (cultural, religious and national) differences 
and persisted in her attempt to 'share' her idea. It is also at that very same 
minute that the painful, perhaps humiliating experience of difference and 
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foreignness, as interpreted by her, all of a sudden become apparent in the 
most concrete and physical way.  
Stanza 7 – Ariella realizes how she has crossed the line and retreats 
28. and all of a sudden I realized what I’m doing  
29. and how I crossed the line  
30. and you know, immediately I held myself back 
31. and I said ‘I’m very sorry’  
32. and she said ‘no, it’s just that it’s still wet and I didn’t want to…’ 
33. but I said ‘no I’m really sorry’,  
34. and I felt very bad 
Stanza 8 – Ariella draws out the conclusion – this crossing the line happened 
because she is an Israeli and this act would have been acceptable in an Israeli 
milieu.  
35. and I knew that if I was an Englishwoman I wouldn’t have done it at all, 
36. I wouldn’t even think of imposing the idea upon her, so to speak  
37. in a sort of aggressive way 
38. which is not exceptional in Israeli terms  
39. but that here it can be felt very harsh 
In the last two stanzas, Ariella tries to amend the transgression through the 
communication with the other girl and declares her renewed commitment to the 
group’s social codes ('I said I'm very sorry', 'no, I'm really sorry') while also 
conveying, perhaps to me, that she also stands behind them morally and 
psychologically ('and I felt very bad'). By doing this she declares that she 
renounces the (alternative, 'Israeli', according to her) codes that she acted on, 
but which would have been normative in Israel. In this sense, sticking to the 
cultural hypothesis (it’s 'because I'm Israeli' and 'it’s imprinted in me') serves to 
relieve the pain of personal rejection. Knowing that ‘this is not exceptional in 
Israeli terms’ is soothing since, according to her, the rejection would not have 
occurred in an Israeli context where she very much hopes to re-gain a sense 
of belonging. Through this story, some of Ariella’s perceptions of ‘Israeliness’ 
(as ‘aggressive’, ‘harsh’ and ‘imposing’) emerge. These self-perceptions, as I 
have shown in the section dealing with differences in daily practices, circulate 
in the Israeli public imaginary sphere and do not distinguish between men and 
women. Ariella describes a striking contrast between her efforts to blend in and 
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integrate into the (European) environment of her fellow students and the 
involuntary eruption of a harsh and dominant Israeli aggressiveness that 
testifies her inevitable foreignness, despite all her efforts. Since Israelis often 
regard themselves judged pejoratively in Britain due to the Israeli 
government’s handling of the national conflict with the neighbouring Arab 
countries and with the Palestinians, these very volatile images are already ‘in 
the air’. There are a few conclusions that Ariella wants to draw by telling this 
story: a. the collective national self is constantly at work; b. it dominates 
alternative selves with different agendas (e.g. achieving integration); c. the 
national self is ‘imprinted in you’ and cannot be negotiated with; and d. within 
this politics of selves, one intention (friendship, sharing an idea, the search for 
recognition) that originates in the ‘personal self’ can be hijacked by the 
collective self and end up being interpreted differently (‘aggressive’, ‘harsh’, 
‘imposing’).       
I argue that it is discursively beneficial for Ariella to describe Israeliness as 
‘imprinted in you’ and hence construct herself as the absolute foreigner; it 
justifies her decision to return to Israel since from that social perspective of 
nationality, foreigners in general, and Jewish-Israelis specifically, are forever 
doomed to be excluded, marginalized and disintegrated. At the same time, by 
attributing the aggressiveness, harshness and imposition of ideas to her 
national inheritance, she is able to ward off the troubling possibility that she is 
excluded on a personal basis. Ariella’s story also tells us something about the 
condition of many Israeli immigrant women living in a material ‘golden cage’, 
excluded from the professional job market and caught up in an in-between 
position – not fully accepting her status of an immigrant in Britain, yet 
separated from her prior socio-professional position in Israeli society; never 
fully integrated and always conscious of the discomfort originating from the 
minute details of their difference and otherness, which is usually not spoken 
about but articulated in many other ways. Since the story is inevitably 
constructed and designed to support her decision to return to Israel, a drama, 
or even a tragedy, serves well to stress her point.  
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8.4. Constructing national identity around ‘the enemy’ – Israelis and 
their representations of ‘Arabs’ and ‘Muslims’ in London in the 
context of ‘the (Arab/Palestinian-Israeli) conflict’ 
As I’ve shown above, the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab conflict in the 
Middle East (which are often used interchangeably) constitute a major 
component around which Jewish-Israelis’ organize their national identity in 
Britain. It also shapes their understandings of the interaction with non-Israeli 
locals. So while direct encounters with Muslims, Arabs or Palestinians were 
hardly ever described spontaneously, and although none of the interviewees 
reported being actually involved in any hostile incident, overall, ‘Muslims’, 
‘Arabs’ or ‘Palestinians’  were taken collectively and individually as a source of 
danger and hostility which was best avoided when living in Britain. Subjects 
often used ‘Palestinians’, ‘Arabs’ and ‘Muslims’ interchangeably and failed to 
distinguish between these different identity categories.   
Na’ama said:  
I would feel uncomfortable if I’ll go into an area which is… Arab. I guess 
I will feel... I won’t put myself in this situation. I won’t go into an area 
which is only Arab   
Noga said:  
Here there are many-many-many-many Arabs and they are not, how 
shall we put it … they are not friendly...  
Michael said:  
Many of the Muslims here, they just hate us, I met a few Indians that 
love us but most of the Muslims I met hate us, they can wipe us out 
without thinking twice.  
Dorit talked about the negative attitude towards Israelis in London and I asked 
her to tell me where she comes across it. She said:  
In my daily life {I come across this hostility} only when I go into falafel, 
Shwarma {kebab} or Halal places. Then you see many times people 
who give you the look, {like} they want to murder you or they will have a 
big ‘Palestine’ necklace or… like, they would be really not nice to you... 
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and once again… [Not nice to you? It’s not written all over you that you 
are Israeli...]. They can identify you. I will not go alone to these places.  
When imagining an encounter with ‘Arabs’ (or even imagining that the falafel or 
kebab salesman is Arab – in some parts of London, many kebab shops are run 
by people who come from Turkey), subjects describe an inevitably dangerous 
situation where they see themselves outnumbered (‘an area which is only 
Arab’; ‘there are many-many-many-many Arabs’) and where their identity as 
Israelis is exposed (‘they identify you’) which might lead to physical attack, 
even murder. Wearing a ‘Palestine’ necklace is taken as a sign of the bearer’s 
murderous intentions towards Israelis. 
Dorit says:  
If I see someone who is really… that you can see ‘murder in his eyes’, I 
won’t mess {talk) with him at all, but if I see a human being who is 
Muslim and speaks in Arabic I… on the contrary, I tend to show him my 
good sides. 
Note that within the encounter between Israelis and Arabs, Muslims or 
Palestinians, it is the ‘Arabs’ who are attributed the violence and aggression (in 
contrast to the ‘uncivilized’ ‘aggressive’ Israeli that was discussed earlier), 
whereas the Israelis are described as civilized and reasonable who try to show 
their ‘good sides’. Such negative, homogenous portrayal of the ‘Arab’ is 
characteristic of a racist discourse that Israelis often adopt.   
The data shows that living away from the immediate Israeli conflict does not 
change the perceptions of Arabs and Muslims constructed within the Israeli 
context (as described by Bar-Tal, 2007) but rather fixes it. Although a racist, 
anti-Muslim discourse circulates in general British society, especially after 9/11 
and the 2005 bombings (Cameron, Maslen, and Todd, 2013), and even has 
currency in the British press (Richardson, 2004), the Israeli subjects in my 
study import with them the image of the murderous Muslim that was 
constructed in the Israeli socio-political context. Many Israelis continue to 
receive information from the Israeli media which continuously highlights any 
criticism of Israel in the UK and interprets it as anti-Zionist or anti-Semitic, or 
describes the ‘Muslim demographic dangers’ in Europe as a means to warn 
Israelis against the dangers of living outside Israel. Israelis have been brought 
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up (Na’ama - ‘when I was in Ha’aretz and I was younger, so yes, I would hear 
that Israelis are not liked {abroad} and that you shouldn’t speak Hebrew’) on 
the notion that, generally, the world is an unwelcoming place for Israelis and 
Jews (see above, the Jewish-Israeli siege mentality - Bar-Tal, 2007). ‘Arabs’, 
‘Muslims’ or ‘Palestinians’, occupy a central role in the portrayal of such 
dangers, and are portrayed usually in racist and pejorative terms, which 
appear to be crucial for Jewish-Israeli identity construction and a means to 
encourage Israelis to stick together in Israel (see the government campaign in 
chapter four).   
As members of Israeli society’s middle class, who traditionally consists of ‘left-
wing’ voters, some of the interviewees did find it relevant to voice their criticism 
of Israel’s policies regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but I felt that their 
comments often served to negotiate their place in the interview encounter with 
me and indicate to me their position in Israeli society.  
Although many subjects voiced their reservation about the Israeli government’s 
policies, the conflict in the Middle East was generally taken as an 
unquestionable fact of life, thus ignoring the part that Israel plays in its 
continuation. This finding was also made by Lomsky-Feder (2004), who 
argued that ‘school memorial ceremonies, like most other forums and 
movements, have not begun to challenge basic cultural assumptions, such as 
the inevitable centrality of war and the army in Israeli life’ (p. 304). Therefore, 
subjects seem to conclude that the continuous conflict in the Middle East has 
political ramifications that impact on life in Britain and that being an Israeli in 
London inevitably puts one in conflict with ‘Arabs’, ‘Muslims’ and ‘Palestinians’ 
who are assumed to be homogenously and non-differentially implicated in the 
Israeli-Arab and Palestinian conflict. It is beyond the scope of this work to 
analyse the military conflict as it is seen through Jewish-Israelis’ eyes. Rather, 
I seek to describe how such categorical perception of the conflict as ‘a given’ 
allows for a racist discourse towards ‘Arabs’ and ‘Muslim’ and crystalizes them 
as the ‘enemy’.  
While drawing on different theoretical frameworks, both Rose (1996) and 
Grinberg (2007) have argued that ‘the conflict’ constitutes a vital aspect of the 
Israeli-Zionist identification and that its resolution might bring about an 
identification crisis. Therefore subjects might ‘need’ the conflict to go on, for the 
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‘Arab’ population to be presented as homogenously dangerous, and for the 
local population to be portrayed as politically hostile in order to consolidate a 
distinct and well-defined identity and to construct Israel as the only safe place 
for Jews.  
8.5. Conclusion: Constructing an Israeli national identity in Britain 
Since identity is constructed within a context, against neighbouring identities 
that operate in the same public space, constructing Israeli identity in Britain, 
especially in London, has its specific features that make it different from 
identity construction in Israel or the USA (where local public opinion towards 
Israel is perceived to be more positive – GlobeScan, 2012), for example. The 
interviews show that within the British matrix of collective identities, the 
boundaries around the ‘Jewish-Israeli identity’ are constructed, above all, in 
reference to three neighbouring local identity groups: the local Jewish 
community, the non-Jewish British majority (taken as the white ‘English’ 
majority) and the Muslim, Arab and Palestinian communities (who mainly 
function as a ‘potential enemy’ to be avoided and feared). Naturally, the close 
links and commitments to Israeli society (whose role in identity-construction 
has been discussed in chapters three and four) inform the images that Jewish-
Israelis have of these three groups. McIlwaine, et al (2006) demonstrated how 
racist remarks were used by low-paid migrant workers to distinguish 
themselves from other workers - members of other nationalities and ethnicities 
who competed for the same labour resources. Like their low-paid migrant 
counterparts, the participants in my study applied racist discourse when 
drawing on pejorative images from Israeli culture of Arabs, Palestinians or 
Muslims. This served them to avoid ambivalence, the need to reconsider 
Israel’s responsibility in the Middle East or the recognition of similar conditions 
which might destabilize and complicate their relations to Israel. Moreover, their 
previous privileged social positioning in Israeli society, their aims in agreeing to 
be interviewed and the interview politics will also shape how the boundaries 
around ‘Israeli identity’ will be drawn.  
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8.5.1. Material conditions of immigration and the construction of 
‘national identity’.  
Many Jewish-Israelis who live in Britain, and certainly most of my interviewees, 
come from affluent socio-economic, educational and professional positions in 
Israeli society. Their overall privileged socio-economic background influences 
the way ‘national identity’ will be constructed and differentiates them from 
immigrant groups who come from less advantageous socio-political and 
economic background (e.g. Turks in Britain, Tanyas, 2010) or those who are 
marginalized or persecuted in their home countries (e.g. Iranian women, Fathi, 
2011). Despite their affluent economic conditions in Britain, most of my 
interviewees contemplated the possibility of returning to Israel (one interviewee 
and one pilot interviewee indeed returned to Israel). As other research shows 
(Floman, 2007), the immigrants’ privileged socio-economic conditions in Israeli 
society complicate their ability to give up the ‘Israeli option’ and settle down in 
Britain, come to terms with the status of ‘immigrants’ and eventually become 
part of British society, i.e. identify as British-Jewish-Israelis (as some other 
immigrant subjects might do). This hypothesis is consistent with research of 
other high-skilled migrants from richer countries (Manning and Roy, 2010) and 
is not unique to the Israeli case. Within this condition of relative affluence, 
women’s positions are often complicated by their disadvantageous job 
opportunities (Lev-Ari, 2008, Iredale, 2005, Boyle, Cooke, Halfacree, and 
Smith, 2001). Thus, both Ariella and Na’ama were trying to make sense of 
Israeliness, from that professional, economic and gendered disadvantageous 
stand.    
8.5.2. Israeliness and the Jewish diaspora  
Upon arrival abroad, Israeli subjects might become aware of alternative 
versions of Jewish communal and private life, which give different 
interpretations to categories such as ‘religion’, ‘citizenship’, ‘Zionism’ and 
‘Jewishness’ and trouble their taken-for-granted understandings of such 
concepts. Secular Zionism’s historical view of religion and the political tensions 
in Israeli society around its interpretation further complicate the relationship 
between secular Jewish-Israelis and the traditionalist, religiously-oriented local 
Jewish communities. Moreover, the Zionist contract between diaspora Jews 
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and Jewish-Israelis, which assumes partnership among all Jews but grants 
priority to Israeli Jews, is questioned. Local Jews enjoy privileged social, 
political and economic positions whereas Israelis, many of whom were used to 
privileged social positions in Israeli society, are assigned the unfamiliar status 
of ‘the immigrant’. Thus, on the local Jewish ‘frontier’, Israelis’ former self-
conceptualization is troubled, requiring subjects to redefine their position or 
stick to it and draw a separating line between themselves and the local Jews.  
Nevertheless, against such political power-relations, and given the privileged 
and affluent socio-economic position of British Jews in British society, it would 
have been reasonable to predict that Jewish-Israelis would like to associate 
themselves with local Jewry and benefit from their social capital. However, the 
efforts of Jewish-Israelis to distinguish themselves from local British Jewry, as 
they imagine them to be perceived in the eyes of the local non-Jewish public, 
might be the result of the unfavourable image of the diasporic old Jew, applied 
here to the British context, rather than because of an acquaintance with the 
local identity politics and the position of Jews in it.  
Gold (2004) discussed the sense of identity alienation of Jewish-Israeli 
émigrés in American society, which resembles Na’ama’s ‘life on hold’ in 
London. He concluded, however, that ‘a considerable number {of Israeli 
émigrés} did … begin to describe themselves as members of the de-
territorialized ethnic or religious community of the Jewish people. In this way 
they were able to reconcile their connections to two or more nationalities 
without appearing disloyal to either’ (p. 347). 
8.5.3. Israeliness and the non-Jewish British public 
‘Jewish Israeliness in Britain’ is also constructed in relation to what is 
perceived as the non-Jewish British majority where ‘the Israeli-Palestinian/Arab 
conflict’ plays an important role. It constructs the British environment as 
potentially politically and personally hostile. When a British anti-Israeli/anti-
Zionist perspective is assumed, manifested through ‘biased media coverage’ 
and an assumed sympathy for the Palestinians, Jewish-Israelis often manage 
the uncomfortable political criticism of Israeli policies by entertaining the 
abstract notion of anti-Semitism. Perceptions of world-wide anti-Semitism 
circulate in Israeli society (where Jews constitute the majority) and in its media 
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(Bar-Tal, 2007), as images of the diasporic Jewish minority amidst a 
predominantly inhospitable non-Jewish majority. Thus, the pre-supposed anti-
Israeli position of the British public on ‘The (Israeli-Palestinian) Conflict’, (e.g. 
‘the world always splits between those who love us and those who don’t’ - 
Noga, chapter six) is often imagined as an overt manifestation of the British 
majority’s underlying anti-Semitism. Jewish-Israelis’ attempts to single 
themselves out draw on available discourses in Israeli society and its 
mythological national narrative. At the same time, they constitute discursive 
practices of Israeli identity construction abroad which help draw clearer lines 
around the group members and manage the discomforts of the migrant 
condition.  
Different daily practices are also used to draw a clearer line between a civilized 
and formal European British person and an uncivilized, creative, informal 
Israeli ‘street cat’ (Sela-Shefi, 2006). Within this category, aggression is 
negotiated and often rehabilitated and romanticized as a constructive, 
productive and sincere Israeli feature, drawing on an idyllic image of the 
revolutionary Sabra, the Israeli-born Jew (see chapter six), who is free from 
social formalities. However, within the practice of national identity construction, 
and the attempt to highlight distinctive, albeit positive, aspects of the group, 
alternative, troubling, versions of aggression (as well as direct references to 
the Israeli occupation and the Nakba) are mainly pushed aside. Ariella’s story, 
which was constructed to explain her decision to return to Israel, demonstrates 
an exception where the interviewee was drawing on troubling notions of Israeli 
aggression in order to justify the inevitability of her decision. To assist them in 
portraying the British public space as unwelcoming or even hostile and 
manage the hardships of migration, Israelis may apply racist discourse, 
homogeneously portraying Arabs and Muslims as potentially murderous. Such 
racist portrayal of the ‘Arab’ as dangerous serves to rehabilitate Israeli 
aggression and locate the Israelis among the civilized Europeans.    
Finally, due to the historical, ideological and political circumstances that still 
monopolize the Israeli public space and which insist on the centrality of living 
in Israel as a key identification feature, Jewish-Israeli subjects are placed in a 
complicated situation when trying to construct a separate ‘British-Jewish-Israeli 
identity’ away from Israel. It appears that Israelis in Britain, who mostly came 
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from affluent socio-economic conditions in Israeli society and for whom the 
return to Israel is always a viable option, find it exceptionally difficult to create 
an intermediary diasporic identity; to come to terms with their immigration 
status; to blur the lines that they draw around themselves and the other groups 
in the British public space; and to be able to see themselves as part of the 
social structure in Britain. The next chapter will focus on such dilemmas.  
The practice of constructing a national identity abroad is performed in the 
‘push-pull’ relationship towards alternative collective identities in the British 
public space and towards Israeli society. While the British public might be 
presented in a favourable way to achieve one discursive goal, the same British 
public may be portrayed negatively within a different discursive context. At the 
same time, subjects are not engaged in making calculated strategic arguments 
as discursive psychologists suggest (Wetherell and Potter, 1992, Potter, 2009). 
As the analysed extracts in this chapter demonstrate, subjects appear to be 
deeply engaged in the positions they occupy, seeing them as part of ‘who they 
are’. Within the highly saturated discursive-ideological-political public space, 
Jewish-Israeli subjects like Ariella, Na’ama, David and others struggle to 
narrate their very private stories, making sense of foreignness and belonging,  
of gender roles and other collective and personal trajectories in a changing 
world of material and imagined circumstances in an effort to construct ‘a 
national identity’.  
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Chapter nine: Gender, employability and the 
construction of an ‘Israeli identity’, ‘Israeli 
family’ and ‘Israeli community’ in Britain  
9.1. Introduction 
According to Anthias (2002), diasporans’ social positioning should be 
considered in relation to three main localities: the home society from which 
they emigrated, the local society into which they immigrated and the local 
migrant group. In chapters seven and eight I have looked at Israelis’ 
construction of Israeliness in references to Israeli and British societies 
respectively. In this concluding ‘findings’ chapter I would like to focus on 
Israelis’ perception of their local diasporic space. However, in response to my 
research data, I suggest an addition to Anthias’s third locality (that of the 
diasporic community):  the diasporic family. In this chapter I aim to focus on 
some of the interrelations between these community and familial spaces.  
The uncertainty about their future in Britain was raised to various degrees by 
the majority of the interviewees (with the exception of Nira and Liat, who were 
decisive about not returning to Israel) and is perhaps one of the central 
features around which ‘an Israeli identity’ in Britain is constructed. For some 
(e.g. Ariella, Na’ama, Roni, or Noga), this uncertainty seemed to be the driving 
force behind the decision to be interviewed and was also the main theme 
around which the interviews were narrated. For others, (e.g. Aaron and even 
Udit, who has been living in Britain for 40 years), it was presented as a 
hypothetical option, mediated from time to time, and an identity-constructing 
practice in its own right which connects the two participants in the interview 
encounter around a discourse of belonging and longing. From this vantage 
point of experienced or declared temporariness, arguments about the 
children’s upbringing, schooling and practices at home were made, subject 
positions were taken and a specific vocabulary was chosen. The uncertainly 
about the future in Britain intersected, naturally, with other conditions including 
the identity of the spouse (whether Israeli or not) and the work status of the 
interviewee. For subjects whose partner was local or non-Israeli, the option of 
returning to Israel was more remote. While previous chapters underscored the 
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role of the national ideology and collective imagination in the construction of an 
‘Israeli identity’ and looked closely at subjects’ narratives, the first part of this 
chapter is somewhat exceptional. In the first section, I will look into the 
association between specific material conditions (notably motherhood and the 
condition of women’s unemployment) and the construction of ‘Israeli identity’ in 
Britain across subjects’ texts, rather than through an analysis of single 
interview narrative. These will be discussed in light of other research in the 
area. The second part resumes the discussion on the role of national ideology 
in the construction of a diasporic space through fine-grained text analysis of 
Roni’s interview.  
9.2. Work, gender, parenthood and the experience of migration  
Sociological research examining the connection between the immigrant’s 
engagement in the local job market and their integration into the local society 
(Battu and Zenou, 2010) or the adoption of the local identity (Manning and 
Roy, 2010). Fathi (2011) has underscored the important role that immigrants’ 
high-status profession played in establishing a sense of belonging and ‘home’ 
in their new country, Britain. She argued that the professional status of Iranian 
women doctors allowed them to see themselves as part of middle-class British 
society and thus gain social recognition within the Iranian community and the 
general British public, a sense of personal belonging and empowerment as 
women in a home society which is traditionally male-centric. This is not the 
case for Jewish-Israeli emigrant women in Britain.  
Five out of seven women participants (but only one out of five men) were not in 
paid employment or were working part-time. Aside other factors that were 
mentioned (e.g. the lack of social support or the change in the climate) this 
condition of employment/unemployment seemed influence their satisfaction 
with their life in Britain as individuals, informed daily family practices and 
determined the nature of the local Israeli community, given that these women 
are often its main ‘weavers’ (Hart, 2004). The relatively low rate of employment 
among the Jewish-Israeli women in my cohort is consistent with other research 
on high-skilled women migrants’ employment (e.g. Boyle et al., 2001, Iredale, 
2005 or Lienonen, 2012). Most of the interviewees (10/12) were living as a 
family in Britain. It was found that employment rates among women who 
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migrate with their partners are markedly lower than their employment rate in 
their home countries or if they migrated alone (Iredale, 2005). Within the 
predominately affluent group of Jewish-Israeli immigrant women in Britain, 
there is a marked decrease in working rates compared with their position prior 
to their relocation. Boyle et al concluded that in terms of their vocational 
career, the migration had a negative effect on skilled women, who migrated 
following their partners. Iredale (2005) argues that high-skilled women 
migrants ‘often sacrifice their own career for the sake of their family or may be 
disadvantaged in the process by gender bias’ (p. 164). Hence, unlike some 
other migrant communities, among certain migrant women groups, the 
relocation to Britain accentuates traditional gender relations and role divisions 
which they were less accustomed to in their countries of origin. Hart (2004), 
Floman (2007) and Lev-Ari (2008) describe how Israeli women become the 
central figures of children’s education and men, being the main bread-winners, 
become less involved in their children’s upbringing. Among the women 
participants, I have noticed three discourses of motherhood in reference to 
occupational status: ‘good motherhood’ defined as the unemployed mother 
(Na’ama); motherhood as a hindrance to employment (Ariella); and managing 
motherhood with a professional career (Noga).  
When asked to give a brief description of herself at the start of the interview 
(see rationale in the methodological chapter), Na’ama chose to elaborate on 
her condition as a non-working mother:  
and we’ve arrived here 9 years ago, I looked for a job, ahh, it was a bit 
difficult to find, I didn't have enough experience in what I wanted to do. I 
was always thrown to finances, I worked for a year in Bank XXX (an 
Israeli bank), in the private banking department, when they developed it 
here, then my older daughter was born and then it was closed down. 
The department closed down and moved back to Israel. And that’s it; I 
never went back to the working market [laughs]… It’s sort of a life on 
‘hold’ because it’s not the real life but I think that I prefer it this way…so 
I prefer it like this, more flexibility, doing something but not… not a 
career… because if I did have some {career} dreams once, let’s call it 
this way, I've given them up [laughs] not because... willingly, I don’t feel 
that I've given up... If I compare myself to people who started with me 
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and studied with me and the sort, who today are in senior positions and 
no… I don't feel that I've missed something, no, I don’t regret, no…  
Na’ama’s choice to open the interview on ‘Israeli identity’ with a description of 
her current vocational status indicates its importance for her. I felt that the 
laughs indicated moments of embarrassment around giving up the 
professional route and that the frequent hesitations or the recurrent negations 
(‘I don’t feel I missed something’) signaled an effort to construct the condition 
of unemployment as willingly chosen rather than imposed by external 
conditions. Raising the children served as an explanation she felt obliged to 
give for abandoning or postponing the route of a professional career. Na’ama 
implies that, had she chosen to, she could have embarked on a professional 
career. This narrative of choice seems to mask another narrative, that of 
professional frustration – the difficulty for highly-skilled foreign mothers to find 
a job, as has been noted in previous research (e.g. Boyle et al., 2001, Iredale, 
2005).  
But while Na’ama’s text captures the condition of the unemployed highly-
skilled Israeli mother in Britain, it should also be seen in its broader context 
where western societies subject women to conflicting trends: on the one hand, 
the unequal, gendered distribution of jobs and child benefits and on the other 
hand the government’s constant encouragement for women to take part in the 
job market (Ingold, and Etherington, 2013). The conflict between, on the one 
hand, the social expectation from women to be the ‘child-bearers’41 and, on the 
other hand, demanding women to take equal part in the job market is 
especially accentuated among migrant women whose access to the job market 
is made even more difficult. Schober and Scott (2012) argue that women’s 
willingness to adopt a traditional gender role (i.e. for women to care for the 
children, and for men to work) depended on their vocational experience and 
economic resources prior to the birth of their children. Women who worked 
more prior to becoming a mother, or those who had greater economic 
resources, endorsed less traditional gender roles, tended to return to work 
after shorter periods of time and engaged in longer hours of work. Thus, 
besides the material, cultural and social hardships of migration itself, Israeli 
                                            
41
 And more generally, as biological reproducers, culture carriers and identity preservers of the 
‘nation’ – Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1989, Yuval-Davis, 1997. 
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women who were used to relative economic autonomy and long hours of work 
prior to migration, now have to face the constraints of the local job market 
which further limits their recruitment, effectively imposes traditional gender 
roles and a life of leisure on them, which they would not necessarily choose 
themselves had they stayed in Israel.  
This view - of migrant motherhood as an impediment for professional fulfillment 
- was raised by Ariella who completed academic degrees in Israel and in 
Britain and described the occupational deadlock she found herself within the 
general British job market as an immigrant woman. 
here I always thought that {if} I’ll come to a job interview and I’ll always 
be second or third best [English wording]: I’m an immigrant, my English 
is not an English-English, I don’t have an experience and I’m a mother 
According to Ariella, being an immigrant and foreign mother from a non-
English speaking country further aggravates the already difficult condition of 
women in a job market that prioritizes men. However, unlike Na’ama, who 
hasn’t decided whether to stay, Ariella is willing to discuss this vocational 
impediment because she is about to return to Israel. Elsewhere I have argued 
that within the interview context the narrative of the excluded Israeli mother 
has been raised specifically in order to justify the return to Israel.  
This condition of unemployment among many immigrant Israeli women with 
academic and professional backgrounds, together with a relatively prosperous 
familial economic situation, occupies a central part of the diasporic experience 
of these mothers and shapes the family relationships with the partner and the 
children. In some cases, it can perpetuate the language and cultural barrier, 
limit Jewish-Israeli women’s encounters and understanding of British society, 
and confine them to Israeli enclaves (Na’ama: ‘I don't have here, friends, 
friends who are not Israelis. I don't have’), which have been termed by some of 
the participants as ‘ghettos’ (see later section in this chapter).  
The mothers often form their social network based on their mutual condition of 
unemployment and the sense of temporariness that accompanies it. Their 
employment status becomes a main signification of identity for Israelis in 
general and for women specifically, from which a specific understanding and 
practice of Israeli identity and child-rearing can be understood.  
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Na’ama said:  
We speak Hebrew at home and our friends are mostly Israeli and the 
girls’ friends… [are] also [Israeli]. We are a very united group of people 
who are [laughs] all sharing the same state of mind: ‘in two years we’ll 
go back’ 
Therefore, it is not surprising that both Ariella and Na’ama felt that it was up to 
them to decide if they wanted to return to Israel or stay in Britain, since their 
working partners had settled better into the local daily life and would have 
preferred to stay.  
Na’ama said about her husband’s intentions: 
My husband, I guess, doesn’t want to go back [you guess, because it’s 
not something that has... {been discussed openly}?] No, as far as he’s 
concerned, he doesn’t want to go back so I guess that as soon as I 
decide to… that I'm not willing to stay here anymore and I will put a 
pressure...  , 
I felt that the heavy responsibility of coming to a decision whether to return to 
Israel or stay in Britain burdened Na’ama and perhaps drove her to be 
interviewed. We learn of a potential tension between the couple which is not 
discussed (‘I guess {he} doesn’t want to go back’). This responsibility is also 
manifest in Ariella’s text: {my husband} would have stayed here. It’s not that he 
doesn’t want to go back, he wants us all to be happy and he understands 
that… {laughs} that for us to be happy somehow starts with me 
9.2.1. Women’s employment and patterns of choosing schools in the 
Israeli community 
Hart (2004) documents patterns of school-choosing among Jewish-Israeli 
parents in London. She describes the mechanisms through which the Israeli 
community’s ‘intra-net operated a powerful control mechanism that 
perpetuated the educational clustering scheme’ (p. 194), ‘tighten[ed] the 
speakers’ [interviewees’] educational horizons and urge[d] them to commit to 
the ‘beaten educational path’ previously validated by others’ (p.200). She 
found that the schools operated as important informal social gatherings around 
which the Israeli community was organized. Moreover, Hart found that ‘women 
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were at the centre of the intra-net, assuming the responsibility not only for the 
circulation of information among members, but also for the reproduction of the 
communal network and its maintenance’ (p. 175). Hence the mothers, most of 
whom were not in paid employment, structured a communal milieu addressed 
to meet their own needs where working women and men who could not take 
part in the social practices might find themselves excluded.  
The condition of unemployment that many of the Jewish-Israeli mothers in 
Britain share impacts mothers such as Noga who do work. This brings about a 
third discourse of the migrating mother. From her position as a working mother 
Noga referred to this feature of the Israeli milieu in London:  
Many of the Israeli women here… 97 percent of the Israeli women here 
don't work. They either don’t work at all or they do part time job. I work. 
I'm the main provider {in the family}. I do a full time job, even more.  
It is within these cultural and material conditions of female unemployment that 
Israeli nurseries operate as Noga describes:  
The Israeli nurseries are based on the concept of the non-working mother so it 
means that the day terminates at two or three {pm}.  
Noga’s motherhood as an exceptional Israeli working woman is constructed 
and negotiated within these specific material and cultural conditions of 
immigration where motherhood and professional career often clash:  
1. and here {at the Israeli nurseries} it's ‘ah, you work? 
2. Ah, you have the child-minder picking up {your child}? 
3. it's a pity because children need their mothers to come and pick them 
up from nursery’ 
4. or all these feelings, you know,  
5. All the guilt feelings that they gradually instill into you.  
From Noga’s point of view, the role of the non-working mother is presented as 
chosen and valued and employment or getting paid assistance from child-
minders are presented as signs of maternal deficiency within this specific 
immigration culture. Hence, within these immigration constraints there are 
specific ways how ‘good’ motherhood is constructed, e.g. as an intentional 
choice not to be employed (‘because children need their mother to come and 
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pick them up from nursery’) and where women’s employment is portrayed as 
the exception (‘ah, you work?’).  
Since Noga felt uncomfortable working, she placed her daughter in a non-
Israeli nursery because ‘it didn't work’. Since the schools and nurseries which 
are occasioned by many Israelis offer ‘a meeting point', an ‘ethnic doorway’ 
and ‘a channel through which new members were introduced to the community 
and gained access to its networks’ (Hart, 2004, p. 190), the choice not to be 
part of this socio-educational milieu impacts the engagement with the local 
Israeli community and defines the perception of ‘Israeliness’ abroad.       
9.2.2. The interpretation of Jewishness and the role of Hebrew in the 
construction of children’s’ Israeli identity  
Israeli parents like Noga who choose to place their children in non-Israeli or 
non-Jewish educational settings, either due to the working constraints or 
because they live away from areas populated by Jews and/or Israelis find that 
they have to cater themselves for the Israeli identity rituals and practices which 
are normally supplied by the nurseries/schools. This requires them to decide 
for themselves ‘what is Israeliness?’ Liat lives with her daughter away from 
Jewish or Israeli areas. I asked her ‘so what is it, really, for you to be an Israeli 
woman?’ and she answered:  
Ok, I think it’s more related to my daughter now. Because before she 
was born I might have talked about it in a totally different way, but 
suddenly, when she was born, I felt that it’s important that she will learn 
Hebrew and that she will know about the {Jewish} holidays and not 
about Jewishness but about how I grew up, about the things that define 
us as Israelis. So I started taking her to synagogue, I did it! And it was 
very important for me that anyone who knows Hebrew will speak 
Hebrew with her.  
Liat (whose unfavourable memories of the life in Israel - ‘I remember, from a 
very early age that I felt I didn’t want to be there’ - chapter seven) describes 
the centrality of children in parents’ sense of national identity abroad and lays 
out some of the criteria that, according to her ‘define us as Israelis’ – i.e. 
speaking Hebrew and celebrating the national holidays in the manner they 
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were celebrated when she ‘grew up’, which is ‘not about Jewishness’ (i.e., in a 
secular way). She recapitulates some of the themes that have been covered in 
the previous chapters, namely, the specific secular and historical interpretation 
of Jewishness clearly distinguished from its ‘Jewish-relgious’ or ‘diasporic’ 
interpretations (chapter eight). The confusion of secular Zionist Israelis 
regarding Jewishness is well summarized in Raz-Krakotzkin’s essay (2005) 
‘There is no God but he promised Ha’aretz to us’: while there is a generalized 
attachment to Israel as ‘the land of the fathers’, there is a reluctance to accept 
it as ‘God’s promised land’. This confusion is captured in Liat’s exclamation ‘I 
did it!’, a revolutionary act of a secular Israeli woman who took her daughter to 
the synagogue in order to educate and try to pass on to her some Israeli 
values. On these occasions, Jewish-Israeli parents who have been raised 
within Israeli secularism face the confusion of passing on to their children 
some of the Jewish traditions while at the same time being wary and 
suspicious of any sign of religious practices, whilst also often being ignorant of 
their details. Noga demonstrates this dilemma: ‘I can’t tell you that we’ve 
decided to light the candles every Friday42, although it did cross my mind {we 
laugh} ah, but we are not there yet...’  
Our joint laughter discloses the embarrassment we both feel as secular 
Jewish-Israelis for whom lighting candles is usually associated with religious 
practices (which also assigns clear gender roles) from which we both felt 
alienated in Israel. The laughter also signified a moment of bond ascertaining 
that we are ‘in the same boat’. Secular (often Ashkenazi), Jewish Israelis (like 
most of the participants in my study) have to negotiate previous 
preconceptions about religion and Jewishness in the process of maintaining 
their children’s ‘Israeli identity’. It also demonstrates how in the mainstream 
secular Israeli culture Jewish is tainted with religious connotations. Therefore 
Israelis often demonstrate ignorance of any forms of non-religious British 
Jewishness and its practices and, as discussed in the previous chapter, tend 
to see British Jews as religious.  
 
                                            
42
 A ritual conducted by women that marks the beginning of the Jewish Sabbath on Friday 
night. The father then makes a blessing. 
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9.2.3. The role of Hebrew in managing the generational gap in the 
diasporic family 
Within the cultural/social milieu that most of my participants and I come from, 
which is suspicious towards religion and religious practices, and given the 
impossibility of performing daily Israeli practices (e.g. socializing, eating 
particular foods, touring the country, going to the beach etc.), speaking 
Hebrew (and, to a lesser extent, writing and reading it) becomes a main tool for 
national and ethnic (Jewish) identification. Through this, parents can share 
with their children some of the cultural capital and values they acquired in 
Israel. According to the national narrative laid out in Israel’s Declaration of 
Independence, the revival of the dead Hebrew language (that remained 
dormant throughout the Jews’ dispersion in exile) is seen as one of the great 
achievements of Zionism and, consequently, a cornerstone of Israeli identity. 
Na’ama said: ‘now the house is very Israeli: we speak Hebrew at home and the 
girls’ friends do too’. Noga said about her three year-old daughter who goes to 
a local English school: ‘all the songs she hears {at home} are in Hebrew. 
Ahh… I mean her experience, the cultural experience at home, is certainly, 
certainly, Israeli-Hebraic, not anything else’. 
Roni, Noga’s husband (in a separate interview) said: ‘at home we only speak 
Hebrew and the English she learns, she picks it at nursery. I don’t teach 
{impart} her English.’ 
Taking a closer look at the interviewees’ texts reveals that parents’ insistence 
on speaking Hebrew with their children is explained on two grounds. The first 
reason is practical and relates to their children’s ability to maintain their ties 
and membership within the Israeli society in case the family (or they) decide to 
return.   
Roni said: ‘because I didn’t decide, to reside… because I’ve decided not to 
reside here, for ever, so…. at home we speak only Hebrew’43. 
David talked of his wife:  
                                            
43
 Note the specific usage of key signifiers such as ‘reside’ (rather than ‘live’), ‘foreign place’, 
and ‘decide/didn’t decide’ to convey the dilemma around returning to Israel or settling in Britain 
that Roni was engaged with. See the discussion of key concepts and signifiers in chapter six,  
The Lexicon of Belonging.  
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My wife, if you ask her, she’s still…one of the reasons that she does 
consider seriously to return {to Israel} is because she would have liked 
our daughter to have the…the Hebrew, so that when she gets to the 
age of 17-18 she could decide for herself between {living in} Israel and 
England.  
However, interviewees also talked about the inevitable gap that will be created 
between them and their children if they switch to English. Liat describes this 
gap:  
I sat at a café in Temple Fortune and there was a mother with a 
daughter and the mother talked to her in Hebrew and the girl answered 
in English; consistently. The whole conversation went like this. I hope 
it’s not going to be like this {for me and for my daughter}.  
Roni said:  
Eventually, {if we stay in England} ‘Rega Im Dodly’44 wouldn’t interest 
her {his daughter} because it’s not part of her culture and I think that for 
me… it would be missed, a bit, that I don’t have a language, I don’t 
have a language, I think that I won’t have a common language {that 
bridges} between my childhood and her childhood.  
Roni was talking of Hebrew as one aspect of a broader cultural context, like 
children’s TV shows, that he associates with ‘Israeli’ and which he would have 
liked to share with his daughter. Liat, on the other hand points to the specific 
signification that language has in itself:  
I guess that if X {her daughter} starts talking to me in English, our 
relationship will change because the… the context is different or the… 
the emotional ‘anchor’ in a language is so and so and in English it will 
be different, I mean how I express myself or how she expresses herself. 
It will change the nature of our communication.  
As discussed above, the revival of biblical Hebrew serves as one of the main 
national achievements of the Zionist movement and therefore a major channel 
for national identification. However, the above text also demonstrates one of 
discursive psychology's main arguments (e.g. Wiggins and Potter, 2008): 
namely that both the ‘subject’ and ‘reality’ are constantly constructed by the 
                                            
44
 A children’s TV programme that Roni related to as an example of ‘being an Israeli’.  
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particular usage of language that the individual employs. Therefore, according 
to Liat, speaking in Hebrew or in English and following Israeli or English 
cultural practices places the speaker/practitioner in two different psychosocial 
positions and has strong implications for the relationship between parents and 
children. One of the clips in the government campaign encouraging Jewish-
Israelis abroad to return to Israel (see chapter four) aptly targets this very point 
by comparing the quality of a Hebrew vs. English-based encounter between a 
father and his son.  
Ironically, Arabic words, pervasively used in everyday Hebrew as slang, were 
also taken as a testimony for Israeli national identification as Noga said:  
If X {her daughter} comes and says to me Sababa or Ahla {Arabic 
words used in Hebrew as slang meaning ‘great’, ‘all well’} [you are 
Mabsuta?…. {the Arabic word for happy, content}] yes, she is Mabsuta 
and I am Mabsuta because it’s part of something that I want to keep  
As demonstrated in other ‘Findings’ chapters, Arabic is used strategically by 
Israelis, pointing to their regional belonging, authenticity and informality while 
at the same time ignoring the reference to the Arab/Palestinian population in 
Israel, the effects of occupation (chapter seven) and the tendency to apply 
racist terminology when addressing local Arabs or Muslims (chapter eight). 
Here Arabic words are taken by Noga as an indication of her daughter’s 
acquaintance with Hebrew’s pragmatic linguistic nuances and a testimony to 
the common cultural background she is sharing with her daughter.   
The desire for cultural synchronicity between the parent and the child is 
demonstrated by Ariella, although for her, the inevitable gap between herself 
and her children wouldn’t be merely linguistic but also cultural:  
I felt that if I wouldn’t place them in {Jewish} educational systems, I’ll 
feel that I’ll create a detachment, they are the children of immigrants, I’m 
an immigrant and I’ll perpetuate my status as an immigrant  
In spite of the discomfort that secular Jewish-Israelis feel within the local 
Jewish communities and their institutions (see chapter eleven), by placing her 
children in a Jewish school, Ariella, like many other secular Jewish-Israelis 
(Hart, 2004), provides an intermediate solution to the dilemmas of the national 
identifications of her children, who were born in England. Ariella argues here 
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that had she placed them in a local non-Jewish school her children’s different 
cultural socialization would draw them apart from her and would emphasize 
even more her personal status as ‘the immigrant’. Thus, the decision to place 
them in Jewish schools is explained here as a means to avoid isolation within 
her own family as the unemployed, ‘Israeli’ mother among her husband and 
her children who are better integrated, culturally or professionally, in British 
society. The status of ‘the immigrant’, then, is not solely dependent on her own 
acculturation in British society, but also relatively determined by the 
acculturation of others around her. Liat reflected on the motivation of parents 
to encourage Israeli identity among their children and said: ‘it’s important for 
me to expose her to these {Israeli} things; perhaps it’s a bit egoistic...’  
As demonstrated here, collective practices (celebrating Jewish holidays, 
speaking Hebrew and sharing cultural knowledge with the children) become 
platforms upon which intimate familial patterns of communication with the 
children are played out. Some subjects indeed related to the usage of Hebrew 
language and the Israeli culture that is constructed around it as an important 
aspect of their relationships with their own parents.  
Roni, whose father was born in Eastern Europe and his mother in Israel, talked 
about the matching between his parents and the Israeli culture he grew up in:  
My mum was born in Ha’aretz. Let’s say that I went to the same primary 
school as my mother. No, both my brothers and I {went to the same 
school as her}. It has a nice continuity feel to it, not very important, but 
nice. 
In chapter seven I described how Ariella sees herself in Israel as ‘the salt of 
the earth’ and ‘walks with her head up high’ because ‘me and my father were 
born in the same room in the same hospital’.   
By contrast, Noga recalled the mismatch between the Israeli environment she 
grew up in and her father’s Eastern European cultural preferences as a new 
immigrant in Israel:  
But this is something that is missing for me, the fact that my parents’ 
culture and my culture were not… it wasn’t the same culture. I had 
many clashes with my dad around the scouts… {those were} 
experiences I had that as far as he was concerned were meaningless 
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Thus, subjects’ insistence on passing on their Israeli cultural upbringing to their 
children is embedded in personal memories of their own childhood and the 
awareness of issues relating to potentially conflictive gaps between parents 
and children. Through the dilemmas of educating children abroad, both Roni 
and Noga, whose parents immigrated to Israel, can relate to their parents’ 
experience of migration and to the dilemmas of intercultural family 
environments where they grew up.     
9.2.4. Discussion  
This section looked at some features of the immigrant Jewish-Israeli family in 
Britain. I have underlined mothers’ frequent unemployment status as a 
condition that impacts their self-perception, their acquaintance with the local 
culture and society, the intra-familial dynamics, the construction of extra-
familial support groups and the educational choices. Ultimately, all these help 
to shape the notion of ‘Israeli identity’ and the practices (such as parenthood 
and modes of identity transmission) that are associated with it.  
Feminist authors such as Yuval-Davis and Anthias (1989) and Yuval-Davis 
(1997) have emphasized women’s pivotal role as ‘biological reproducers’ and 
‘culture carriers’ in constructing and marking the boundaries of ‘the nation’, 
which is organized according to a patriarchal structure. Kamir (2011) has 
argued that Zionism as an ideology is constructed to promote a masculine 
agenda where the men are destined to fight and the women to mourn45. Amir 
(1995) demonstrated how the expectation on women to take part in the Zionist 
national project (e.g. by contributing to reproduction) defines ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
femininity in abortion committee panels.  
My findings show how the condition of low employment among high-skilled 
Jewish-Israeli women who worked prior to their immigration shapes their self-
perception and impacts the way they conduct family life in a way that 
preserves the former life in Israel, its values and themes and further 
accentuates their detachment from local British society. This locks the Jewish-
Israeli mother into a specific intra-familial position compared to her partner or 
children and leaves the heavy burden of deciding whether to stay or return to 
Israel in her hands. Intra-familial dynamics between partners and parents and 
                                            
45
 This was discussed in depth in Nira’s interview (chapter seven). 
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their children were reflected in the interviews. Belonging and estrangement 
among the different family members are negotiated and childhood memories of 
generational differences in the parents’ own families emerge.  
Within these conditions Jewish-Israeli women are pushed even further towards 
the role of ‘culture bearers’ or promoters of the national project as discussed 
above. Indeed, Casey and Dustmann (2010), who examined the links between 
immigrants’ identity and their economic integration into German society, found 
that ‘mothers appear to be more important in the transmission of the home 
identity and fathers in the transmission of the host country identity’ (p. 48). This 
is perhaps to do with the finding that in addition to the general tendency of 
gendered job inequality in any western society, immigration accentuates this 
trend and contributes to the alienation of women in the host society compared 
to working men. These conditions also determine the characteristics of the 
local Israeli community organized and orchestrated by the women (Hart, 2004, 
Floman, 2007) who tend to recycle daily practices and habits prevalent in 
Israeli society. It is also within this context that the perceptions of ‘Israeli 
children’ or ‘Israeli family’ are understood and constructed.  
Practices of collective identifications have great significance for people, 
allowing them to feel part of an imagined Israeli community by sharing 
common public daily practices such as speaking Hebrew and celebrating 
collective rituals (see chapter seven for a discussion of collective practices of 
mourning) and by sharing and passing on public cultural knowledge (TV 
shows, folkloristic stories etc.). This section therefore presented how 
social/cultural practices are conducted in order to maintain the Jewish-Israeli 
immigrant community (Hart, 2004) and provide mothers with a sense of 
belonging. Jewish-Israelis’ personal experience of immigration to Britain, their 
sense of solitude or socialization, professional career, experiences of early 
childhood and family of origin, all contribute to the dilemmas about how best to 
promote and maintain a sense of ‘Israeliness’ within the family and community. 
Other research (e.g. Lienonen, 2012) shows similar trends of alienation from 
the local society among highly qualified employed or unemployed ‘elite’ 
migrants. In the last chapter I will discuss the question whether the Israeli 
migrant group is exceptional.  
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9.3. The Israeli Community in Britain: a diasporic space or a 
constraining ‘ghetto’?   
Apart from the representations of British society, the local Jewish community, 
and the Arab/Muslim community (which have been presented in the previous 
chapter), Jewish-Israelis’ understanding of 'Israeli identity' abroad was also 
constructed against the backdrop of the local Jewish-Israeli population in 
London/Britain. Research in the US (e.g. Shokeid, 1988, Lahav and Arian, 
1999, Gold, 2002) and Britain (Hart, 2004, Lev-Ari, 2008) showed that Jewish-
Israelis tended to cluster in closed communities alienated from both the local 
non-Jewish society and the local Jewish communities. All interviewees in the 
current study referred to this closed Israeli community that has been partly 
presented in the previous section. Hart (2004) classified her research 
participants into ‘embedded’ and ‘detached’ subjects, referring to the extent to 
which they were engaged with an Israeli network in their daily life. Along these 
crude categories, at least half of my research participants maintained close 
relationships with an Israeli network, while the rest kept lesser degrees of 
contact, with Nira and Michael choosing to detach themselves from it 
altogether.  
In the broader immigration literature, some variables have been outlined to 
account for an engagement with the expatriate local communities. These 
variables include the time spent in the new country, the psychological 
developmental process of immigration (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1989), the 
intention to stay or to return (Gold, 2000, Floman, 2006), the ideological 
context within which emigration from Israel is perceived (Shokeid, 1998) and 
the professional, economic and cultural accessibility to the general local 
society (Fathi, 2011).  
Undoubtedly, the Israeli communal network provides psychological and 
material support for newcomers in their struggles with the first stages of 
immigration/relocation (Hart, 2004) and a familiar environment for those who 
only come temporarily and do not intend to settle (a condition termed 
‘sojourners’ in immigration literature - Hart, 2004, Floman, 2007). It can prove 
especially supportive for Israeli women who struggle with acculturation into the 
British society and its customs (Hart, 2004) and the constraints of the local job 
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market, as discussed above. However, aside from the practical advantages 
that this network may offer its members, I was interested in studying the 
significations or representations (Hall, 1994) of ‘Israeliness’ abroad which this 
community elicits among Jewish-Israelis who are either engaged or 
disengaged in it. Surprisingly, most of the interviewees, even those who 
described themselves as engaged in it on a daily basis, expressed 
ambivalence towards this Israeli milieu referring to it pejoratively as the Israeli 
‘ghetto’ (Roni), ‘the swamp’ (David) or a ‘commune’ (Noga).  
This discrepancy between the actual engagement with the Israeli community 
and the articulated ambivalence towards it raises the possibility that it reflects 
an accepted discourse that people articulate in order to gain discursive 
benefits. David described this phenomenon:  
There are those Israelis who really like {to say} ‘I don’t go into the Israeli 
ghetto’ ahhh, and everyone has ‘non-Israeli friends’ but if you check it 
out, two, three or four years later {following their arrival to Britain}, I 
don’t know how it’s with you, but I think that it’s rare that… {you’ll find 
Israelis with non-Israeli friends} 
A very similar phenomenon was described by Sela-Shefi (2006) in her 
research of Israelis’ condemnation of the image of ‘the Israeli’ where she 
concluded that such condemnation served to ‘maintain a distinguished social 
position and moral superiority over ‘the masses’’ (p. 339). This discourse of 
condemnation served mainly to signal the speaker’s socio-cultural taste and 
communicate their desired social affiliation as independent from the ‘Israeli 
herd’.    
Another way of interpreting this discourse of condemnation towards the local 
Israeli community is by attributing it to the Zionist ideology that condemns 
Israeli emigrations (as has extensively discussed before, e.g. Shokeid, 1988). 
Within such an ideological climate, Jewish-Israelis abroad would be reluctant 
to identify themselves as members of a community of Israeli émigrés.  
In chapter seven I cited Noga, who described Jewish-Israelis in the following 
way:  
Everyone would like to live abroad but also to live in Ha’aretz too. And 
it’s a sort of a dissonance, and if you ask me what’s an Israeli this is 
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also a part of being an Israeli. Wanting to live in Ha’aretz but being 
abroad too. 
Within the interview context dealing with the military threats in Israel, the 
ambivalence is described as rooted in Israelis’ identities: they feel, on the one 
hand, an ideological-territorial commitment but, on the other hand, long to 
disengage from the military threats that come with it. Taken in a broader 
sense, Israeli identification comprises both the ‘New Jew’, with his/her fixed 
ideological commitment to his/her territory, and the transnational wandering 
‘Old Jew’. According to the same logic, Israelis who live in Britain within the 
confinement of a closed Israeli milieu would also like to live away from it.  
While all these hypotheses sound plausible, it is important to trace the 
particular and idiosyncratic usage and meaning that subjects make of available 
and recognizable social discourses. In what follows I will trace the way such 
common features perform in Roni’s extract and look at the particular function 
that this discourse of condemnation serves for him when negotiating his 
private agenda. Like many other interviewees, Roni seemed to have been 
preoccupied with the decision whether and when to return to Israel. He 
explained his decision to be interviewed with a book he read (Floman 2007), 
which described San Francisco based Israelis’ dilemmas around staying or 
returning to Israel. The book classified the speakers into permanent settlers 
(those who decided to stay in the USA), returnees (those who had concrete 
plans to return to Israel) and sojourners or permanent-temporaries (who 
constantly delay their decision-making and live in a condition of 
temporariness). In the interview analysis, it appeared that Roni’s dilemma was 
organized along three key binary dimensions:  
a. Livings, i.e. having high emotional commitment to the place you are in 
vs. residing/ staying, i.e. having minimal emotional engagement with the 
place you are in.  
b. Deciding - making free, active choices vs. being passively carried along 
by life. 
c. Preserving identity – sticking to past collective and individual 
attachments vs. opening to new experiences  
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I will follow these themes as they are raised in the analysed extract in order to 
understand the emotional significations and implications they seem to have for 
Roni.  
In various parts of the interview, Roni describes himself as living a similar way 
of life to the one he lived in Israel ('I kind of.. .preserve more or less... as much 
as I can, the daily schedule I had in Ha’aretz…because this is what I feel and 
this is what's convenient and what I like, for instance reading YNET {an Israeli 
e-news site} in the mornings'). Like some of the other interviewees, his social 
environment consists mostly of Israelis. He declares that 'I don't think my 
musical taste has changed'), he rarely switches on the TV in his home and 
'when I do switch it on once a week, I watch 'Friends', not anything else which 
relates to {actuality}…'. He is not acquainted with local British politics or 
information concerning daily life ('so from that aspect, watching the BBC now 
seems to me too heavy and the ITV, as far as I know, don't have news 
broadcast and that's just about it') and declares that he intends to go back to 
Israel once his wife’s role is terminated ('I see ourselves returning {to Israel}…. 
no one believes us but deep inside I know that we are returning').  
At the same time, right at the end of his interview, Roni introduced the signifier 
‘ghetto’ to address and criticize the Israeli community in London with which he 
was himself engaged. He said:  
39. Ahh… if you've already decided, to live here forever, Al-Hakeifak 
{Arabic – 'that's fine'}  
40. So that comes once again to what we talked about a minute ago,  
41. I don't see the point of living here as if in a ghetto  
42. Once again, don't wipe out your past, Al-Hakeifak {fine} 
43. But living in a ghetto, out of choice, of course,  
44. For me at least… it seems to me not clever.  
45. If you want to live in a ghetto, you might as well live in Israel 
46. Why would you cross half the world in order to live in a ghetto, the same 
as the one you had before?  
The reference to an ethnic diasporic community as a ghetto has by now 
exceeded its traditional Jewish connotation and addresses issues that 
preoccupy immigrant communities and individuals around closure, inclusion 
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and exclusion vis a vis the local society (Werbner 2002). Thus some of Roni’s 
concerns around the ‘ghetto’ should be read as a concern common to 
migrants. At the same time, we cannot ignore the ‘ghetto’s’ specific 
signification in Jewish and Israeli historiography and the meaning it has for 
Jewish-Israelis who were brought up within a Zionist outlook on diasporic 
Jews, perceived to be willingly or unwillingly confined to denigrating Jewish 
enclaves (ghettos) associated with persecution, closedness and 
backwardness.  
Four distinct features characterize Roni’s concept of 'the ghetto':   
a. You live in a ghetto.  
b. You create and make it for yourself  
c. You do it willingly and intentionally  
d. It is a duplicate of what you had before  
Roni was especially careful when choosing the words to describe his status in 
Britain. He refrained from using the verb ‘live’ (‘Chay’) which in Hebrew 
describes a fuller, more comprehensive form of existence and signifies stability 
and permanence, rather preferring other verbs such as ‘reside’ (Gar), ‘stay’ 
(‘Nish’ar’) and ‘be here’ (‘Shohe’), which accentuate temporality and 
provisionality46. This could be seen as a reflection of a more generalized 
difficulty for immigrants in acknowledging their immigration condition, but it is 
further complicated among Israeli immigrants who have to re-think a Zionist 
ideology (with which they have been brought up) which insists that Jews live 
fuller Jewish lives in Israel and therefore should settle there (see chapter 
seven for a discussion of David’s text on the meaning of ‘life’ vs. ‘experience 
for life’). Thus Israeliness is constructed by the underlying commitment to this 
geographic space – which Israelis call 'Ha’aretz'. It appears that the ‘ghetto’ 
makes an exception to this rule since Roni talks about ‘living in a ghetto’ (43).   
Logically then, what comes up from an analysis of Roni's text, is that a 'life' – 
with the full meaning it brings with it - only happens in Israel or in Israeli 
enclaves called ghettos which duplicate 'what you had there'. All other forms of 
existence outside Israel could only be partial and would always lack a specific 
quality. Hence the Israeli subject in the diaspora is confronted with an 
                                            
46
 For a discussion of specific vocabulary usage see chapter six – ‘Words in the service of the 
nation’  
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impossible choice – between living in an Israeli (p)reservation – a ghetto - or 
forever facing a partial existence abroad – trying to experience, residing or 
staying. This perspective resonates with traditional Jewish religious notions of 
diasporic lacking and the yearning for the land of Israel (‘Eretz Israel’), which 
have been interpreted by Zionism as a political social and cultural deficiency 
and have driven the establishment of a Jewish homeland. At the same time, 
Roni’s view of the partiality of life abroad resonates with contemporary 
diaspora theories (e.g. Brah, 1996, Karla et al., 2005), which see it as a 
reflection of the existential condition of lack, temporality and fluidity, and 
disrupt notions of fixity, homogeneity and stability in private and collective 
identities.             
Throughout the extract and in other parts of the interview, we see Roni’s clear 
preference for an active subject (who takes control over his/her life) over a 
passive subject (driven by circumstances or by social pressure and 
commitment). In the above text, this preference is demonstrated through the 
subject who has ‘decided, to live here forever’ (39) ‘out of choice’ (43) to live in 
a ghetto (my emphasis). Roni’s approach to the dilemma of going back to 
Israel or staying abroad distinctively favours an active choice and rational 
decision making. He clearly avoids the possibility that subjects might be driven 
to stay abroad by circumstances, cannot make up their minds or has conflicting 
wishes or interests. Thus the ghetto phenomenon taunts and perplexes him 
because it highlights the contradiction between the choice-making agent 
subject and the confinement of the ‘ghetto’, which signifies the limits of one’s 
agency and ability to choose (‘Why would you cross half the world in order to 
live in a ghetto, the same as the one you had before?’,46)  
The last dialectic dimension in Roni’s speech addresses the contrast between 
sticking to past collective and individual attachments (preserving identity) and 
opening up to new experiences. The 'ghetto' is presented by Roni as a space 
where no new experiences are created. It is a conservative milieu which 
mechanically recycles life in Israel and blocks the introduction of new 
experiences which Roni is especially keen on (in other parts of the interview he 
was urging Israelis abroad to: 'try and accept the culture and the customs and 
language of this new place', to 'try to experience this other place', to 'definitely 
try to experience this other place' and to 'Get to know a little bit, other view 
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points, new places, new people'). Constructed in this way, the 'ghetto' 
articulates the idea of 'preserving the identity' which obstructs the subject from 
'experiencing' these 'new' and 'other' people, places and viewpoints.  
In this extract, Roni uses twice the Arabic term ‘Al Hakeifak’. Literally 
translated, this means ‘fine’ or even ‘great’, but in the current context would 
better be translated as ‘fair enough’, actually instilling some reservation to 
subjects’ decision to ‘live here forever’ (a move which could bring about the 
wiping out of their collective past – a classical Zionist criticism towards those 
who leave Israel). Through its quality of familiarity and informality, the Arab 
slang minimizes the underlying criticism towards these decisions and presents 
them as legitimate and acceptable, albeit questionable. The overt criticism is 
being made towards those who decide to leave Israel but maintain it within the 
confinement of the Israeli ghetto.     
Either intentionally or unintentionally, Israel itself is brought into the discussion 
around living in a ghetto. It starts off with an ambiguous assertion: 'If you want 
to live in a ghetto, you might as well live in Israel' which could be understood 
as: 'if you live in an Israeli world outside Israel you might as well live the real 
thing – in Israel.’ But Roni goes on to portray Israel itself as a ghetto – 'why 
would you cross half the world in order to live in a ghetto, the same as the one 
you had before?' (46) – closed down by rigid ways of life and not opening up to 
new experiences and 'other view points, new places, new people'. This 
criticism could reflect a political criticism relating to the deepening geographical 
and cultural siege mentality within Israeli society, but there are no further 
indications to corroborate this claim.      
Thus, Roni’s text could be read as a reflection of the subject's existential 
ambivalence - torn between, on the one hand, a commitment to social 
identities, (here national), their fixed (‘ghettoed’) ways of articulating, and the 
limitations they bring with them; and on the other hand, the subject's urge to 
destabilize old conceptions (‘wipe out your past’) and introduce new 
'experiences' of temporality and otherness. This ambivalence is also part of a 
generalized diasporic condition. In this context, the text articulates the dilemma 
of the potentially (Jewish-Israeli) diasporic subject torn between the tempting, 
stable, secure and recognizable (Israeli) ghetto (in Israel and outside it) 
(Werbner, 2002), and the political, cultural and personal temporality and 
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otherness that the diasporic (Israeli-Jew) subject is condemned to (Said in 
Magid, 2006). Paradoxically, Israel, which was established as a new, 
revolutionary Jewish society differentiated from the old and stable diasporic 
Jewish ghetto, becomes itself the site of conservatism and self-closure.   
9.3.1. Discussion  
Seen through Roni’s eyes, the Israeli community in London is presented as a 
closed enclave of Israelis who rigidly maintain daily cultural habits and 
practices imported from Israel. A similar picture of Israeli communities abroad 
has been portrayed by other scholars (Shokeid, 1998, Gold, 2002, Hart, 2004). 
As I discussed in other parts of this chapter, the conditions of closure and lack 
of social integration on the part of Jewish-Israelis are supported by other 
factors: the generalized alienation from local society (the general non-Jewish 
British society, the local Jewish community and the representations of local 
hostile Muslims and Arabs) or the lack of professional engagement of Israeli 
mothers. The emphasis of difference between ‘Us and Them’ helps construct 
the boundaries around the group which maintain its distinctiveness but causes 
subjects like Roni (and others) to see it as a constrictive ghetto. Through an 
analysis of parents’ educational choices for their children, Hart (2004) 
demonstrates the mechanisms that maintain these boundaries around the 
group, ‘tighten[s] the speakers’ educational horizons and urge[s] them to 
commit to the ‘beaten educational path’’ (p. 200).  
My research, however, does not focus on sociological analysis of social 
entities such as the Israeli community in Britain, but rather analyses the way 
these entities are represented, evaluated and understood by individual Israeli 
subjects, such as Roni, as part of their construction of their ‘Israeli identity’.  
As I argued above, Roni’s choice to present the Israeli community in this light 
stems from his own engagement with the dilemma around staying in Britain or 
returning to Israel and other more general life issues such as ‘living’ vs. 
‘experiencing’ and ‘making decisions’. The Israeli community is specifically 
constructed by Roni in an unappealing way so as to help him come to a 
decision not to stay, in the same way that Ariella underscored her status as an 
immigrant so as to argue her case for returning to Israel.  
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At the same time, it would be misleading to assume that subjects’ construction 
of the social world is a byproduct of a personal agenda and the private 
narratives that subjects entertain of themselves. Roni’s construction of an 
Israeli community draws on available discourses in Israeli society that are 
molded by Zionist ideology. Therefore, concepts of ‘life’ and of ‘experience’ of 
living abroad and of being an immigrant cannot be separated from the 
ideological signification they have within the speaker’s culture. For Roni’s 
private agenda, as well as for the hegemonic Zionist discourse, it would be 
risky to think of Jewish-Israeli communities abroad as potentially thriving 
diasporic communities. Werbner (2002), in relation to the Pakistani community 
in Britain, describes a diasporic community which understood 'its minority 
status and identified with its newly adopted nation' (p. 2) while at the same 
time recognizing, not simply their loyalty {to their new country}, but their 
existential connection with a co-diasporic elsewhere, or in the home country' 
(p. 251). Such diasporic space is 'the site of constant processes of struggle 
and negotiation, of constructing the collectivity and its interest’ (Yuval Davis 
1997, in Werbner 2002 p. 193-4). Such a description of a communal diasporic 
space does not emerge from Roni’s text and its analysis. The Jewish-Israeli 
subject abroad, according to Roni, can only choose between a personal 
diasporic condition of 'experiencing but not living', which ‘wipe[s] out our past’ 
or living in 'the Israeli ghetto, the same as the one you had before' (46).       
It comes as no surprise that communities of Jewish-Israelis living abroad are 
only rarely referred to as ‘Israeli diaspora’. A thorough English and Hebrew 
internet search of the term ‘Israeli diaspora’ in both professional and popular 
search engines yields very limited results (Gold, 2002, Lahav and Arian, 1999, 
Cohen, 2005, are the exceptions). Under Zionist terminology, the concept of 
‘Israeli-diaspora’ may well be a contradiction in terms, hyphenating an 
extremely nationalized notion (‘Israel’) with a de-territorialized one. Hence, 
‘diaspora’ is still associated with the local Jewish communities living away from 
Israel and Israelis living abroad are generally related to as Israelis living 
abroad (and previously as Yordim or ‘leavers’). Anteby-Yemini (2004) writes: 
‘Israeli emigrants (‘Yordim’) are beginning to form in Europe and the United 
states as new “Israeli diaspora” separate from the Jewish diaspora of these 
host countries’ (p.68). It is not a discursive coincidence that the term ‘diaspora’ 
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was marked with inverted commas, or that the word Yored has been applied 
even in Anteby-Yemini’s paper (which is critical of the mainstream Zionist 
outlook on ‘immigration’). It exemplifies, once more, the grip of Zionist 
terminology, or the ‘Zionification’ of Israeli society, that informs available 
discursive concepts of ‘Israeliness’, ‘diaspora’, ‘Judaism’, or ‘citizenship’ and 
the practices that emerge out of them.  
While factors such as the economic integration of the migrant (Casey and 
Dustmann, 2010), his/her gender or family status (Iredale, 2005) or the socio-
economic condition in the ‘home’ country of migration (Manning and Roy, 
2010) may help to explain subjects’ engagement and identification with the 
western host societies or the local expatriate community, ‘the Israeli case’, 
presented here emphasizes the role of ideology and of the national 
imagination as it intersects with the other factors cited above in constructing a 
limiting diasporic space and restrictive engagement with the host society. 
While research shows a similar malaise among other privileged migrants and a 
difficulty of integration into the local society despite or even because of the 
high social/professional capital migrants bring with them (Lienonen, 2012), 
Israelis try to make sense of this estrangement by drawing on the ideological 
arguments they grew up with. In the absence of an accepted notion of ‘Israeli 
diaspora’, individual Jewish-Israeli subjects have to negotiate and create for 
themselves such intermediately ‘Israeli diasporic space’. Indeed Yael Bartana’s 
revolutionary art work (2007) depicting the return of Polish Jews to Poland to 
reclaim their lost diasporic space within Polish society, has provoked 
condemnation among the Jewish-Israeli public as it undermines the 
foundations of the Israeli national project.    
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Chapter ten: Discussion – Jewish Israelis in 
Britain – narrating a national identity 
between Zionist ideology and diasporic 
reality  
10.1. Introduction  
As the title of my thesis and of this concluding chapter states, this research 
applied empirical tools (interviews and their analysis) to study the intersections 
of three major areas of academic research: nationalism, diaspora and 
immigration, and identities as they are captured in Jewish-Israelis’ 
representation of ‘Israeli identity’ in Britain. The thesis was mainly interested in 
the processes of the ‘suturing’, in Hall’s terms, of the participants into available 
subject positions within these three cultural arenas, i.e. the process through 
which subjects locate themselves in these social categories and accommodate 
them into their understandings of ‘who they are’, in this case their ‘Israeliness’. 
The analysis demonstrates major dimensions, contents, processes and 
discursive strategies that take part in the construction of ‘an Israeli identity’ in 
this context of migration. My main arguments in this thesis were:  
1. The representation of ‘Israeli identity’ reflected to a large extent the 
speaker’s condition of dislocation in the British context. 
2. ‘Israeli Identity’ is constructed in response to a combination of 
interdependent material, cultural and personal conditions in the 
speakers’ lives and in response to the interview politics.  
3. The participants match the profile of other privileged high-skilled migrant 
groups in some western societies and share some of their concerns. 
4. Zionist ideology and ethos inform the Israel collective imagination and 
are foundational for making sense of ‘Israeliness’ abroad and the 
portrayal of neighbouring identities. This constitutes an exceptional 
feature of the Jewish-Israeli group. 
5. This collective imaginary reservoir serves as a common platform upon 
which participants can communicate, locate themselves socially and set 
up rules of inclusion or exclusion.  
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6. Zionist preconceptions and the participants’ attachment to it restrict the 
imagination of an ‘Israeli diaspora’ and inform the practices and 
structure of the Israeli community. It fixes the image of ‘the Jew’ and of 
‘the Arab’ or ‘the Muslim’ and limits the ability of subjects to envision 
these identities differently and thus restricts social encouters.   
7. ‘Israeli identity’ is constructed differently against the backdrop of various 
social spaces (Israeli society, British society, diasporic Israeli society).  
8. Subjects negotiate their idiosyncratic position (‘who am I’) in each one of 
these spaces (‘who are They’ and ‘who are We’) in relation to private 
memories and a notion of ‘who I am’.  
9. Constructing a personalized representation of ‘Israeli identity’ involves 
the continuous effort to accommodate contradictory and troubled social 
and personal experiences and preconceptions into a personal narrative 
that makes sense.   
The three research questions that guided my analysis will also guide me 
through this discussion. They were:  
1.  What hegemonic and counter-hegemonic national narratives, themes, 
images and daily practices do Jewish-Israeli subjects draw on when making 
sense of ‘their’ ‘national identity’?  
2. What are the subject-positions and underlying power relations 
implicated in these social discourses of nationality? How are practices of 
inclusion and exclusion informed and managed by this collective imaginary?    
3. How do participants negotiate or narrate these social discourses to 
accommodate them to their personal narratives of ‘who they are’?   
The questions address three crucial interdependent dimensions of identity 
construction:     
The first research question is interested in mapping the contents and themes 
of Israeli culture and Zionist ethos (e.g. Ram, 2006, Sand, 2008). In this 
respect I found the ethnosymbolist approach (Smith, 2001), Anderson’s notion 
of the imagined community (1991) and psychoanalysis’ notions of the troubled 
nation (Bhabha, 1990 or Rose, 1996) highly productive in locating collective 
imaginations and narratives as key factors that drive and sustain nationalism.  
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Acknowledging that such collective imaginations were highly politicized, i.e. 
inform daily practices of inclusion and exclusion (as highlighted by social 
theorists e.g. Foucault, 1974, Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, Raz-Krakotzkin, 1994, 
Azoulay and Ofir, 2002) underlined the second research question.  
The third research question assumed the constant negotiations that subjects 
engage in while appropriating given socio-political positions (Hall, 1994). This 
view also determined the methodological approach I chose (critical narrative 
analysis – Emerson and Frosh, 2004) and the method of collecting data 
(interviews). I have focused on the intricate ways through which individual 
subjects toiled (I have used various verbs such as ‘negotiate’ or ‘narrate’ to 
describe this effort) to construct a meaningful story of who they were as 
Israelis in Britain.  
In line with my interest of the suturing between the ‘psycho’ and the ‘social’, 
the discussion in this chapter is therefore divided into two main sections: in the 
first part I will be looking across participants at the key contents and themes 
that characterize this sample and relate to their demographical and 
sociological profile when making general claims about ‘Israeli identity’ 
construction. Since, overall, subjects drew uncritically on Zionist ideology and 
its imagination, I discuss potential reasons for this tendency linking it to their 
socio-economic and class background in Israeli society, their affinity to the 
Zionist ethos as a middle-class ethos, and their material conditions of 
dislocation in Britain.  
In the second part of this chapter I will be discussing the intricate ways through 
which individual subjects struggle to appropriate a personal position cutting 
across the social categories mentioned above in order to construct a 
personalized ‘Israeli identity’. In this context I will be discussing my own role in 
the construction of the interviewee’s narrative as the speaker’s audience 
whose concerns and views might be similar to those of the speakers. I argue 
that the notion of ‘identity’ inevitably involves the constant move back and forth 
between the private and the collective, between the specific and the general, 
between ‘self’ and ‘other’ constantly redefining what the ‘figure’ is and what is 
the ‘ground’.   
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10.2. Zionist Ideology and narrative as a discursive axis for ‘Israeli 
identity’  
I would like to open this concluding chapter with a discussion of the Jewish-
Israeli ‘cultural reservoir’. This is the cultural context that subjects turned to 
when performing that painstaking, continuous, very personal ‘identity’ 
construction.  
To begin with a disclaimer: I am approaching this section with marked 
uneasiness: pointing to similarities (Pavon-Cuelar, 2010) or consistencies 
across participants’ texts so as to highlight a common cultural reservoir or 
condition of ‘Israeliness’ inevitably undermines the particularity and peculiarity 
of each participant and ignores the inconsistencies within the national canon 
and the individual narratives of nationality, all of which are an inevitable and 
inherent part of ‘national identities’. Highlighting the ‘cultural rules’ of Israeli 
nationality also does injustice to those participants who advocate counter-
hegemonic discourses of nationalism. After presenting the commonalities, in 
the second part of this chapter I will therefore discuss their limitations, 
disruptions and inadequacies. 
As discussed in chapters three and four, Israeli society appears to be 
undergoing dramatic changes over the past decades in what has been 
considered a post-Zionist phase (Ram, 2006), an era of ‘privatization’ 
(Gutwein, 2009), or a mark of multiculturalism in Israeli society (Yona and 
Shenhav, 2005). The national narrative and its ethos (succinctly summarized in 
the Declaration of Independence - chapter three), which has served as ‘social 
glue’ for the Jewish-Israeli public, is consistently challenged by various groups 
within and outside the Jewish public (Said, 2004, Magid, 2006, Rose, 2005, 
Butler, 2011). An argument could be made that, at least for Israeli society, 
Anderson’s concept of the nation as an imagined ‘homogenous’ community 
(1991) may have been more appropriate in the country’s formative years (as 
for other newly established nations), but has now given way to a myriad of 
imagined communities which although all referencing this prototypical 
hegemonic story, entertain quite different notions of ‘the nation’.  
At the same time, authors (e.g. Naveh, 2006, Lomsky-Feder, 2004) point to the 
resilience of Zionist discourse and narrative and First and Herman (2009) 
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argue that this collective ethos ‘appear[s] at all moments in the ‘circuit of 
culture’ model’ (p. 520), in the absence of an alternative common ideological 
agenda. In chapters two and three I discussed some of the theories 
(modernism, ethnosymbolism, psychoanalysis) that try to explain the 
persistence of national projects in general and that of the Israeli project 
specifically. This thesis has sought to include in its analysis the imaginary 
aspects of Israeli nationalism as they intersect with economic, material or 
social conditions.   
Drawing on my own personal critical experiences in Israel (as described in the 
introduction), I studied the ways these hegemonic and counter-hegemonic 
trends were imported by the participants and how the experience of living 
abroad shapes their representations of ‘Israeliness’. On the whole, the Zionist 
discourse of nationality appears to maintain its hegemony; participants’ texts 
were cautious (or conservative), sticking to many of the common assumptions 
in Israeli culture and making only occasional, hesitant critical remarks 
regarding hegemonic Israeli preconceptions or Israeli society (e.g. group 
divisions, intolerance to non-Jews). Overall, the participants tended to gloss 
over many of the troubling issues that preoccupy the Jewish-Israeli society in 
Israel. The economic hardship, the continuous occupation and military conflict 
with the neighbouring countries and the anxieties that come with them, the 
uncertainty about the future or the troubled history of the Zionist movement 
(e.g. the expulsion of Arabs from Palestine during the 1948 war or the horrors 
of the Holocaust) did not play a major role in these Jewish-Israelis’ portrayal of 
‘Israeliness’. Bruner (1990) argues that the effect of narratives resides 
specifically in their ability to form an internal cohesion which strategically 
includes certain aspects of the social reality and neglects others. As early as 
1882, Renan (1990) argued similarly, claiming that ‘the essence of a nation is 
that all individuals have many things in common and also, that they have 
forgotten many things’ (p.11). The participants were preoccupied with their 
experiences as dislocated Israelis in Britain: raising ‘Israeli children abroad’, 
forming social interactions with Israelis and with locals in Britain, managing 
their relationships with their families and friends in Israel or defining the 
uniqueness of the Israeli group compared with that of the locals. Therefore the 
analysis considered the narratives of ‘Israeli identity’ to be situated (Emerson 
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and Frosh, 2004) rather than as indications of generalized, consistent identities 
that subjects carry with them across social circumstances.  
The exceptions, like Nira or Liat who articulated criticisms and openly declared 
that they did not want to return to Israel teach us most about the rules 
themselves. Both Nira and Liat (Nira: So for me, personally {she giggles} it's 
more suitable, this style’ {of living abroad}; and Liat: ‘then perhaps, all of a 
sudden, I became aware that… that perhaps there are other places in the 
world...that are perhaps more suitable for me to live in’) made an effort not to 
generalize their claims about Israeli society (using conditional words ‘for me’, 
‘perhaps’ or ‘more suitable’) and demonstrated marked embarrassment and 
discomfort (through giggles, chuckles and laughter) when voicing their 
criticism.  
The experiences of belonging to or estrangement from the local British or 
Israeli spaces were demonstrated through two competing discourses of 
nationality that I referred to as ‘Ha’aretz’ and ‘Israel’. In chapter six, I argued 
that these seemingly innocent terms in fact signify two opposing subject 
positions that defined subjects’ emotional engagement with Israel as a 
‘homeland’ and are accompanied by a range of psychological, social and 
cultural viewpoints. I argued that although some subjects could identify 
themselves with one of these psychosocial positioning, more often subjects 
moved between the two in the course of a single interview (see chapter seven 
for David’s painstaking efforts to disengage himself from the ‘Ha’aretz’ position 
and plant himself in an ‘Israel’ position). These two states of mind regarding 
Israel informed notions of ‘home’, ‘life’, ‘settledness’, ‘temporality’ and 
‘belonging’ and constructed accordingly ideas of who are ‘We’ and who am ‘I’. 
Later, I will discuss the extent to which subjects are indeed ‘caught up’ (or 
interpellated, in Althusserian terms, 1971) in these positions and their ability to 
negotiate their subjectivity within.   
10.3. Accounting for the conformist portrayal of ‘Israeliness’  
Throughout the findings chapter I have outlined a few probable, and not 
mutually exclusive, explanations for this caution or conservatism. In the 
methodological chapter, I described the research participant sample – middle-
class, secular, often Ashkenazi, high-qualified, Israeli-born – who stepped 
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forward voluntarily and wanted to be interviewed as my first research finding. 
This sample was consistent with the profile of Israeli émigrés in previous 
research in Britain (Hart, 2004, Lev-Ari, 2008) or the US (Floman, 2007). This 
profile of highly qualified professional migrants is disproportionate compared to 
the general population in Israel, but is similar to that found among émigrés 
from other economically developed countries with small job markets (e.g. 
Switzerland, Della Pergula, 2012). In terms of its educational, socio-economic 
and professional background, my sample also resembles other high-skilled 
migrant populations. These were characterized by high unemployment among 
the women (Iredale, 2005), who mostly came as their partner’s dependent, and 
the sense of estrangement and lack of integration into the local society 
(Manning and Roy, 2010, Lienonen, 2012). Thus at first I would like to look at 
the speakers’ construction of ‘Israeli identity’ within the context of their socio-
economic or middle-class features.  
10.3.1. The material dilemmas of middle-class Israelis abroad 
Unlike other immigrant groups that have been discussed in the context of 
diaspora studies – Pakistanis (Webner, 2002), Algerians (Sayad, 2004), Turks 
(Tanyas, 2010) or Iranians (Fathi, 2011), Jewish-Israelis, as highly-qualified 
immigrants (though not necessarily working), are not excluded or marginalized 
on ethnic, professional or economic grounds in British society; in fact, 
economically, they could be described as a middle-class group. Also, in 
contrast to some of the above communities, Israelis’ return to Israel is warmly 
welcomed in Israeli society given the ideological ethos of Israel as a welcoming 
society for Jews (that offers generous benefits to returnees) and the presence 
of their familial/professional social networks. Thus, on the face of it, Israelis 
have a greater social mobility and accessibility to British or Israeli society; 
specifically, however, this privileged condition makes it difficult for them to 
choose since they have something to lose whichever decision they take 
(Floman 2007). 
Such experience of psychological turmoil or stagnation is especially 
characteristic of women who were not on the job market and was described in 
Na’ama’s text as ‘life is “on hold’’’. Part of their identity as Jewish Israeli 
women in Britain intersected for Ariella, Na’ama or Dorit with the condition of 
 
266 
unemployed women which marked their detachment from the local British 
social and professional networks but also signified their detachment from their 
old self-image as working women in Israeli society. Hart (2004) describes the 
ability of the informal social support network of the Israeli community in 
London, structured especially around children’s nurseries and primary schools, 
to meet the social and material needs of these mothers who were not on the 
job market and encourage ‘intra-group associations while erecting barriers 
between group members and others’ (Hart, 2004, p. 187). 
Similarly, Lienonen (2012) describes the experiences of high-skilled Americans 
in Finland, mostly women, who are unemployed or employed in under-qualified 
professions that are forced to live a life of leisure at the price of a sense of 
non-belonging and professional dissatisfaction. She also reports a sense of 
alienation from the local culture and society among those who do manage to 
integrate professionally. I have noted that contrary to some other immigrant 
groups (e.g. Algerians in France - Sayad, 2004) none of the respondents 
applied the signifier ‘immigrant’ to address their status in Britain (except for 
Ariella who used it especially to explain why she has to return to Israel); they 
were not willing to consider themselves as British (let alone English) and were 
reluctant towards any other form of institutionalization in Britain (e.g. buying 
houses). Their knowledge of and acquaintance with British society and its 
culture (reading newspapers, voting in the elections, taking part in local 
communal activity) appeared to be minimal, taking into consideration that they 
were asked to talk about ‘Israeli identity’. So in contrast to Sayad’s portrayal of 
the Suffering of the Immigrant (2004) among mostly unqualified Algerian 
manual workers in France, my Israeli cohort’s experience of dislocation in 
Britain, and concomitantly, their portrayal of Israeli society, could be 
summarized as ‘the distress of the privileged middle-class Jewish-Israeli’ that 
is forced to negotiate immigration/emigration.   
10.3.2. Zionist discourse as a common language between 
participants  
In order for Israelis abroad to maintain common ground with other Israelis (me 
included), disagreements and troubling instances have to be put aside or 
handled very carefully. This also involved putting the differences and 
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disagreements outside the encounter in a move of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ rather than 
dealing with the disquieting differences within such ‘Us’. 
The participants (me included) could ‘touch base’ with each other by drawing 
on the Zionist ethos, narrative and ideology through shared familiar signifiers 
(Ha’aretz, live vs. reside etc.), images (the Sabra, ‘a street cat’, ‘warm people’, 
‘Israeli Hutzpah’), the usage of informal slang language (often taken from 
Arabic) and preconceptions (anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism in Britain, the 
imagined hostility of Arabs and Muslims) which link members together, 
presumably, as equal shareholders in the national project and offer respite 
from the on-going condition of otherness. In chapter six, I presented various 
usages of such ‘common knowledge’ (e.g. Michael’s extract - ‘got off the boat 
and said: ‘Phew! I’m home’” or Noga’s ‘We are the centre of the world’) as they 
were played out between the speakers and me.  
Similarly, the option to return to Israel was mentioned in the vast majority of 
cases, even among those like Udit (who has been living in the UK for forty 
years) or Aaron (whose wife is not Israeli and does not speak Hebrew and 
whose children do not speak Hebrew either) who both own houses and have 
settled down in Britain. For them, it was more about taking part in the 
acceptable discourse of an Israeli abroad rather than a real option, but even 
these momentary unrealistic phantasies help subjects imagine themselves as 
part of the Israeli group ‘out there’ and reach out to an Israeli researcher.   
10.3.3. The Zionist national ethos as an Israeli middle-class 
discursive practice 
Another explanation for the conservative portrayal of ‘Israeliness’ and the 
higher proportion of middle-class Israelis in my research cohort compared to 
members of other social classes was also because of their special 
engagement with the topic. As members of a privileged group, they were more 
concerned and involved with the national canon that was actually more ‘theirs’. 
Noga described it well: ‘Here the conversations around ‘identity’ replace the 
conversations on… [politics?] that we frequently have in Ha’aretz’. Both Ariella 
and Yariv, whose grandparents immigrated to Israel from Europe and who 
consequently enjoyed the social privileges of the (Ashkenazi) founders group 
in Israel (Raz-Krakotzkin, 1994, 2007, Yona and Saporta, 2002, Shohat, 
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2003), mourn in their texts the loss of this prioritized position. Both find 
themselves out of place in British-European society where their European 
ancestry is of ‘no use’ and where their Middle Eastern Israeliness stigmatizes 
them as ‘non-Europeans’. In other words, taking part in the interview on ‘Israeli 
national identity’ was, in itself, a practice of identity construction. According to 
such a Bourdieusian reading of the texts, participants demonstrated their 
commitment to a certain social milieu and its socio-cultural ‘tastes’ (Bourdieu, 
1984) among which is the hegemonic national narrative – a middle-class 
Eurocentric version of ‘the nation’ with which they are culturally and socially 
associated. The fact that participants could locate me as part of the same 
Israeli social milieu or class turned the interviews into a social practice of 
middle-class ‘Israeli identity’ construction. This brought about an intensification 
of the boundaries around ‘Us’ as demonstrated for example though racist 
images of ‘Arabs’, ‘Muslims’ and ‘Palestinians’, that mainly served to separate 
between a ‘good’ ‘civilized (i.e. European) Us and a hostile, ‘bad’ (non-
European) other and avoid recognition of and responsibility for ‘Israeli 
badness’.   
10.3.4. Emigration in Zionist culture and imagination  
Another explanation, closely related to the previous one, that can account for 
the subjects’ conservative portrayal of Israeliness is the content of the ethos 
within which those Jewish-Israeli middle-class participants grow – namely the 
Zionist narrative that specifically asserts living in Israel as the correct form of 
the ‘new Jewish’ private and communal life. Israeli subjects’ experience of 
dislocation in Britain (and consequently their identity construction) could not be 
grasped without acknowledging what it means in Israeli culture to live abroad, 
especially for those Israelis whose parents or grandparents (like Na’ama, 
Noga, Liat or Roni) immigrated to Israel en masse, some in order to flee 
conditions of persecution and marginalization. In Israeli culture, material 
immigration (as opposed to ideological Aliya to Israel) receives criticism from 
local Jewish Israelis (Golden, 2001). Despite the lessening of the Zionist 
agenda, the ‘return to diaspora’ still carries its bleak associations in the Jewish-
Israeli imagination. Hence, even when they have not personally experienced 
hostility, Jewish-Israelis in Britain assume they will encounter anti-Semitism or 
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anti-Zionism in some form or another. Nevertheless, I argued that the national 
narrative which tells a certain historical story and draws certain social 
conclusions and values, indispensable as it is for understanding nationalism, 
cannot be studied in isolation without appreciating its ideological (political) 
implications which prioritize some at the expense of others (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985), inform certain views of the world and simultaneously close down 
alternative views (Davis and Harré, 1990). My subjects were perhaps more 
cautious in disturbing the canonical narrative because the hegemonic national 
narrative was above all their story as mainly members of a privileged group. 
Like their skewed perception of ‘Arabs’, the interview texts show marked 
ignorance concerning local Jewish life – religious or secular and, generally, a 
limitation in the interpretation of Jewishness.            
In summary, I argue that this specific, privileged indecisiveness (it is not 
infrequent for Israeli families who have lived for 10 or even 20 years in London 
to return to Israel), which I branded earlier as ‘the distress of the unsettled 
middle-class Jewish-Israeli’, is one of the trademarks of the Israeli group of 
émigrés that I have studied. It can account, at least partly, for the reluctance to 
openly challenge or disturb certain prevalent preconceptions in Israeli society 
about Israeli society, and about the world, and can explain the limited 
engagement with British society and reality. This reluctance to settle down in 
‘the diaspora’ – to accept the socio-cultural implications of the departure from 
‘Ha’aretz’ - was captured in my participants’ reference to the Israeli community 
as ‘a ghetto’ or ‘a swamp’. This position also shapes the collective space of the 
Israeli community as inherently temporary and secluded: based on informal ad-
hoc interactions solely among Israelis, the lack of formal social institutions 
(Hart, 2004) or distinct local rituals and charity activities which focuses on 
‘there’ rather than on ‘here’ (Floman, 2007). Such communal space differs 
considerably from the models of cultural hybridity proposed by Hall (1990), 
which are founded on ‘the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and 
diversity; by a conception of 'identity' which lives with and through, not despite, 
difference; by hybridity’ (Hall, 1990 p. 235).   
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10.4. Subjects negotiating ‘Israeli national identity’  
After discussing some of the contents that were raised (and those that were 
ignored) that make up the ‘Israeli we-ness’ among my participants, I now turn 
to the dynamics of identity construction (second and third research questions). 
Although participants were speaking from certain social locations (as members 
of the Israeli middle-class or highly qualified, employed or not employed 
subjects), they were also constructing a very personal narrative of themselves 
within these social configurations. In the analysis of the different interviews, I 
argued that subjects often (though not always) volunteered to be interviewed in 
order to try and ‘sort out’ disruptions to their personal narratives as Israelis who 
live in certain social-political conditions and therefore have a preconceived 
agenda (not necessarily intentional or conscious) which informs their speech. 
Hence, Ariella chose the polite (‘friendly’) but unwelcoming ‘European’ art 
workshop environment to convey her experience of alienation and justify the 
decision to return to Israel where she can walk ‘straight up with my head raised 
high’ because she is ‘the salt of the earth’. This was also true for Na’ama, who 
felt that her life was ‘on hold’, perhaps overly ‘comfortable’ and volunteered to 
be interviewed on ‘Israeli national identity’ although ‘she didn’t know what to 
say about it’. Michael constantly tried to prove to me his Israeli membership 
through the acquaintance with vernacular slang and general knowledge while 
also underlining his disengagement from it. Interviewees’ personal narratives 
were also constructed in conjunction with the distribution of roles and the 
interview politics. In Nira and Liat’s interviews, each one of them may have 
been drawn to act the role of the rebellious group members whose negative 
memories of their Israeli childhood and consequently their decision not to 
return to Israel ‘are screwing up your data’ (Liat), while I was cast as a 
representative of the Israeli establishment (a relatively newly-arrived, male, 
Israeli researcher) who expects them to long for Israel and mourn its absence. 
I am arguing here that the text analysis cannot be based solely upon the social 
and cultural positioning (e.g. their professional, gender or class status), but 
must also include the private interpretation or ‘suturing’ of the subject through, 
against and around these highly politicised social positionings as they 
continuously construct their personal narrative of ‘who I am’. 
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10.4.1. ‘Selfing’ and ‘othering’ and the processes of identity 
construction  
The material demonstrated that differentiation from ‘the other’, and through it 
the setting up of the rules of inclusion and exclusion, constitutes a major 
strategy for defining one’s identity whatever theme was raised (e.g. patterns of 
work or social interactions, raising children, social and moral values, etc.). In 
this work I have used the ‘other’ to designate members of a different national/ 
ethnic group rather than the more abstract notion of ‘the Other’ as 
representative of culture and language as applied in Lacanian theorizing.  Hall 
(1996) describes the indispensable role that the ‘other’ plays in the 
construction of one’s identity:  
Above all….identities are constructed through, not outside, difference. 
This entails the radically disturbing recognition that it is only through the 
relation to the other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it 
lacks… [that] its identity can be constructed (p. 17).  
Thus, the construction of these ‘others’ helps to maintain an illusionary sense 
of one’s personal and collective cohesion, continuity and persistence. For that 
end, reality experience is unnecessary, even disruptive. Subjects could keep 
their personal, Israeli space ‘clean’ – coherent and rational - while attributing 
unwanted, ‘messy’ aspects to the ‘others’: in a racist manner, Arabs/ Muslims 
are assigned murderous (negative) aggression while Israelis’ aggression is 
described as productive/creative (having an Israeli Hutzpah, being ‘street 
cats’), with Israeli military aggression or occupation of Palestinian lands being 
ignored; Britons are described as overly formal (‘schedule lunch a month and a 
half in advance’ or ‘putting children to bed at 7 pm’), passive and lacking 
ambition, while Israelis are informal in their social and family relationships, 
confident and professionally ambitious. Local Jews are depicted as backwardly 
religious and passive (‘Our Jewishness is something very-very specific: It 
doesn't have a God….’we left Egypt' and not 'we were taken out of Egypt'), 
whereas Israelis, as the New Jews, who ‘grew up in a country of sun’ are 
liberal, creative and ‘have a certain joy of life’. These claims were made above 
all to clarify the boundaries of the group and claim private and collective 
superiority; as Hall argues: ‘identities can function as points of identification 
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and attachment only because of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, to 
render ‘outside’, abjected’ (p. 17-8).  
The interplay of inclusion and exclusion was also raised, albeit much more 
delicately, in the interview encounter. Inevitably, I played an important part in 
the subjects’ narration of ‘Israeliness’ - as their audience - and it was also 
against and for this imaginary other that they constructed their narrative of 
Israeliness. Each participant placed me in a specific authoritative position (‘the 
researcher’, ‘the psychologist’, ‘the Israeli male’, ‘the Sabra’) that supported the 
narrative they wanted to unfold: Michael sought to convince me of his genuine 
Israeliness; Na’ama, who knew that I was a psychologist, came to talk about 
living a ‘life on hold’ and Liat expected me to be disappointed, as an Israeli 
researcher, by her critical remarks on Israel.  
However, as part of imagining Israeliness abroad, Jewish-Israelis who have 
grown up as the majority in Israel (and who had their own ‘others’) have to 
address their own condition of foreignness, exclusion or ‘otherness’ in the 
locals’ own ‘homeland’ since ‘in a world governed by ‘state thought’’, ‘we 
automatically think in national terms’ which ‘introduces that inevitable, and 
eminently ‘statist’ distinction, which is arbitrary as it is pertinent, between the 
national on the one hand, and the non-national on the other’ (Sayad, 2004, p. 
294). Thus, the participants had to reconcile into their stories the painful 
experiences of foreignness, of exclusion, of loneliness away from their families 
in a situation in which their previous social and cultural capital no longer 
counted. Here were not only stories of fractured nationality and coming to 
terms with conditions of collective minority, but also private memories of early 
family relationships where immigration and cultural difference played a 
significant emotional role. Ariella’s strong sense of ‘otherness’ in a local British 
environment was constructed against a notion of belonging in Israel where ‘me 
and my dad were born in the same room in the same hospital’. For her, this 
sense of Israeli otherness was almost physically ‘imprinted’ in her determining 
every aspect of her conduct (e.g. her speech, behaviour, social interaction) 
and consequently confined her to the unbearable exclusionary position of the 
non-European other. This sense of ‘otherness’ can potentially seep into the 
family, as the frequent discussions on children’s future Israeli identity disclose. 
This is a major concern for Jewish-Israeli women whose engagement with 
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British society is limited compared with that of other family members (children 
or the working spouse) due to their employment conditions and the strong pull 
towards the Israeli community. For Nira or Liat, however, their exceptional 
social positioning in a highly ideological Israeli society (as an IDF orphan, as a 
daughter of transnational immigrants) located them as the ‘others’ and 
structured their experiences of alienation and exclusion there. ‘Selfing’ and 
‘othering’ constitute two sides of the same coin whereby setting the rules of 
inclusion inevitably excludes.  
10.4.2. The contingency of (national) identities 
Throughout the thesis, I have outlined the conditionality and contingency of 
these identities dependant on the changing discursive circumstances within 
the interview encounter and the social spaces that subjects relate to. 
Therefore, ‘Israeliness’ was imagined differently against different social 
backgrounds (e.g. Israeli society, British society or the Israeli community in 
Britain). David described it succinctly in response to my question what it meant 
for him to be an Israeli:  
… and there are many aspects to being an Israeli: towards Israel, I 
mean the interest in what’s going on in Israel, or the longing, or… the 
connections with the people who are there or thoughts about being an 
Israeli outside Israel… or an Israeli who seeks or doesn’t seek to 
preserve his Israeli identity and an Israeli with Israeli friends and again, 
an Israeli with non-Israelis so all these together form the … ah… the 
Israeliness 
Subjects will make very different, even contradictory claims depending on the 
immediate context and their discursive goals, provided these make sense 
within the narrative that they want to promote (Bruner, 1990). Dorit produced 
two contradictory images of Israeliness in its relation to local British Jews: the 
first one was made in the context of criticising Israeli society for its promotion 
of individualism, materialism and the lack of Jewish roots:  
If I compare my Jewish friends here to my Israeli friends here, they [the 
local Jews] are much more Zionist than us, they believe [in God] more 
than us, they are more united, in their Judaism.  
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The second claim tried to account for the desirability of Israelis in the eyes of 
the local Jews:   
here you have many Jews who are by definition Jewish but they don’t 
kind of, live it in their daily life. They don’t ‘do’ {celebrate} holidays. They 
don’t observe it very much… And through the Israelis, all of a sudden, 
someone reminds them that today it’s Purim47  
These two quotes portray two different images of Israelis because they are 
constructed against different backdrops, i.e., designate different ‘others’ (the 
Israelis in Israel and the Jewish-Israelis in Britain) and aim to achieve different 
goals for the speaker. Both are nevertheless equally valid and take part in the 
subject’s construction of an overall notion of ‘Israeliness’. Moreover, these 
discrepancies are an inherent part of the constitution of identities, as will be 
elaborated below.  
10.4.3. The multiple, on-going efforts for identity construction – 
moving from identities to identifications 
Despite the dominance of the Zionist ideology and narrative operating as 
cultural and social ‘compasses’, the interviews revealed the constant shift of 
subject positioning, the contradictions, disruptions and moments of 
embarrassment as speakers tried to construct regularities out of their 
confounding experiences as Israelis abroad. These have demonstrated to me 
the vibrant, fluid features, the changing emotional experiences and 
engagements of what we commonly call ‘national identity’, but should rather 
refer to as ‘national identifications’. This nuance emphasizes: a. the process of 
construction rather than the constructed object itself (‘identity’); b. the effort to 
achieve a coherent narrative rather than the ‘already-achieved’ coherent story 
itself; and c. the multiplicity of ever-changing idiosyncratic meanings rather 
than one fixed consensual meaning. Hall (1994) accentuates the creative 
(rather than merely defensive) dimension of identities which serves ‘not as a 
second-order mirror held up to reflect what already exists, but as that form of 
representation which is able to constitute us as new kinds of subjects, and 
thereby enable us to discover places from which to speak’ (p. 402). 
Participants tried to compose coherent stories of who they are based on their 
                                            
47
 A Jewish festival. 
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varied, often contradictory, private daily experiences of living abroad. This was 
also my concern as the author of this thesis, the transcriber of the interview 
texts and their editor. I often found myself concerned about the incoherence of 
my translation or the content of the participants’ texts and wondered how these 
would be seen and judged by non-Israeli readers. Thus, the tension between 
coherence and disruption, between a narrative and fragmented discordant 
texts, an essential part of the human experience according to Lacanian theory 
(Bhabha, 1990, Pavon-Cuelar, 2010), was demonstrated on various occasions 
of text production by my participants or by me. So while identities should rather 
be seen as identifications (‘something local, fluid, unstable and contingent, 
made up of momentary stabilities that are then instantly displaced’ - Frosh and 
Baraitser, 2009, p. 167), but also as something in the making), the Zionist 
ethos with its themes and values, so dominant in Jewish-Israeli culture, 
provided a helpful structure around which the participants could organize these 
momentary stabilities.  
10.4.4. Negotiating subject positioning 
When defining a subject position Harré and Davis (1990, p. 46) argue that: 
Once having taken up a particular position as one's own, a person 
inevitably sees the world from the vantage point of that position and in 
terms of the particular images, metaphors, storylines and concepts 
which are made relevant within the particular discursive practice.  
In contrast, I have tried to demonstrate the precariousness of such subject 
positioning not only because of the frequent change in social setting (as 
described above) or the different discursive goals subjects attempt to achieve 
in the course of any encounter, but also because social positioning can never 
be fully fixed or closed. In line with Lacanian theorizing (Bhabha, 1990, Hall, 
1996, Žižek, 1998), I have focused on certain moments in the narrative 
construction when meaning and coherence fail. These were articulated in 
hesitations, slips of tongues, or marked discomfort (Dorit: ‘I don’t know, I feel 
terribly uncomfortable with the responses I give’). They point to the dualism 
and contradictions ingrained in identities due to two binaries: meaning and 
fragmentation and self and ‘the other’. On one level, this tension relates to the 
discrepancy between the apparent coherence that the imaginary provides (‘the 
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nation’, ‘Us’, ‘Them’, ‘good’ or ‘bad’) and the often fragmented experiences of 
daily life when signifiers lose their meanings. In response to my question ‘what 
does it mean for you to be an Israeli?’ Aaron hesitated and then replied:   
To be an Israeli for me, personally, it's a given thing. I mean I was born 
Israeli so I'm Israeli. So it's a thing that you... it's a goo...{d question} 
which I thought about, what does it mean to be an Israeli? I know I'm 
Israeli but I don't know what it means… 
But identities are contradictory in another way: they draw on a collective 
reservoir of images, signifiers, concepts and myths that inform certain subject 
positions (as described above), but also have to answer specific narratives that 
individuals entertain privately about themselves. Nira’s experience of 
discrepancy between her bodily experience while cycling during Memorial Day 
for the dead soldiers and the meaning it was given by her classmates and 
school staff provides one such example. Pavon-Cuelar (2010) claims that ‘for 
each position the language is [also] a language’ (p. 164). The extent to which 
subjects are indeed obligated (even constituted – Foucault, 1970) by these 
subject positions have been extensively discussed in social theory (e.g. Fanon, 
1967, Althusser, 1971). I have been interested in Israeli subjects’ struggles to 
accommodate, negotiate or narrate the national canon (in the form of a social 
discourse, a narrative or a daily practice) which signalled the tension that is an 
integral part of national identities as troubled and unsettled (Bhabha, 1994). 
Noga described Israeli identity as contradictory by nature: 
Everyone would like to live abroad but also to live in Ha’aretz too. And 
it’s a sort of a dissonance, and if you ask me what’s an Israeli this is 
also a part of being an Israeli. Wanting to live in Ha’aretz but being 
abroad too. 
While Noga related this dualism to the military tensions in Israel, I have 
analysed it also, more generally, in terms of the on-going tension, especially 
accentuated in Israeli society, between the collective and private trajectories, 
between the New Jew’s territorial commitment to the Zionist ethos of living 
(and fighting) in Israel and the Old Jew’s urge to disperse and to wander or 
flee. Liat’s exceptional narrative of displacement in Israel (‘I remember, from a 
very early age that I felt I didn’t want to be there’ {giggle}) revealed a diasporic 
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model based on a familial network stretched across Russia, South America, 
Israel (and now London) whose familial-transnational ethos challenges the 
hegemonic national Zionist narrative which places Israel at the centre of the 
Jewish world (Magid, 2006, Shneer and Aviv, 2010). I have also argued that 
despite its efforts to construct a coherent story of Jewish heroism and historical 
linearity, the Zionist narrative was never able to eliminate the shadows of its 
others – the diasporic Old Jew against which it was imagined, or the 
Palestinian in whose land the Zionist project was materialized.  
The participants in my study were each trying to reference themselves in 
relation to acceptable pre-given categories that prevail in Jewish-Israeli culture 
- nationality, Hebrew language, Jewish religious practices and beliefs, Israeli 
social stratification and more. The reference to each of these categories 
inevitably required the subject to engage in an effort of appropriation (third 
research question). Therefore, the process of engagement, as much as the 
contents themselves (first research question), make up the sense of 
‘Israeliness’ among the subjects in my study.   
10.5. The Israeli diaspora and the exceptionality of the Israeli case 
In this last section, and following my research findings, I would like to discuss 
the notion of ‘the Israeli diaspora’ in light of the theoretical debates on the 
diasporic space and the research findings. In its radical cultural-political 
meaning (e.g. Brah, 1996, Hall, 2000, Werbner, 2002 or Magid, 2006) an 
Israeli diaspora could be envisioned as a critique of the hegemonic Zionist 
perception of nationality, territoriality, citizenship or belonging. Elsewhere, 
however (Moshkovitz, 2013), I ask whether within a climate of dominant Zionist 
discourse such a Jewish-Israeli diasporic identity is at all viable or whether 
there are some migrant groups that will never become a diaspora in its cross-
national, cultural meanings.  
The gradual changes in Israeli discourses on nationality, the growing 
acceptance of a transnational ethos and the global economic and cultural 
changes that enable Israelis to relocate abroad more easily, as well as the 
economic, social and military hardships in Israel, have made emigration more 
practical and partly more legitimate. New communities of young Israelis (e.g. in 
Berlin) who are more temporally distanced from the establishment of the state 
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and its ethos and have not yet established themselves as part of its social 
structure may provide alternative models of Israeliness abroad in what can be 
seen as an ‘Israeli diaspora’ and redefine concepts of nationality. However, the 
findings in my study do not present the emergence of such diasporic Israeli 
communal space in Britain. This is perhaps to do with the fact that my 
participant cohort comprises mostly middle-class family members who did not 
experience social or political exclusion in Israeli society. The experience of 
temporariness and reluctance to settle down, much like the geographical 
proximity to Israel and the frequent travels back and forth, also precluded the 
construction of an independent Israeli community that could formulate new 
concepts of Israeliness and its engagement with the local society – the Jews, 
Arabs/Muslims and non-Jewish Britons - or engage critically with Israeli society 
and its preconceptions. 
The participants’ professional and socio-economic profile and their experience 
of dislocation resembled that of other high-skilled migrant groups (e.g. Iredale, 
2005, Manning and Roy, 2010 or Lienonen, 2012) and was, therefore, not 
exceptional to Israelis. Nevertheless, although ideology is not a sole factor in 
the construction of ‘Israeli national identity’, and despite the constant erosion in 
the power that classical Zionist ideology has in Israeli society and culture, the 
socio-economic and political power-relations still implicated in it complicate the 
construction of Israeliness abroad and contribute to an on-going condition of 
temporariness and de-institutionalization of the Israeli community in Britain. 
Thus, while the concerns of the privileged, high-skilled Jewish-Israeli working 
migrant and family may resemble those of other privileged migrants (the lack of 
integration into and social mobility within the local societies, Lienonen, 2012), 
the arguments and the narrative to address such discomfort or temporariness 
is exceptional and stems from the special political and military conditions, but 
also from the way collective history is perceived and is being told.   
And yet, the findings show that there are potentially many ways to envision 
Israeliness, each contributing to a different ‘diasporic’ experience. Michael who 
made Aliya (immigrated) to Israel in his twenties, got married and had children, 
only to leave Israel on his own twelve years later insisted on his Israeliness 
much like Udit, who immigrated to Israel from Morocco with her family when 
she was a child, lived there for ten years before leaving for Britain forty years 
 
279 
ago. Conversely, Nira, who was born in Israel and grew up there and whose 
father died as a soldier, had bitter memories of growing up as an ‘IDF orphan’ 
and saw her Israeliness as only technical. Aaron, on the other hand, 
introduced an exceptionally cultural rather than ethnic definition of Israeliness.  
Vertovec (1997) proposes to see diaspora also as specific mode of 
consciousness. Participants constructed momentary diasporic areas where 
they could think about their Israeliness abroad outside the confinement of an 
Israeli discourse of nationality, not merely as an adventure (‘an experience for 
life’ – David’s aunt) but as genuine and valid way of life.  
Aaron said:  
But I think you have to have, kind of, a few things to be Israeli: I think it's 
a way of thinking, I think it's language, I think it's a cultural context, ahh 
… and it can also be the place where you were born. And in my view, 
you don't have to do all of them in order to be Israeli. It’s enough that 
{you do} part of them [Ahh]  
Similarly, Na’ama said regarding her daughters and in reference to the sense 
of foreignness: ‘So o.k., they will not be totally Israeli, they will not turn out to 
be totally English either. They will be a sort of a hybrid, something in the 
middle.’ 
I found these two articulations innovative in that they specifically break away 
from the familiar patterns of group belonging and the sense of Jewish-ethnic 
fixedness and permanence. They offer a different perception on the 
relationship between Israelis abroad and Israel – describing the condition of 
dislocation not necessarily as deficient, as Zionist ideology and Israeli culture 
often portray it (‘living in a ghetto’), but in a way that accepts the displacement 
even if not embracing it (as Said in Magid, 2006, proposes to do); it even 
considers a hybrid Israeli-British identity, usually unheard of in Israeli 
emigrants’ discourse. 
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10.6. Conclusion 
10.6.1. Contributions of this study and practical implications for 
further research 
This research has added to current knowledge in numerous fields – 
immigration and diaspora studies, nationalism and Israeli nationalism, and 
national identity and looked at their intersections with each other as well as 
with other central categories: class, professional status, gender, religion and 
ethnicity. Its contribution can be seen in the following areas:    
10.6.2. Immigration among high-skilled migrants  
Much of the research on migrants is dedicated to the hardships low-skilled 
migrants face to integrate into British society. By contrast, this research 
presented a complex picture of a middle-class, high-skilled group in Britain 
which is usually under-researched. Within the general discussion on 
immigration and immigration policies in Britain, providing there is an intention 
to facilitate the incorporation of newcomers into British society, this research 
provides information (e.g. women’s employment, patterns of schooling, familial 
structures, identificatory needs) regarding the immigration experience of a 
group whose members have to a large extent managed to secure a degree of 
economic comfort in British society and presumably contribute to local 
economic productivity. The research shows these group members’ particular 
concerns and dynamics within the family, within the communities they form and 
within broader British society.  
10.6.3. The role of ideology and the national imagination in the 
experience of dislocation  
More specifically, I have outlined the centrality of ideology within the 
construction of the collective imagination. This cultural ‘map’ helps the 
interviewees to make sense of their condition of dislocation in Britain. Hence, 
given the way that Jewish-Israelis in this case, engage and negotiate their 
nationality and the way material conditions and historical events are 
interpreted and imagined, the current military, social and political conditions in 
Israel and the resolution or continuation of the conflict with the Palestinians 
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and the neighbouring countries profoundly shapes their experience of 
dislocation and their interpretation of local British society. This no doubt 
applies to refugees from other areas of conflict and should be considered 
when trying to assist them in settling in their host country.  
10.6.4. The conditions of dislocation – between ‘diaspora’ and 
‘immigration’  
The research also examines critically various definitions of dislocation such as 
‘diaspora’ and ‘immigration’ that circulate in the academic and popular spaces. 
Since how ‘diaspora’ is imagined in the host and home environments shapes 
the experience of dislocation, the notion of ‘diaspora’ should be expanded to 
include a variety of experiences of dislocation as manifested by a wide range 
of migrant groups with their varying cultural, professional, material or political 
circumstances.  
10.6.5. Discourses of nationality in Israeli society  
This research constitutes an analysis of the discourses of nationality in Israeli 
society. It concludes that in spite of the distancing from Israeli society, but most 
probably because of it, the hegemonic Zionist discourse and narrative can be 
found in many aspects of the speakers’ speech, attesting to its continuous 
hegemony in Jewish-Israelis’ daily lives and private and collective imagination, 
as has been argued in Israeli theoretical literature. Since I have concluded that 
this hegemonic discourse prevails among the participant sample partly due to 
their socio-economic class, further research among other Jewish and non-
Jewish Israelis from other social, ethnic and religious classes might reveal a 
different approach to this national ethos in a way that could open up 
‘Israeliness’ to alternative outlooks. This research provides a critical mirror of 
such ideology and its fixed and constraining interpretation of ‘the Israeli’, 
demonstrating the discursive and imaginative limitations it imposes on 
subjects’ understandings of their multi-cultural British environment, their 
interpretation of Jewishness and their implication in it, the notions of belonging 
as a minority in British society and their abilities to form ties that transcend the 
customary division between ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ in the British context. 
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10.6.6. The importance of qualitative research and specifically of 
critical narrative analysis  
The findings also reiterate the importance of qualitative research for learning 
about migrant experiences of dislocation which eventually determine their 
engagement with and integration into the local and home societies. The 
research demonstrated the intricate ways in which subjectivity is constructed 
and negotiated in the context of immigration and dislocation which cannot be 
captured in quantitative research. As Israeli culture transforms and legitimacy 
for emigration and for Israeli transnational networks grows, the experiences of 
dislocation or diaspora among Israelis in Britain as well as the structural 
features of the local Israeli community and its perception of and relationship 
with neighbouring communities are bound to change too. Those changes beg 
further research.  
  
 
283 
References 
Adorno, T.W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D., & Sanford, N. (1950). The 
Authoritarian Personality, Studies in Prejudice Series (Vol. 1). New York: Harper & 
Row.  
Alexander, C. (2010). Diasporas, race and difference. In K. Knot & S. McLaughlin  
(Eds.), Diasporas: Concepts, intersections, identities. (pp. 112-117) London: Zed 
Books.  
Althusser, L. (1971). Ideology and ideological state apparatuses. In T. B. Brewster 
(Ed.), Lenin and philosophy and other essays (pp. 127-188). London: NLB. 
Amichai, Y. (1996) Poem without an end from, (Bloch, C. & Mitchell, S. trans.) 
Selected Poetry Of Yehuda Amichai. University of California Press. 
Amichai, Y. (2010) Tourists (Abramson, G. & Parfitt, T. trans.) retrieved from 
http://matthewsalomon.wordpress.com/2010/01/05/yehuda-amichai-tourists/ 
Amir, D. (1995). Responsible, committed and wise: Constructing femininity in abortion 
committees. Theory and Criticism [Heb.], (pp. 247-254). 
Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined communities. London/New York, NY: Verso. 
Anderson, B. (1998). The spectre of comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and 
the world. London/New York, NY: Verso.  
Andrews, M., Sclater, S.D., Squire, C., & Tamboukou, M. (2004). Narrative research 
in Seale, C., Gobo, G., Gubrium, J. F., & Silverman, D. (Eds.). Qualitative research 
practice (pp. 109-124). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
Anteby-Yemini, L. (2004). Ethiopian Jews, new migration models in Israel and 
diaspora studies. Bulletin du Centre de Recherché Français de Jérusalem, 15, 60-71. 
 
284 
Anthias, F. (2002). Where do I belong? Narrating collective identity and translocational 
positionality. Ethnicities, 2(4), 491-515. 
Anthias, F., & Yuval-Davis, N. (Eds.). (1989). Woman-nation-state. New York: St. 
Martin's Press. 
Arendt, H. (1970). On violence. New York, NY: Harvest Books. 
Auron, Y., Katzenell, J., & Silberklang, D. (1994). The holocaust and the Israeli 
teacher. Holocaust Genocide Studies 8(2), 225-257. 
Azoulay, A., & Ofir, A. (2002). Bad days – Between disaster and utopia [Heb.]. Tel-
Aviv: Resling Publishing.  
Azoulay, A. (2009). Constituent violence – 1947-1950: A genealogy of a regime and a 
catastrophe from their point of view [Heb.]. Tel-Aviv: Resling Publishing.  
Bar-Tal, D. (2007). Living with the conflict: Socio-psychological analysis of the Israeli-
Jewish society [Heb.]. Jerusalem: Carmel.  
Bartana, Y. (2007). And Europe will be stunned. Podcast retrieved from 
http://www.artangel.org.uk//projects/2012/and_europe_will_be_stunned/audio_podcas
t_and_talks/podcast_and_recordings 
Battu, H., & Zenou, Y. (2010). Oppositional identities and employment for ethnic 
minorities: Evidence from England. The Economic Journal, 120, 52-71.  
Bauman, Z. (2011). Culture in a liquid modern world. Cambridge: Polity. 
Ben-Amos, A., & Bet-El, I. (1999). Commemoration and national identity: Memorial 
ceremonies in Israeli schools. In A. Bishara (Ed.), Between ‘I’ and ‘we’: The 
construction of identities and Israeli identity [Heb.]. (pp. 129-151). Jerusalem: Van-
Leer Institute and Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishing House. 
 
285 
Ben-Eliezer, U. (2007). From collective identity to identity politics: The I.D.F. and the 
Israeli society in a changing era. In M. Naor (Ed.), Army, memory and national identity 
[Heb.], (pp. 13-26). Jerusalem: The Hebrew University Magness Press [Heb.]. 
Bhabha, H. (1990). Narrating the nation. In Bhabha. H.K. (Ed.), Nation and narration 
(pp. 1-7). Location: Routledge  
Bhabha, H. (1994). Anxious nations, nervous states. In J. Copjec (Ed.), Supposing the 
Subject (pp. 201-217). London: Verso. 
Billig, M. (1995). Banal nationalism. London: Sage Publications.  
Bloch, L.R., & Lemish, D. (2008). Persuasion through insult: The 'F' word in Israeli 
media. Media, Culture, and Society, 30(2), 239-256. 
Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction: A social critique of the judgment of taste. (R. Nice, 
Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Boyarin, D. (1997) Unheroic Conduct: The Rise of Heterosexuality and the Invention 
of the Jewish Man, Berkley: University of California Press 
Boyle, P., Cooke, T. J., Halfacree, K., & Smith, D. (2001). A cross-national 
comparison of the impact of family migration on women’s employment status. 
Demography, 38(2), 201-213. 
Brah, A. (1996). Cartographies of diaspora: Contesting identities. London: Routledge.  
Braidotti, R. (2011). Nomadic subjects: Embodiment and sexual difference in 
contemporary feminist theory (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Columbia University Press.  
Breuilly, J. (1993). Nationalism and the state (2nd ed.). Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 
 
286 
Bronner, E. (2003, November 9). The New Historians. The New-York Times. 
Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/09/books/the-new-new-
historians.html 
Brubaker, R. (2004). Ethnicity without groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Brubaker, R. (2005). The ‘diaspora’ diaspora. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28(1), 1-19. 
Bruner, J. (1990). Acts of meaning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Buckner, S. (2005). Taking the debate on reflexivity further: Psychodynamic team 
analysis of a BNIM interview. Journal of Social Work Practice, 19 (1), 59-72. 
Butler, J. (1997). The psychic life of power – Theories in subjection. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press. 
Butler, J. (2011). Is Judaism Zionism? In E. Mandieta (Ed.), The power of religion in 
the public sphere (pp. 70-91). New York, NY: Columbia University Press. 
Butler, J., & Spivak, G.C. (2007). Who sings the nation state? Language, politics, 
belonging. London: Seagull Books. 
Carver, R. (1981). What do we talk about when we talk about love: Stories. New York, 
NY: Alfred A Knopf.  
Cameron, L., Maslen, R., & Todd, Z. (2013). The dialogic construction of self and 
other in response to terrorism. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace 
Psychology, 19(1), 3. 
Casey, T., & Dustmann, C. (2010). Immigrants’ identity, economic outcomes and the 
transmission of identity across generations. The Economic Journal, 120, 31-51. 
 
287 
Cohen, R. (2005). The Israeli diaspora. In M. Ember, C.R. Ember & I.A. Skogard 
(Eds.), Encyclopaedia of diasporas (pp. 136-143). New-York: Springer Science and 
Business Media.  
Cohen, Y. (2007). The Demographical Success of Zionism. Israeli Sociology [Heb.], 8 
(2), 355-362.  
Craib, I. (1998). Experiencing identity. London: Sage. 
Davies, B., & Harré, R. (1990). Positioning: The discursive production of selves. 
Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 20 (1), 43-63. 
Della Pergola, S. (2012).  Thoughts about Immigration. Hagira [Heb.], 1, 5-31.  
Elliott, A. (2002). Psychoanalytic theory: An introduction (2nd ed.). Durham: Duke 
University Press. 
Elliott, A. (2009). Contemporary social theory: An introduction. London: Routledge. 
Elliott, H., Gunaratnam, Y., Hollway, W., & Phoenix, A. (2009). Meaning, practices and 
identity change in the transition to becoming a mother. Theorising identities and social 
action, 19-37. London: Palgrave. 
Emerson, P., & Frosh, S. (2004). Critical narrative analysis in psychology: A guide to 
practice. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Elon, A. (2003). The Pity of it All: a portrait of the German-Jewish epoch, 1743-1933. 
Macmillan. 
Fanon, F. (1967). Black skin white masks. New York: Grove Press. 
Fathi, M. (2011). Classed Pathways: Narratives of Iranian Women Migrants 
(unpublished doctoral dissertation) University of East London, London. 
 
288 
Feige, M. (2007). Canges in collective memory and political myth: New perspectives. 
In M. Naor (Ed.), Army, Memory and National Identity [Heb.], (pp. 87-92). Jerusalem: 
The Hebrew University Magnes Press  
Filc, D. (2006). Hegemony and populism in Israel [Heb.], Tel-Aviv: Resling Publishing  
First, A., & Herman, T. (2009). Sweet nationalism in bitter days: A commercial 
representation of Zionism. Nations and Nationalism, 15(3), 506-523. 
Floman, R. (2007). Sojourners and settlers: the Israeli community in the San 
Francisco bay area [Heb.]. Jerusalem: Carmel  
Fortier, A.M. (2011). Anne-Marie Fortier in conversation with Debra Ferreday and Adi 
Kuntsman. Borderlands E-Journal: New Spaces in the Humanities, 10(2), 1-17.  
Foucault, M. (1970). The order of discourse. In R. Young (Ed.), Inaugural lecture at 
the College de France in untying the text - A post-structuralist reader. London:  
Routledge and Kagen Paul. 
Freud, S. (1939). Moses and monotheism. (K. Jones, Trans.). New York, NY: Vintage 
Books.  
Freud, S. (1922/2004). Mass psychology and other writings. (J.A. Underwood, 
Trans.).  London: Penguin. 
Frosh, S. (2003). Psychosocial studies and psychology: Is a critical approach 
emerging? Human Relations, 56, 1547–1567. 
Frosh, S., & Bararitser, L. (2008). Psychoanalysis and psychosocial studies. 
Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society, 13, 346-365.  
Frosh, S., & Baraitser, L. (2009). Goodbye to identity? In A. Elliott & P. du Gay (Eds.), 
Identity in question (pp. 158-169). London: Sage.  
 
289 
Frosh, S., Phoenix, A., & Pattman, R. (2003). Taking a stand: Using psychoanalysis to 
explore the positioning of subjects in discourse. British Journal of Social Psychology, 
42, 39-53. 
Gee, J.P. (1991). A linguistic approach to narrative. Journal of Narrative and Life 
History, 1, 15-39. 
Gee, P. (2005). An Introduction to discourse analysis (2nd ed). New York, NY: 
Routledge. 
Gellner, E. (1964). Thought and change. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell. 
GlobeScan (2012) A globescan poll for the BBC, retrieved from 
http://www.globescan.com/84-press-releases-2012/186-views-of-europe-slide-
sharply-in-global-poll-while-views-of-china-improve.html 
Gold, S. (2002). The Israeli diaspora. London: Routledge. 
Gold, S. (2004). From nationality to peoplehood: Adaptation and identity formation in 
the Israeli diaspora. Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, 13(2/3), 331-358. 
Golden, D. (2002). Storytelling the future: Israelis, immigrants and the imagining of 
community. Anthropological Quarterly, 75(1), 7-35. 
Graham, D., & Boyd, J. (2010). Committed, concerned and conciliatory: The attitudes 
of Jews in Britain towards Israel. London: The Institute for Jewish Policy Research. 
Graham, D., & Boyd, J. (2011). Home and away: Jewish journey towards 
independence. London: Institute of Jewish Policy Research  
Gutwein (2009) The privatization of the Holocaust: Memory, Historiography, and 
Politics. Israel Studies, 14(1), pp. 36-65. 
 
290 
Grinberg, L., & Grinberg, R. (1989). Psychoanalytic perspectives on migration and 
exile.  New-Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Grinberg, L. (2007). Imagined peace, discourse of war. Tel-Aviv: Resling Publishing 
[Heb.]. 
Habermas, J. (2001). The postnational constellation: Political essays. Cambridge: 
Polity.  
Hall, S. (1990). Cultural identity and diaspora. In J. Rutheford (Ed.), Identity (pp. 222-
237). London: Lawrence and Wishart.  
Hall, S. (1994). Cultural identity and diaspora. In P. Williams & L. Chrisman (Eds.), 
Colonial discourse and post-colonial theory: A reader (pp. 392-401). London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf.  
Hall, S. (2000). Who needs identity? In P. du Gay, J. Evans & P, Redman (Eds.), 
Identity – A reader (pp.15-30). London: Sage. 
Helbling, M., & Stojanovic, N. (2011). Switzerland: Challenging the big theories of 
nationalism. Nations and Nationalism, 17(4), 712-717. 
Hiles, D., & Cermac I. (2008). Narrative analysis. In C. Willig & W. Stainton-Rogers 
(Eds.), The sage handbook of qualitative research in psychology (pp.148-164). 
London: Sage. 
Hollway, W., & Jefferson, T. (2000). Doing qualitative research differently: Free 
association, narrative and the interview method. London: Sage. 
Hook, D. (2008). Articulating psychoanalysis and psychosocial studies: limitations and 
possibilities. Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, 13(4), 397-405. 
Hutchinson, J. (2004). Myth against myth: The nation as ethnic overlay. Nations and 
Nationalism, 10(1-2), 109–124. 
 
291 
Ingold, J., & Etherington, D. (2013). Work, welfare and gender inequalities: an 
analysis of activation strategies for partnered women in the UK, Australia and 
Denmark. Work, Employment & Society, 27, 621-638 
Iredale, R. (2005). Gender, immigration policies and accreditation: Valuing the skills of 
professional women migrants. Geoforum, 36(2), 155-166. 
Jefferson, G. (1972). Side sequences. In D. Sudnow (Ed.), Studies in social 
interaction (pp. 294–338). New York, NY: Free Press. 
Kahn-Harris, K., & Gidley, B. (2010). Turbulent times: The British Jewish community. 
London: Continuum International Publishing Group. 
Kamir, O. (2011). Zionism, Masculinity and Feminism. In M. Shilo (Ed.), Gender in 
Israel – New studies on gender in the yishuv and state (pp. 443-470). Beer-Sheva: 
Ben-Gurion Research Institute. 
Karla, V.S, Kaur, R., & Hutnyk, J. (2005). Diaspora and Hybridity. London: Sage.  
Kaufmann, E. (2011). Reflection of the Swiss Sonderfall. Nations and Nationalism, 
17(4), 815-820. 
Kaufmann, E. (2008). The lenses of nationhood: an optical model of identity. Nations 
and Nationalism, 14(3), 449-477.  
Kimmerling, B. (2001). The invention and decline of Israeliness: State, society and the 
military. Berkley, CA: University of California Press.  
Klingbail, S., & Shiloh, S. (2012). I have another country: Why almost 40% of Israelis 
consider leaving [Heb.] Ha’aretz Magazine, 14/12/2012. Retrieved from 
http://www.haaretz.co.il/magazine/1.1884838 
Knot, K. (2010). Space and movement. In K. Knot & S. McLaughlin (Eds.), Diasporas: 
Concepts, intersections, identities (pp.79-83). London: Zed Books. 
 
292 
Korner, A., & Riall, L. (2009). Introduction: The new history of Risorgimento 
nationalism. Nations and Nationalism, 15(3), 396-401. 
Kuntsman, A. (2008). Geneologies of hate, metonymies of violence: Immigration, 
homophobia, homopatriotism. In Miyake, E. & Kuntsman, A. (Ed.), Out of place: 
Interrogating silences in queerness/raciality. York: Nerve Books. 
Kuntsman, A. (2008a). Queerness and Europeanness: Immigration, orientalist visions 
and racialized encounters in Israel/Palestine. Darkmatter, 3. Retrieved from 
http://www.darkmatter101.org/site/2008/05/02/queerness-as-europeanness-
immigration-orientialist-visions-and-racialized-encounters-in-israelpalestine/  
Kvale, S. (1999). The psychoanalytic interview as qualitative research. Qualitative 
Inquiry, 5(1), 87-113. 
Kymlica, W. (2003). Immigration, citizenship, multiculturalism: Exploring the links. The 
Political Quarterly, 74(1), 195–208. 
Labov, W. (1972). Sociolinguistic patterns. Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press. 
Laclau, E., & Mouffe, C. (1985). Hegemony and socialist strategy: Towards a radical 
democratic politics. London: Verso. 
Lahav, G., & Arian, A. (1999). Israelis in a Jewish diaspora: The multitude dilemmas 
of a globalized group. Paper presented for the Annual Meeting of the International 
Studies Association, Washington, D.C. . 
Lazar, A., Chaitin, J., Gross, T., & Bar-On, D. (2004). Jewish Israeli teenagers, 
national identity, and the lessons of the holocaust. Holocaust Genocide Studies, 
18(2), 188-204. 
Lev-Ari, L. (2008). Israeli emigrants abroad – Jewish continuity or assimilation? [Heb.] 
Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press 
 
293 
Levitt, P. (2010). Transnationalism. In K.A. Knott (Ed.), Diasporas - Concepts, 
intersections, identities (pp. 39-44). London: Zed. 
Livne, N. (2001). The rise and fall of post-Zionism. [Heb] Ha'aretz 21.9.2001 
Lomsky-Feder, E. (2004). The memorial ceremony in Israeli schools: Between the 
state and civil society. British Journal of Sociology of Education, 25(3), 291-305. 
Lomsky-Feder, E. (2011). Competing models of nationalism: An analysis of memorial 
ceremonies in schools. Nations and Nationalism, 17(3), 581-603. 
Magid, S. (2006). In search of a critical voice in the Jewish diaspora: Homelessness 
and home in Edward Said and Shalom Noah Barzofsky's Netivot Shalom, Jewish 
Social Studies, 12(3), 193-227. 
Manning, A., & Roy, S. (2010). Culture clash or culture club? National identity in 
Britain. The Economic Journal, 120, 72-100 
Marcuse, H. (1955). Eros and civilization. Boston, MA: Beacon. 
McIlwaine, C., Datta, K., Evans, Y., Herbert, J., May J., & Wills, J. (2006). Gender and 
ethnic identities among low paid migrant workers in London. London: Queen Mary 
University of London.  
McNamara, T. (1987). Language and social identity: Israelis abroad. Journal of 
Language and Social Psychology, 6, 215-228. 
Nationalism. (n.d.). Merriam-Webster dictionary online. Retrieved from 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nationalism 
Midgley, N. (2006). Psychoanalysis and qualitative psychology: Complementary or 
contradictory paradigms? Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3(3), 213-231. 
Mishler, E. (1986). Research interviewing: Contact and narrative. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
 
294 
Modood, T. (2010). Multiculturalism and citizenship. Diasporas: Concepts, 
intersections, identities (pp. 50-54). London: Zed Books.  
Morris, B. (1988). The new historiography: Israel confronts its past. Tikkun, 3(6), 19-
23. 
Moshkovitz, Y. (2013). Is there an ‘Israeli diaspora’? Jewish Israelis negotiating 
national identity between Zionist ideology and diasporic reality. Jewish Culture and 
History, 14(2), 1-12. 
Mouffe, C. (2001). Democracy - Radical and plural. CSD Bulletin, 9(1), 10-13. 
Naveh, E. (2006). The dynamics of identity construction in Israel through education in 
history. In R.I. Rotberg (Ed.), Israeli and Palestinian Narratives of Conflict – History’s 
Double Helix. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.  
Nairn, T. (1997). Faces of nationalism: Janus revisited. London: Verso. 
Nesher, T. (2012, November 14). The Minister Saar's programme for differential 
budgeting of schools according to army recruitment rates is on its way. Ha’aretz [Heb.] 
Retrieved from http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/education/1.1864119 
Nightingale, D., & Cromby, J. (1999). Social constructionist Psychology:  A critical 
analysis of theory and practice. Buckingham: Open University Press. 
OECD iLibrary. (2012). Employment rates: Women. OECD Factbook 2011-2012: 
Economic, environmental and social statistics. Retrieved from  http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/sites/factbook-2011-en/07/01/01/07-01-01-
g3.html?contentType=&itemId=/content/chapter/factbook-2011-58-
en&containerItemId=/content/serial/18147364&accessItemIds=&mimeType=text/h 
Pavon-Cuellar, D. (2010). From the conscious interior to an exterior unconsciousness. 
London: Karnac Books. 
 
295 
Pappe, I. (1997). A history of modern Palestine: One land, two peoples (2nd ed.). 
Haifa: University of Haifa Press. 
Parker, I. (2005). Qualitative psychology: Introducing radical research. Maidenhead: 
Open University Press.  
Patterson, W. (2008). Narratives of events: Labovian narrative analysis and its 
limitations. In M. S. Andrews (Ed.), Doing narrative research (pp. 22-40). London: 
Sage. 
Patton, C. (2000). Migratory vices. In C. Patton & B. Sanchez-Eppler (Eds.), Queer 
diasporas (pp. 15-37). Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Peres, S. (1993). The new Middle East. New York, NY: Henry Holt and Co. 
Philo, G., & Berry, M. (2004). Bad news from Israel. London: Pluto Press.  
Philo, G., & Berry, M. (2011). More bad news from Israel. London: Pluto Press.  
Potter, J., & Hepburn, A. (2005). Qualitative interviews in psychology: Problems and 
possibilities. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 2, 281-307. 
Potter, J. (2009). Discourse analysis. In M. Hardy & A. Byrman (Eds.), The handbook 
of data analysis (pp. 607-624). London: Sage.  
Rabikowska, M. (2010). The ritualization of food, home and national identity among 
Polish migrants in London. Social Identities, 16(3), 377-39.  
Ram, U. (2006). The time of the “post” on nationalism and the politics of knowledge in 
Israel [Heb.]. Tel Aviv: Resling Publishing. 
Raz-Krakotzkin, A. (1994). Exile within sovereignty: A critique of the exile negation in 
Israeli culture. Theory and Critique, 4, 4-23.  
Raz-Krakotzkin, A. (2005). There is no God but it promised us Eretz-Israel. Mita'am, 
3, [Heb.] Retrieved from http://www.mitaam.co.il/mit3nono.htm  
 
296 
Raz-Krakotzkin, A. (2007). Memory, orientalism and the formation of the Israeli 
consciousness. In M. Naor (Ed.), Army, memory and national identity [Heb.] (pp. 102-
123). Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, Magnes Press. 
Reinharz J., & Shavit, Y. (2010). Glorious accursed Europe - An essay on Jewish 
ambivalence. Lebanon, NH: Brandeis University Press. 
Renan, E. (1990). What is a nation? In B. H.K (Ed.) Nation and narration (pp. 8-22). 
London/New York, NY: Routledge. 
Richardson, J. E. (2004). (Mis) representing Islam: The racism and rhetoric of British 
broadsheet newspapers (Vol. 9). John Benjamins Publishing. 
Riessman, C.K. (1993). Narrative analysis. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Riessman, C.K. (2008). Narrative methods for the human sciences.  London: Sage 
Publications. 
Roberman, S. (2007). Commemorative activities of the Great War and the 
empowerment of elderly immigrant Soviet Jewish veterans in Israel. Anthropological 
Quarterly, 80(4), 1035-1064.  
Roninger, L. (1999). Individualism among the Jewish-Israeli public during the 1990s. 
In A. Bishara (Ed.), Between ‘I’ and ‘we’: The construction of identities and Israeli 
identity (pp. 109-125). Jerusalem: Van-Leer Institute and Hakibbutz Hameuchad 
Publishing House. 
Rose, J. (1996). States of phantasy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Rose, J. (2004). An introduction. (J.A. Underwood, Trans.). In A. Phillips (Ed.), Mass 
psychology and other writings (p. vii-xlii). London: Penguin.  
Rose. J. (2005). The question of Zion. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
 
297 
Roseneil, S. (2006). The ambivalences of Angel’s ‘arrangement’: a psychosocial lens 
on the contemporary condition of personal life. The Sociological Review, 54(4), 847-
869. 
Said, E. (1978). Orientalism. New York, NY: Vintage Books. 
Said, E. (2003). Freud and the non-European. London: Verso. 
Sand, S. (2008) When and how was the Jewish people invented? [Heb.] Tel-Aviv: 
Resling Publishing. 
Sasson-Levi, O. (2006). Identities in uniform: Masculinities and femininities in the 
Israeli military [Heb.]. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, Magnes Press.  
Saville-Young, L., & Frosh, S. (2010). And where were your brothers in all this?: A 
psychosocial approach to texts on ‘brothering’. Qualitative Research, 10(5), 511-531. 
Sayad, A. (2004). The suffering of the immigrant. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Schober, P., & Scott, J. (2012). Maternal employment and gender role attitudes: 
dissonance among British men and women in the transition to parenthood. Work, 
Employment & Society, 26(3), 514-530 
Segal, H. (1997). Psychoanalysis, literature and war. London : Routledge and the 
Institute of Psychoanalysis. 
Sela-Shefi, R. (2006). Detachment and engagement: Israelis' everyday verbal 
representations of the Israeli person and the contest for the right to condemn a 
collective identity. Social Identities, 12(3), 325-344. 
Senor, D., & Singer, S. (2009). Start-up nation: The story of Israel's economic miracle. 
New York, NY: Twelve. 
Shafir, G. (1989). Land, labor and the origin of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 1882-
1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
298 
Shafir, G. (1996). Israeli society: A counter view. Israel Studies, 1(2), 214-229.  
Shafir, G., & Peled, Y. (2002). Being Israeli: The dynamics of multiple citizenship. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Shaw, P., & Wong, Y. (1989). Genetic seeds of warfare: Evolution, nationalism, and 
patriotism. Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman. 
Sherwood, H. (2012). Israel PM: illegal African immigrants threaten identity of Jewish 
state. The Guardian. (20 May) Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com 
Shindler, C. ( 2003). Reading the guardian: Jews, Israel-Palestine and the origins of 
irritation. In T. Parfitt & Y. Egorova (Eds.), Jews, Muslims and mass media (pp.157-
177), New-York: Routledge. 
Shlaim, A. (1988). Collusion across the Jordan. New York, NY: Columbia University 
Press. 
Shneer, D., & Aviv, C. (2010). Jews as rooted cosmopolitans: The end of diaspora? In 
K. Knott & S. McLaughlin (Eds.), Diasporas: Concepts, intersections, identities (pp. 
263-268). London: Zed Books. 
Shohat, E. (1991). The Israeli cinema: History and ideology. Tel-Aviv: Breirot. 
Shohat, E. (2003). Rupture and return: Zionist discourse and the study of Arab 
Jews. Social text, 21(2), 49-74. 
Shokeid, M. (1988). Children of circumstances – Israeli immigrants in New York. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Shokeid, M. (1993). One-night-stand ethnicity: The malaise of Israeli-Americans. 
Israel Social Science Research, 10, 23-50. 
Siu, P.C. (1952). The sojourner. The American Journal of Sociology, 58, 34-44.   
Smith, A. D. (1991). National identity. London: Penguin Books. 
 
299 
Smith, A.D. (1999). Myths and memories of the nation. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Smith, A.D. (2001). Nationalism: Theory, ideology, history. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Smoocha, S. (2010). The Israeli society: Like all societies or an exceptional case? 
[Heb.] Israeli Sociology, 11(2), 297-302. 
Sobel, T. (1986). Migrants from the promised land. New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers.  
Stavrakakis, Y., & Chrysoloras, N. (2006). (I can't get no) Enjoyment: Lacanian theory 
and the analysis of nationalism. Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, 11(2) 144-163. 
Stavrakakis, Y. (2007). The Lacanian left – Psychoanalysis, theory, politics. Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press.  
Tanyas, B. (2010). Narratives of migration: Young Turkish identities in the United 
Kingdom. Unpublished doctoral  dissertation). London: Birkbeck College, London 
Taylor, S. (2001). Locating and conducting discourse analytic research. In M. 
Wetherell, S. Taylor & S.J. Yates (Eds.), Discourse as data – a guide for analysis (pp. 
5-48). London: Sage. 
The Ministry of Immigrant Absorption 
http://www.moia.gov.il/Moia_he/ReturningHomeProject [the videos are no longer 
accessible on-line].  
Tyler, I. (2010). Designed to fail: A biopolitics of British citizenship. Citizenship 
Studies, 14(1), 61-74. 
Uriely, N. (1994). Rhetorical ethnicity of permanent soujourners - The case of Israeli 
immigrants in the Chicago area. International Sociology, 9(4), 431-445. 
 
300 
Van den Bergh, P. (1981). The ethnic phenomenon. London/Connecticut/Westport: 
Praeger.  
Vertovec, S. (1997). Three meanings of diaspora, exemplified among South Asian 
religions. Diaspora, 6(3), 277-299. 
Vidacs, B. (2011). Banal nationalism, football, and discourse community in Africa. 
Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 11(1), 25-41. 
Volcan, D. (2002). Large-group identity: Border psychology and related societal 
processes. The German Psychoanalytic Association Annual Meeting, Leipzig, 
Germany 
Walla editorial article. (2012 November 14). Research finding: Israel was ranked as 
the most militarized country in the world. Walla News Website [Heb.]. Retrieved from 
http://news.walla.co.il/?w=/2689/2585834 
Werbner, P. (2002). Imagined diasporas among Manchester Muslims: The public 
performance of Pakistani transnational identity politics. Oxford: World Anthropology 
series, Oxford University 
Wetherell, M., & Potter, J. (1992). Mapping the language of racism: Discourse and the 
legitimation of racism. New York, NY/London: Harvester and the University of 
Columbia Press.  
Willig, C. (2008). Introducing qualitative research in psychology. Maidenhead: Open 
University Press. 
Yablonka, H. (2009) Oriental Jewry and the holocaust: A tri-generational perspective.  
Israel Studies, 14(1), 94-122. 
Yadgar, Y. (2002). From the particularistic to the universalistic: National narratives in 
Israel's mainstream press, 1967-97. Nations and Nationalism, 8(1), 55-72. 
 
301 
Yonah, Y., & Shenhav, Y. (2005). What is multiculturalism? The politics of difference 
in Israel [Heb.]. Tel-Aviv: Babel. 
Yonah, Y., & Saporta, Y. (2002). Pre-vocational education and the making of the 
working class in Israel. In Haver, H. ed., Mizrhaim in Israel: A new critical discussion 
[Heb.] (pp. 68-104). Tel Aviv: Van Leer/Hakibbutz Hameuchad. 
Yuval-Davis, N. (1997). Gender and nation. London: Sage Publications. 
Yuval-Davis, N. (2003). Conclusion: Some thoughts on post-Zionism and the 
construction of the Zionist project. In E. Nimni (Ed.), The challenge of post-Zionism: 
Alternatives to Israeli fundamentalist politics (pp. 182-196). London: Zed Books. 
Yuval-Davis, N. (2006). Belonging and the politics of belonging. Patterns of Prejudice, 
40(3), 197-214. 
Zizek, S. (1998). The seven veils of phantasy. In Nobus. D (Ed.), Key concepts of 
Lacaninan psychoanalysis (pp. 190-218). London: Rebus Press.  
Zrubavel, Y. (1995). The multivocality of a national myth: Memory and counter-
memories of Masada. In R. Wistrich & D. Ohana (Eds.),The shaping of Israeli identity 
(110-128). London: Frank Cass & Co.  
Zuckermann, M. (2007). Between public and personal existence: Transferring the 
holocaust memory. In M. Naor (Ed.), Army, memory and national identity [Heb.] (pp. 
150-160). Jerusalem: The Hebrew University Magnes Press.  
 
  
 
302 
Appendix one: Israel’s Declaration of 
Independence (Retrieved from 
http://www.brijnet.org/israel50/decl-eng.htm )  
ERETZ-ISRAEL [(Hebrew) - the Land of Israel, Palestine] was the birthplace of the 
Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped. Here 
they first attained to statehood, created cultural values of national and universal 
significance and gave to the world the eternal Book of Books.  
After being forcibly exiled from their land, the people kept faith with it throughout their 
Dispersion and never ceased to pray and hope for their return to it and for the 
restoration in it of their political freedom.  
Impelled by this historic and traditional attachment, Jews strove in every successive 
generation to re-establish themselves in their ancient homeland. In recent decades 
they returned in their masses. Pioneers, ma'pilim [(Hebrew) - immigrants coming to 
Eretz-Israel in defiance of restrictive legislation] and defenders, they made deserts 
bloom, revived the Hebrew language, built villages and towns, and created a thriving 
community controlling its own economy and culture, loving peace but knowing how to 
defend itself, bringing the blessings of progress to all the country's inhabitants, and 
aspiring towards independent nationhood.  
In the year 5657 (1897), at the summons of the spiritual father of the Jewish State, 
Theodore Herzl, the First Zionist Congress convened and proclaimed the right of the 
Jewish people to national rebirth in its own country.  
This right was recognized in the Balfour Declaration of the 2nd November, 1917, and 
re-affirmed in the Mandate of the League of Nations which, in particular, gave 
international sanction to the historic connection between the Jewish people and Eretz-
Israel and to the right of the Jewish people to rebuild its National Home.  
The catastrophe which recently befell the Jewish people - the massacre of millions of 
Jews in Europe - was another clear demonstration of the urgency of solving the 
problem of its homelessness by re-establishing in Eretz-Israel the Jewish State, which 
would open the gates of the homeland wide to every Jew and confer upon the Jewish 
people the status of a fully privileged member of the comity of nations.  
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Survivors of the Nazi holocaust in Europe, as well as Jews from other parts of the 
world, continued to migrate to Eretz-Israel, undaunted by difficulties, restrictions and 
dangers, and never ceased to assert their right to a life of dignity, freedom and honest 
toil in their national homeland.  
In the Second World War, the Jewish community of this country contributed its full 
share to the struggle of the freedom- and peace-loving nations against the forces of 
Nazi wickedness and, by the blood of its soldiers and its war effort, gained the right to 
be reckoned among the peoples who founded the United Nations.  
On the 29th November, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly passed a 
resolution calling for the establishment of a Jewish State in Eretz-Israel; the General 
Assembly required the inhabitants of Eretz-Israel to take such steps as were 
necessary on their part for the implementation of that resolution. This recognition by 
the United Nations of the right of the Jewish people to establish their State is 
irrevocable.  
This right is the natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate, like 
all other nations, in their own sovereign State.  
ACCORDINGLY WE, MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLE'S COUNCIL, 
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY OF ERETZ-ISRAEL AND OF 
THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT, ARE HERE ASSEMBLED ON THE DAY OF THE 
TERMINATION OF THE BRITISH MANDATE OVER ERETZ-ISRAEL AND, BY 
VIRTUE OF OUR NATURAL AND HISTORIC RIGHT AND ON THE STRENGTH OF 
THE RESOLUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, HEREBY 
DECLARE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JEWISH STATE IN ERETZ-ISRAEL, TO BE 
KNOWN AS THE STATE OF ISRAEL.  
WE DECLARE that, with effect from the moment of the termination of the Mandate 
being tonight, the eve of Sabbath, the 6th Iyar, 5708 (15th May, 1948), until the 
establishment of the elected, regular authorities of the State in accordance with the 
Constitution which shall be adopted by the Elected Constituent Assembly not later 
than the 1st October 1948, the People's Council shall act as a Provisional Council of 
State, and its executive organ, the People's Administration, shall be the Provisional 
Government of the Jewish State, to be called "Israel".  
THE STATE OF ISRAEL will be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering 
of the Exiles; it will foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its 
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inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the 
prophets of Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its 
inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, 
conscience, language, education and culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of all 
religions; and it will be faithful to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.  
THE STATE OF ISRAEL is prepared to cooperate with the agencies and 
representatives of the United Nations in implementing the resolution of the General 
Assembly of the 29th November, 1947, and will take steps to bring about the 
economic union of the whole of Eretz-Israel.  
WE APPEAL to the United Nations to assist the Jewish people in the building-up of its 
State and to receive the State of Israel into the comity of nations.  
WE APPEAL - in the very midst of the onslaught launched against us now for months 
- to the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve peace and participate in the 
upbuilding of the State on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due 
representation in all its provisional and permanent institutions.  
WE EXTEND our hand to all neighbouring states and their peoples in an offer of 
peace and good neighbourliness, and appeal to them to establish bonds of 
cooperation and mutual help with the sovereign Jewish people settled in its own land. 
The State of Israel is prepared to do its share in a common effort for the advancement 
of the entire Middle East.  
WE APPEAL to the Jewish people throughout the Diaspora to rally round the Jews of 
Eretz-Israel in the tasks of immigration and upbuilding and to stand by them in the 
great struggle for the realization of the age-old dream - the redemption of Israel.  
PLACING OUR TRUST IN THE "ROCK OF ISRAEL", WE AFFIX OUR SIGNATURES 
TO THIS PROCLAMATION AT THIS SESSION OF THE PROVISIONAL COUNCIL 
OF STATE, ON THE SOIL OF THE HOMELAND, IN THE CITY OF TEL-AVIV, ON 
THIS SABBATH EVE, THE 5TH DAY OF IYAR, 5708 (14TH MAY,1948).  
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Appendix two: Information and Birkbeck 
consent forms  
Title of Study: Israeli subjects living 
away from Israel and defining 
national identity. 
 
This study is being conducted as 
part of my PhD in the Department 
of Psychosocial Studies, Birkbeck, 
University of London. The study 
has received ethical approval.  
 
This study wants to explore the ways Jewish-Israeli subjects currently living 
away from Israel relate, define and understand their national identity.  
If you agree to participate, we will set up a convenient time and place for me to 
interview you. The interview will last about an hour. You will be free to stop the 
interview and withraw at any time. In case I find that a second session will be 
important for the enrichment of the material generated in our  first session, a 
follow up meeting will be offered to you. Note, however, that although a second 
meeting might prove to be important for research purposes, you have no 
obligation to take part in in it. A code will be attached to your data so it remains 
totally anomymous and I am obliged by ethical and legal rules to maintain the 
confidentiality of our talk. The analysis of our interview will be written up in a 
report of the study for my degree. You will not be identifiable in the write-up or 
any publication which might ensue.  
This study is supervised by Prof. Frosh and Dr. Baraitser who may be 
contacted at the above address and telephone number.  
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Psychosocial Studies 
BIRKBECK  
University of London 
Malet Street,  
London WC1E 7HX  
020 3073 8045 
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Title of study:  Defining national 
identity away from Israel.  
 
Name of researcher: Yuval 
Moshkovitz  
 
I have been informed about the 
nature of this study and willingly 
consent to take part in it.  
I understand that the content of the interview will be kept confidential and that I 
might be contacted at a later time to be invited to a follow-up interview.   
I understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time and that I'm under 
no obligation to take part in a second meeting if such a meeting is offered to 
me.  I am over 30.  
 
Name:  
Signed:  
Date:  
Tel. Number:  
*E-mail address:  
  
 
 
Department of Psychosocial Studies 
BIRKBECK  
University of London 
Malet Street,  
London WC1E 7HX 
020 3073 8045 
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Appendix 3 - Recruiting participants – the 
research advert  
Hebrew Version  
לע םירבדמ ונחנאשכ םירבדמ םצעב ונחנא המ לע 
?תילארשי תימואל תוהז 
,לארשיל ץוחמ םיררוגתמה ונתיאמ םיבר  ןפואב וא הכורא הפוקתל
.תוהז לש תולאשב םיקוסע עובק 
וכיספ ימדקא רקחמל- םישורד תימואלה תוהזה אשונב יתרבח
 ליג לעמ ,םילארשי םינייאורמ03  עובק ןפואב הינטירבב םיררוגתמה
.ינמז וא .העשכ ךראיו תירבעב םייקתי ןויארה 
ל המ םכל שיו וז היגוסב םיקוסע םכמצע םיאצומ םתא םג םא רמא
ץיבוקשומ לבוי םע רשק ורצ אנא ,אשונב 
33030383-370 וא  yuval.mosh@gmail.com 
English translation 
What do we actually talk about when we talk about  
Israeli National Identity? 
Many of us who live outside Israel for a long period of time or 
permanently are preoccupied with questions of identity. 
Israeli interviewees, above the age of 30, who live in Britain 
permanently or temporarily for over two years, are invited to 
take part in an academic psycho-social research dealing with the 
topic of national identity. The interview will be held in Hebrew 
and will last for approximately one hour.  
If you too find yourselves preoccupied with this topic and you 
have something to say about it, please contact Yuval Moshkovitz 
075-88302810 or yuval.mosh@gmail.com   
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Appendix four: The interview schedule  
 
A general introduction: Hello, we are meeting today to talk about Israeli 
national identity. It is part of my doctorate studies at Birkbeck University.  
A personal background: To start with I will ask you to tell me a bit about 
yourself.  
The general question: what does it mean for you to be an Israeli?  
Identity in context: what does it mean for you to be an Israeli in London?  
Elaboration throughout the interview: [when an interviewee refers to something 
as ‘Israeli’/’very Israeli’] ‘what makes it Israeli? In what way is it ‘Israeli’?  
Motivation to be interviewed: what do you think made you want to be 
interviewed?  
After thoughts/’foot notes’: Is there anything you wanted to add before we end?  
  
 
310 
Appendix 5 – An example of an interview 
transcript – Noga – interview number three  
[Ah, Good morning, I’d like to open up with a rather general question; could you 
please give me a little background of yourself, your life?] 
Background?  
[Some personal description of your ….  
O.k. what kind of description shall I give? I’m 36 years old; I was born in Israel ah… I 
grew up in X, did the scouts, I started the whole process of going ‘outwards’ when I 
was 17 when I went with a scout’s convoy to the States. Ah, the army service, the 
usual, I was an officer, I spent 3 years in the army, I started my studies, did a BA, 
which was a period… I studied economics and sociology I worked for a year as an 
economist and then realized this isn’t....the right direction for me. I went back to 
instruction and then I actually started to work in A {A big high Tec company}. It’s 
already 10 years I work at A… and ehhh whenever I thought of leaving and upgrading 
they offered me something new. Actually, I’m doing the last 6 years as relocations, 
last three years in Vancouver, and three years, no, not three years, two years; it will 
be three years at the end of the year. During this period I got married to my husband 
after moving to North America. I had my daughters born each one in a different 
continent ahhm, that’s it basically.... ahh.... I completed a Masters in Tel-Aviv in the 
course of my work. Shall I talk about my life abroad? Or is it?  
[You may] 
These years were very interesting. The idea was to see a little bit of the world, to live 
outside for a bit, away from home, I’m coming from a small family so the whole family 
thing is very.... intense, and it looked very interesting and we.... I can speak for myself, 
both me and my husband really like big cities, Tel Aviv included, 3 years before we 
moved out {we were living in Tel Aviv} and then we moved to Vancouver and a large 
part, apart from the job, was about travelling. We travel here a lot, we travelled in 
North America, throughout our period there, even after the birth, and when we moved 
here it was a feeling of let’s try, let’s try something new, in a new place. Ah.... at any 
stage ahh... we don’t have any intention of staying. I mean, flatly, our goal is to return 
to Ha’aretz. We are not.... although we went for 2 years and we are almost ending our 
fifth year... five and a half, but we are, again, we haven’t settled down. We didn’t issue 
passports anywhere, we never stayed in a place longer because ‘in a year or two we’ll 
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get the passport’, and it’s really not something that is of interest to us, we left before 
we felt that we cannot stand it anymore there. We left Vancouver in a very good 
feeling. In Vancouver we were also bachelors, for two years, not bachelors, we didn’t 
have children, for two years and it was a very-very different experience, culturally too, 
because we didn’t live in a Jewish area so our integration was much stronger 
comparing to what it looks like here. Also, getting acquainted with what goes on in the 
larger society, around us, being updated with the news etc. it was something we took 
a bigger part in. Our friends there were … Canada is full of Chinese; we had good 
Indian friends, I mean, definitely not Israelis whereas moving here was more ahh... I 
don’t want to use harsh words, but the Israeli Commune here is very strong. So the 
reason for our current location is one, the proximity to work, I mean half an hour door 
to door {using the English expression} to work. Very crucial for me, because of the 
young ones, but we also grasped it very quickly when we walked around: I see this 
guy talking over the phone in Hebrew in the supermarket. We felt that our privacy is 
severed because we used to speak Hebrew everywhere and no one understood us. 
Here it doesn’t exist. So here it’s more a feeling, of living in Israeli communes. It has 
many advantages especially since the girls are still young, ah. And that’s it, for the 
time being. Here too, we continue... our aim is still to travel and get to know and walk 
about and that’s what we do. This is how we spend most of our free time. And 
because... what happened is that we got to know many people of different ages, 
different statuses and what happened is that one of the reasons I said I wanted I’m 
willing... to talk about this topic is because ever since we left Ha’aretz, you constantly 
think about it consciously or unconsciously, It’s something that happens all the time 
including the repetitive question: ‘when do you come back?’. Now with the families it’s 
a different circle, but I don’t think I finish any telephone conversation with anyone, with 
friends without this question being asked. It doesn’t happen. Because we were 
supposed to return this year, but because I was on maternity leave, so I extended it 
{our stay in London} for a bit because I took a relatively long maternity leave so they 
are under the impression: ‘you are not returning. You are staying there’ whereas our 
feelings are very different. Ah, so, part of the thing is that I met Israelis and you talk a 
lot about it, people feel a need, in Vancouver or here, there is an apology etc. and 
why? We messed about with it quite a lot, especially in Vancouver. In Vancouver we 
more or less formalized our position, I did at least, we said what we want and then 
there was less this daily preoccupation with it, but it is something people talk about a 
lot. [ahha] ah, yes, in parentheses, I’m sitting here with a few other moms and we 
meet once a week, we talk about child development with a developmental 
psychologist who coordinates, and we just talked about the issue of identity, that was 
the topic, how do we want to bestow it to our kids.  
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[An Israeli group?]   
Of course {she laughs} an Israeli group. You must also be reminded that we don’t 
have the supportive network of the family, so the friends are turning into the family 
support network. If a child is sick and you need help to get them from nursery or you 
need to someone to pick your child up form nursery, so it’s the friends, there isn’t 
another circle. It also has an additional meaning, I think, in terms of what is the 
meaning of friends and what type of friends do you make, who you connect with. So 
we were just talking about this topic and then I came home and I saw the mail that G 
passed on from you, and it was funny. Because as you’ve said {in the ad} we deal 
with it quite a lot. My elder daughter is two years and 9 months and she talks both 
languages, but from day to day, ah… or here, at home we speak only Hebrew.  
Ah…we... since we intend to go back we don’t spend too much time learning English. 
It happens on its own in the nursery. We also know that it won’t stay and it doesn’t 
bother us. Some split the languages among them and speak both  
[Because the nursery is…] 
The nursery is an English nursery. I tried an Israeli nursery. It didn’t work. It’s an 
English nursery where half of the kids are Israelis but…. She speaks a lot in English, 
she knows…she says everything in both languages and she also knows to approach 
people in their own language. But there are some things that she can’t do in Hebrew. 
If she speaks to her dolls, she will imitate what she says in the nursery, she will not do 
it in... in Hebrew. She will speak the language that she hears. So there is a feeling that 
crops... all of a sudden you hear that she has an accent, things that you say, o.k. how 
do you deal with them? She can also better understand now and Hanukah 
approaches and in her nursery they told us specifically, we don’t really know, and they 
even asked who is willing to come and talk about it. So we are going to take some 
part in it. Not intentionally. So the fact that she didn’t dress up in Purim for three years, 
that’s not the end of the world there are still some years ahead of her but there are 
things that are missing.  
[What do you feel missing?]  
So I’m saying, Hanukah, I’m going to look for a book on Hanukah because they won’t 
talk about it in nursery and if last year we lit up the candles and she really liked the 
candles and I want her to... to understand a little bit more and that. She does come 
back from nursery and says jingle bell, jingle bell and they celebrated Diwali and it’s 
very nice, nice, I think that versatility is a very-very nice thing, she has friends of all 
colors and all languages, She calls her doll Shwaye, {‘slowly’ in Arabic} which is kind 
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of funny {we laugh} that of all the languages, she has an Arab minder, and she got 
attached to this so from that respect it’s very nice to see it, there isn’t any, no kind of 
judgment in any way but ah… we come from a secular house, we don’t keep the 
Shabbat, ah... so we don’t have that ceremony... we celebrate all the holidays 
ourselves, usually with friends etc. but there isn’t this feeling of ah... that atmosphere 
that is created on its own, and the responsibility... if we want her to understand the... 
it’s on our shoulders, so that’s something that I feel that at least in the past year there 
is some change, it’s something that I’m more, I’m taking a bigger part in it. 
[Why over the past year?]  
No, because she is older. Before she didn’t really understand. She started speaking a 
little bit later but I’m more, she also keeps on asking ‘Why’ all the time. I already 
anticipate her asking where is our Xmas tree.  It’s legitimate, it’s o.k. but she only now 
started talking. Ah…  
[So maybe now I will ask you the question… ahh. I’ll ask you the big question ah, what 
does it mean for you to be an Israeli?]  
First of all, I think of the cultural ‘baggage’ we come with... being an Israeli could be… 
starting from words to sentences to different situations you see and you can see 
people’s reaction. I’ll give you an example, I attended recently a 2-3 days’ business 
conference in Rome, where they brought all the sales men and they brought security 
guards from Ha’aretz. Now, you immediately spot them and others around me, sort of 
didn’t know, who are they what are they, and not only this, there was a nice girl, she 
stepped aside to speak over the phone and the guy rebuked her ‘cause she didn’t 
know what he wanted from her. It’s also an effect ... a sort of an Israeli effect, I can’t 
really tell you that I go into, I, we travel here a lot, we get into festivals, they don’t 
check our bags, and not that, sometimes it can be nice and sometimes a little scary. 
Because you know, in the tube here, you have a feeling of safety that is perhaps 
unreal in Ha’aretz but it doesn’t exist here. The way we look at things, I remember that 
in Vancouver we used to sit in front of the television for entire evenings, watch the 
news and be thrilled about how they talk of a squirrel which got stuck on a tree. And 
this is what they talked about throughout the news programme, and we just sat and 
enjoyed ourselves. There was something relaxing about it. I still don’t know, not in 
Vancouver, and not here, what time do they broadcast the news. Let’s say in Ha’aretz, 
if I drive…here I don’t know what time it's on, whereas in Ha’aretz it constantly gets 
into you, it's there all the time. … ahm, I think that Israeli is mainly, ahh my childhood, 
it can be about my daughter, for instance about X or Y (classic TV children 
programmes) as far as I'm concerned because now that she has finished using with 
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her nappies and I wanted to tell her ‘hey you are a big girl now’ so I could show it to 
her because this is my childhood, and it's my culture and I could connect with her. 
And a family, it's very-very close because the main reason for us to go back is the 
family and the friends, all the marriages, all the Briths, births, we've missed a lot out 
and it's missing.  
[What’s missing?] It’s missing, in what sense? [Yes] First of all family-wise, ahh, in 
Ha’aretz there's too much of it but here the nothing is a too nothing. Ah, yes, I would 
like to celebrate the holidays with the family, and I would like to be able to pop once a 
week to say hello and not to be able to speak only through Skype ahh. And if the two 
girls are sick on Saturday morning I would be glad if there was a grandmother that can 
help out, but the kind of help that happens on its own… if we are sick, have someone 
prepare a soup, all kinds of thing… small things.  [ahha]. We have very strong ties 
with the families. Even before I left I used to talk to my parents at least once a day. It 
didn't change. Actually with R's {her husband} parents we used to speak less. In this 
sense the ties now are much closer. And the visits etc. I mean we are not here and 
not there when things are happening. My father was a little bit sick and my mother 
was sick and you are far away [ahha] so there's a feeling… a little bit not good in that 
sense. As far as the friends are concerned… the real friends, the friends you've 
picked up over the years, I mean childhood friends etc. and friends that I know that… 
they'll always be there for me. Ah here we find ourselves a little bit, sort of not having 
the same experience. We pick the friends we want to be with, we know many people 
who connect to others merely out of lack of choice, people who connect to others in 
re-locations in other places which happens a lot. And it wasn't really on our mind, 
having new things, we were kind of snobbish, we weren't kind of interested in new 
friends, Israelis, I mean we have our friends, we kept in touch with them, that's good I 
mean, I don't need new friends. [Friends from Ha’aretz?] from Ha’aretz, yes because 
since we moved here it's a bit different, once again, because of the girls, and there 
are some connections formed through the nursery etc. So some connections were 
made and it has something very nice about it. We still, in my opinion, comparing to 
others, we are less, ahh, less... since we travel a great deal, it's not like every 
weekend I find myself making plans {to meet} which many people do: There's winter 
outside {so we can't go out so let's meet indoors with others} It doesn’t bother me so 
much, we put on warm clothes and go out.  We have quite a big social circle but its' a 
circle we enjoy, I mean, clearly, these are people I'll keep on being in touch with 
because I... I feel that I'm... 
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[You say two things: first of all that perhaps there is a difference between being an 
Israeli in Canada, Vancouver, and being an Israeli in London and... there's also the 
issue of whether you are an Israeli abroad with or without children]  
Regarding the second question you are absolutely right, the first question, I think in 
Vancouver we were with no kids and here with kids and without kids... we came to 
experience the city and live, and really know a certain area as I've said before, if we 
would have come here younger, I wouldn't have lived here because this area, not that 
it's not charming but I would have wanted to live more centrally, more in the downtown 
and experience it differently. Ah so that's in terms of the change. As far as having or 
not having children, there is I think a difference, sure, although, as I've said before, we 
have friends who even when they didn't have children' looked out for this Israeliness. 
Not us. We, but it also depends on our couple relationship. We feel very good with 
each other. Frequently, a re-location can either bring together or separate. It brings us 
together and unifies us, ahh. We very much like to be in each other's company and to 
spend time together so from the start we didn't really look too much for it' ah' but 
[ahha] our  experience is very different because you think of different points of 
consideration which are slightly different. Yes, when we moved here I first went to an 
Israeli nursery because I thought that perhaps it might be easier and more adequate. 
Ah... it didn't work. Because it didn't really match my life style. Many of the Israeli 
women here… 97 of the Israeli women here don't work. They either don’t work at all 
or they work a part time job. I work. I'm the main provider. No doubt I do a full time 
job; even more. The Israeli nurseries are based on the concept of the mother not 
working so it means that the day ends at two or three. They take all the vacations that 
they have here and all the vacations there are in Ha’aretz, including the Day of 
independence. In short, most of the time you find yourself looking for solutions of what 
to do with the child. Another thing that happens is that they do activities with the 
parents, with the mothers, let’s call it this way, with the mothers, and they tell you in 
advance: ‘look, on this and this Friday there's an activity’. Great but if you forget and 
you don't get organized in advance so there's a problem. And it happened. ahh. It 
happened because there was no awareness... bottom line, it wasn't important enough 
for them. But ahh, there was a situation when I left her at home because... I needed a 
child-minder to take her from the nursery and bring her home and it's a sort of a 
solution, so O.K. sometimes I used to leave her at home with the child-minder 
because they didn't tell me, because I'm the only mother that doesn't come to collect, 
because the nursery teacher didn't bother to inform her {the child-minder who came to 
pick her child from nursery}. I think that this entire concept is very-very different, 
whereas in the English nurseries it's another extreme. The nurseries are open until 6 
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pm. So as of 6 pm they go straight to bed, sort of ...they don't have any … I used to 
have a friend, she's still a friend from Z's former nursery, an English nursery too and 
she tells me: ‘half past six she goes to bed’ so... this in itself is delirious... and there I 
have the flexibility, because I always had... you also don't have that thing of ‘come on 
parents, volunteer!’, the English, you won't have this, the unexpected and surprises. 
You'll always know what's going on and when it happens and it's more convenient to 
get organized this way. I think that also in this respect I'm different, from all my friends 
because if you look at my friends, most of them don't work. And it's different too. 
Ahham. 
[How is it manifested in the English nursery?] It is manifested in... Look the English... 
the English nursery  they are: ‘what can you do? The child is in nursery until 6pm 
because we have to work’ and this is how it works. So ok, the kids grow up into this 
and here {with the Israeli nurseries} it's ‘ah, you work? Ah, you have the child minder 
pick up {your child}? it's a pity because kids need their mother to come and pick them 
up form nursery’ or all these feelings, you know, all the guilt feelings that they instill to 
you, which, again if we talk about friends in Ha’aretz, it happens less because in 
Ha’aretz, it’s like everyone is in the same 'pot' even a more difficult 'pot' because in 
Ha’aretz nursery ends at 4 and here at least you have extra 2 hours which makes it a 
little bit more spacious. Ahh. So there is a lot of engagement around, there's really a 
lot, I nursery ends at 3, they always meet with the children, I mean all the activity 
around this which I didn't take a part in, also out of choice. Even if I finish early, I want 
to spend time with her {with her daughter}… here, at home, quietly, I don't need... ah, 
I don’t feel I have to ‘wow, what am I going to do with her. It's 3 pm now, she goes to 
sleep at 8pm, I have many hours to 'kill', I'll meet someone else’. It doesn't happen to 
me. But yes, it does happen a lot, {to others around her} ah, It took me a little more 
time until I got into, into the staff that goes on {finding myself among the non-working 
mothers} but it can still happen ‘let's meet for coffee, -  no it's not relevant as far as I'm 
concerned’. In this respect it's different.   
[When you say that it's not relevant what do you mean?] That either I’m working, or, 
last week I met a... I dropped Z. in the nursery so I met a friend, so she tells me, ‘ah, 
you're here, so come for a coffee’ I told her I'm working, it's just that I'm working from 
home so she tells me ‘you don't really work from home’ I told her ‘yes, you do, it's not 
really different from a normal day of work’ [ahha] ... I remember, though, at some 
other point, that we started discussing this topic, when you meet the people and you 
talk to them, and also with our friends here, I don't think that there is a single 
encounter where this topic of identity doesn't come up. Including when they think that 
we'll return next year, 'it can't be, you'll stay’ people are really disturbed by someone 
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wanting to go back, it disorients them in a way [ahh] it comes up in many 
conversations, non-intentionally around this topic. In Vancouver there were many 
families who came for a year and they explain to you how, a year by year, and the kid 
is now 13 and he doesn't want to go back home now. Now I don't criticize anyone but 
if you've reached a decision, stand by it. Many people we talk with are not whole 
hearted about it so ‘we'll wait another year or the passport, and then another year 
goes by and then they try, sometimes through you… ah…to slightly destabilize you in 
that sense that... I'm regularly being asked to explain why we want to go back to 
Ha’aretz because ‘it's terrible in Ha’aretz, really terrible, you work terribly hard, life is 
terribly hard’ because here it's really 'a piece of cake'. There are advantages and 
disadvantages here and advantages and disadvantages there. It's all true, I'm not one 
of these people saying ‘they went back {to Israel} and now they want to return {to 
England}’. And those that say all the time how difficult and difficult and difficult  
[How do you explain it?]  
Because people are…I, I, I, I think here there is... at least the life in England, at least 
where I live, the Israeli community, we are in a sort of a dissonance, you chose to live 
in another place of your own choice, fine but the ah. The sort of Israeli ghetto that we 
have here? It's not only that you... you don't really live in England, you live in … Israel 
within London, and reading newspapers, it's Ynet {Israeli news web site}, it's only 
Israeli TV, ah... I don't know how many of them know what's going on in England, I 
don't either but, once again, out of choice because I don’t choose to live here, there's 
no integration, I mean, everyone can tell me, I don't have a clue but I always call 
someone {and they tell me} where is the Israeli hairdresser, the Israeli car mechanic 
the... ahh everything is Israeli. So for me it's a sort of a lie. If you chose to live here, 
live, right, be a part of… who ever lives here at the moment. But everyone choose to 
live in the same place, be in the same place, kind of really want to belong etc. but it's 
sort of obstructing. How many English friends do we have here? The few I've made in 
the nursery? And because the English are so 'heavy', we didn't yet get to the situation 
where they came home for a visit. I can't fix a date two weeks in advance, its' a bit 
difficult for me this contrast I don't know if you know but you can't meet someone in 
the nursery and invite them over to your house. You have to preplan not two days but 
two weeks in advance so it’s very different from the Israeli thing.  Think that merely 
from being here you… you put efforts into feeling... feeling Israeli, ah or Jewish in 
some of the situations, but mainly to feel Israeli because it's not…you have to be one, 
just one out of…  
[What do you mean? One of what?]  
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There are many, many all sort of, in Vancouver too and here there are many 
immigrants. You have people of all sorts and each one lives in a fixed area, but it's not 
different in Vancouver, in Canada. There are no Canadians, there's no such thing as a 
Canadian, it can be that he's an Indian but there isn't, there isn't an individual who's 
Canadian, it doesn't exist. It’s an immigrants’ state. Here too they speak about it, that 
Europe and London, they do not belong to the English anymore, when you walk in 
London how many English do you see. I work in a company with English, how many 
English do I see? Not too many. So everyone comes from somewhere and the first 
question they ask you everywhere... is where are you from, they will always ask me 
where I'm from.  
[Who will ask you?] 
Even people that know you, here for example I just got back from the gym and they 
talked about it that in Xmas they are closing so they asked ‘you are going home?’ yes. 
‘Where is home?’, ‘where is home?’, ‘where is home?’ One from Denmark, one from 
Italy and I said Israel, so they said, what? You are from Israel? Not from France? No 
I'm from Israel. But the fact was that it was a question that was asked and I think that 
even here, in this country this topic of immigration… the child-minder where is she 
from. Romania, you immediately ask where from [ahha] it's a very important thing. 
People are looking to belong, I think that's the thing, I think that… here, it's also 
because of the kids because they constitute some sort of a mirror and you ask 
yourself where do you want them to be? In what culture do you want them to grow? 
My parents made Aliya {immigrated to Israel} from Romania. They will always be 
immigrants [when did they make Aliya?] in the 70's. my mother was a teacher so her 
integration was a little bit better, the language in school, but my father… until now he 
watches Romanian television, so for him Romania is the centre of the world it's 
amusing ahh but for me there is something missing, the fact that my parents’ culture 
and my culture weren't the same. I had many clashes with my father about the scouts 
or else… things that I went through with them that as far as he was concerned were 
meaningless because he didn't go through it and it's… now I am certain that if my kids 
will grow up in Ha’aretz they will not have the same experience that I went through 
because the world has changed, everything has changed but the basic things of the 
culture are there…. Ah if Z {her daughter} comes and say to me Sababa or Ahla 
{slang words in Hebrew meaning that everything is fine, ok, the second word is in 
Arabic} [you are Mabsuta…. {the Arabic word for happy, content}] yes, she is Mabsuta 
and I am Mabsuta because it’s part of something that I want to keep and there's no 
doubt that if I will stay here, there are some advantages to staying here, I don't say 
there aren't, but she will gradually… I mean people who stay here send their kids to 
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Sunday school because the Hebrew gets a little worn out and you need and extra 
factor to help you maintain this identity. And I don't want to get there, I mean right now 
I don't [you don't want to get there…?] to the stage where I have to send her to 
Sunday school. I think that one of the things I talked about with some friends 
regarding the identity, one of the conclusions is that if you want to maintain the identity 
you have to take a very active process, very, constructing the identity whereas in 
Ha’aretz it doesn't happen.  
[So what kind of active processes, do you, sort of, take?]  
So, once more,  
You have to keep in mind that Z. is not 3 yet. Ah, At home it's only Hebrew. All her 
books...no...She also has some books in English. But since she doesn't see 
{understand} the letters so it doesn't really matter. All the songs she hears are in 
Hebrew ah... so her cultural experience at home is clearly, clearly Hebraic – Israeli. 
Not something else. Yes we work very strongly, it's about birthdays {using the English 
word} so we explain what's this birthday thing is all about, so it won't be only in 
English. I think we try to balance it and for instance I have to do something on 
Hanukah. I don’t have a clue how to explain to her about the Greeks and the Makabim 
or whatever so that we’ll create some sort of atmosphere around her, ahha,   Here 
everybody goes to Ha’aretz for Xmas because there’s a vacation of a month, so we 
plan to meet there and I’m curious to see how she will react. It’s a bit weird; she 
knows all the children and all the family very-very closely. She loves looking at the 
photos and she points to different people {of the family} We speak a lot on Skype, 
everyone has been here, we were there not long time ago, so she really understands 
and she knows that Yonathan and Shira (Hebrew names) are here {in England} and 
seeing them in Ha’aretz, I’m interested to see how she will respond to it. Perhaps it’s 
only me, but it could still be slightly different. That’s it, other staff? I can’t tell you that 
we made the decision to light candles every Friday, although it did cross my mind {we 
laugh} but ah, we are not there yet, but once more, I think that the way we conduct 
ourselves... we taught her to count in Hebrew without knowing that in the nursery they 
taught them to count in English. She just told us the numbers in English, one, two, 
three, so every day we count. She chooses what language we start with and we count 
using the other language. She leant ABC, it’s a little tricky in Hebrew because there 
isn’t a clipy song about the letters but, bottom line, we don’t put an effort on the 
English it happens on its own in the nursery but I can tell you that we’ve learnt all the 
English nursery songs. Every day she comes with a song and we’ll look for it on 
UTube, ahh... that’s it….  
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[so tell me, what is it for you, ahh’ in some ways you’ve already talked about it, you 
said... somehow, but I’ll ask it more directly, what is it for you to be an Israeli in 
London. Yes.]  
Ahh, I’m working in a company which is English but related to another Israeli 
company. It also relates to the conference I’ve already told you about. A guy, we were 
talking of companies in Europe, and there was a sentence he’d say, ‘Israel is not the 
centre of the world’, Israelis have the feeling [is he Israeli?] German, [A {her company} 
is an American company, no?]  yes but still fifty percent is Israeli, all the most senior 
directorate is, all the middle rank directorate, and if you travel to Europe, there are 
about 15 countries {where the company has branches in} and very few of the local 
directorate are locals, the directors are Israeli, the more lower ranked workers are 
locals and there are some in the middle rank positions but still most of the directors 
are Israeli. And then you have the feeling of ‘what do you mean by saying that Israel is 
not the centre of the World?’ to start with it is! But it’s also funny because every Israeli 
he told it to, gave him the same answer [‘for sure, we are the centre of the world’] yes, 
and then later when he said it in the larger forum, when the main speaker said it {an 
Israeli} he already got pissed off. And it was funny because you still have that feeling 
that although you come from this little Israel into the big world, still, you are the centre 
of the world. We were in Vancouver, it was during the second Lebanon war, and here 
we had the flotilla. And it means that so many things happen which you have to …I 
don’t have an explanation, not only do I not have a good explanation, I also don’t 
justify what goes on but also seeing how it’s being broadcasted, like in Vancouver we 
saw, here too, but you are always have to defend and the world is always split, and 
you see it everywhere into those who love you and those who don’t love you.  And 
here there are many Jews, everywhere, so you go about ‘ah, really, my mom lives in 
Herzliya, and I still remember that we walked in Montreal, a sort of France in Canada 
and... Someone came up to us and asked us if we are from Paris and we said ‘no, we 
are from Israel’ you could really see the disappointment on his face and he said: ‘ahh, 
because the way you dress, it looks like you are from Paris [ahha,] ahhh... {The child-
minder comes in with her other child so there’s an intermission in the interview} 
Remind me what was the last sentence I said? [you were talking about the man from 
Montreal’s face] yes, you could see that he was really disappointed [but how do you 
understand this disappointment?] because we are Israelis and it was in the midst of 
the war... there wasn’t anything special [did he say something special?] no. you could 
see it on his face ‘it’s just that by the look of your clothes I thought you were from 
Paris and he just turned and walked away when initially he turned to us for a 
conversation.   Ahh so I repeat, If I would have worked in an English company it could 
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have been less comfortable. You have to remember that we are in an Israeli company 
so everyone is very cautious. And there are many Israelis around so it’s not that 
someone will approach me and say ‘what’s that thing?’ {The war, the flotilla etc.}. 
Especially in London, even if they do think so, they wouldn’t say anything. You also 
know the people on a slightly more personal level, they know you as a human being, 
and you don’t represent something much bigger. I think that this is the thing: you go 
abroad and you become an ambassador voluntarily or involuntarily. Many times I don’t 
have, not the will and I don’t support many of the things that happen. But it’s totally 
irrelevant and I find myself having to talk and explain because… [Can you give me an 
example?] ah’ during the war... {The 2nd Lebanon war} it was very difficult, very-very 
difficult to be so far away. There’s a war and now I remember that our feeling was 
that... I used to work very-very hard. I don’t have even five spare minutes for a break, 
ahh I didn’t have five minutes. Frequently you tell yourself, o.k. I have five minutes 
what do I do with it, R. {her husband} for example logs onto Ynet {an Israeli news’ 
website} and gets the updates, and it was a very intense period, and I log onto Ynet to 
see what happened  and I’d know that something happened. A guy worked next to me 
{an Israeli worker in Vancouver} ... they already went back to Ha’aretz a year ago, and 
he was… every time he walked into the room I’d be afraid he’s going to say something 
bad happened. And then the war broke and it was very scary because all the friends 
were recruited to the army ahh. R. because he was already 3 years away from 
Ha’aretz he was discharged {from his regiment} [but he's abroad? Yes but there were 
others who went back, there were also those who went back [what do you mean? 
Some people who went back to the army on their own initiative?] Yes. Now there is... 
once more, you are not in Ha’aretz so everything looks different, so it was just terrible 
[so was there a sort of a dilemma, a thought that he might go back to join the army?] it 
didn't come up because his regiment, he's not there regularly and he was in the air 
force so if you don’t get regularly updated in new aircraft and new material, so It's not 
relevant so when we decided {to stay} it was clearly irrelevant {for him to go back to 
the army} it didn't come up but you call and this friend's husband, and her boyfriend, 
and everyone is in the army [ahh] and it's so stressful. Very-very stressful. [And do 
you get... they give you a feeling that you are out of it?] Yes! [That you don't belong] 
Yes! Yes! Yes! As if you ran away, and I always find it funny this thing with the ‘why 
didn't you stay there?’ because, bottom line, it's already five years {since we've left}. 
We could have had a Canadian passport, ‘why didn't you stay for the passport, just in 
case’, a sort of feeling ‘that you might have a place to ran away to’ [who asks?] many 
people in Ha’aretz and many of the friends here. Many people here, now for example 
there is ‘a wave’ of passport receivers, ahh, ‘so that you'll have somewhere to ran 
away to’, ‘that you'll have another passport, another possibility’ all the time, all the 
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time. [actually it looks to me as if you always have very confusing messages, on the 
one hand ‘you probably won't come back’ or that they don't think you'll come back and 
on the other hand, stay, have a passport] yes, ask anyone, at least my friends, 
everyone would like to stay in Ha’aretz, to try out what we are doing [everyone will 
want to…]  sorry, everyone would like to go away and it's a kind of a dissonance, and 
if you ask me what is it to be an Israeli this is also a part of being an Israeli.  
Wanting to live in Ha’aretz but being abroad too. That is you have to live in Israel and 
want to be abroad and never admit it, I mean even the friends that went back {to 
Israel}, we have 3 couples, good friends of ours who say that to go back is Sababa {a 
slang word for ‘fine’} their answer is 'the kids flourish, the kids flourish' for you {the 
adults} it'll be o.k.’ [I laugh]. That's how they look at it, they will never admit that this is 
THE place, everyone looks back, outwards {abroad} [they will not admit that ISRAEL 
is the place?] yes, they will still be, many people go back because one among the 
couple, usually the woman, the husband would like to stay, there is a feeling that 
…...you know we frequently laugh about it now: here we travel a lot we don't have a 
problem where to choose to go. Our joke is: we'll go back home, where can we travel 
to? How many times can you go to the Sataf? {A spring on the outskirts of Jerusalem}. 
but it's true, in many ways Ha’aretz is very small ah... and our life here and our 
friends’ lives in Ha’aretz, are very different. I sometimes see my friends {in Israel}, 
they meet with the kids and they travel sometimes to the sea side, sometimes having 
a camping trip and we go to X or Y, to Paris. Very different. A totally different 
experience. Now when I think about it I ask myself, it's fun {having these trips in 
Israel}, where did we leave our tent, I mean, and my friends think that we live in a 
movie and every time we send pictures {they say} ‘you live in a movie’ [what are the 
reactions?] ‘Your life is {sweet} like homey’, ‘your life is tranquil and fun’ everything... 
everything is glamorous. They think that everything is glamorous abroad. My daily life 
is not less difficult than the daily in Ha’aretz. Ah I have a sister in law that says that... 
she doesn't … she can't have it without the family around her, not being helped. I 
have help here; I just have to pay for it. In Israel the feeling is that ‘you have a 
grandma so she'll babysit the kids and she'll come and watch them and if it doesn't 
work out you get terribly disappointed. I don't have it here; I pay for it and step out of 
this dilemma, but ahh. But ‘the daily hardship doesn’t exist here {in England}’ this is 
the message we get. So friends we talk to, that talk to you, they want you to be in that 
pot, a bit like: ‘how long are you going to stay there in your great-fun-life and send us 
your pictures, and make us a little bit jealous?’, ‘what's happening?’ {‘Wake up’}. It's 
funny because every year, when we considered moving here, there was always a 
need to explain. I don't have to excuse myself for decisions {I make}! Even if we would 
decide to stay it's my decision. I mean, you always have to go around and explain 
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{give an account} [to whom do you have to explain?] usually it's the friends, not the 
family [what do they say?] the parents: what is it about going away but they are also 
those who encourage us ‘stay, stay’ {abroad}. [Your parents or R's?] Both, I mean I 
think that they are far away and they don't see much of the girls but in terms of… 
seeing the world. Both I and R have grown a lot in terms of... I mean that is the reason 
we moved here. We moved here because I was offered a job that will enable me to 
return to Ha’aretz in a better condition {professionally and economically} or R. right 
now, is working so they see things in a slightly different way ahh although friends, 
aside from a very-very good friend of mine, who also got back from a relocation in 
Orlando and tells me, you'll really enjoy getting back. It's so fun here, I don't know, I 
think that everyone would have liked, because of the hardship… in Ha’aretz [what 
hardship?] look, everyone says that you work really-really hard. Now, I always 
believed that it's a little bit up to you because if you are willing to work every day until 
8 pm so they will keep you at work until 8 pm. No problem. I am also working in a 
company where they work very-very hard and there will always be an event {to attend 
to}. When R. was working in A. he used to see around him workers calling their wives 
{telling them} ‘we have to stay back, there’s something very urgent in work’ and then 
play solitaire. [We laugh] so, you can't admit that you it's more difficult at home, that's 
one thing but saying that you must stay at work every evening? Ok. So there are 
certain periods {that you have to stay later at work} but… look, both in Vancouver and 
here, you can still have one person working and live well out of his/her salary. In 
Ha’aretz it doesn't exist. You must have both people working all the time... which does 
have implications. The weekends here, are much longer because we don't have a 
family here so you don't have this meal here and that meal there, and also because 
on Fridays, at 4 -5 pm. That's it. It's silent, whereas in Ha’aretz, just imagine Thursday 
evening. You get back home with ‘your tongue out’ {exhausted}... the days off here, 
it's a sort of an illusion that here in Ha’aretz or here there are more days off [??] we've 
counted, for sure, we've counted how many, basically, when the {Jewish} holidays are 
not greatly scheduled, you have the same number of days off and when the holidays 
are spread superbly [in the middle of the week...] in the middle of the week, so we are 
very well off {in Israel}.  Here it's that you just have more respect to the distinction 
between work and family, whereas in Israel people {from work} don't have any 
problem calling me to request something whereas if I have to call Ha’aretz on a 
Friday, {I won't call} ‘even if the world collapses’, I mean I don't want to intrude on 
people's weekend, because I got used to this concept here. In Ha’aretz it doesn't 
exist. Ahh, you also have, I think that the weather too, that heat. When I arrived from 
Vancouver and they {a car} almost ran me over on a pedestrian crossing because I 
assumed that I'm on a pedestrian crossing so the vehicle will stop. In Ha’aretz it's not 
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like that, it's a road war, so it immediately becomes... whereas I remember the first 
time in Vancouver and there were four ‘stop’ signs and no body moved {their cars} 
because they waited for me because it was my turn {as a pedestrian}. It's different 
much more quiet [ahha]. Here on the other hand, for me, English people are Israelis in 
suits, I don't see any difference [hhm] yes [yes? You don't see a difference between 
Israelis and English?] Yes, they are not polite, not nice, they don't say anything. In my 
first day here, once again, I find it funny, because I got used to it in Vancouver, that 
they'll hold the door for me, Here I got the door slammed in my face, I bumped into the 
door because the manager who went past me simply closed the door, he finished 
passing and closed it. So it's about politeness too. When I was pregnant, I used to, 
regularly, people used to sit on seats designated for pregnant women. I always had to 
make someone stand and the looks they'd give me, they never see you, you're 
transparent. In Ha’aretz, I think people are a bit more aware, but... they are not that 
nice {the English} the bureaucracy here is impossible. We came from Canada, it's like 
the USA, it's a service mentality, and you are the customer so you are the king. Here 
when they tell you that it will take 6 weeks to connect you to the internet, what is it? A 
third world country? They close your bank account because there is no verification, 
{so} let me know, ‘no we can't let you know because we closed your account, we can't 
send you mail’. ‘So call me over the phone’, no you can't. So how am I supposed to 
know about it?’ ‘Now you know’. It's the kind of answers you get, very similar to 
Ha’aretz in this respect, ahh we were sure that going on a re-location is 'easy-peasy' 
and it was very difficult for us at the beginning. The first 6 months were very difficult. 
As soon as we realized that we are really in a larger country and there are a lot of 
places to hang around, and the public transportation is advanced and many things 
that happen, in Ha’aretz… ahhh, don't happen in Ha’aretz, do happen here.  But 
basically, I don't feel a difference in the level of privacy, by the way once again, we 
are an international company and the main staff is based in Ha’aretz and works with 
different people and there's one English woman, that if we forget for a minute her 
English {the language} let her speak in Hebrew… they {the staff in Israel} they are 
shocked by her because they are used to speaking English and being super polite 
and she, just like an Israeli, and all her energy and nerves and all that staff. So I see 
some similarities, at least in these matters…So what was the question? [We started 
off with being an Israeli in London and I think that you are talking about the specifity of 
London regarding Israelis and how you are defining it] but there is something in it, R. 
started now going with suits and ties and he really enjoys it. It has something 
dignified, it's more than merely a decoration, and everything looks slightly more 
beautiful even though deep inside it's all the same... and an Israeli in London… it's 
about hiding a bit because in Vancouver for example I would go to an area of Arabs 
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and there were Shawarmas {meat wrap} everywhere and here I don't dare. I'm afraid 
[why?] it's scary, there are many-many-many Arabs, they don't… how shall I say it… 
they are not friendly… once more, I don’t like to say Arabs, it's a little inclusive and a 
little bit... it doesn’t bother me that Z. connects with an Arab friend in nursery and I 
have another friend whose best friend in Iranian, go figure it out, you have to face 
these challenges at the very early stages of life and of course it's excellent and I don't 
have any problem with it, but I'll tell you that if I'll go to a mall and everyone will wear a 
cover it doesn’t give me… it makes you a twitch in you tummy. They could be 
charming women… I remember traveling in Turkey, close to the borders of Iran and 
we took a transit with women with covers. 10 minutes go by, Tack, they take of their 
covers, take out the food and start chattering and everything is nice. I mean, {here in 
London} they are people like us, who arrived… the politics is there and we are here on 
a different level. If they would let us run things, but it's still scary. It's scary because 
you are afraid here [and what's the difference between being an Israeli in terms of the 
Arab groups in Vancouver and here, in what is it different?] in Vancouver there are 
less. You don't see them in such quantity all the time, all the time, all the time. Ahh 
and again it could be that in Vancouver I didn't have children so that's a part of the 
thing too [how come?] because you don't only have to take care of yourself, but you 
have small ones too. When you are alone, and I'll go into a restaurant and I'll eat so 
Sababa {no problem} but sitting with the girls is not something I'd like. So once again I 
find it funny, you buy something and you step into a shop and say Humus and 
immediately they know who you are, you can't hide it too much [the way you 
pronounce it?] sure because here they say Humus or something else, they all Tabule, 
Tabuli, they say it differently, I mean if you speak... that's it. You're lost!  [O.k. did you 
ever have such incident regarding the ... let's call it the...] there wasn’t an incident but 
I remember in Vancouver, near our office there was a Lebanese restaurant, very nice, 
and during the war {with Lebanon} I went with another guy and I said, they'll put 
something in our humus, as soon as they know that... It's not something that I, met in 
a trip, I didn't come across anything like that except that incident I told you about with 
the French {the man who walked away in Montreal once they said they are from 
Israel} who, actually didn't do anything, he just turned and went away. Yes, ahh. 
There wasn't ... I didn't stumble across some sort of... but there were these anti-
Jewish demonstrations and they did a… a counter supportive demonstration in 
Trafalgar, it was a year ago, [anti-Jewish demonstrations?] yes, yes anti…. Israeli 
[Israeli?] anti-Israeli, yes and then... [You mean during the war in Gaza?]  Yes right so 
once more, it's what goes on around us, we said ‘let's go’ [you didn't go...] no, 
whereas in Ha’aretz there is no way I wouldn't go {to a demonstration}. So it means 
that... [‘No way you wouldn't go to what?] if I'd like to go to a demonstration or 
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something else, if I want to voice my views, I wouldn't be afraid, [here} I'll be cautious 
from places that are... because they are a little bit un… but no, we didn't have an 
incident here. On the contrary, there is something else [what do you mean on the 
contrary?] no because for instance, some friends of mine, other people me met in 
Vancouver or here, they are really interested to hear about Israeliness and Jewish 
identity and what it's about…. And what do you do. We talk about it, because they are 
a little bit more open, because they moved away too, they are immigrants too, they 
also moved to other countries, and they know us as humans so it's different [???]. {A 
telephone rings} I'm trying to remember what it was, but yes, it's something that I 
miss, a sense of more security. Although they say that in Ha’aretz you are not secure, 
here you don’t have a sense of security. You have something because you know that 
you are surrounded by Israelis, by Jews and all that and some people repress it, but 
the fact that you are in an international society, we had a conference and a client from 
Indonesia spoke, and told about the Ramadan and she explains that in Ramadan it's 
a holiday for the family, people get closer to each other and travel to meet each other 
and then people around are whispering ‘and there are bombings’, so each side sees 
the holidays in a different way, and honestly, because we live here we can see it in 
another light [see what?] another culture, to what it's actually about, Ramadan, 
because it's true ‘the Ramadan, they don't eat and they commit attacks’ this is what in 
Ha’aretz, this is what people think. You don't really stop to ask yourself what do they 
actually do? What does this holiday mean to them [ahha] and there are other things. 
So I kind of have an advantage [over the ones in Israel} because of the distance, 
abroad, excuse me {telephone rings again, she answers and talks to a friend of her 
and tells her that she will call her before Shabbat breaks}. You too {meaning herself} 
by being here, many of your prejudices are wiped out, so to speak, because they don't 
have justification. There is a difference between what you see on TV and when you 
have a person standing in front of you, and I hope I can pass this on {to my kids}, 
pass it on. [Do you feel that something in your perception of the Israeli-Arab conflict 
has changed as a result of this move?] No. I am talking about all that ahh... I don't find 
myself in all that mess any way, the war and all that. It looks to me like a terrible 
errorה. And to repeat, if they expect me to … I can't explain it to myself, I mean there 
was the flotilla affair and I say… it's lucky that I don't have anything positive to say 
about it [did anyone ask you about it?] no, no one asked and if in other occasion I 
might raise the issue myself, here I didn't raise it, because what can I say? It's not 
good? There wasn't any good explanation for all this. I must say that here the 
conversation around the identity replaces the conversations on... [politics] that are 
frequently run in Ha’aretz, because you talk about it a lot. In my house too {my 
family's house} if... in our house we are half-half {the political orientation of the family 
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members} there have always been 'wars' {around political issues} so now we talk 
about other things, when we visit you don't talk about it [about politics?] no. it's not 
something I am used to {avoiding talking about politics}. For the first time in my life I 
missed the elections, I always came to vote, so we missed the elections. Although we 
did consider whether to come or not, so that's a part of the issue too: how much you 
see yourself engaged. I remember that there was a debate whether to allow people to 
vote abroad. To whom do you give the right to vote? It's a complicated question, it's 
difficult to answer it from here because it would be preferable to be able to vote {when 
living abroad} but may people like me, who don’t really live in Ha’aretz…and then you 
ask that question. But the decision... It's an essential question how much power would 
you give to people who don't really live in Ha’aretz [ahha] they ask me what's an 
Israeli? An Israeli is someone who lives in Israel... we traveled a lot and we were in all 
these places, Los Angeles and all these places where groups of Israelis live. It's not 
for real. It's living in Israel only in a different place. It’s something, slightly, not … real. 
Let's say that you are in another place and you live in a very-very closed way. Here 
too, the Bnei-Brak {an ultra-religious town in Israel} next to us [what do you mean? 
Golders Green? Hendon?] it's really Bnei-Brak [in what way?] all the familiar things, 
and all the things from Ha’aretz, you have a supermarket like in Ha’aretz, only it's 
here. In Vancouver we didn't live where the Jews were. The truth is that you also had 
a supermarket where you could find the soup almonds; you could always find the 
basic things. In my daughter's nursery... so you know how addictive it is to buy the 
Rogalach (pastries} and the Shabbat's Challah, and the Krembos {a sweet} or other 
staff you don't really need but also the... [A {her company} where is it in Israel?]…. In 
Raanana and Hod Hasharon (Israeli towns) [I thought that it might be close to Bnei-
Brak, do you know Bnei-Brak?] sure, R. is originally from P. {a nearby town} he thinks 
this town {Bnei Brak} should be demolished. Ahh in Tel-Aviv, if there are traffic jams, 
you go through there so [are they different the… {meant to ask about the difference 
between the local and the Bnei-Brak religious communities}] Sure, because I know... 
A few years ago, I used to work with a guy, who made Aliya? {immigrated to Israel} a 
religious guy, he didn't wear all black but had a kippa {a Jewish religious head cover} 
and kept all the … {rules} and I remember him saying that what's so difficult for him is 
that he doesn't have a weekend, anymore. Because here, they had the Friday, 
Saturday and the Sunday and {there} it doesn't exist anymore and he says ‘it kills me’. 
And it's amazing that what bothers you, finally are these things, and it's true because 
if you ask me why people stay here, they stay because of the economic convenience 
or because they want to get away from the family, which is legitimate. No problem or, I 
don't know… but it's about something specific in your life which attracts you. He's still 
in Ha’aretz, that guy but he says ‘I'll never get used to it’, and it's like me, here, still, 
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the fact that on Friday I don't have that silence, it drives me crazy. When I come to 
Ha’aretz, I go outside on Friday to hear the silence [whereas here there's no silence] 
no silence, you don't have it any time, except form Xmas and then people are stuck in 
their houses [is there anyone religious in your family?] no [I'm asking because of the 
phone call when you said that you'll call before Shabbat breaks in] no, that girl is 
religious, that's it. So once again, because we've decided that we are going back, so 
when you ask me why do people constantly ask us about it, I think that it's happening 
because we are so confident and people are hesitant and they want to know what you 
are so confident about... I think that this is also a part of the thing but I must admit that 
I really don't want… I don't want... I want my kids to have my identity, that our basic 
identity is similar. There is a delay {due to the generations gap} but that's o.k. and that 
each one will have a passport {another passport} [so that...] in case they have to ran 
away {she laughs} if they'll have to ran away, so yes, they have passports. [it sounds 
like this condition between two forces, between those {in Israel} who ask you ‘when do 
you come back’ and those {abroad} who ask you ‘why do you go back' or ‘what are 
you going back for’, so your decision if you go back really influences how your view 
the place here and the way you look at what goes on in Ha’aretz...] that's right, that's 
right, they talked to me about re-locations: she described to me the diagram of the 
relocation process: at first the place you moved to is the best in the world. Ha’aretz 
sucks. Then there is a period when it's ‘Ha’aretz is the only place {to live}’ ‘only in 
Ha’aretz’, ‘only in Ha’aretz’, and then it evens up. So to what direction does it turn that 
depends on where you see your life continuing, but you arrive at a point where you 
know the advantages here and there and you reach a decision. And it's true. But, still, 
I say that we still have to explain it {our position regarding going back or staying} on a 
weekly basis here and there {in Israel}. All the time, all the time. It's on this level that 
here, now we've had to extend our daughter’s nursery and I told him {her husband} 
you know it allows us and he says yes I know {I think that she talks about being able 
to apply for a residency after living here more than 3 years} [are there nuances 
between the two of you?] R. is more… in Canada, I said, let's start going through the 
process {of getting a passport} we'll have a passport. There is a preliminary process, 
like here and then you get residency status and I told him let's start with this. It's not a 
big financial investment and he said ‘absolutely no, not for any money in the world’, he 
wouldn't hear of it, he was even more than… on the other hand, now I told him ‘you 
know, they opened now an office in New Jersey’ and he said, why don't you check if 
we can move there? I asked him ‘what do you mean moving to New Jersey?’ so I 
think that there are nuances, still he would... truth is me too. He would be willing to live 
some other place yes, but not getting too rooted. If there will be an opportunity some 
other place, he will be willing to... me, no... I don't think, I talked to my brother this 
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week and he says to me, perhaps you could go to Paris. It's very convenient for him 
that I'm here. I told him, ‘what do you mean Paris? Forget about Paris, will you?’ For 
him it's convenient those people who move from one place to the other. But I think 
that R. is more open, I'm more... [The official contract with A. is?] the contract is for 3 
more years and then I can become a permanent worker {in London} [and then...] and 
then, my father who ran away from Romania, insisted on issuing us Romanian 
passports, so I have a Romanian passport that allows me in any case to stay here. 
But ahh, yes I can stay [how does the fact that your dad came from abroad, from 
Romania, to Israel, made Aliya to Israel, how does it come about family wise {you 
being here}?]  They see It more as a career opportunity, this is how they present it 
and I don't correct them [present it?] outwards. Yes, they know that we don't want to 
stay, they ask us, I mean, ahh I don't know, it's also amusing because we had some 
good friends of ours for a visit an I told,, I said that we'll extend {our stay} most likely 
and that I'll also take maternity leave and it's something that I also told my mom but he 
met my parents later in the Tel-Aviv promenade and he told her something like ‘so 
they don't come back, ah?’ and then my mom immediately called on her way back 
home and said to me ‘what did you tell him that I don't know?’ [Who did she speak 
to?] A good friend of mine who was visiting us here, they are also on a re-location and 
they visited us here, and he met my mother. Now he was stressed out lest he told her 
something new she didn't know about and my mom was stressed out about what he 
knows – if we intend to stay or something like that. I told her ‘no, it's just as you 
usually say, as you already know, I am most likely prolonging {my stay in London} 
because of the maternity leave’ and she says ‘ah’. But this is probably stemming from 
my mother always wanting to know first. My father can try to persuade me why it's 
better to stay, but his approach was always different than mine. I mean if I would have 
said ‘I'm coming back because of you’ he wouldn't accept it, they always saw it as a 
leap in my career. The truth was that it did combine, so it's not disconnected from the 
reality, but that wasn't the real cause, and that's how it's being presented. I meant, if I 
wanted to go back because of him, he doesn’t get younger every day. That’s a part of 
it too, so he wouldn't like this answer. [You mean formally?] not formally [or would he 
really not like that reason?] you know what, only formally {he wouldn't like this reason} 
he enjoys a lot me being there, and indeed it did affect the family, my brother told me 
‘promise me that you'll have 3 children so that if one of them decides to go away so 
the second one wouldn't be left alone with it [how many brothers and sisters are you?] 
we are two and we were... we are very-very close to each other, once again we don't 
have a very-very close family {in Israel} [where does he live?] in Ha’aretz but all the 
burden… I mean, what's burden… visiting the parents and the daily happening etc. he 
has to carry it, basically, [so he makes you vow to have 3 children so that if one of 
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them moves away the burden can be split] because as far as he's concerned, that's a 
part of the whole thing. [If he could, would he move away too?] No. if he would have 
wanted? I don't... it's more difficult for him because his wife immigrated from Argentina 
when she was 10 but before coming to Ha’aretz, they moved to the States and then 
they came. All this was very traumatic for her, it was traumatic when she was young 
so for her moving an apartment is a nuisance, so when I asked her and if you'll move 
away and stuff she tells me ‘the transition itself makes me...’ so it's something that is 
not even discussed when you know where it comes from. So no, they don't they enjoy 
it' they enjoy it very much that I'm here in London, they come to visit, much more than 
they came in Vancouver. No doubt. [II think that we'll stop here, but before we stop is 
there anything you'd like to add or ask?] ahha... I'd like to read your research when It's 
done [you know it can be that thick!] and ahh when we were in Vancouver, there was 
another girl who did a research I think it's different from the one you are conducting 
the way you have defined it, did you hear of it? Someone in the USA who did her work 
on Israelis [you mean ‘Temporaries and Permanents’?] exactly, yes. [Did you read it?] 
sure, sure, very interesting, it's basically about the reasons and excuses, I don't say 
excuses, but the reasons people give {for their stay abroad} and sees the difficulty... 
how difficult it is sometimes to accept the move they've made, sometimes. It was very 
interesting… [Thank you very much]                         
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Appendix six – Pen portraits  
Here are short descriptions of the participants in the study that present some 
biographical details (also presented in table one on page 117), the main 
themes that were raised in the interview and a reference to the interview 
dynamics. All participants have been given pseudonyms based upon their 
Hebrew initials as they appear on the English keyboard. A Hebrew-sounding 
name was then chosen based on these English initials.  
Ariella is an Israeli born woman in her late thirties who, at the time of the 
interview, had been living in London for eleven years with her two children and 
Israeli husband whom she met in London. Her family lives in Israel. She has 
British and Israeli nationality. The interview was held in my clinic. It was 
conducted a few weeks prior to their return to Israel. This fact impacted the 
course, content and dynamics of the interview as Ariella claimed at the start of 
her interview that her ‘head is already there’. Ariella talked a lot about the 
sense of social alienation that she felt in Britain, which she attributed to the 
style of life imposed on her being an unemployed foreign mother. Ariella has 
two academic degrees, one of which she acquired in Britain. She described 
loneliness and lack of support and disclosed her fear that if they stayed in 
Britain, a cultural gap would emerge between her and the children. Ariella was 
the only participant that addressed herself as an ‘immigrant’; she used this 
term to justify and explain her decision to return to Israel. In an especially 
moving part of the interview, she described the causes that led her to come to 
Britain in the first place – the fear for her life during the suicide bombings at the 
end of the nineties and especially one incident when she thought her brother 
was killed. She didn’t disclose any such fears thinking ahead about returning to 
Israel. She argued that a sense of belonging cannot be acquired but rather 
almost inherited form the parents. She sees this as explaining the inability and 
futility of her efforts to integrate into British society, explaining why she can 
only belong in Israel and justifying her decision to return. Her interview also 
describes a hierarchical Israeli society from the view point of a member of the 
old Ashkenazi elite (she describes herself as ‘the salt of the earth’), which 
excludes new-comers or immigrants like her sister-in-law. Describing the time 
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she spent in Britain as ‘a journey’ served her as a discursive strategy to justify 
the decision to return to Israel where she ‘belonged’.  
Na’ama is an Israeli-born 38 year-old woman who has been living in London 
with her Israeli husband and two daughters for the past 10 years. Her parents 
and siblings live in Israel. She has British nationality. She works part-time in a 
society organized by the local Israeli community. She has an academic degree 
that she acquired in Israel. Na’ama stepped forward and volunteered to be 
interviewed on ‘Israeli identity’, but claimed that she didn’t really know what to 
say about it. The interview was conducted in my clinic. Throughout the 
interview Na’ama focused on the condition of temporariness in Britain and the 
need to come to a decision about whether to settle indefinitely in Britain or 
return to Israel, a decision that she delays. She therefore described her 
condition as ‘life on hold’ or ‘not the real life’ and tried to negotiate this 
condition of temporariness with the overall sense of ‘comfort’ of living in Britain 
as opposed to the life in Israel which was too stressful for her. Na’ama opened 
her self-description with an elaboration of her vocational status as a mother 
who didn’t pursue her career. She declared that she thought her husband 
didn’t want to return to Israel and that her daughters felt comfortable in Britain 
having been born here and therefore the decision whether to return or not lies 
with her. Na’ama, whose friends are mostly Israeli, described in depth the 
disconnection with the local Jewish community.  
Noga is an Israeli born woman in her early thirties; she is married to an Israeli 
man and has two young daughters. They have been living in London for the 
last 3 years; they previously lived in Canada. Her parents and brother live in 
Israel. Noga appears to be a confident woman who asserted her arguments in 
a persuasive way. The interview was conducted in her home. She was 
exceptional among the participants of this study in that she is fully employed in 
a high-tech firm and is the main breadwinner in her household; most other 
women participants were either not working or were only partly working. This 
condition of working mother and successful career woman was central to her 
discussion of her relationships with her Israeli milieu in London – e.g. the 
nurseries or the social circle - and was pivotal in the dilemmas around how to 
promote an Israeli identity for her children. Noga described the dilemma of 
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whether to return to Israel or to remain longer in Britain through the 
relationships with friends and family in Israel and the ambivalent and confusing 
direct and indirect messages trying to persuade them to return while at the 
same time urging them to get a passport ‘so that you’ll have a place to run 
away to’. Her text disclosed some of the popular preconceptions about what is 
‘Israeliness’ – being ‘the centre of the world’, is coupled with a sense that ‘the 
world always splits into those who love us and those who don’t’. At the same 
time, it also described the confusing effects of such strong mythical convictions 
as they often clash with daily reality and material considerations. Noga 
described this duplicity as a main feature of Israeliness: ‘everyone would like to 
live abroad but also to live in Ha’aretz’.    
Michael is an American-born man in his late forties who is not working. He 
has been living in Britain for the last 10 years. The interview was carried out in 
his home. He is married to a local British-Jewish woman and has two children. 
Prior to coming to Britain he has lived in Israel for 13 years since emigrating 
there in 1987. In Israel, Michael had a seemingly successful immigration 
process: he married a local Israeli woman, had three children and established 
a business. However, after his wife filed for divorce, he left Israel and settled in 
Britain where he met his current wife. He frequently travels between Israel and 
Britain to see his three children there. Michael mainly talked about his 
memories from Israel and seemed to try and convince me of his acquaintance 
with the Israeli culture and daily routine so as to argue for his membership as 
an Israeli. Michael came across as a man who is not settled wherever he is 
and constantly struggles to be part of a group while also retaining his 
individuality and separateness. Michael doesn’t have any contacts with the 
Israeli community here in London but reads its local Hebrew monthly magazine 
(where he found my advert for the research). He is not involved with the local 
the Jewish community or with current British affairs and feels alienated from 
the local British environment. He described in detail how his insertion into 
Israeli society was made through the encounter and friendship with a 
Palestinian man and expressed sympathy for the individual Palestinian who 
suffers the Israeli occupation; at the same time he entertains an image of 
Muslims as hostile. 
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Roni is a 30 year-old Israeli-born man, married to Noga (interviewee number 
three), and has two young daughters. He works in a local bank. His family lives 
in Israel. He and his wife, Noga, only have Israeli citizenship. The interview 
was conducted in his home. Roni argued that he maintains the same lifestyle 
that he had in Israel, keeps the same taste in music and food he had in Israel 
and closely follows Israeli politics. He asserted that he intends to return to 
Israel at some point. He also declared that he did not integrate socially or 
culturally in the local British environment, doesn’t follow the local news or 
television and refrains from speaking English with his older daughter who is 
placed in a local nursery. He argued that since he doesn’t intend to settle in 
Britain, he doesn’t make any effort to accommodate his lifestyle to the local 
British culture. Accordingly, many of the views he expressed and the way 
certain groups were presented – local Jews, Britons or ‘Arabs’ - were 
characteristic of mainstream Israeli discourse of nationality and appeared not 
to have been effected by the years he has spent abroad. At the same time, 
Roni seemed troubled by the local Israeli community, which he regards as a 
‘ghetto’ that preserves and recycles the same lifestyle and viewpoint that 
prevail in Israel. Throughout our encounter, I wondered what made him want to 
be interviewed given his unequivocal certainty about returning to Israel and his 
‘Israeli’ lifestyle. Only towards the end of the interview did he articulate the 
problem that troubled him: ‘Why would you cross half the world in order to live 
in a ghetto, the same as the one you had before?’ I understood it as a concern 
that he too might find himself, despite his intensions, living abroad in such a 
‘ghetto’ – the same as the one he had in Israel - and would thus lose both 
agency as well as the ability to experience new viewpoints.     
Aaron is a thirty nine-year old, Israeli-born man, married to an American 
Jewish woman. Together they have two boys. He has been living in London for 
ten years and works as a local director of an Israeli high-tech and consultancy 
firm. His parents and brother live in Israel. He has British nationality. The 
interview was held in his home. Aaron appears to be settled in London and 
although he raises the question of whether to go and live in Israel for a while, 
his financial and family circumstances make it a hypothetical rather than 
concrete option. Both his children go to a local Jewish primary school but none 
speak Hebrew and neither does his wife. From his settled position, Aaron 
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provided an alternative and exceptional interpretation of Israeli nationality, 
emphasizing its civil rather than ethnic dimensions. He argued for example that 
Israeliness is made of various aspects – culture, mode of thinking, using 
Hebrew and also being born there or living there but that all these are not 
necessary conditions. In his speech he refrained from using ‘Ha’aretz’ when 
referring to Israel and did not apply many of the signifiers that were often used 
by other participants that distinguished between ‘real life’ in Israel and the 
anecdotal experiential and temporary life abroad. Being more comfortable in 
his intermediate position abroad, Aaron presented a less engaged and 
therefore more distanced view point around the question of belonging in Israeli 
and British society.  
Dorit is a 34 year-old woman who, at the time of the interview, had lived in 
Britain for over two years. She had married a year before and has no children. 
Her family lives in Israel. She only has Israeli citizenship. The interview was 
conducted in her rented home in one of the popular areas for Jews and Israelis 
in London. Dorit said she arrived in London with a friend, looking for an 
adventure and ‘love’ since she wasn’t satisfied with her romantic relationships 
in Israel. Romantic gender relations were indeed an important part of the 
interview. In Israel she worked as a sales executive and when she arrived to 
London she worked for a bit in temporary stalls at various shopping malls 
before being employed for a while in a formal Israeli institution. Currently she is 
unemployed. Dorit described a lively social life among local Israelis and Jews 
and provided her view on the relationships between the two groups and their 
differences. She applied some traditional Zionist concepts around the wish of 
Jews to make Aliya (immigrate to Israel) and the desirability of Israeli men and 
women in the eyes of local Jews. In contrast to most other participants, Dorit 
comes from a Mizrahi background. Like many other Mizrahi Jews she is more 
closely affiliated with religion, tradition and the synagogue, eats only Kosher 
food and organizes events at her house that follow religious practices. She 
declares that she wants to return to Israel to raise her children there, but would 
like to use the financial opportunities that London offers for young couples to 
gain a head start. Dorit described herself as living in a Jewish/Israeli hub, living 
in ‘little Israel’, following closely the politics and daily life in Israel and being 
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mostly unaware of current events in British society. She says that this is partly 
due to her insufficient knowledge of English.         
Nira is a 37 year-old single woman who was born in Israel where her mother 
and brother live. She has been living in London for the last twelve years and 
has British nationality. She saw the research advert in the local Hebrew 
newspaper and wrote with the thought that it was a paid job. When I corrected 
her mistake she was willing to go ahead with the interview although she 
claimed that she might not be the person I was looking for because she 
doesn’t have many connections with the Israeli community or live in those 
areas where Israelis normally live. The interview was held in her apartment. 
She said that during her pregnancy her mother lost her husband, during the 
1973 war, and so Nira grew up without a father. She grew up in Israel but felt 
disconnected from her Israeli surrounding. When she was 23 and following her 
art studies in Israel she came to London, fell in love with a local man and 
married. She later divorced and went back to Israel with the intention of settling 
there but didn’t fit in and returned once more to London. She is currently out of 
work. At the beginning of her interview she described herself as only 
technically Israeli and claimed she didn’t have any longing or nostalgia for the 
life there. She described herself as someone who doesn’t fit in and rejects any 
attempts to be classified within any social category. A major part of her 
interview focused on the sense of estrangement in Israeli society that she 
mostly associated with the way Israeli society and individuals relate to ‘IDF 
orphans’. By contrast she praised the British lifestyle and claimed that it suits 
her better.  
Liat is a 34 year-old single woman who was born in Israel but currently has 
also British nationality. When she was twenty, after completing the military 
service in Israel, she came to study in Britain and eventually stayed. She 
completed her PhD and is now looking for a post-doctorate position. The 
interview was conducted at her home. She has a daughter with a local Jewish 
man from whom she is now separated. In her self-presentation she said that 
her parents were born in Russia and wanted to immigrate to Israel. However, 
after leaving Russia they first lived in South America where her grandparents 
stayed and later joined them in Israel. When she was ten years old her much 
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loved grandparents returned to South America, which was a major blow for 
her. A few years later her mother, who was now separated from her father, 
went with Liat and her sister to join the grandparents in South America, leaving 
the father behind. Finally, a few years later the whole family returned to Israel 
and settled there permanently.  Liat is now the only member within the close 
family cell to be living away from Israel. Liat, who appeared at first to be well-
established in Israeli society and culture surprised me when she declared that 
she remembers that from a very young age she didn’t want to live in Israel. 
The interview then focused on her sense of alienation in Israeli society, her 
connections mainly with children who also travelled and lived elsewhere. It 
also highlighted the salience of the familiar network as a primary source of 
identity, which might contrast with the national Zionist ethos. At times, Liat 
seemed to almost intentionally present a personal narrative that would disturb 
the popular national preconceptions. She does not live in an area which is 
typically populated by Israelis and is not highly connected with the Israeli 
community. Despite her conflictive memories, Liat’s understanding of 
Israeliness follows that of many other participants in the study and focuses 
around the negation of Jewishness, and religion. She is concerned about her 
daughter’s Israeli identity, talks to her daughter in Hebrew and looks for a 
Hebrew school for her. She travels frequently to Israel.  
Yariv is a 37 year-old single man who was born in a Kibbutz in Israel. At the 
time of the interview he had been living in London for nine years; he has British 
nationality. The interview was conducted at my office. In his self-introduction at 
the beginning of the interview, Yariv described his life as a gay man in the 
Israeli Kibbutz, which he left after his military service. He worked for a while in 
central Israel and completed his academic studies before being relocated by 
his firm to London. He describes himself as a work addict who travels around 
the world as part of his post. He frequently visits Israel, but doesn’t intend to 
return and currently would like to buy a property in London. In his interview, 
Yariv voices some exceptionally exclusionary remarks concerning Arabs, 
Orientals, Mizrahi Jews, Israelis in general or local Jews, which at times were 
highly racist (‘Israelis are very-very mixed…it’s not black nor white but it’s 
certainly not white’). He struck me as highly provocative, trying to single 
himself out from the usual social categories and cast himself as ‘unique’.  In its 
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crude way, Yariv’s text accentuates some of the prevalent schisms in Israeli 
society between the European/Ashkenazi and the Mizrahi Jews, the religious 
and secular Jews and the othering of the Arab/Palestinian Israelis. It sums up 
the arguments of the classical Ashkenazi elite (and its Zionist ethos – around 
Europeanism in the Middle East) whose political, cultural and social hegemony 
in Israeli society has been eroded over the past three decades. It also 
described Israeli society through the prism of a gay man and the hardship of 
growing up in a militarized masculine Israeli society and especially that of the 
Kibbutz.    
David is a 43 year-old man who at the time of the interview had been living in 
Britain for seven years with his wife and daughter. They only have Israeli 
nationality. The interview was conducted in my clinic. David completed his PhD 
degree in a British university and is currently employed as a post-doc 
researcher. Before coming to the UK, David worked in Israel, then moved to 
US for his MA degree and then came to Britain. David declared that he fits in 
better with the British lifestyle and would like to settle in Britain, but that visa 
and work issues might eventually cause him to return to Israel. Despite his 
declared comfort in Britain, David described his close acquaintance with, 
attachment to and interest in Israeli cultural and political actualities and the 
daily means through which he follows events there. He also described a strong 
emotion attachment to Israel and an effort to uproot himself from such 
engagement (to make himself feel more foreign in Israel). In his speech, I 
demonstrated this strong ambivalence and the constant pull towards and push 
away from Israel through the interchanging usage of signifiers such as 
‘Ha’aretz’ and ‘Israel’. He also described the strong social pressures to return 
to Israel that he is subjected to by Israelis and critically outlined some the basic 
preconceptions about Israeli nationality: the hostility of the world towards Israel 
(e.g. through anti-Semitism), the centrality of Israel in international politics and 
the temporariness (or ‘experience’) of life away from Israel as opposed to the 
‘real life’ in Israel. To an extent I felt that David describes well many of the 
issues I am engaged in as part of my own dislocation.      
Udit is a 63 year-old woman who has been living in Britain since 1971. She is 
married to a British Jew and they have two sons. At home they all speak 
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English. She works with her husband and they own their own shop. The 
interview was held at her house in one of the neighbourhoods inhabited by 
many Jews. She still socializes with Israelis and mostly speaks with them in 
Hebrew. At the same time she is also engaged with the local Jewish 
community. Udit came with her family to Israel at the beginning of the sixties 
from North Africa alongside many other Jews. They lived in an area in central 
Israel where many North African Jews lived. At home they spoke French. She 
lived in Israel throughout her adolescence and left for London to study English 
when she was twenty. She describes her years in Israel as exceptionally 
liberating and enjoyable and as a period where she found her freedom as a 
woman and was able to stand up to traditionalist pressures that prevailed in 
the Jewish society in North Africa and was prioritizing men over women. 
Between the lines she also hinted to some difficulties in her adaptation to 
Israeli society, its educational system, social exclusion and language barriers 
but overall appeared to cultivate a positive image of Israelis and of Israel as 
‘the best period of my life’. The interview also portrayed the outlook of Israeli 
society and its values seen through the eyes of a North-African Ola (Jewish 
immigrant) in an encounter with a ‘local’ Israeli-born Ashkenazi researcher. At 
the same time, the interview, which took place away from Israel, portrayed the 
politics between the ‘local’ already established Jew and the Israeli new-comer 
in what appears like a historical reversal.   
 
